THIRD
DIVISION
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SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, - versus
- SPOUSES ALICIA AND LEODEGARIO MOGOL,
JR., Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 177007 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: July 14, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Challenged
in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision[2]
dated
Petitioner
Sansio Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation that is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling appliances and other related products.
On
Petitioner stated in the Complaint
that respondent spouses Alicia and Leodegario Mogol, Jr. were the owners and
managers of MR Homes Appliances, with residence at P217,250.00
and P5,521.20, respectively. Respondent
spouses Mogol apparently issued postdated checks as payment therefor, but said
checks were dishonored, as the account against which the checks were drawn was
closed. Respondent spouses Mogol made
partial payments, leaving a balance of P87,953.12 unpaid. Despite several demands by petitioner,
respondent spouses Mogol failed to settle their obligation. Thus, petitioner prayed that respondent
spouses Mogol be ordered to pay the former, jointly and severally, the amount
of P87,953.12, with legal interest; as well as attorney’s fees in the
sum of twenty-five (25%) percent of the amount collectible, plus P2,000.00
for every appearance in court; and costs of suit.
On
On
RETURN ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS
This
is to certify that on October 3, 2000, the
undersigned tried to serve a copy of the Summons issued by the Court in the
above-entitled case together with a copy of Complaint upon defendant Leodegario
Mogol[,] Jr. and Alicia Mogol doing business under the name/style of “Mr.
Homes Appliance” (sic) at MTC (sic)
Branch 24 Ongpin (sic) (courtroom) as requested by plaintiff counsel, but
failed for the reason that they refused to received (sic) with no valid reason
at all.
The
original and duplicate copies of the Summons are hereby respectfully returned,
(sic) UNSERVED.
(signed)
ALFONSO
S. VALINO
Process
Server (Emphases ours.)
Motion to Declare in Default
On
On
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Motion to
Declare [Respondents] in Default dated
The MeTC of
Respondent spouses Mogol
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14]
on the above Order, but the same was denied by the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25,
in an Order[15]
dated
On 17 July 2001, respondent spouses
Mogol filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or
Injunction[16] before
the RTC of Manila against Judge Severino B. de Castro, Jr. of the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 25 and herein petitioner.
Said petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-101267 and raffled to Branch 33 thereof.
Respondent spouses Mogol
insisted there was no valid service of summons per return of the process
server, which was binding on the MeTC judge, who did not acquire jurisdiction
over the persons of respondent spouses.
They contended that the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25, acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring
them in default in Civil Case No. 167879CV, thereby depriving them of their
right to be heard with due process of law, despite their having a good defense
against petitioner’s complaint. Respondent
spouses Mogol prayed that the Orders dated
On
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing observations and
findings, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[17]
The RTC of Manila, Branch 33, held
that Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not mandate that summons be
served strictly at the address provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Contrarily, said provision states that the
service of summons may be made wherever such is possible and practicable. Therefore, it did not matter much that the
summons and the copy of the complaint in this case were served inside the
courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, instead of the address at
Respondent spouses Mogol
filed a Notice of Appeal[18]
on the above-mentioned Order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, which was given
due course. The appeal was docketed in
the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 70029.
On
We
find the appeal meritorious.
After
a careful perusal of the records, We hold that there was no valid service of
summons upon the [respondent] Mogol spouses in Civil Case No. 167879. Perforce, the MeTC [Branch 25] never acquired
jurisdiction over them. We explain.
x x x
x
In
this case, it is indubitable that the [respondent] Mogol spouses, as defendants
in Civil Case No. 167879, never received the summons against them, whether
personally or by substituted service. As stated earlier, the process server
failed to effect personal service of summons against the [respondent] Mogol
spouses at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, because the latter
refused to receive it, arguing that the same should be served at their
residence, and not anywhere else.
Concomitant to the trial court’s duty to bring the
defendant within its jurisdiction by the proper service of summons is its duty
to apprise the plaintiff, as in the case of [petitioner] Sansio, whether or not
the said summons was actually served upon the defendant. The proof of service of summons (or the lack
of it) alluded to by the rules is found in Sec. 4, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
SECTION
4. Return. – When the service has been
completed, the server shall, within five (5) days therefrom, serve a copy of
the return, personally or by registered mail, to the plaintiff’s counsel, and
shall return the summons to the clerk who issued it, accompanied by proof of
service.
In this
case, the process server’s Return of
Service of Summons states, in clear and unequivocal terms, that:
The original and duplicate copies of the Summons are
hereby returned, UNSERVED.
