THIRD DIVISION
|
D.B.T. MAR-BAY
CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, - versus - RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO
PANES, Respondents. |
G.R. No.
167232 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: July 31, 2009 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition[1]
for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2]
dated October 25, 2004 which reversed and set aside the Order[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The Facts
Subject of this controversy is a parcel
of land identified as Lot Plan Psu-123169,[4]
containing an area of Two Hundred Forty Thousand, One Hundred Forty-Six (240,146)
square meters, and situated at Barangay (Brgy.) Pasong Putik, Novaliches,
On June 24,
1992, respondents Ricaredo P. Panes (Ricaredo), his son Angelito P. Panes
(Angelito), Salvador Cea, Abogado Mautin, Donardo Paclibar, Zosimo P. Peralta,
and Hilarion Manongdo (herein collectively referred to as respondents) filed a
Complaint[7]
for “Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No. 200519 and all Titles derived
thereat (sic), Damages, with Petition for the Issuance of Injunction with
Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order Ex-Parte, Etc.” against B.C.
Regalado, Mar-Bay Realty, Inc., Spouses Gereno Brioso and Criselda M. Brioso,
Spouses Ciriaco and Nellie Mariano, Avelino C. Perdido and Florentina Allado,
Eufrocina A. Maborang and Fe Maborang, Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura, Spouses Oscar Ikalina and the Register of
Deeds (RD) of Quezon City. Subsequently,
respondents filed an Amended Complaint[8]
and a Second Amended Complaint[9]
particularly impleading DBT as one of the defendants.
In the Complaints, Ricaredo alleged
that he is the lawful owner and claimant of the subject property which he had declared
for taxation purposes in his name, and assessed in the amount of P2,602,190.00 by the City
Assessor of Quezon City as of the year 1985.
Respondents alleged that per Certification[10]
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) National Capital Region (NCR) dated
May 7, 1992, Lot Plan Psu-123169 was verified to be correct and on file in said
office, and approved on July 23, 1948.
Respondents also claimed that Ricaredo,
his immediate family members, and the other respondents had been, and still
are, in actual possession of the portions of the subject property, and their
possession preceded the Second World War.
To perfect his title in accordance with Act No. 496 (The Land
Registration Act) as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (The
Property Registration Decree), Ricaredo filed with the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 82 a case docketed as LRC Case No. Q-91-011, with LRC Rec. No. N-62563.[11]
Respondents averred that in the process
of complying with the publication requirements for the Notice of Initial
Hearing with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), it was discovered by the
Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an overlapping of portions of
the land subject of Ricaredo’s application, with the subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. The said portion had, by then, already been conveyed
by B.C. Regalado to DBT.
Ricaredo asseverated that upon
verification with the LRA, he found that the subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado
was deliberately drawn to cover portions of the subject property. Respondents
claimed that the title used by B.C. Regalado in the preparation of the
subdivision plan did not actually cover the subject property. They asserted that from the records of B.C.
Regalado, they gathered that TCT Nos. 211081,[12]
211095[13]
and 211132,[14]
which allegedly included portions of the subject property, were derived from
TCT No. 200519. However, TCT No. 200519
only covered
In essence, respondents alleged that
B.C. Regalado and DBT used the derivative titles which covered properties
located far from Pasong Putik,
Novaliches,
In his Answer[18]
dated July 24, 1992, the RD of Quezon City interposed the defense that at the
time of registration, he found all documents to be in order. Subsequently, on December 5, 1994, in his Motion[19] for
Leave to Admit Amended Answer, with the Amended Answer attached, he admitted that
he committed a grave mistake when he earlier said that TCT No. 200519 covered
only one lot, i.e.
