Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
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GLORIA
OCAMPO and TERESITA TAN,
Petitioners, - versus - LAND BANK OF THE Respondents. |
G.R. No. 164968 Present:
Ynares-Santiago,
J., Chairperson, chico-nazario, VELASCO, Jr., nachura, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: July 3, 2009
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I O N PERALTA, J.: |
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This
Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Court of Appeals Decision[1]
dated July 21, 2004, in CA-G.R. CV No. 77683, which reversed and set aside the
March 18, 2002 Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, in Civil Case
No. U-7095.
The
facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In
1991, Gloria Ocampo and her daughter, Teresita Tan, obtained from the Land Bank
of the Philippines a P10,000,000.00[3]
loan (herein referred to as quedan loan), which was released to them on the
following dates: P3,996,000.00 on
January 31, 1991, upon the issuance of promissory note (PN) Nos. 91-038 and
98-039,[4] to
mature on July 30, 1991; P6,000,000.00, on April 5, 1991, upon the
issuance of PN Nos. 91-054, 91-055 and 91-056,[5] to
mature on October 2, 1991.
Ocampo
and Tan availed of the Quedan Financing Program for Grain Stocks of the Quedan
and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation[6]
(Quedancor), whereby the latter guaranteed to pay the Land Bank their loan,
upon maturity, in case of
non-payment. Pursuant thereto, they delivered
to the Land Bank several grains
warehouse receipts (quedans), and executed a Deed of Assignment/Contract of
Pledge covering 41,690 cavans of palay.[7]
The
liability of Quedancor, however, was limited to eighty percent (80%) of the
outstanding loan plus interests at the time of maturity.[8] Corollarily, the quedans delivered by Ocampo
and Tan, as security, turned out to be insufficient. To address the matter, the Land Bank wrote
Ocampo a letter[9] dated
Accordingly,
Ocampo and Tan constituted a real estate mortgage[10]
over two parcels of unregistered land owned by Ocampo, as evidenced by Tax
Declaration (TD) Nos. 6958 and 6959[11]
(subsequently canceled and replaced by TD No. 317-A).[12] The mortgage was executed on
Meanwhile,
Ocampo filed with the RTC, Branch 49, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, a case for the
registration of the subject properties, docketed as Land Registration Case No.
U-1116. Land Bank filed therein a Motion,[13] praying for the RTC to take into consideration
the mortgage over the properties, and to register the same in Ocampo's name
bearing the said encumbrance.
On
P100,000.00 as partial payment
of the quedan loan.[14] After the maturity of the remaining three
(3) promissory notes on
As
regards the 20% portion of the quedan loan, Land Bank filed on
On
May 25, 2000, Ocampo and Tan filed with the RTC a Complaint[18]
for Declaration of Nullity and Damages with Application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against the Land Bank of the Philippines and the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan, praying[19]
that after due notice and hearing on the merits, the RTC: (1) declare the deed
of real estate mortgage null and void; (2) declare the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings and notice of extrajudicial sale, null and void; (3)
make the writ of preliminary injunction permanent; and (4) order the defendants
to pay, jointly and severally, moral damages in an amount to be fixed by the
RTC, plus attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, among others.
In
their Complaint, Ocampo and Tan claimed that the real estate mortgage is a
forgery, because Land Bank did not inform them that the properties would be
used to secure the payment of a P2,000,000.00 loan, which they never
applied for, much less received its proceeds.
They also claimed that Tan could not have mortgaged the properties since
she does not own the same.
During
the trial,[20] Ocampo
narrated that, on P5,000,000.00, but only P1,000,000.00 was approved. Not amenable to the said amount, she decided
not to pursue her loan application. She
further narrated that, in order to facilitate her P5,000,000.00 loan
application, she signed a document denominated as Real Estate Mortgage. She insisted, however, that when she affixed
her signature thereon, some portions were still in blank.[21] As for the quedan loan, she contended
that she had fully paid the same when she executed a Deed of Absolute
Assignment[22] dated
In
its Answer,[25] Land
Bank contended that Ocampo and Tan executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
dated
Land
Bank presented as its witness, Zenaida Dasig, the assigned account officer of
Ocampo. Dasig testified[26]
that Ocampo and Tan obtained a P10,000,000.00 quedan loan from the Land
Bank, 80% of which was secured by quedan receipts. She stated that Ocampo was required to
submit an additional collateral for the 20% unsecured portion, which she did
through the mortgage contract. As for
Ocampo's claim of full payment of the quedan loan, Land Bank insisted
otherwise. It argued that the quedan
loan was still not fully satisfied because it was not made a party to the Deed
of Absolute Assignment between Ocampo and Quedancor. Land Bank relayed its position on the matter
through a letter[27] dated
On
After the trial, the RTC rendered a Decision[29]
in favor of Ocampo and Tan, to wit:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment declaring the Real Estate
Mortgage between the Plaintiffs and Defendant [Land] Bank of the
Land
Bank moved for reconsideration,[31]
but the RTC denied the same in its Order[32]
dated
Land
Bank filed an appeal with the CA, which granted the same. Accordingly, it reversed the RTC and ordered
the dismissal of the complaint. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated March 18, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45 of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[33]
Ocampo
and Tan did not file a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. Instead, they elevated the matter before the
Court via the present petition,[34]
which involves the following issues: (1) whether or not the deed of real estate
mortgage was void; and (2) assuming that it was valid, whether or not the loan
was already extinguished.
