Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - CLARO JAMPAS Y LUAñA, Appellant.
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G.R. No. 177766 Present: QUISUMBING, Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: July
17, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the August 10, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the April 13, 2004 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran (Branch 16) finding him guilty of
rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, Claro Jampas y Luaña (appellant) lodged the present
appeal.
In a complaint[1] dated
That sometime in the mid month of 1999 at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning[,] the above named accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with me against my will and continued to have carnal knowledge with me several times in 1999 and the year 2000. (Underscoring supplied)
After preliminary investigation,[3] appellant
was charged in an Information dated
That sometime during the mid-year of 1999, at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, more or less, [AAA], a 10-year old grade III pupil and a resident of Bgy. Villa-consuelo, Naval, Biliran Province, was called by herein accused, her uncle being the husband of her aunt, and when she went near him, he carried her to the upper part of his house called in dialect ‘lawting’, and once thereat, with lewd designs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, accused removed [AAA]’s short pants and panty and afterwhich, accused removed his long maong pants and brief, placed on top of her and kissed her, pointed a knife to her and warned her not to tell anyone for he would kill her should she do and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances that accused is her uncle and that offended party is under twelve years of age.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The prosecution, via the testimony of
two witnesses, that of AAA who was only eight years old when the alleged
rape occurred,[5] she having
been born on November 29, 1991,[6]
and that of Dr. Josephine Dayoha (Dr. Dayoha) who examined her, proffered the
following version:
During the middle part of 1999, at 11:00
o’clock in the morning, as AAA was playing “sayasaya”
with two girl friends near the adjacent house of appellant and DDD, appellant’s
common-law spouse and AAA’s aunt, appellant
summoned AAA. Obliging, AAA approached
appellant who was then in his house and who then closed the door and carried her
to the “lawting” (mezzanine) of the
house.[7] There, once inside, appellant took off AAA’s short
pants and panties, undressed himself, and placed himself on top of AAA[8]
and inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA who felt pain as a result thereof.[9] Appellant threatened AAA that he would kill
her if she would tell what transpired between them.[10]
AAA, then a Grade 1 pupil, went to
school in the afternoon without her telling anyone about the incident. The following day, she mustered the courage
to tell her mother BBB about it. BBB
relayed it to her Ate CCC, who in
turn relayed it to AAA’s grandmother EEE.
EEE disbelieved the tale, however.
It took a relative, Tita FFF, to
report the incident to the barangay captain who in turn informed the police of
the crime.[11] When the report was made to the
police, the records do not show. As
reflected above, AAA’s complaint is dated
Dr. Dayoha of the
Appellant, denying the accusation and
proffering alibi, claimed that he went to
To buttress his alibi, appellant presented
Virgie Comayas who testified that her live-in partner Mario Sañosa and her
sister accompanied appellant when he left for
Further, appellant claimed that AAA
was impelled by vengeance in filing the criminal complaint because he was
rumored to have impregnated her mother BBB.[18]
By Judgment of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Claro Jampas Y Luaña GUILTY in Criminal Case No. N-2164 hereby imposing upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
The
accused shall pay [AAA] the amount of P75,000.00 in moral damages and to
further pay P50,000.00 in civil indemnity for the rape committed.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Appellant
appealed before this Court which, pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo,[20] referred
the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition.[21]
By Decision[22]
of
Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari,[23] appellant
insisting that there was grave error in
I
…CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
…NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
… NOT CONSIDERING [THE] INFORMATION CHARGING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE THE PRECISE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED RAPE.[24]
Appellant takes issue on the sufficiency
of the Information as to the approximate date of the commission of the offense
which, he posits, is fatally defective to thus jeopardize his right to be
informed of the nature of the offense charged.[25]
Appellant questions the sufficiency
of the Information only now when he had all the opportunity to raise it before
his arraignment during which he could have conveniently filed a bill of
particulars[26] to apprise
himself of the exact date of the alleged rape, or he could have moved to quash
the Information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form.[27] By such lapses, appellant is deemed to have
waived any objection to the sufficiency of the Information.
At any rate, in a prosecution for
rape, the material fact to be considered is the occurrence of carnal knowledge,
not the time of its commission.[28] It is enough that the Information indicates a
date which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the accused.[29] It is not essential that the date be alleged
in the Information with ultimate precision.[30]
Appellant goes on to question the
trial and appellate courts failure to take note of the “considerable delay” in
filing the complaint, given that there is no showing that AAA was under a
continuing threat to her life,[31]
which delay “affects the credibility” of AAA, citing People v. Miñano.[32]
The Court finds that with respect to
the unexplained delay in reporting the alleged incident to the police
authorities, the present petition is impressed with merit. It bears noting that AAA claimed to have reported
the rape to her mother the day after it happened, the threat to her life
notwithstanding. Oddly, however, it
took more than two years before such alleged rape was reported to the police
and the victim examined by a physician.
The prosecution offered no reasonable or justifiable explanation for the
delay nor presented AAA’s relative Tita
FFF or the barangay captain who reported the matter to the police to shed light
on this crucial matter. AAA’s following testimony
quoted verbatim, on
this score, is most revealing:
A: He threatened me not to tell somebody because if I will tell somebody he will kill me.