On December 28, 1993, then defendants
Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura (Spouses Tabangcura) filed their Answer[20]
with Counterclaim, claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value
when they bought a house and lot covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C. Regalado,
the latter being a subdivision developer and registered owner thereof, on June
30, 1986. When respondent Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property,
Spouses Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of Property before the RTC,
On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint,
alleged that it is the legitimate owner and occupant of the subject property
pursuant to a dacion en pago executed
by B.C. Regalado in the former’s favor; that respondents were not real
parties-in-interests because Ricaredo was a mere claimant whose rights over the
property had yet to be determined by the RTC where he filed his application for registration; that the other respondents did not allege matters or invoke
rights which would
entitle them to
the
relief
prayed for
in their complaint; that the complaint was premature; and that the action
inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT.[22]
The RTC's Rulings
On June 15,
2000, the RTC through Judge Marciano I. Bacalla (Judge Bacalla), rendered a
Decision[23]
in favor of the respondents. The RTC held that the testimony of Ricaredo that
he occupied the subject property since 1936 when he was only 16 years old had
not been rebutted; that Ricaredo's occupation and cultivation of the subject
property for more than thirty (30) years in the concept of an owner vested in
him equitable ownership over the same by virtue of an approved plan, Psu
123169; that the subject property was declared under the name of Ricaredo for taxation
purposes;[24]
and that the subject property per survey should not have been included in TCT
No. 200519, registered in the name of B.C. Regalado and ceded to DBT. The RTC further held that Spouses Tabangcura
failed to present satisfactory evidence to prove their claim. Thus, the RTC
disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Certificate of Title No.
200519 and all titles derived thereat as null and void insofar as the same
embrace the land covered by Plan PSU-123169 with an area of 240,146 square
meters in the name of Ricaredo Panes; ordering defendant DBT Marbay Realty,
Inc. to pay plaintiff Ricaredo Panes the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000) pesos as attorney’s fees plus
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On September 12, 2000, DBT filed a
Motion[25]
for Reconsideration, based on the grounds of prescription and laches. DBT also
disputed Ricaredo’s claim of open, adverse, and continuous possession of the
subject property for more than thirty (30) years, and asserted that the subject
property could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession because it
is covered by TCT No. 200519.
While the said
Motion for Reconsideration was pending, Judge Bacalla passed away.
Meanwhile, on
January 2, 2001, a Motion[26]
for Intervention and a Complaint in Intervention were filed by Atty. Andres B.
Pulumbarit (Atty. Pulumbarit), representing the Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo
Estate. The intervenor alleged that the
subject property formed part of the vast tract of land with an area of 117,000
hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 779 issued by the
Honorable Norberto Romualdez on March 14, 1913 under Decree No. 10139, which
belongs to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo. Thus, the Complaint[27]
in Intervention prayed that the RTC’s Decision be reconsidered; that the
legitimacy and superiority of OCT 779 be upheld; and that the subject property
be declared as belonging to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo.
In its Order[28]
dated March 13, 2001, the RTC, through Acting Judge Modesto
C. Juanson (Judge Juanson), denied Atty. Pulumbarit’s Motion for Intervention
because a judgment had already been rendered pursuant to Section 2,[29]
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On April 10,
2001, the RTC issued an Order[30]
stating that there appeared to be a need for a clarificatory hearing before it
could act on DBT's Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, a hearing was held on May
17, 2001. Thereafter, supplemental memoranda were required of the parties.[31] Both parties complied.[32]
However, having found that the original copy of TCT No. 200519 was not
submitted to it for comparison with the photocopy thereof on file, the RTC
directed DBT to present the original or certified true copy of the TCT on
August 21, 2001.[33] Respondents moved to reconsider the said
directive[34]
but the same was denied.[35]
DBT, on the other hand, manifested that
a copy of TCT No. 200519, consisting of 17 pages, had already been admitted in
evidence; and that because of the fire in the Office of the RD in
On November 8,
2001, the RTC, through Judge Juanson, issued an Order[37]
reversing the earlier RTC Decision and dismissing the Complaint for lack of
merit. The RTC held that prescription does not run against registered land;
hence, a title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open or
notorious possession. Moreover, the RTC opined that even if the subject
property could be acquired by prescription, respondents' action was already
barred by prescription and/or laches because they never asserted their rights when
B.C. Regalado registered the subject property in 1974; and later developed,
subdivided and sold the same to individual lot buyers.
On December 18,
2001, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[38]
which the RTC denied in its Order[39]
dated June 17, 2002. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA.[40]
The CA's Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the CA reversed
and set aside the RTC Orders dated November 8, 2001 and June 17, 2002 and
reinstated the RTC Decision dated June 15, 2000. The CA held that the
properties described and included in TCT No. 200519 are located in San
Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and Cubao,
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[42]
which was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution[43]
dated February 22, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
Petitioner
raises the following as grounds for this Petition:
I.
PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO ALLEGE PRESCRIPTION IN ITS ANSWER IS NOT A WAIVER OF SUCH DEFENSE.
