PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - JOJO MUSA y Accused-Appellants. |
G.R. No. 170472
Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, carpio-morales, **CHICO-NAZARIO, ***LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. Promulgated:
July 3, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We review in this appeal the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 11, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00735, which affirmed with modification the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, convicting Jojo Musa (Jojo), Robert Cariño (Robert), August Dayrit (August), Cesar Domondon, Jr. (Cesar), and Michael Garcia (Michael) – collectively referred to as the appellants – of robbery with homicide and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellants and Roberto Barredo (Barredo) before the RTC with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under an Information that states:
x x x
That on or about the 11th day of June 2001,
in the city of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and they [sic] mutually helping and
aiding one another, while armed with guns and knives, respectively, with intent
to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously rob and divest from one NANCY BONIFACIO y GALVO
of her black wallet containing the following:
ATM
China Bank Card
ATM
Allied Bank Card
Smart
Money
School
I.D., School Registration Form
S.S.S.,
TIN, Pag-ibig
Cash
money
Video
shop card
Casio
electronic organizer
Cosmetics
Office
Uniform
in the amount of P700.00 belonging to said
NANCY BONIFACIO y GALVO, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof, and that on the occasion and by
reason of said robbery, accused ROBERTO BARREDO armed with a gun and with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot HAROLD HERRERA on his neck, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[3]
On arraignment, the appellants pleaded
not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented the following witnesses during
the trial on the merits that followed: Dr. Maria Cristina B. Freyra (Dr. Freyra); Nancy G. Bonifacio (
The prosecution and the defense agreed at the pre-trial that the deceased accused Barredo would be excluded from the Information.[4]
Dr. Freyra, the Medico-Legal Officer
of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory, declared on the witness stand
that she conducted on
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Fairly developed, fairly nourished, male cadaver in rigor
mortis with postmortem lividity at the dependent portions of the body.
Conjunctiva, lips, nailbeds are pale. There is surgical incision at the right submandibular
region, measuring 1.3 x 0.9 cm, 4 cm from the anterior midline, 145 cm from the
heel, surgical incision at the right lateral neck region, measuring 11 cm long
with 12 stitches applied, surgical incision at the right lateral neck region,
measuring 1.4 x 1 cm, 7 cm right of the anterior midline, 143 cm from the heel
and surgical incision at the umbilical region, measuring 5 cm long with 4
stitches applied, cutdown incision at the left arm and gastronomy incision at
the abdomen, measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, 2.5 cm from the anterior midline.
x x x
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest as a
result of a gunshot wound, neck.
S/P neck exploration, esophageal repair muscle flap of
esophageal injury, gastrostomy tube insertion and tracheostomy. [5]
According to Dr. Freyra, the victim died from a gunshot wound on the right side of his neck which “fractured the 6th and 7th cervical vertebra, lacerating the spinal cord and esophagus.” She added that a .38 caliber slug was recovered from the victim’s left scapular region.[6]
When
the jeepney reached the flyover in Barangka, Barredo fired a gun and Jojo (who
was seated inside the jeepney) declared a hold-up. Barredo pointed a gun at Harold as he tried to
get the latter’s wristwatch.
They
arrived at
On
cross-examination,
Ryan
testified that he boarded a jeepney at around
Ryan
saw Harold give his watch to one of the appellants who was pointing a gun at
him (Harold). Ryan then heard a gunshot
and claimed to have seen the “explosion from the gun.” Soon after, the robbers
got off the jeepney, but one of them again fired a gun while crossing the
street.
On
cross-examination, Ryan admitted executing a sworn statement before the police
on
On re-direct, he maintained that it was Michael who clung to the jeepney at the loading area and told the driver to stop along EDSA. On re-cross, he declared that a total of six persons committed the robbery.[14]
The
testimony of Honesto A. Herrera, Harold’s father, was dispensed with after the
prosecution and the defense stipulated that he had spent P100,000.00 for
the hospitalization, wake, and burial of his son.[15]
The defense presented a different version of events.
Jojo
declared on the witness stand that he was asleep in their house on
He
recalled that on
On
cross-examination, he testified that the police did not interrogate him in the
station. He also disclosed that Cesar,
Michael, and August were also his co-accused in a separate robbery incident
that allegedly happened on
Michael
testified that he was asleep with his older brother in their house at Stop
Dragon, Zenia, Parola, Cainta, Rizal at
The prosecution and the defense dispensed with the presentation of Cesar as a witness, after stipulating that Ryan could not identify him.[19]
August testified that he and his wife
and daughter were resting at their house at
Robert maintained that he was working at
his aunt’s auto air conditioning supply store at Jacky Lou Ville, BF Homes, Parañaque
on
The RTC convicted the appellants in
its decision of
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court
finds the accused JOJO MUSA y SANTOS,
ROBERT CARIÑO y FERRERAS, AUGUST
DAYRIT y HERNANDEZ, CESAR DOMONDON,
JR. y SACRIZ and MICHAEL GARCIA y DELA CRUZ all GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of having committed the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE and each of the herein
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission
thereof, and: (1) to jointly and severally indemnify the parents of victim,
Harold Herrera, of the amount of Php50,000.00; (2) to jointly and severally pay
the amount of Php100,000.00 representing the stipulated amount of
hospitalization and funeral expenses incurred; and (3) to jointly and severally
pay the amount of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[22]
On
appeal, we endorsed this case to the CA for appropriate action and disposition[23]
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[24] The
CA, in its decision of P50,000.00.