Q: But despite what he said to you, did you tell somebody what happened to you?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Whom did you confine?
A: At the following day, I tell my mother.
x x x x
Q: What did your mother do?
A: My mother told this matter to Ate [CCC].
Q: What did your Ate [CCC] do?
A: Ate [CCC] revealed this to my grandmother and my grandmother did not mind.
x x x x
Q: When your grandmother did not believe, what
did you Ate [CCC] do?
A: We just leave and forget it.
Q: How did this incident reached . . . the
Police?
A: Tita [FFF] revealed it.
Q: To whom?
A: . . . the Brgy. Captain.
Q: What did the Brgy. Captain do?
A: The Brgy. Captain reported the incident to the Police.[33] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From
the above-quoted testimony of AAA, it is gathered that when AAA’s grandmother
refused to believe her claim of rape, there was a lull in the chain of events before
it was finally reported to the police. Nothing
in the records, however, sufficiently explains why there was indeed such “considerable
delay.” Appellant’s contention then to
the effect that absent any proof that AAA was under a continuing threat to
her life, the delay affects AAA’s credibility assumes importance.
For
more than two years or from mid-1999 to September 27, 2001 when she filed the
complaint, the Court does not appreciate any continuing threat against her life
as in fact, it does not appear that the threat was reiterated.
Even
considering then the inherent weakness of the defense of alibi as to preclude
the possibility of the occurrence of the incident prior to appellant’s date of
departure, appellant’s testimony to the effect that he was in Manila from June
20, 1999 and returned only in February 2000[34] indicates
that every opportunity was available for AAA and her family to bring the matter
to the attention of the authorities. It
is not thus farfetched to consider the delay an indication that the complaint
was made in a desire other than to bring the culprit to justice.
In
reviewing rape cases, this Court observes the following guiding principles: (1)
an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.[35]
The
lone uncorroborated testimony of a complainant in a rape case suffices to
warrant a conviction, provided that it is credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Such testimony should not be received with
precipitate credulity, however, but with the utmost caution.
The test for determining the
credibility of a complainant's testimony is whether it is in conformity with
common knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. Whatever is repugnant to these standards
becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.[36]
That this Court should refrain from
disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimony does not apply where the trial court might have overlooked
certain facts of substance or value which, if considered, would affect the
outcome of the case.[37]
After
opening the entire criminal case for review[38]
and subjecting AAA’s testimony to judicial scrutiny, the Court finds her
narrative tainted with ambiguity and deficiency on vital points. Consider her narration of the supposedly
harrowing incident:
Q: What did you do when he called you up?
A: I approach him.
Q: After that what did he do to you?
A: He closed the door.
Q: Whose door of the house?
A: Claro Jampas.
Q: When he closed the door, what did he do to you next?
A: He carried me and he brought me to the mezzanine locally known as “lawting”
Q: When you reached lawting, what did he do next to you, if any?
A: He took off my black short pant and white panty.
Q: How about him, what did he do?
A: He undressed himself.
Q: After that, what did he do to you?
A: He raped me.
Q: How did he rape you?
A: He put himself on top of me.
Q: And then what happened?
A: And then he successfully raped me.
Q: How did you feel when he successfully raped you?
A: I felt pain.[39] (Italics and underscoring supplied)
The
stark outline of AAA’s testimony is so simplistic that it leaves much to be
desired and leaves unmentioned those expectedly required. In view of the inevitability of a judicial
scrutiny, it is a given that evidentiary matters of a descriptive or
illustrative nature be supplied during trial to detail the recital of elemental
facts in the Information.
How
AAA was “successfully raped” by appellant, the prosecution did not bother to
elicit from her. It took the trial
court’s clarificatory questioning to obtain the pithy statement that “he tried
to insert his penis to my vagina and [a]fterwards he successfully inserted his
penis”[40]
without her describing any thrusting motion.
And the Court observes that in the four corners of AAA’s testimony, no kissing
was disclosed to have happened and no knife was mentioned at all, contrary to what
appears in the Information. Her
testimony on these key aspects contains gaps that allow the crevices of
reasonable doubt to creep in.