II.
IT IS NOT ERRONEOUS TO REQUIRE THE PRODUCTION OF A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF TCT NO. 200519 AFTER THE DECISION ON THE MERITS HAS BEEN RENDERED BUT BEFORE IT BECAME FINAL.
III.
A REGISTERED LAND CAN NOT BE ACQUIRED BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.
IV.
THE TESTIMONY OF ENGR. VERTUDAZO ON THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION OF
V.
MR. PANES HAS NEVER BEEN IN OPEN, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.[44]
Distilled from the petition and the responsive
pleadings, and culled from the arguments of the parties, the issues may be
reduced to two questions, namely:
1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of
prescription and laches as raised in the latter's Motion for Reconsideration?
2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a
better right over the subject property?
Our Ruling
We answer the first question in the
affirmative.
It is true that in Dino v. Court of Appeals[45] we ruled:
(T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, [f] Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez; 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, one of the inherent powers of
courts is to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to
law and justice. This includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in
its opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and adherence to its
decision would cause injustice.[46]
Thus, the RTC in its Order dated
November 8, 2001 could validly entertain the defenses of prescription and
laches in DBT's motion for reconsideration.
However, the conclusion reached by the
RTC in its assailed Order was erroneous. The RTC failed to consider that the
action filed before it was not simply for reconveyance but an action for
quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
Verily, an action for reconveyance can
be barred by prescription. When an action for reconveyance is based on fraud,
it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and such
discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original
certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the
issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of title.
The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD
constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery
of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration.[47]
However, the prescriptive period
applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If the plaintiff, as the real owner of the
property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to
recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such
a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.[48] Thus, in
Vda. de Gualberto v. Go,[49]
this Court held:
[A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Insofar as
Ricaredo and his son, Angelito, are concerned, they established in their
testimonies that, for some time, they possessed the subject property and that
Angelito bought a house within the subject property in 1987.[50]
Thus, the respondents are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of
title because persons having legal, as well as equitable, title to or interest
in a real property may bring such action, and “title” here does not necessarily
denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit.[51]
Although prescription and laches are
distinct concepts, we have held, nonetheless, that in some instances, the
doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was filed within the
prescriptive period provided by law. Therefore, laches will not apply to this
case, because respondents' possession of the subject property has rendered
their right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and,
hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity,
acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and
unequivocal so as to avoid injustice. Laches
will operate not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but
rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation.[52]
Albeit the conclusion of the RTC in its
Order dated November 8, 2001, which dismissed respondents' complaint on grounds
of prescription and laches, may have been erroneous, we, nevertheless, resolve
the second question in favor of DBT.
It is a well-entrenched rule in this
jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[53]
Article 1126[54]
of the Civil Code in connection with Section 46[55]
of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 47[56]
of P.D. No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree), clearly supports this rule.
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also
against his hereditary successors. Possession is a mere consequence of
ownership where land has been registered under the
Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive
prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the
Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the
Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No.
496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.
Consequently, in the instant case, proof
of possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.[58]
Moreover, it may be stressed that there
was no ample proof that DBT participated in the alleged fraud. While factual
issues are admittedly not within the province of this Court, as it is not a
trier of facts and is not required to re-examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence anew, we have the authority to review and, in proper
cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts when the findings of fact
of the trial court are in conflict with those of the appellate court.[59] In
this regard, we reviewed the records of this case and found no clear evidence
that DBT participated in the fraudulent scheme.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[60] this Court gave due importance to the fact
that the private respondent therein did not participate in the fraud averred.
We accord the same benefit to DBT in this case. To add, DBT is an innocent
purchaser for value and good faith which, through a dacion
en pago duly entered into with B.C. Regalado, acquired
ownership
over the subject property, and whose rights must be protected under Section 32[61]
of P.D. No. 1529.
Dacion
en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by
the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the
obligation. It is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another
thing to the creditor, who accepts it as an equivalent of the payment of an
outstanding debt. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an objective novation
of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the
performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of
sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price.[62]
It must also be noted that portions of
the subject property had already been sold to third persons who, like DBT, are
innocent purchasers in good faith and for value, relying on the certificates of
title shown to them, and who had no knowledge of any defect in the title of the
vendor, or of facts sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the subject property.[63]
To disregard these circumstances simply on the basis of alleged continuous and
adverse possession of respondents would not only be inimical to the rights of
the aforementioned titleholders, but would ultimately wreak havoc on the
stability of the
A final note.