The
resolution of the first issue is factual in nature and calls for a review of
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. As a general rule, the Court is not a trier
of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.[35] Only errors of law are reviewable by the
Supreme Court on petitions for review.[36] However, this rule admits of several
exceptions, wherein We disregarded the aforesaid tenet and proceeded to review
the findings of facts of the lower courts.[37] Two
exceptions are present in this case, namely: (1) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; and (2) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.
Ocampo
and Tan filed the complaint invoking the nullity of the real estate mortgage on
the ground of forgery. To bolster their
claim, they averred that a physical examination of Ocampo's signature showed
that the typewritten name “Gloria Ocampo” was superimposed, or it overlapped
the signature “Gloria Ocampo.” They argued that this indicated that the
signature “Gloria Ocampo” was affixed to the printed form of the deed before
the typewritten “Gloria Ocampo” was typed thereon. Such also confirmed the testimony of Ocampo
that she was made to sign a blank form before the typewritten parts thereof
were typed.[38]
Forgery is present when
any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s name with intent to
defraud.[39] Here, Ocampo admitted that she
had affixed her signature to a Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage purportedly as a prefatory act to a P5,000,000.00
loan application. In her direct
examination,[40] she
testified as follows:
ATTY.
TANOPO: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. Mrs. Ocampo, I show you
here a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage purportedly executed by you and the Land
Bank of the Philippines, which has already been marked for purposes of
identification as Exhibit “6” for the defendants, and I point to you a
signature which overlapped (sic) the typewritten name Gloria Ocampo, will you
inform this Honorable Court, whose signature is that which overlaps the
typewritten name Gloria Ocampo?
A. That is my signature, sir.
ATTY. TANOPO:
Q. Now, in your complaint, you claim or alleged that this mortgage is a forgery, notwithstanding the fact that you admitted that the signature overlapped the typewritten Gloria Ocampo is your signature. Kindly inform the court why is this a forgery?
A. Because they made me sign a blank form, sir.
Q. Why were you made to sign a blank form by the bank?
A. Because that was the procedure of the bank, letting them sign blank forms for the loan.
x x x x
COURT:
Q. Madam Witness, what do you mean by blank form? It would seem that the exhibit is not blank?
A. They showed us blank instrument for us to sign before we can obtain the loan, your Honor.
Q. You mean to say in
blank form, the form is not filled up although there are printed statements, is
that correct?
A. Yes,
sir.
Corollarily,
Ocampo's signature in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was not forged. We agree with the CA when it held that there
is really no reason to discuss forgery.[41] Notably, Ocampo and Tan failed to present
any evidence to disprove the genuineness or authenticity of their signatures.[42] A perusal of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
dated
It is well settled
that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that
enjoys the presumption of regularity.
It is a prima facie evidence
of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its
existence and due execution. To
overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and
convincing. Absent such evidence, the
presumption must be upheld. In
addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where one’s signature
appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the
notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act.[43] We have also held that a notarized instrument is admissible in
evidence without further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the
truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity.[44]
Ocampo denied having appeared before
the notary public.[45]
When asked further by the RTC if she was certain, she replied that she cannot
remember if she had indeed appeared before the notary public.[46] She also denied knowing Zenaida Dasig but
she knew Julita Orpiano, who, according to her, was in-charge of the loan in
Land Bank.[47] Contrary to Ocampo's claims, Dasig narrated
that Ocampo signed the real estate mortgage in the presence of the notary
public[48]
because she was also present during that time.[49] As Land Bank's account officer, Dasig was
tasked to evaluate loan
applications and projects related thereto, for proposal as to viability and
profitability, including the renewal of credit lines for management
approval. As such, she was not only
vested with knowledge of banking procedures and practices, she was also
acquainted with the individuals who transact business with the Land Bank.
The
real issue here is not so much on forgery, but on the fact that the Land Bank allegedly used the genuine
signature of Ocampo in order to make it appear that she had executed a real
estate mortgage to secure a P2,000,000.00 loan. Ocampo maintained that when she signed the
blank form, she was led to believe by the Land Bank that such would be used
to process her P5,000,000.00 loan
application. She was, therefore,
surprised when she received a notice from the sheriff regarding the foreclosure
of a mortgage over her properties.
