EN BANC
|
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants. |
G.R. No. 171655 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,
PERALTA,
and BERSAMIN,
JJ. Promulgated: July 22, 2009 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Appellant Maritess Ang (Maritess) was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
That
on or about the 10th of October 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with two (2) other
persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been
ascertained and mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap one CHARLIE CHUA, a businessman, from the Casa Leonisa Bar
located at Examiner Street, Quezon City and brought him to an unknown place and
detained him up to the present for the purpose of extorting ransom money in the
amount of P15,000,000.00, Philippine Currency, thereby depriving him of his
liberty from October 10, 1995 up to the present, to the damage and prejudice of
said offended party.[1]
The
Information was subsequently amended to implead the other appellant, Pablo
Estacio, Jr. (Estacio), and to change the charge from kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder. The accusatory portion of the Amended
Information reads:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippipnes, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with another person whose true name and identity has not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA, a businessman, with the use of motor vehicle from Casa Leonisa Bar located at Examiner Street, Quezon City and brought him to BRGY. STO. CRISTO, San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and thereafter with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly stab said CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA on the different parts of his body with the use of [a] fan knife, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Charlie Mancillan Chua.[2] (Underscoring in the original.)
Still
later, the Information was further amended to additionally implead one Hildo
Sumipo (Sumipo)[3] who was,
however, subsequently discharged as state witness.[4]
The
evidence for the prosecution presents the following version of events:[5]
At
around
After
the victim arrived past
Not long
after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to pull the car
over. As the victim complied, Estacio,
with a gun pointed at him, pulled him to
the backseat as Maritess transferred to the backseat, sat beside the victim, tied
the victim’s hands behind his back, and placed tape on his mouth. Estacio then directed Sumipo to take over the
wheels as he did.[7]
While Sumipo
tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they replied that they
would kill the victim so that he would not take revenge.[8] Thereupon, the victim told Maritess, “bakit mo nagawa sa akin
ito sa kabila ng lahat?,” to which she replied, “Bayad na ako sa utang ko sa iyo ngayon.”
On
Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching
a secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess
and Estacio then brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later resurfaced.
The
three then headed towards Malinta, Valenzuela, Bulacan. On the way, Estacio and Maritess talked about
how they killed the victim, Estacio telling Maritess, “Honey, wala na tayong problema dahil siguradong
patay na si Charlie sa dami ng saksak na nakuha niya.”
On Estacio’s
and Maritess’ directive, Sumipo stopped by a drug store where Maritess bought alcohol
to clean their hands. Along the way,
Maritess and Estacio threw out the victim’s attaché case. Maritess later told Estacio “Honey,
The
three later abandoned the car in Malinta.
The
following morning, Estacio went to the residence of Sumipo where he called up by
telephone the victim’s mother and demanded a P15,000,000 ransom. The mother replied, however, that she could
not afford that amount.
In the
afternoon of the same day, Maritess and Estacio went to Sumipo’s residence
again where Estacio again called up the victim’s mother, this time lowering the
ransom demand to P10,000,000 which she still found to be too steep. Sumipo expressed his misgivings about future
calls, as they might get caught, but Estacio and Maritess assured him that that
call would be the last.
The
group then went to Greenhills where Estacio still again called up the victim’s mother,
still lowering the ransom demand to P5,000,000, P1,000,000 of
which should be advanced. The victim’s mother
having agreed to the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the
money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills at
Sumipo soon
learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s gun, watch, and necklace from the
proceeds of which he was given P7,000.
On
The
police, accompanied by the victim’s mother and Estacio, went to the crime scene and recovered
the remains of the victim who was identified by his mother by the clothes
attached to his bones. The victim’s dentist
found his teeth to match his dental record.
Sumipo
explained in an affidavit,[9]
which he identified in open court,[10] that
Maritess got angry with the victim after he lent money to her husband, one
Robert Ong,[11] enabling
him to leave the country without her knowledge, while Estacio was jealous of the
victim with whom Maritess had a relationship.[12]
In his affidavit[13]
which he identified in open court, Estacio claimed that a quarrel broke out in
the car between the victim and Maritess about a debt to the victim; that he tried
to pacify the two, but the victim got angry at him, prompting him to point a
fan knife at his neck; and that he then asked Sumipo to drive the car up to Barangay
Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan where he dragged the victim away from
the car and accidentally stabbed him.
When
asked on cross-examination why the stabbing was accidental, Estacio replied
that he and Maritess originally planned to leave the victim in Bulacan, but
since there was talk of the victim getting back at them, he “got confused and
so it happened.”[14]
Maritess
for her part denied[15] having
conspired with Estacio. She claimed that
while on board the car, the victim took issue with her “friendship” with
Estacio, whom he insulted. Incensed,
Estacio grabbed the victim by the collar, prompting the victim to pull out a
gun from under the driver’s seat which he aimed at Estacio.
Continuing,
Maritess claimed that she tried to pacify the quarreling men; that the car
stopped at San Jose del Monte and the three men alighted; that
Sumipo returned to the car and was later followed by Estacio who
said “Masama raw ang nangyari,”[16] he
adding that he did not intend to stab the victim.
Branch
219 of the Quezon City RTC found both Estacio and Maritess guilty of
“kidnapping on the occasion of which the victim was killed,” disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE,
finding accused Pablo Estacio, Jr. and Maritess Ang guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping on the occasion of which the victim was
killed, the court hereby sentences each of them to suffer the maximum
penalty of Death; to jointly and
severally pay the heirs of Charlie Chua the amount of P200,000.00,
as actual damages, and P1,000,000.00, as moral damages;
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[17] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The case
was forwarded to this Court for automatic review.[18] However, the Court referred it to the Court
of Appeals for intermediate review following People v. Mateo.[19]
Estacio faulted
the trial court for:
I
x x x FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
x x x CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF DETENTION AND “LOCK UP”.[20] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As for Maritess,
she faulted the trial court for:
A. x x x Discharging Sumipo as State Witness
and in Relying on His Testimony for the Conviction of Appellant Ang.[21]
x x x
B. x x x Finding That There was Kidnapping
with Murder and That Appellant Ang is Guilty Thereof.
