THIRD DIVISION
Gloria s. dy, Petitioner, - versus - Mandy
commodities co., inc., Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 171842 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: July 22, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Gloria S.
Dy seeks to reverse and set aside the 15 September 2005 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 dismissing petitioner’s appeal on
the ground of forum shopping and its Resolution[2]
dated 3 March 2006, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
This case has its origin in the
contract entered into by the National Government with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) on
On
When the expiration of the subject lease
contract was approaching, then Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Secretary Heherson Alvarez (Secretary Alvarez), on behalf of the
government, issued a Memorandum Order dated
Since the subject lease was about to
expire, the Land Management Bureau (LMB), on behalf of the National Government,
in a letter dated
On
In an Order dated
On 18 September 2003, the Court of
Appeals, in the PNB Injunction Case, nullified the said RTC Order and granted
PNB’s application for TRO.
Since the LMB had already taken possession
of the questioned property, thereby rendering the
In a letter dated
In the meantime, banking on the same
OSG opinion, LMB granted petitioner Gloria Dy a provisional permit to occupy
the subject realty. Equipped with the provisional permit from the LMB,
petitioner was able to enter and install her own guards in the premises of the
property on
On
Meanwhile, in the PNB Injunction
Case, the Court of Appeals in its
On
On 4 December 2003, respondent
commenced the instant case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila,
Branch 20, for Forcible Entry (Respondent’s Forcible Entry Case), with prayer
for mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 176953-CV.
On
Respondent appealed to the RTC
Manila, Branch 30, for the dismissal of its forcible entry complaint.
On
Meanwhile, the OSG filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking intervention in Respondent’s Forcible Entry Case, as well as the
admission of its motion for reconsideration-in-intervention of the RTC decision
and opposition-in-intervention to respondent’s motion for immediate execution. The RTC Manila denied the Omnibus Motion
filed by the OSG. This adverse ruling
was questioned by the OSG before the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 86307 (OSG Certiorari).
On
On
In
the meantime, on 15 May 2005, without waiting for the result of Respondent’s Forcible
Entry Case (CA-G.R. SP No. 86478) pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner
filed an Unlawful Detainer case (Petitioner’s Unlawful Detainer Case) against
respondent before the MeTC Manila, Branch 15, where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. 00000004-CV. In her complaint,
petitioner made use of the same facts as in CA-G.R. SP No. 86478.
On
account of the foregoing fact, respondent moved for the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP
No. 86478 on the ground of forum shopping. Calling the Court of Appeals’ attention to the
10 November 2004 and 2 February 2005 Resolutions of this Court in G.R. No.
164786 (PNB’s Injunction Case) denying PNB’s application for TRO, petitioner
opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that, among other things, her
Unlawful Detainer Case was now premised on the settled termination of PNB’s
contract of lease with the National Government as implied by said Resolutions.
In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED on account of
forum shopping and for lack of merit[3].
On
In its
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner maintains that she did not
commit forum shopping, since there is no identity of the cause of action or of the
issue between Respondent’s Forcible Entry Case and Petitioner’s Unlawful
Detainer Case.
The
petition is not meritorious.
Forum
shopping is a deplorable practice of litigants consisting of resorting to two
different fora for the purpose of
obtaining the same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
judgment.[4] What is pivotal to the determination of whether
forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to the courts and the party-litigants
by a person who asks appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on
the same related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same
relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the
different courts or fora upon the
same issues.[5]
The grave evil sought to be avoided
by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals
of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage
of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several
different fora until a favorable
result is reached. To avoid the
resultant confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum
shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case. To stamp out this abominable practice, which
seriously impairs the efficient administration of justice, this Court
promulgated Administrative Circulars No. 28-91 and No. 04-94, which are now
embodied as Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC.
5. Certification
against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification of or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
The test for determining the
existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one
case amounts to res judicata in
another. Thus, there is forum shopping
when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration. Said
requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis
pendens.
In the instant case, the first element of forum shopping is
present. The parties to CA-G.R. SP No.