Article 1338 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
Verily, fraud refers to all kinds of
deception -- whether through insidious machination, manipulation, concealment
or misrepresentation -- that would lead an ordinarily prudent person into error
after taking the circumstances into account.[50] The deceit employed must be serious. It must be sufficient to impress or lead an
ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the circumstances of
each case.[51]
Unfortunately,
Ocampo was unable to establish clearly and precisely how the Land Bank
committed the alleged fraud. She failed
to convince Us that she was deceived, through misrepresentations and/or insidious
actions, into signing a blank form for use as security to her previous
loan. Quite the contrary, circumstances
indicate the weakness of her submissions.
The Court of Appeals aptly held that:
Granting,
for the sake of argument, that appellant bank did not apprise the appellees of
the real nature of the real estate mortgage, such stratagem, deceit or
misrepresentations employed by defendant bank are facts constitutive of fraud
which is defined in Article 1338 of the Civil Code as that insidious words or
machinations of one of the contracting parties, by which the other is induced
to enter into a contract which without them, he would not have agreed to. When fraud is employed to obtain the consent
of the other party to enter into a contract, the resulting contract is merely a
voidable contract, that is a valid and subsisting contract until annulled or
set aside by a competent court. It must
be remembered that an action to declare a contract null and void on the ground
of fraud must be instituted within four years from the date of discovery of
fraud. In this case, it is presumed
that the appellees must have discovered the alleged fraud since 1991 at the
time when the real estate mortgage was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. The appellees
cannot now feign ignorance about the execution of the real estate mortgage.[52]
In
fine, We hold that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was valid.
Anent
the second issue, We also resolve the same against Ocampo and Tan and,
consequently, hold that the loan obligation was not yet extinguished.
Ocampo
claimed that she had already paid the quedan loan when she assigned parcels of
land covered by three (3) transfer certificates of title in favor of Quedancor,
as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Assignment,[53]
to wit:
WHEREAS,
the ASSIGNOR acknowledges to be justly indebted to the ASSIGNEE in the total
sum of NINE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND P9,996,000.00
exclusive of interest charges.
WHEREAS, the ASSIGNOR, in full settlement thereof has voluntarily offered to assign and convey certain properties belonging to her and the ASSIGNEE indicated his willingness to accept the same;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of NINE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND representing the total obligation owing to the ASSIGNEE by the ASSIGNOR does hereby sede (sic), assign, transfer and convey in a manner absolute and irrevocable in favor of the said ASSIGNEE the following property/ies free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, x x x
The
essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property has been
identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor
as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to
answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default of payment.[54] In the case before Us, the loan amount was
established. It was also admitted that
80% was guaranteed by Quedancor, while the remaining 20%, by the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage. Finally, the records
show that Ocampo and Tan obtained the loan from the Land Bank and it was the
latter which released the loan proceeds.
We
cannot countenance Ocampo's actions in order to justify her alleged full
payment of the quedan loan. The loan
was between her and the Land Bank; yet, she did not include the latter as party
to the Deed of Absolute Assignment, for the following reasons: that it was
Quedancor which collected from her and that, once, when she went to the Land
Bank to pay her loan, the person she approached merely smiled at her.[55] Her justifications were flimsy and
incredulous. Moreover, there are other
evidence on record which she chose to ignore, showing her indebtedness to the
Land Bank, and not to Quedancor, to wit: (1) she delivered the TDs on her
properties as well as the survey plan to the Land Bank; (2) the mortgage was
annotated on TD Nos. 6958 and 6959, and subsequently, on TD 317-A; (3) the Land
Bank registered the mortgage with the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan;
(4) she used TD No. 317-A in her application for the registration of her
properties before the cadastral court; (5) the Land Bank even filed a motion in
the land registration case so that the mortgage will be considered and noted as
encumbrance on the properties; and (6) she paid Land Bank, by way of debit
advices, in the amount of P100,000.00.
All
the above circumstances, notwithstanding, Ocampo hastily executed the Deed of Absolute Assignment and
conveyed some of her properties to Quedancor without prior notice to the Land Bank.
In
the case of Vda. De Jayme v. Court of Appeals,[56] We held that
dacion en pago is the
delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor
as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. Thus, it is a special mode of payment where
the debtor offers another thing to the creditor, who accepts it as equivalent
of payment of an outstanding debt, which undertaking, in one sense, amounts to
a sale. As such, the essential
elements are consent, object certain, and cause or consideration. In its modern concept, what actually takes
place in dacion en pago is an
objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of
the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any case, common consent is an essential
prerequisite, be it sale or
novation, to have the effect of
totally extinguishing the debt or obligation.