The
CA ruled that the positive, clear, and categorical testimonies of witnesses
Nancy and Ryan “deserve full merit in both probative weight and credibility
over the mere alibi of the appellants.” The CA added that
The CA gave the appellants’ alibi scant consideration, ruling that after positive identification by witnesses, they could no longer deny their participation in the robbery by claiming to be somewhere else.
Finally, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding of conspiracy, as it had been proven that there was unity of purpose and design in the commission of the crime. Therefore, all those who participated in the robbery were held guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide even if they did not take an active part in the homicide.
In their brief,[25] the appellants argue that the trial court gravely erred in:
(a) convicting them of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
(b) admitting the seriously flawed out-of-court identification by the witnesses.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the prosecution proved the appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
THE COURT’S RULING
We
resolve to deny the appeal for lack
of merit.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
An established rule in appellate review is that the trial court’s factual findings – including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings – are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect if duly supported by evidence. These factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA. This jurisprudential rule notwithstanding, we fully scrutinized the records of this case; the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the CA imposed on the appellants demands no less than this kind of careful consideration.[26]
A distinctive feature of this case is
the presence of a witness, Nancy, who was inside
the jeepney during the robbery, and who positively identified all the
appellants in her
PROSECUTOR
FLORIAN ABALAJON:
Q: Madam
witness, could you remember where were you in the early morning or at around
NANCY BONIFACIO:
A: We were
at the loading area of vehicles going to Montalban at the corner of EDSA and
x x x
Q: On that
day, from the time that you took the jeepney, could you remember any incident
that happened to the passengers of the jeep?
A: The
jeep left and there was somebody clinging to the jeep, sir.
Q: What
happened next?
A: Upon
crossing EDSA, the person clinging to the jeepney flagged down the jeepney to
allow four (4) other passengers to board the jeepney, sir.
x x x
Q: After
the other four passengers rode while clinging to the passenger jeepney, what
happened, if any, on your way to Montalban?
A: When we
were somewhere in Barangka, one of them fired a gun and declared a holdup, sir.
Q: Who, if
you remember, declared the holdup?
A: As far
as I could remember, the one who declared
the holdup was Jojo Musa, and the one who fired the gun was Robert Barredo.
x x x
Q: Was
Jojo Musa one of the passengers who rode on the jeepney after the passenger
jeepney has crossed EDSA?
A: He was
together with the person who clung to the vehicle before the jeepney crossed
EDSA, sir.
Q: Do you
know the identity of the person who was clinging to the passenger jeepney and
told the driver to stop upon crossing EDSA?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Who was
he?
A: I do
not know his name, but I could recognize his face, sir.
x x x
Q: Could
you kindly point to him?
(The witness pointed to the rightmost person on the
bench at the last row. The person pointed to by the witness when requested to
stand up identify his name as Michael
Garcia y De la Cruz [sic])
x x x
Q: From
these five persons seated at the back, could you point or identify the person
that you said is Musa?
(The
witness pointed to the leftmost person seated at the last row. The person
pointed to by the witness, when requested to stand, identified himself as Jojo Musa y Delos Santos)
x x x
Q: Now
what happened after the declaration of the holdup?
A: They
gathered the personal belongings of the other passengers, and the person beside
Harold pointed a gun at him and tried to get his wristwatch, sir.
Q: And could you remember who is the person
who was pointing a gun at Harold?
A: Robert Barredo, sir.
x x x
Q: And why
are you so sure that this Robert Barredo was the one who pointed a gun at
Harold Herrera?
A: While
we were in the hospital we learned that the suspect was arrested, and they
presented picture of Robert Barredo, and he was identified by the victim, sir.
Q: Now,
let us go back to the incident when a gun was pointed at Harold. What happened
at that time?
A: Robert
Barredo pointed a gun like this. (The witness raised her right hand with the
index finger pointing towards her face) [A]nd the suspect tried to use his left
hand to get the wristwatch of Harold, and after getting the wristwatch of
Harold, I heard a gunshot, and I did not know that Harold was hit by that
gunshot, and afterwards Robert Barredo pointed a gun at me (the witness pointed
her right hand index finger into her forehead) and Robert Barredo tried to grab
my handbag, sir.
x x x
Q: Were
you divested your bag by Robert Barredo? [sic]
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: What
happened with Jojo Musa? Were you able
to notice what Jojo Musa did during the incident?