C. x x x Not Concluding that the Crime
Committed was Plain Homicide, and That Accused Estacio is Solely Responsible
Therefor.[22]
(Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
By
Decision[23] of
WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63818 finding accused-appellants Maritess
Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping with murder and sentencing them to each suffer the penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants are
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P500,000.00 as moral damages.
In view of the death penalty imposed, let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for further review.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellants
manifested before this Court that supplemental pleadings would not be necessary,
all relevant matters having already been taken up.[25]
Findings
of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses,
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect,
by this Court because of the trial court’s unique advantage in observing and
monitoring at close range the demeanor, deportment, and conduct of the
witnesses as they testify.[26] This Court need not thus pass upon the
findings of fact of the trial court, especially if they have been affirmed on
appeal by the appellate court, as in the present case.[27] Nevertheless, the Court combed through the
records of the case and found no ground to merit a reversal of appellants’
conviction.
The
Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants were convicted was erroneously
designated.
Appellants
were eventually charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping
with murder, defined in the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code. In a special complex crime,
the prosecution must prove each of the component offenses with the same
precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.[28]
In the
case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound
and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these
acts to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no
time in killing him. That appellants’
intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the
conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife
would be used to kill him so that it would not create noise.[29] The subsequent
demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants’
prior acts as kidnapping.
People v. Padica[30] instructs:
We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case of Masilang, et. al., although the accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they first killed him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money, such demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only murder.
That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended to kill the victim can be readily deduced from the manner by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly snuffed out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever to show or from which it can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the victim intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary, the demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the victim’s family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation among the felons who had killed the victim around five hours earlier.
x x x The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of movement would at most constitute coercion.[31] (Underscoring supplied)
The
crime committed was thus plain Murder. The
killing was qualified by treachery. The
victim was gagged, bound, and taken from
This
Court’s finding that the offense committed is Murder notwithstanding, the
resulting penalty is the same. Under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The use of a motor vehicle, having been
alleged in the Information and proven, can be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. There being
one generic aggravating circumstance, the resulting penalty is death. In view, however, of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346 on
Respecting
the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state witness, the same does not
lie.
The conditions
for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.[32]
These
conditions were established by the prosecution.
Sumipo was the only person other than appellants who had personal
knowledge of the acts for which they were being prosecuted. Only he could positively identify appellants
as the perpetrators of the crime. He does
not appear to be the most guilty. He did
not participate in planning the commission of the crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was
joking when she said, “Diretsong dukot na
rin kay Charlie.” He tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He did not participate in the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from the
attempts to extract ransom from the victim’s family.
Sumipo’s
testimony was corroborated on material points.
The victim’s mother testified regarding the demands for ransom.[33] Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing the
victim, Estacio, and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day and at the time
in question.[34] Henry
Hong, the victim’s cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the
victim’s brother during the scheduled delivery of the ransom, testified to
seeing Estacio there with companions.[35] And the victim’s skeletal remains were found
at the scene of the crime upon Estacio’s
information and direction.
And there
is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
Even
assuming arguendo that the discharge
of Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the competency
and quality of his testimony.[36]
Finally,
the Court brushes aside Maritess’ disclaimer of
participation in killing the
victim. It was she who bound the hands and
gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess’ company, brought the victim to
the scene of the crime and thereafter returned to the car, her and Estacio’s hands
were bloodied.
Parenthetically,
prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess’ friend who visited her in
prison, testified that Maritess admitted having killed Chua.[37] And the prosecution presented letters from
Maritess to Estacio, written from prison, where she admitted the deed.[38]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals of
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES- Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Information, records, p. 1.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Vide TSN, September 24, 1996, pp. 2-75; TSN, September 30, 1996, pp. 2-59; TSN, October 8, 1996, pp. 2-84; TSN, October 14, 1996, pp. 2-56; TSN, October 22, 1996, pp. 3-34; TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 2-47; TSN, November 7, 1996, pp. 3-91; TSN, November 11, 1996, pp. 3-27; TSN, December 4, 1996, pp. 2-32; TSN, January 15, 1997, pp. 3-81; TSN, February 24, 1997, pp. 3-77; TSN, March 5, 1997, pp. 3-45; TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 2-35; TSN, May 5, 1997, pp. 2-30; RTC records, pp. 171-241, 243.
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8]
[9] Records, pp. 237-240.
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12] Records, p. 237.
[13] Exhibit “AA,” supra note 9.
[14] TSN,
[15] Vide
TSN,
[16]
[17] Records, p. 402.
[18] Rollo, p. 1.
[19] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[20] CA rollo, pp. 161-162.
[21]
[22]
[23] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Eliezer R. de los
[24] CA rollo, pp. 245-246.
[25] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[26] Vide
Nombrefia v. People, G.R. No. 157919,
[27] First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 575.
[28] People
v. Larrañaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75,
[29] TSN,
[30] G.R. No. 102645,
[31]
[32] Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 17.
[33] TSN,
[34] TSN,
[35] TSN,
[36] Vide
People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 118670,
[37] TSN,
[38] Exhibit “N -4,” (transcript), pp. 209-210. Original: Exhibit “C-5,” records, p. 185.