The requisite consent is not present in this case, for as
explained by the Court of Appeals:
x x x True, the plaintiffs-appellees executed a Deed
of Assignment. But what does the said
deed guarantee? The Deed of Assignment
referred to was entered into between Quedan [Guarantee] Fund Board and the
plaintiffs-appellees. The appellant
creditor bank, however, had no participation, or much less, consented to the
execution of the said deed of assignment.
Hence, the deed of assignment cannot have the valid effect of
extinguishing the real estate mortgage or much less the quedan loan insofar as
the creditor bank is concerned. Basic
is the rule that in order to have a
valid payment, the payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the
obligation is constituted, or his successor-in-interest, or any person
authorized to receive it. Why then did
the plaintiff Gloria Ocampo assigned (sic) her properties to a guarantor and
not directly to the creditor bank? The
pre-trial order will readily disclose that the Quedan [Guarantee] Fund Board is
a mere guarantor or surety of 80% of the quedan loan. Thus, even if the deed of assignment has the
effect of a valid payment, we may reasonably conclude that the extinguishment is
only up to the extent of 80% of the quedan loan. Thus, it leaves the balance of 20% of the
quedan loan which can be fully satisfied by the foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage.[57]
In a civil
case, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case through a
preponderance of evidence. If he claims
a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence.[58] After
considering the evidence presented by the parties, as well as their arguments
in their respective pleadings, We hold that petitioners Ocampo and Tan failed
to sufficiently establish their cause of action. Consequently, their complaint should have
been dismissed by the RTC.
One more thing. Ocampo is a businesswoman
and she had testified that she had availed of loans from other banks. The amount involved was not a measly
amount. Verily, she is expected to be
acquainted with the banking procedures as regards to loan applications. With this premise, she ought to have read
the terms and conditions of the document that she was signing, especially so
when, as claimed by her, there were still blank spaces at that time when she
affixed her signature thereon. Finally,
We believe that she must also be
familiar with the manner by which the loans should be paid and settled; yet,
that was not what happened here. The
Court has always maintained its impartiality as early as in the case of Vales v. Villa,[59]
and has warned litigants that:
x x x The law furnishes no protection to the inferior simply because he is inferior any more than it protects the strong because he is strong. The law furnishes protection to both alike – to one no more or less than the other. It makes no distinction between the wise and the foolish, the great and the small, the strong and the weak. The foolish may lose all they have to the wise; but that does not mean that the law will give it back to them again. Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. x x x[60]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring, rollo, pp. 25-32.
[2] Penned by Judge Joven F. Costales; rollo, pp. 83-98.
[3] Based on the five (5) promissory
notes, the total amount released was P9,996,000.00.
[4] Records, pp. 202-203.
[5]
[6] Then Quedan Guarantee Fund Board.
[7] CA rollo, p. 18.
[8]
[9] Records, p. 208.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] TSN,
[15] Records, pp. 131-133. Judge Modesto C. Juanson acquitted Ocampo of the crime charged under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
[16] Entitled,
“Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceeding No. U-1464”; records, pp. 23-24.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] TSN,
[21]
[22] Records , p. 219.
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25]
[26] TSN,
[27] Records, p. 211.
[28]
[29] Supra note 2.
[30] Rollo, p. 98.
[31] Records, pp. 262-263.
[32]
[33] Rollo, p. 32.
[34]
[35] China Banking Corporation, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155299, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 103, 109.
[36] Sering v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil., 467, 471 (2001).
[37] Espino v. Vicente, G.R. No.
168396,
[38] Memorandum for the Plaintiffs, records, pp. 237-244, 240.
[39] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Casa Montessori Internationale, G.R. No. 149454, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 261, 275, citing Agbayani, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Vol I (1989 ed.), p. 191
[40] TSN,
[41] CA Decision, rollo, p. 30.
[42]
[43]
[44] China Banking
Corporation v. Lagon, G.R. No. 160843,
[45] TSN,
[46]
[47]
[48] TSN,
[49] TSN,
[50] Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao
Ferroalloy Corporation, G.R. No.
153535, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 409, 425.
[51] Mayor v. Belen, G.R. No.
151035,
[52] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[53] Supra note 22.
[54] China Banking Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 121158, December 5, 1996, 265 SCRA 327, 340-341.
[55] TSN,
[56] G.R. No. 128669, October 4, 2002,
390 SCRA 380, 392-393, citing Tolentino, CIVIL CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES Vol. IV (1991), citing 2 Castan, 525; 8 Manresa 324; Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Philippine
Acetylene Co. Inc., 111 SCRA 421 (1982).
[57] Rollo, p. 32.
[58] Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation v. Marcopper Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 170738,
[59] 35 Phil. 769 (1916).
[60]