NOLI LIM, Petitioner, - versus - ANGELITO Respondents, DENIA R. ADOYO, ET AL., Intervenors, GLORIA MURILLO, ET AL., Protestants. |
G.R. No. 172574
Present: Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio
Morales, chico-nazario,* LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,** and BERSAMIN,***
JJ. Promulgated: July 31,
2009 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
Decision[1]
dated
The antecedent
facts are as follows.
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Protest dated July 17, 1991
filed by protestant Noli L. Lim is hereby as it is ordered DISMISSED and
dropped from the records for lack of merit and whatever amount paid on account
thereof is forfeited in favor of the Government.
Consequently, the Free Patent Application No. (IV-8)-5958
of Angelito delos Santos for Lot No. 3389-A, PLS-83, located at Barangay
Mar-Francisco, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, be now given further due course
leading to the issuance of patent therefor.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On appeal,
the DENR Secretary affirmed the said Order and dismissed petitioner’s appeal
for lack of merit. The DENR Secretary
found that the controverted lot was previously titled in the name of Florencia
Carl under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-9106, issued by virtue of
Free Patent No. 514819. The subject lot
was under the care of Florencia Lim, through her sons Noli and Eli Lim and
Hospicio Magcawit. Said lot later became
the subject of Civil Case No. R-445, entitled, Republic of the
Philippines v. Carmen Carl-Gillette, et al., for Annulment of Patent and
Reversion of the Land to the State, where judgment was rendered on June 27, 1988
by the RTC of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, declaring void ab
initio Free Patent No. 514819 and OCT No. P-9106 issued in the name of
Florencia Carl. Moreover, the DENR
Secretary noted the trial court’s finding that as early as 1936, therein
protestant’s (Angelito delos
Thus,
according to DENR Secretary, since the title of Florencia Carl, from whom petitioner
Noli Lim derived his claim and gained entry to the land in question, had been
cancelled, then Noli Lim cannot claim a better right over respondent Angelito
delos
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration from the said decision, but his motion was
denied for lack of merit. In the same
order, the Motion for Intervention filed by Denia R. Adoyo, et al., and the
Protest filed by Gloria Murillo, et al. were also denied.
Not satisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the
President. Thereupon, petitioner was
directed, among others, to submit his appeal memorandum and remit, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00)
as appeal fee.[12] Petitioner prayed for an additional period of
fifteen (15) days from
In the meantime, the Office of the President, after verifying that no
appeal fee has been paid by petitioner although an appeal memorandum has been
filed by his counsel, issued on
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals
which rendered the herein assailed Decision affirming the orders of the Office
of the President. The Court of Appeals
held that perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted
by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional; and indispensable to the
perfection of an appeal is the payment of the appellate docket fees.[13]
The appellate court acknowledged that the
dismissal of an appeal for non-payment of docket and lawful fees is
discretionary, but enunciated that the Office of the President cannot be
faulted for exercising such discretion and proceeded to dismiss petitioner’s
appeal, since petitioner was given every opportunity to perfect his appeal
through the filing of an appeal memorandum and the payment of corresponding
appeal fees.[14] Said court further concluded that inasmuch as
the payment of the appellate docket fees was made long after the expiration of
the period for the perfection of an appeal, the Office of the President did not
acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, except to order its
dismissal.[15]
Hence,
petitioner is now before us raising the sole issue of whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the orders of the Office of the President
in dismissing his appeal for failure to timely pay the corresponding appeal fees.
In the
main, petitioner asserts that he has paid the corresponding appeal fees within
a reasonable time after the appeal memorandum was filed and that the dismissal
of the appeal on a mere technicality is tantamount to denial of substantial
justice. Petitioner begs this Court to
disregard the rules of technicality and consider the merits of the case.[16]
Respondents
(the heirs of Angelito delos
Simply
stated, the question before us now may be rephrased as follows: does
petitioner’s failure to pay on time the appeal fee warrant the dismissal of his
appeal filed with the Office of the President?
It is a well-established
rule that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory
for the perfection of an appeal.[18] Without such payment, the appellate court does
not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision
or final order sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[19] The payment of docket fees is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement for the
perfection of an appeal.[20]
In
the instant case, petitioner failed to perfect his appeal with the Office of
the President, despite having been given reasonable opportunity to do so. Records would show that petitioner was
granted an extension of fifteen (15) days from
Indeed,
petitioner’s motion was appropriately not acted upon, it having been filed
after the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Also, while petitioner filed his appeal
memorandum on
In
exceptional cases, we had allowed a liberal application of the rule. The recent case of Villena v. Rupisan,[24]
extensively discussed and enumerated the various instances recognized as
exceptions to the stringent application of the rule in the matter of paying the
docket fees, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good
faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without
appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to
each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance
of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances.[25]
Considering
that petitioner has not proffered an acceptable explanation for the
delay
in the payment of the appeal fee, his
reason not being one of the recognized exceptions, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that there is no compelling reason to reverse
the orders of the Office of the President dismissing the appeal filed by
petitioner. It bears emphasizing that
perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the questioned
decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction
to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.[26]
Here,
petitioner paid the appeal fee only after the Office of the President had
already dismissed his appeal on
Now as to the
invocation by petitioner of substantial justice which warrants the allowance of
his appeal, the pronouncement by this Court in the case of Lazaro v. Court
of Appeals,[29] is apt:
We must stress that the bare invocation of “the
interest of substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.
“Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.”[30]
Moreover, as to the alleged merit of his
case claimed by petitioner, we are not convinced. Both the Regional Executive Director and the
DENR Secretary are in agreement that Angelito delos
As regards
the claim of one Augusto Marte, who allegedly purchased one (1) hectare or ten
thousand (10,000) square meters of the subject property from the heirs of
deceased respondent, Angelito delos Santos, and who filed his comment to the
petition before this Court seeking to protect his rights and interests in the
property, we deem that his claim is not a proper subject in the instant
petition, as it would entail the presentation of evidence which is beyond the
ambit of the instant review.
To conclude, we find no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
affirming the orders of the Office of the President dismissing petitioner’s
appeal for his failure to timely pay the appeal fee. The appellate court’s ruling is in accordance
with the time-honored principle that the right to appeal is not a natural right
or a part of due process, it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The party who seeks to avail of the privilege
must comply with the requirement of the rules.
Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
WE CONCUR: CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
||
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
||
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 658.
** Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 635.
*** Additional member per Raffle of June 10, 2009 in place of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion who took no part due to prior action in the Court of Appeals.
[1] Rollo, pp. 30-37. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court) and Magdangal M. de Leon concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 22-23.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Rollo, pp. 44-45. Docketed as DENR Case No. IV-B-5506.
[7] “Marfrancisco,” in other parts of the records.
[8] Rollo, pp. 46-48.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Caspe
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142535,
[19] Enriquez
v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 139303,
[20] La
[21] Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing Appeals to the Office of the President of the
Philippines, done on
[22] G.R. No. 174219,
[23]
[24] G.R. No. 167620,
[25]
[26] Meatmasters International
Corporation v. Lelis Integrated Development Corporation, G.R. No. 163022,
[27] Social Security System v. Isip, G.R. No. 165417, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 310, 314.
[28] National Power Corporation
v. Degamo, G.R. No. 164602,
[29] G.R. No. 137761,
[30]
[31] Estrella
v. Robles, Jr., G.R. No. 171029,