SECOND DIVISION
|
SPS. ARTEMIO and ESPERANZA ADUAN, Petitioners,
- versus - LEVI
CHONG, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 172796 Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO,* LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and BRION, JJ.
Promulgated: July 13, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via petition for review on certiorari,
spouses Artemio and Esperanza Aduan (petitioners) assail the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated March 27, 2006 and the Resolution[2]
dated May 22, 2006 reversing the Department of Justice (DOJ) Resolutions dated November
5, 2004[3]
and March 14, 2005[4] which
modified the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office Resolution[5] — finding probable cause to indict
petitioner Esperanza and her uncle Ernesto Sagum for falsification of public document — by ordering the discharge of petitioner Esperanza from the Information
filed in court.
It appears that on P850,000
postdated
When the loan was on maturity not
settled, despite demand, petitioners presented the check for payment but it was
dishonored due to Account Closed.
Petitioners thereupon instituted criminal
complaints against Nelia, as well as her husband, for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) and for Estafa before the City Prosecutors Office of
Manila.[7] In a
separate move, they filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
On the other hand, the Chongs filed a
complaint for forgery against petitioner Esperanza and her uncle Ernesto Sagum,
alleging that Esperanza induced said uncle to forge the signature of respondent
Levi Chong in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage.[8]
The City Prosecutor of Manila found
probable cause to hold respondent Levi Chong’s wife Nelia liable for violation
of B.P. 22 and for estafa. It also found
probable cause to hold Sagum and petitioner Esperanza liable for falsification
of public document as in fact an Information therefor was filed against Sagum
and Esperanza before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Petitioner Esperanza sought the
review by the DOJ of the City Prosecutor’s Resolution indicting her for falsification
of public document. The DOJ, by Resolution
of November 5, 2004, modified the City Prosecutor’s resolution by ordering the discharge
of Esperanza from the Information filed before the MeTC, it holding that in
light of her uncle-co-accused Sagum’s admission against his own interest that
he was the one who actually forged the signature of Levi Chong, without
Esperanza’s assistance or participation, and in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that Esperanza conspired with him, she should be discharged
from the Information. And the DOJ denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of its
Respondent assailed the DOJ
Resolutions before the Court of Appeals.
In the interim, acting on Esperanza’s Omnibus Motion in light of the DOJ
directive for her discharge,[9]
the MeTC, Branch 4,
By the assailed Decision of March 27,
2006, the appellate court set aside the DOJ Resolutions and ruled that
the Information against both Sagum and Esperanza filed before the MeTC by the
City Prosecutor of Manila stands, it holding that the DOJ Resolutions had “no
basis except the self-serving denial of . . . Esperanza Aduan,” and that “there
is strong indication that Esperanza Aduan, who was to benefit from
the performance of the act complained of, acted in concert with Sagum” (Underscoring supplied). The appellate court went on to state as
follows:
It is noticed that the Information had clearly and accurately mentioned the elements of the crime charged. The use of allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient (Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443). The purpose of preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial (Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, id.).
The test for the correctness of
the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute an
offense is the sufficiency of the averments in the Information, that is,
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements
of the offense (Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. CA, 257 SCRA 430). In the present case, the Resolution of the
Esperanza and her co-petitioner
husband’s Motion for Reconsideration, in which they insisted that the petition before
the appellate court had become moot and academic in view of the trial court’s
grant of petitioner Esperanza’s Omnibus Motion,[12] was
denied by the appellate court by Resolution dated May 22, 2006 which reiterated
its previous ruling and noted that with its grant of the writ of certiorari
prayed for by the spouses Chong, the DOJ Resolution has been declared null and
void, hence, all actions emanating from such Resolution are also null and void.
Hence, this petition.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court held in First Women’s
Credit Corporation v. Perez that:[13]
It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of public prosecutors. The court’s duty in an appropriate case is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final, albeit in extreme cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized. The rule is also consistent with this Court’s policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and of leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed offender.
While prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, their findings are subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis supplied)
And it held in UCPB v. Looyuko:[14]
Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
x x x x
In other words, judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the executive branch; it may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The issue on
appeal before the Court of Appeals was whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of
discretion in determining that there was insufficient evidence showing probable
cause to hale petitioner Esperanza into court.
It is hornbook principle that the
term “grave abuse of discretion” means such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[15] The abuse of discretion
must be grave as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[16]
The DOJ, in reversing the City Prosecutor’s finding of
probable cause and ordering the discharge of Esperanza, noted that although the
evidence on record fully supported the finding of probable cause against Sagum based
on his admission that he forged herein respondent’s signature on the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage without the participation of Esperanza, there was no
basis to hold that Esperanza conspired with him to effect the forgery. The DOJ, citing Dans, Jr. v. People,[17]
ruled that conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven by competent
proof, independently and beyond reasonable doubt.
A reading of the Resolution of the
Office of the City Prosecutor does not at all indicate why conspiracy was
present between Esperanza and her uncle.
The City Prosecutor’s Resolution merely states:[18]
In other words, Sagum did it in conspiracy with Aduan, his niece, who stands to benefit from the forgery as she is the purported mortgagee of the house that belongs to the Chongs. (Emphasis supplied)
There was thus no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ in issuing its Resolutions.
Contrary to the City Prosecutor’s
finding, which was adopted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, that
Esperanza was the mortgagee of the subject property does not, without more, show
conspiracy in the commission of the forgery admitted to have been done by Sagum
alone. If everyone who stands to be benefited from a forged
document can be deemed a conspirator, then Nelia Chong as mortgagor may
likewise be held liable since the mortgage deed which she signed, albeit
under duress according to her, was used to guarantee the loan she admittedly
contracted.
In loan transactions secured by mortgages,
both mortgagee and mortgagor stand to benefit from the execution of the
documents. To assume that Esperanza is a conspirator in the commission of the
forgery simply because she was to benefit as mortgagee from the execution of the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is thus absurd.
Absent then any evidence to indicate conspiracy, the City Prosecutor’s
finding of probable cause against Esperanza fails, as correctly held by the
DOJ.
WHEREFORE,
the Court of Appeals Decision of dated March
27, 2006 and Resolution dated May 22, 2006 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice Resolution dated
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 658.
** Additional member per Special Order No. 635.
[1] Annex “A” of the Petition, rollo, pp. 21-26. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los
[2] Annex “D” of the Petition, id. at
37-38. Penned by Associate Justice
Eliezer R. de los
[3] CA rollo, pp. 95-98.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Annex “F,” rollo, pp. 49-50. Penned by Judge Nicanor A. Manalo, Jr.
[13] G.R. No. 169026,
[14] G.R. No. 156337,
[15] People
v. Terrado, G.R. No. 148226,
[16] Ibid.
[17] G.R. No. 127073,
[18] CA rollo, p. 50.