In the case of Spouses
Madrigal v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 129955,
In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that the refusal
of a defendant to receive the summons is a technicality resorted to in an
apparent attempt to frustrate the ends of justice. It is precisely for this reason that the
rules provide a remedy that, in case the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, [the same is served] by tendering
it to him. Moreover, even if tender
of summons upon the defendant proves futile, the trial court may further resort
to substituted service of summons, as provided under Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Stated
otherwise, the trial court is not left with any other remedy in case the
defendant refuses to receive and sign for his receipt of the summons, as in
this case. Unfortunately, however, after
the incident at the courtroom of the MeTC of
x x x x
All told, it is clearly established that there was
indeed no valid service of summons upon the Mogol spouses in Civil Case No.
167879. Consequently, the MeTC of
Thus, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order dated January 18, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 33, in SP Civil Case No.
01-101267 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order dated
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[21] thereon,
but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed Resolution[22]
dated
Complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages
In the interregnum, on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner] and against
the [respondent spouses Mogol], ordering the latter to pay the former
jointly and severally the sum of P87,953.12 with interest thereon at the
legal rate from date of demand until the same is fully paid; the sum equivalent
to 25% of the amount due as and by way of attorney’s fees, and the cost of
suit.[23] (Emphasis ours.)
Respondent spouses Mogol appealed[24]
the above Decision to the RTC of Manila.
The appeal was docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-101963 and was raffled to Branch 50 of the trial court.
On
Respondent spouses Mogol sought a
reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision, but the RTC of Manila, Branch 50,
denied the same in an Order[26]
dated
On
1.
Whether or not
the service of summons in the courtroom, before the hearing, [was] a valid
service of summons;
2. Whether or not the clause “tendering it to him” when
the defendant refuses to receive and sign for the summons under Section 6, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court means “leaving a copy of the summons to her or in the
premises where the defendant could get it”;
3. Whether or not summons refused to be received by
[respondent spouses Mogol], upon advice of their counsel, need to be served
anew to them;
4. Whether or not the court is bound by the conclusions
of the Process Server in his Return of Service of Summons; and
5. Whether or not the appeal before the Court of Appeals
denying the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Injunction has become moot and academic when the [RTC of
Manila, Branch 50] rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the [MeTC of
Manila, Branch 25], and which Decision of the [RTC of Manila, Branch 50] has
become final and executory.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, petitioner argues that the service of summons inside the courtroom
of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, was already valid. Such was a more practicable and convenient
procedure, as opposed to requesting the process server to serve the summons and
the copy of the complaint upon the respondent spouses Mogol at their residence
in
We find merit in the petition.
A summons is a writ by which the
defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either
upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in
court. When the defendant does not
voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction, or when there is no valid
service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, is null and void.[27] Where the
action is in personam, i.e.,
one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of
the defendant through the judgment of a court,[28] and the defendant is in the Philippines, the
service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the
manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which
read:
SEC. 6. Service in person on
defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign
for it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service.
– If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
It is well-established
that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy
thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to
him. Personal service of summons most
effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional
requirement of due process is accomplished.[29] The essence of personal service is the
handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself,[30]
wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the
Philippines.[31]
In the instant case, the Court finds that there was
already a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol. To recapitulate, the process server presented
the summons and the copy of the complaint to respondent spouses at the
courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24.
The latter immediately referred the matter to their counsel, who was
present with them in the aforesaid courtroom.
At
the express direction of his clients, the counsel took the summons and the copy
of the complaint, read the same, and thereby informed himself of the contents
of the said documents. Ineluctably, at
that point, the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the
summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of
his clients, for the same was done with the latter’s behest and consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of
“handing” a copy of the summons to respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila, Branch
25. That being said, the subsequent act
of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of
the complaint to the process server was no longer material.
Furthermore, the instruction
of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain a copy of the summons and
the copy of the complaint, under the lame excuse that the same must be served
only in the address stated therein, was a gross mistake. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does
not require that the service of summons on the defendant in person must be
effected only at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear
that, whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant; or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to
him. Nothing more is required. As correctly held by the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, the service
of the copy of the summons and the complaint inside the courtroom of the MeTC
of Manila, Branch 24 was the most practicable act under the circumstances, and
the process server need not wait for respondent spouses Mogol to reach their
given address, i.e., at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City, before
he could serve on the latter the summons and the copy of the complaint. Due to the distance of the said address, service
therein would have been more costly and would have entailed a longer delay on
the part of the process server in effecting the service of the summons.
Much more important than
considerations of practicality, however, is the fact that respondent spouses
Mogol based their case on a wrong appreciation of the above-stated provisions
of the Rules of Court. Respondent
spouses Mogol principally argue that Section 6 of
Rule 14 cannot be singled out without construing the same with Section 7. They posit that, in a civil case, summons
must be served upon the defendants personally at the designated place alleged
in the complaint. If the defendants
refuse to receive and sign the summons, then the process server must tender the
same to them by leaving a copy at the residence of the defendants. If the summons cannot be served in person because
of the absence of the defendants at the address stated, then the same can be
served by (1) leaving copies of the summons at the defendants’ residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or (2) leaving the
copies at defendants’ office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
Said arguments must fail, for they have no leg to
stand on.
Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions do not provide for alternative
modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to on the mere basis
of convenience to the parties. Under our
procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is
generally preferred over substituted service.[32]
Substituted
service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method, since it seeks
to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit, even
though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the
law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.[33] For substituted service to be justified, the
following circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of
summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to
locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person
in charge of the party’s office or place of business.[34]
Relevantly, in Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas
(Bulacan), Inc.,[35]
very categorical was our statement that the service of summons to be done
personally does not mean that service is possible only at the defendant’s actual
residence. It is enough that the defendant
is handed a copy of the summons in person by anyone authorized by law. This is distinct from substituted service
under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. As already discussed above, there was already
a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol in the
courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, when their counsel, upon their
explicit instructions, received and read the same on their behalf. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, the fact that the summons was returned to the process server and respondent
spouses Mogul subsequently declined to sign for them did not mean that the
service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses was a failure, such
that a further effort was required to serve the summons anew. A tender of summons, much less, a substituted
service of summons, need no longer be resorted to in this case.
Indeed, a contrary ruling by this
Court would inevitably give every future defendant to a case the unwarranted
means to easily thwart the cardinal procedures for the service of summons at
the simple expedient of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to
the process server and refusing to sign for the same even after being already
informed of their contents. This the
Court will never allow.
As
to the reliance of the Court of Appeals on the second paragraph of the Return on
Service of Summons stating that the original and duplicate copies of the
Summons were returned “UNSERVED,” the Court finds the same utterly
misplaced. A simple reading of the first
paragraph of the Return on Service of Summons, which contains the circumstances
surrounding the service of the summons on the persons of the respondent spouses
Mogol, manifestly reveals that the summons and the copy of the complaint were
already validly served on the said respondents.
They merely refused to receive or obtain a copy of the same. The
certificate of service of the process server is prima facie evidence of
the facts as set out therein. This is
fortified by the presumption of the regularity of performance of official duty.
To overcome the presumption of
regularity of official functions in favor of such sheriff’s return, the
evidence against it must be clear and convincing. Sans the requisite quantum of
proof to the contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith and credit.[36] In the instant case, it is worthwhile to note that the
facts stated in the first paragraph of the Return on
Service of Summons were not at all disputed by the respondent spouses
Mogol.
Although
We find lamentable the apparently erroneous statement made by the process
server in the aforesaid second paragraph – an error that undoubtedly added to
the confusion of the parties to this case – the same was, nonetheless, a mere
conclusion of law, which does not bind the independent judgment of the courts. Indeed, it cannot be said that because of
such a statement, respondent spouses Mogol had the right to rely on said return
informing them that the summons had been unserved, thus justifying their
non-filing of any responsive pleading.
To reiterate, respondent spouses Mogol were validly served summons and a
copy of the complaint against them. At
their explicit instructions, their counsel read the same and thereby learned of
the nature of the claim against them. After
being made aware of the complaint filed against them, they chose not to obtain
a copy thereof and pretended that it did not exist. They, thus, took a gamble in not filing any
responsive pleading thereto. Suffice it
to say, they lost. The constitutional requirement of due process
exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the
notice desired. Once the service
provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of
justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied and due
process is served.[37]
In fine, we
rule that jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was
validly acquired by the MeTC, Branch 25 in this case. For their failure to file any responsive
pleading to the Complaint filed against them, in violation of the order of the
said court as stated in the summons, respondent spouses Mogol were correctly
declared in default.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-27.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-42.
[3] Rollo, pp. 45-46.
[4] Penned by Judge Romulo A. Lopez; rollo, pp. 109-112.
[5] Rollo, pp. 48-50.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Complaint. – The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.
[12] Penned by Presiding Judge Severino B. de Castro, Jr.; rollo, pp. 71-73.
[13] Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
[14] Rollo, pp. 75-78.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Penned by Presiding Judge William Simon P. Peralta; rollo, pp. 165-169.
[26] Rollo, p. 170.
[27] Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 130974,
[28] Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407,
[29] Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 433 Phil. 290, 300 (2002).
[30] Paluwagan Ng Bayan Savings Bank v. King, 254 Phil. 56, 58 (1989).
[31] See Cohen & Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526, 535 (1916), cited in Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court (2001 Ed.), p. 458.
[32] See Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, 12 December 2006, 510 SCRA 678, 683.
[33] Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 29.
[34] Robinson v. Miralles, supra note 32.
[35] 456 Phil. 414, 424 (2003).
[36] Guanzon
v. Arradaza, G.R. No. 155392,
[37] Montalban v. Maximo, 131 Phil. 154, 162
(1968), cited in Boticano v. Chu,
Jr., G.R. No. L-58036,