|
SPS.
ELIZABETH S. TAGLE & ERNESTO R. TAGLE,
Petitioners, -versus- HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, RTC, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 162738 Present: pUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and BRION,* JJ. Promulgated: July
8, 2009 |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
certiorari assailing the August 4, 2003 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75707, upholding the Orders issued
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97, dated October 25,
2001[2]
and December 16, 2002[3]
which respectively denied petitioners’ Motion
to Set Aside /Annul Public Auctions dated July 18, 2002 and Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 27, 2002.
The present controversy stemmed from
the execution of a favorable judgment in the civil case for rescission of
contract filed by respondent spouses Federico and Rosamyrna Carandang (the
Carandangs) against petitioner spouses Ernesto and Elizabeth Tagle (the
Tagles). As culled from the records, the
factual and procedural antecedents of this case follow:
Sometime in 1984, the Carandangs
mortgaged several properties with the Philippine Banking Corporation
(PBC). Among those mortgaged and subject
of the present controversy is a house and lot located in White Plains, Quezon
City. Unable to pay their mortgage
obligation, the Carandangs ceded or assigned the subject property, among
others, to PBC by way of a Dacion En Pago
with Right to Repurchase.[4] Under the said agreement, the Carandangs were given the right or option to repurchase the
property within two (2) years from the date of the agreement but this period
was later extended by the bank until February 16, 1990.
On January 26, 1989, the parties
herein executed a Contract to Sell[5]
involving the White Plains property for P 4.5 million and thereupon the
Tagles issued a check for P1 million in favor of the Carandangs. The Carandangs, in turn, delivered said amount
to PBC as partial payment of the redemption/repurchase price and surrendered
possession of the property to the Tagles.
Since the
property was still to be redeemed from PBC, the parties executed another
contract on March 31, 1989, this time, the Carandangs, by virtue of a Deed of Assignment,[6]
sold the right to repurchase the subject property to the Tagles. The Deed of Assignment superseded the
Contract to Sell. Hence, pursuant to the Deed of Assignment, the Tagles would
be able to acquire title to the property upon payment of the redemption price
as they would step into the shoes of the Carandangs.
The Carandangs submitted the Deed of
Assignment to PBC for acceptance and approval and in a letter[7]
dated April 4, 1989, PBC conveyed its acceptance and approval of the same.
However, the sale and conveyance of
the title to the property were protracted by several factors one of which was
the fact that the title of the subject property needed to be reconstituted
because it was among those gutted by the fire which razed the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Quezon City.
Upon reconstitution of the title in
June 1991, a meeting was held among PBC and the parties to discuss the payment
scheme. At this point, the Tagles
insisted that the dacion be
registered and a Deed of Sale executed between them and PBC. They said they would pay PBC directly but
asked for a more liberal term of payment because they did not have sufficient
funds to pay the bank the full amount.
On March 20, 1992,
PBC and the Tagles executed a Deed of Absolute P2,934,884.96. This deed made no mention of the parties’
prior Deed of Assignment because the Tagles refused to sign unless any
reference thereto was removed.
Having dealt with
PBC directly, the Tagles refused to honor their obligation to the Carandangs
under the Deed of Assignment. Hence, on
September 26, 1991, the Carandangs filed a complaint for rescission of contract
against the Tagles in the RTC of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q91-10092. The complaint sought
payment of the balance of their obligation to the Carandangs under the Deed of
Assignment.
After trial, the RTC decided in favor
of petitioners and ordered respondents to reimburse the down payment given to
them.
However, on appeal, the CA reversed
the decision of the RTC and declared that the Tagles were bound by the parties’
Deed of Assignment.[9] The CA decision in CA G.R. CV No. 46256 was
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from
is hereby REVERSED, and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the defendant-appellees [Tagles] to pay to the plaintiffs-appellants
[Carandangs] the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTEEN
AND 04/100 PESOS (P445,115.04), with interest thereon at the legal rate
from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid. (Words in
brackets ours)
SO ORDERED.
The Tagles’ subsequent motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the CA, they elevated the case to this
Court through a petition for review on certiorari. In a Resolution dated October 29, 1998,[10]
the Court denied said petition for being insufficient in form and substance. This resolution became final and executory on December 9, 1998 and entry of judgment was
made in due course.[11]
Upon motion of the Carandangs, the
RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Thereafter, the branch clerk of court ordered
the sheriff to implement the final and executory decision in CA G.R. CV No.