86478 and Petitioner’s Unlawful Detainer Case are the same. As to the second element, it must be stressed
that in ejectment cases, either in unlawful detainer or in forcible entry cases,
the only issue to be resolved is the question of who is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.[6] Thus, these are summary proceedings intended
to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of
possession of property. Title is not involved;
that is why it is a special civil action with a special procedure.[7] Here, the rights asserted in both cases are
also identical, namely, the right of possession over the subject property. In fact, in the Unlawful Detainer case,
petitioner’s cause of action was based on her alleged superior right over the
property in question as a lessee thereof, pursuant to the provisional permit
from the LMB, as against respondent’s allegedly expired sub-lease contract with
the National Government.[8] This is the very same assertion of petitioner
and the contentious fact involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 (Respondent’s
Forcible Entry Case). As the issues in
both cases refer singularly to the right of material possession over the
disputed property, then an adjudication in Repondent’s Forcible Entry Case
constitutes an adjudication
of Petitioner’s Unlawful Detainer Case, such that the latter court would be
bound thereby and could not render a contrary ruling on the very same issue.
Petitioner
insists that, assuming arguendo he is guilty of forum shopping, the Court of
Appeals should have only dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 (Respondent’s Forcible
Entry Case) and allowed Petitioner’s Unlawful Detainer Case be decided first by
the MeTC.
Petitioner’s argument is inaccurate.
Once there is a finding of forum
shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the petition pending
before this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court.
This is so because twin dismissal is a
punitive measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration of justice.
In
Buan v. Lopez, Jr.,[9]
petitioners therein instituted before the Court a special civil action for
prohibition and, almost a month earlier, another special civil action for
“prohibition with preliminary injunction” before the RTC Manila. Finding petitioners guilty of forum shopping,
the Court dismissed not only the action before it, but also the special civil
action still pending before the RTC, viz:
Indeed,
the petitioners in both actions x x x have incurred not only the sanction of
dismissal of their case before this Court in accordance with Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, but also punitive
measure of dismissal of both their actions, that in this Court and that in
Regional Trial Court as well.[10]
Also, in First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals,[11]
an action for specific performance became the subject of a petition for review
before the Court. While said case was
pending, a second one -- denominated as a derivative suit and involving the
same parties, causes of action and reliefs -- was filed before the RTC Makati. The Court therein dismissed the petition
before it and the derivative suit that was pending before the RTC Makati, thus:
[F]inding the existence of forum-shopping x x x, the only
sanction now is the dismissal of both
cases x x x.[12]
Taking our cue from these cases, the
Court of Appeals’ action of dismissing petitioner’s appeal relative to Respondent’s
Forcible Entry Case and Petitioner’s Unlawful Detainer Case is, therefore,
warranted.
Moreover, even as we pass upon the
merit of the instant case, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the same.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of
physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth.[13]
The basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us
that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire
jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
property; and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his
possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution of
such cases, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical
possession of the property. Thus, the plaintiff must prove that he was in
prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the
defendant. Indeed, any of the parties
who can prove prior possession de facto
may recover the possession even from the owner himself, since such cases
proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely
to prove prior possession de facto
and undue deprivation thereof.
In the case under consideration, the
Court of Appeals found that respondent as sub-lessee of the PNB was acting
within its prerogatives as possessor when it filed the forcible entry suit
against petitioner. From 1994 until the
controversy arose, respondent was in peaceful possession of the property in
question. The Court of Appeals even
pointed out that even when the LMB gained possession of the property on
In sum, this Court defers to the
findings of the Court of Appeals, there being no cogent reason to veer away
from such findings.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 15 September 2005 and its Resolution dated 3 March 2006 dismissing petitioner’s
appeal of the adverse resolution against her in Respondent’s Forcible Entry
Case (CA-G.R. No. 86478) and Petitioner’s Unlawful Detainer Case ((Civil Case
No. 00000004-CV) in the MeTC Manila, Branch 15, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Rebecca de Guia-
[2] Rollo, pp. 35-39.
[3]
[4][4] Collantes
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169604,
[5]
[6] University Physicians Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
100424,
[7]
[8] Rollo, p. 458.
[9] 229 Phil. 65 (1986).
[10]
[11] 322 Phil. 280 (1996).
[12]
[13] Bañes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, G.R. No. 142308, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA 13, 34.