While
rape victims are not required or expected to remember all the details of their
harrowing experience, and minor inconsistencies are considered badges of truth,
the inconsistencies drawn from AAA’s declarations on examination vis-à-vis the
Information cannot be considered as mere minor not affecting her credibility of
testimony.[41]
With
respect to the rigor and indignities of an open trial that a private
complainant chooses to endure by pursuing a rape case, the Court has viewed
such sensitive predicament in this perspective:
This is too simplistic a view to adopt regarding a crime that could cost the accused his liberty for the rest of his life. To warrant a conviction, it is necessary that the complainant's story, standing alone independently of the presumption, be believable. Otherwise, if such presumption alone is sufficient to convict the accused, every accusation of rape would result in the conviction of the accused, contrary to the fundamental right of the accused in every criminal prosecution to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
The presumption that a woman would not make an accusation of rape had it not been the truth finds justification in the natural reticence of a woman to expose herself to a trial which would further degrade her and make her relive an experience that she would in fact want to forget. Against such a presumption, however, must be weighed the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. In People v. Godoy, it was held:
The presumption of innocence. . . is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so.[42]
More. AAA testified that after the agonizing experience
past 11:00 o’clock in the morning, she still went to school in the afternoon.[43] To the Court, this episode of the story is remarkable. In a case where a 7-year old girl was
ravished and yet was still thereafter able to continue selling junkfood, the
Court stated:
The conduct of the victim immediately following an alleged sexual assault should prove to be material. Whether her personal behavior would tend to establish the truth or the falsity of the accusation would depend in large measure on whether that conduct, in turn, is expected to be, or would instead be contrary to, the natural reaction of an outraged woman robbed of her honor. In this instance, the Court sees a situation where, after the alleged incident of rape, complainant has gone about her usual chore of peddling her goods. x x x[44] (Underscoring supplied)
In
another vein, there is grain of doubt as to whether there was indeed an attic
or mezzanine locally known as lawting that was described by AAA to be eight
meters high,[45] where
appellant’s house was depicted to be a mere bungalow.[46]
With
respect to the medical finding of healed incomplete
hymenal laceration which, the physician opined, could have been caused by a
sharp object or a male sex organ, the Court resolves such possibilities in
favor of the innocence of appellant as his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Considering the medical
results, AAA could either have been actually raped several months prior to the
examination by appellant or by someone else, or she had not been raped at all.
Where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.[47]
Before an accused is convicted, there
should be moral certainty - a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason
and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
Absolute guarantee of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a
person of a criminal charge but there must, at least, be moral certainty on
each element essential to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of
the offender. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt is meant to be that, all things given, the mind of the judge can rest at
ease concerning its verdict.[48]
Undoubtedly, rape is a vicious crime,
and it is rendered more loathsome in a case where the victim is a minor and the
accused is a person whom she perceives as a figure of authority. However, sympathy for the victim and disgust
at the bestial criminal act cannot prevail over the court’s primordial role as
interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice.
It is thus the primordial duty of the
prosecution to present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. If the prosecution fails to discharge its
burden, the court must sustain the presumption of innocence of the accused,
whose exoneration must then be granted as a matter of right.[49]
It is better to liberate a guilty man
than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proven by the
required quantum of evidence.[50]
WHEREFORE, appellant CLARO JAMPAS y LUANA is ACQUITTED of the crime of rape for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED unless he
is being detained for some other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, who is ORDERED to cause the immediate
release of appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and
to inform this Court of action taken within 10 days from notice.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 658.
** Additional member per Special Order No. 635.
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] The real name of the victim is withheld
per Republic Act Nos. 7610 and
9262, and People v. Cabalquinto, G.R.
No. 167693,
[3] The preliminary investigation was carried
out under the old rules prior to amendment introduced by A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC of
[4] Id. at 12.
[5] Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN),
[6] Records, p. 37, Exhibit “B-2.”
[7] TSN,
[8]
[9]
[10] Id, at 6.
[11]
[12] Records, p. 2.
[13] TSN,
[14]
[15] TSN,
[16] Ibid.
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN, January 14, 2004, p. 6.
[19] Records, p. 77.
[20] G.R. No. 147678-87,
[21] Per Resolution dated
[22] Rollo, pp. 4-16; penned by Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and concurred by Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Agustin S. Dizon.
[23] In this petition, both parties dispensed with the submission of supplemental briefs and instead adopted their respective Briefs filed with the appellate court.
[24] CA rollo, p. 54.
[25]
[26] Rules of Court, Rule 116, Sec. 9 reads: The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
[27] Rules of Court, Rule 117, Secs. 1 and 3(e); vide People v. Ibañez, G.R. No. 174656, May 11, 2007, 523 SCRA 136, 143.
[28] People v. Losano, 369 Phil. 966, 978 (1999).
[29] People v. Bugayong, 359 Phil. 870, 879 (1998).
[30] People v. Ibañez, supra note 27 at 142.
[31] CA rollo, p. 60.
[32] G.R. No. 97609,
[33] TSN,
[34] TSN,
[35] People v. Lumibao, 465 Phil. 771, 780 (2004).
[36] People v. De la Cruz, 408 Phil. 838, 848 (2001).
[37] People v. Ladrillo, 377 Phil. 904, 917 (1999).
[38] People v.
[39] TSN,
[40] Id. at 17.
[41] Vide People v. Perez,
G.R. No. 172875,
[42] People v. De la Cruz, supra note 36 at 851.
[43] TSN,
[44] People v. Dela Cruz, 388 Phil. 678, 687 (2000).
[45] TSN,
[46] TSN,
[47] People v. De la Cruz, supra note 36 at 853-854.
[48] People v. Lumibao, supra note 35 at 781.
[49] Vide People v. Ramirez,
Jr., G.R. Nos. 150079-80,
[50] People v. Perez, supra note 41 at 393.