A: He
pointed to the passenger beside him and gathered their belongings, sir.
Q: What
did he point to the other passengers?
A: Gun,
sir.
Q: What
about the three other passengers that you said there were four passengers? [sic]
A: They
were carrying bladed weapon(s), sir.
x x x
Q: Could
you remember the person who entered the jeepney?
A: The two
persons were able to enter, and one of them was Jojo Musa and the other one, I
don’t know his name, but I could recognize his face, sir.
Q: Could
you identify him if you could see that person inside the courtroom?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Please
point to him.
(The
witness pointed to the second person from the right seated on the last row,
who, when requested to stand up, identified himself as Robert Cariño y Ferreras)
x x x
Q: Could
you recall what Robert Cariño did while the holdup was going on?
A: He was
at the other end collecting the belongings of the other passengers.
Q: You
said after they had divested you, Harold, and other passengers of their
personal belongings they alighted upon reaching
A: They
were six (6), sir.
x x x
Q: At the
back there were five (5) persons sitting. Could you kindly go over the faces
and tell us who you said alighted together with Jojo Musa, Robert Barredo and
other accused that you just identified?
(The
witness pointed to the second and third person from the last sitting on the
last row, who, when requested to stand up, identified themselves as August Dayrit y Hernandez and Cesar Domondon, Jr. y Sacris)[27] [Emphasis ours]
These testimonies, when considered
together, lead to no conclusion other than the appellants’ direct participation
in the robbery where Harold was shot and killed. Aside from their court testimonies, Nancy and
Ryan executed separate sworn statements on
In considering the testimonies of Nancy and Ryan, we find it significant that the defense failed to refute their testimonies through evidence of motive impelling them to falsely testify against the appellants. The absence of such evidence immeasurably enhances the worth and credit of their testimonies.[29]
Admissibility of Identification
The
appellants assail the reliability and integrity of their out-of-court
identification by Nancy and Ryan. They argue that when these witnesses went to
the police station, their minds were ready to accept that the persons they would
identify were the suspects in the
We find this argument misplaced.
We
had the opportunity to explain the procedure for out-of-court identification
and the test to determine their its in People
v. Rivera[30] where
we said:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in
various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is
brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify
the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz: (1) the
witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.
The totality test has been formulated precisely to assure
fairness as well as compliance with constitutional due process requirements in out-of-court
identification. Applying this test, we find
If any identification should be critically examined at
all, this should be
In People v. Pineda,[31] we laid down the proper procedure on photographic identification: first, a series of photographs must be shown and not merely that of the suspect; and second, when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.
In
the present case,
ATTY.
RODAFLOR LARRACAS:
Q: So
the pictures of the six persons that you said a while ago no other pictures
except the pictures of the six persons?
NANCY BONIFACIO:
A: There
were other persons but we were not
able to identify to [sic] them; only
the pictures of the six persons were identified.[32]
The
records are bereft of any evidence showing that
Ryan’s
identification of the appellants at the police station is not as reliable since
he admitted having been told by the police that the persons detained were the
suspects in the robbery before he identified them. Nevertheless, this irregular identification
does not need to affect the admissibility of Nancy and Ryan’s independent in-court identification.[33] We
emphasize that in convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the RTC and
CA did not rely on the identification
made by Nancy and Ryan at the police station; they relied on
The Appellants’ Defense
The appellants interposed the defense of alibi to support their claim of innocence.
Jojo and
Michael maintained that they were sleeping in their respective houses in
Alibi is generally viewed with suspicion because of its inherent weakness and unreliability. For this defense to prosper, jurisprudence demands the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.[34] Where the least chance exists for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi fails.[35]
In the
present case, the appellants failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that they were so far away from
the scene of the crime so that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the crime scene at the time of its
commission. In other words, their alibi
did not meet the requirements of “time” and “place.” The places where they
claimed to be at the time of the hold up were Cainta and
The Crime Committed
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art.
294. – Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons. – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, when by reason or
on the occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed,
or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
Robbery with homicide is committed when a person is killed, either by reason or on occasion of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the malefactor’s main purpose and objective, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery.[37]
In the case before us, the prosecution proved that the appellants’ original intention was to rob the passengers of the jeepney. A careful examination of the testimonies of Nancy and Ryan reveals the following facts clearly pointing to the appellants’ intent: Michael clung to the jeepney as it left the loading station; he ordered its driver to stop when the jeepney crossed EDSA to allow his companions to board; Jojo announced a hold-up and Barredo fired a gun when the jeepney reached the Barangka flyover; in Barangka; Barredo pointed a gun at Harold, took his wristwatch, and shot him; Barredo pointed the gun at Nancy and grabbed her handbag; Jojo pointed a gun at the other passengers and grabbed their belongings; the other appellants divested the other passengers of their belongings.