While the Torrens system is not a mode
of acquiring title, but merely a system of registration of titles to lands,
justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the
absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons. The real purpose of the
WHEREFORE, the
instant Petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated October 25, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
hereby entered DISMISSING the Complaint filed by the respondents for
lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and
the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-19.
[2] Particularly
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75550, penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello,
Jr., with Associate Justices Regalado E.
Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; rollo,
pp. 22-36.
[3] Rollo, pp. 82-85.
[4] Records, Vol. 1, p. 15.
[5] Records, Vol. 3, pp. 723-739.
[6]
[7] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-13.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] In the pleadings filed by respondents, they alleged that the aforementioned TCT bore the number 211152. However, a perusal of the said title reveals that the TCT bears the number 211132; Records, Vol. 1, p. 288.
[15] Records, Vol. 1, p. 290.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Penned by former RTC Judge Oscar Leviste.
[22] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 355-358.
[23] Rollo, pp. 56-61.
[24] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 709-710.
[25] Records, Vol. 3, pp. 799-808.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] SEC. 2. Time to intervene.- The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
[30] Records, Vol. 3, p. 867.
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37] Rollo, pp. 82-85.
[38]
[39]
[40] Records, Vol. 3, pp. 939-940.
[41] Supra note 2.
[42] Rollo, pp. 150-163.
[43]
[45] 411 Phil. 594, 603-604 (2001), citing Gicano v. Gegato, No. L-63575, January 20, 1988, 157 SCRA 140.
[46] Mauricio v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 164635, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 323, 331, citing Tocao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127405, September 20, 2001, 365 SCRA 463, 464; and Astraquillo v. Javier, G.R. No. L-20034, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 125.
[47] Millena v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil.
132, 138 (2000).
[48] Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas
Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898, June 8,
2007, 524 SCRA 492, 494.
[49]
G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 671, 681, citing Development Bank of the Phils. v. CA, G.R. No. 129471, April 28,
2000, 331 SCRA 267, 270.
[50] TSN, February 2, 1996, pp. 53-55.
[51]
Art. 477, New Civil Code; Mamadsual v.
Moson, G.R. No. 92557, September
27, 1990, 190 SCRA 82, 89.
[52] Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 430 (2000).
[53]
Abadiano v. Martir, G.R. No. 156310, July 31, 2008, 560 SCRA 676, 693; Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 146823, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 136, 148; Alcantara-Daus
v. Sps. De Leon, 452 Phil. 92, 102 (2003); Velez, Sr. v. Rev. Demetrio, 436 Phil. 1, 9 (2002); Villegas v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil.
791, 801 (2001); Bishop v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 636, 641; and Barcelona, et. al. v.
[54] ARTICLE 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary prescription of ownership or real rights shall not take place to the prejudice of a third person, except in virtue of another title also recorded; and the time shall begin to run from the recording of the latter.
As to the lands registered under the Land Registration Act, the provisions of that special law shall govern.
[55] SECTION 46. No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
[56] SECTION 47. Registered land not subject to prescription. — No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
[57] Gallardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-67742, October 29, 1987, 155 SCRA 248, 260. (Citations omitted)
[58] Feliciano v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 162593, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 182, 197, citing Natalia Realty Corporation v. Vallez, et al., G.R. Nos. 78290-94, May 23, 1989, 173 SCRA 534.
[59] Tan v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 134, 141-142 (2001).
[60] G.R. No. 116111, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 366, 370.
[61]
SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration;
Innocent purchaser for value. — The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any
person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper
Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of
such decree of registration, but in no
case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser
for value has acquired the land or an interest therein whose rights may be
prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in
any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or
any other person responsible for the fraud (Emphasis supplied).
[62] Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111544, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 424, 438. (Citations omitted)
[63] Agag v. Alpha Financing Corporation, G.R. No. 154826, July 31, 2003, 407 SCRA 602, 610.
[64] Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424, 445.
[65] Republic v. Orfinada, Sr., G.R. No. 141145, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 342,
359, citing Heirs of Spouses Benito Gavino and Juana Euste v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 120154, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 495, 509.