From these established facts, the overriding intention of the appellants could not but be robbery; the death of Harold incidentally intervened in the course of the robbery. Admittedly, the reason for Harold’s shooting was unclear, as the testimonies of the witnesses revealed that Barredo had already taken his watch when he shot Harold. Why Barredo still shot Harold, however, is immaterial as long as the killing is perpetrated as a consequence, or on the occasion of, the robbery. Thus we held in People v. Werba:[38]
A conviction for robbery with homicide is
proper even if the homicide is committed before, during or after the robbery. The homicide may be
committed by the malefactor at the spur of the moment or by mere accident. x x
x What is critical is the result obtained without reference or distinction as
to circumstances, cause, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime. [Emphasis ours]
The
Presence of Conspiracy
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to, and are indicative of, a
joint purpose, concert of action, and community of interest.[39]
Conspiracy does not require proof of an
appreciable period of time for the perpetrators to come to an agreement, or for
proof of an agreement prior to the criminal deed; conspiracy exists if
evidence indicates that at the time of
the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[40]
In the present case, the appellants and Barredo clearly acted in conspiracy in committing the crimes charged. From the time Michael stopped the jeepney for the others to board, to the time they announced a robbery in Barangka, up to the time they commonly alighted near Marcos Highway, there can be no conclusion other than that they had a prior criminal scheme that led to their synchronized acts, unity of execution, and assistance to each other to consummate their plan.[41]
When conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a common criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary.[42]
As a corollary rule, when homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the robbery will
also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, although they did not all actually take part in the
homicide; only those who clearly endeavored to prevent the homicide are
excluded. In the
present case, none of the appellants has been shown to have tried to prevent Harold’s
shooting. In fact, they exhibited an
indifferent and nonchalant attitude to the killing as shown by the fact that
they continued robbing the other passengers even after they heard a shot from
inside the jeepney. Hence, their cooperative acts toward their common criminal
objective render them equally liable as conspirators.[43]
The Proper Penalty
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is punished under Article 294 (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63[44] of the Revised Penal Code states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the crime is neither attended by mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Considering that no modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the RTC correctly sentenced the appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
For
the death of Harold, we sustain the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity as ordered by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Jurisprudence sets the
amount of civil indemnity at P50,000.00 if the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide was not qualified by any circumstance warranting the
imposition of the death penalty. This award for civil indemnity is
mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime.[45]
We
likewise agree with the CA’s grant of moral damages even in the absence of
proof for the entitlement to the same. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional
pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently
human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain, and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing. The heirs of Harold are thus entitled to
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
Finally,
we sustain the award of P100,000.00 representing the hospital and
funeral expenses incurred, as this amount was based on the stipulation of the
prosecution and defense.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the
foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
|
WE CONCUR: LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
** Designated
additional Member of the Second Division effective
***
Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza and Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag.
[2] Penned by Judge Reuben P. De la Cruz (now Deputy Court Administrator).
[3] Records, pp. 4-5.
[4] See Pre-Trial Order, id., pp. 68-69.
[5]
[6]
TSN,
[7]
TSN,
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
TSN,
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Records, p. 94.
[16]
TSN,
[17]
[18]
TSN,
[19] Records, p. 151.
[20] TSN,
[21]
[22] RTC Decision, CA rollo, pp. 33-34.
[23]
Per our Resolution dated
[24]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[25] CA rollo, pp. 46-63.
[26] People v. Algarme, G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009, citing People v. Ballesteros, G.R. No. 172696, August 11, 2008 and People v. Garalde, 521 SCRA 327, 340 (2007).
[27] TSN,
[28] Records, pp. 10 and 13.
[29] See People v. Algarme, supra note 26, citing People v. Laurente, 255 SCRA 543 (1996).
[30]
G.R. No. 139185,
[31]
G.R. No. 141644,
[32]
TSN,
[33]
See People v. Almanzor, G.R. No.
124916,
[34]
See People v. Navales, G.R. No.
135230,
[35]
See People v. Werba, G.R. No. 144599,
[36]
See People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 174775,
[37] People
v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173,
[38] People v. Werba, supra, citing People v. Daniela, 401 SCRA 519 (2003).
[39] People v. Porras, G.R. Nos. 103550-51,
[40] People v. Carrozo, G.R. No. 97913,
[41]
See People v. Napalit, G.R. Nos.
142919 and 143876,
[42] People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 78853,
[43]
See People v. Sabadao, G.R. No.
126126,
[44] Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties.
[45]
See People v. Buduhan, G.R. No.
178196,