46256. In the process, certain personal
properties of the Tagles consisting of various paintings and artworks of petitioner
Ernesto R. Tagle were sold at public auction on August 9, 2000 for the amount
of P62,000.00 which resulted in the issuance of a certificate of sale to
the Carandangs as the only bidder. It
was followed by another auction sale on September 27, 2000 of Tagle’s properties,
again consisting of various paintings and artworks which were sold for the
amount of P189,500.00.
On August 3, 2001, the Tagles filed
an urgent motion and opposition to execution, praying for the return of the
artworks levied upon and in lieu thereof, to accept payment of P400,000.00
as satisfaction of the CA decision in CA G.R. CV No. 46256, but this motion was
denied by the RTC in a resolution dated December 7, 2001.
On June 3, 2002, the Carandangs filed
a motion to fix balance of the Tagles’s judgment debt by submitting certain
guidelines in computing the judgment debt.
Meanwhile, on June 5, 2002, the
sheriff issued a notice of sale on execution of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 59497 in the name of the Tagles.
On July 18, 2002, the Tagles filed a
comment/opposition to the motion to fix balance of their judgment debt with
motion to set aside/annul public auctions.
On October 25, 2002, the RTC fixed the
Tagles’ judgment debt at P558,461.00, but denied their motion to set
aside/annul auction sale.
A motion for an order directing the
sale of the property under execution was filed and granted in an order dated
January 17, 2003.
Displeased, the Tagles filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion
when it upheld the regularity and validity of the August 9, 2000 and September
27, 2000 public auctions despite (a) the alleged lack of written notice to them
in violation of Section 15, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (the
“Rules”) and (b) the shockingly inadequate proceeds thereof.
In the decision dated August 4, 2003,
the CA dismissed the petition declaring, in essence, that the Tagles were duly
notified of the questioned auction sales and the purported inadequacy of the
sale price in such auction sales is immaterial to the validity of the sale.
Hence, the Tagles appeal to this
Court via the present petition. Unfortunately, we cannot uphold their claims therein.
First, petitioners assert that they
never received written notices of the August 9, 2000 and September 27, 2000
public auctions as required by the Rules.
However, their denial is belied by the record.
With respect to the August 9, 2000
public auction, petitioners argue that the written notice of sale served on
their private secretary is invalid.
According to petitioners, the notice served on their secretary was in
violation of Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules which purportedly requires that
the notice of sale be given to the judgment debtor and no other person.
We do not agree. Section 15, Rule 39
states:
SEC. 15. Notice of sale of property on execution. Before the sale of property on execution, notice thereof must be given as follows:
(a) In case of perishable property, by posting written notice of the time and place of the sale in three (3) public places, preferably in conspicuous areas of the municipal or city hall, post office and public market in the municipality or city where the sale is to take place, for such time as may be reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property;
(b) In case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in the three (3) public places above-mentioned for not less than five (5) days;
(c) In case of real property, by posting for twenty (20) days in the three (3) public places above-mentioned a similar notice particularly describing the property and stating where the property is to be sold, and if the assessed value of the property exceeds fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, by publishing a copy of the notice once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in one newspaper selected by raffle, whether in English, Filipino, or any major regional language published, edited and circulated or, in the absence thereof, having general circulation in the province or city;
(d) In all cases, written notice of the sale shall be given to the judgment obligor, at least three (3) days before the sale, except as provided in paragraph (a) hereof where notice shall be given at any time before the sale, in the same manner as personal service of pleadings and other papers as provided by Section 6 of Rule 13.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)
Section 15(d) of Rule 39, cited by
petitioners must be read in relation to Section 6, Rule 13, which in turn
provides:
Sec. 6. Personal service. Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. (emphasis ours)
Verily,
following Section 6, Rule 13, the written notice of sale to the judgment
obligor need not be personally served on the judgment obligor himself. It may be served on his counsel, or by
leaving the notice in his office with his clerk or a person having charge
thereof. If there is no one found at the
judgment obligor’s or his counsel’s office or if such office is not
known/inexistent, it may be served at the residence of the judgment obligor or
his counsel and may be received by any person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein. Thus, petitioners’
theory (that only written notice of sale served on petitioners’ themselves
would be valid) is utterly bereft of merit.
Other circumstances on record further
support the finding that petitioners were duly notified of the August 9, 2000
auction sale. It can be gleaned from the Sheriff’s Report[12]
dated August 11, 2000 that a notice of sale was first issued on March 20,
2000. This was a notice for the public
auction of various personal properties initially set on March 28, 2000 but the
sale on said date was postponed upon the request of the parties (including
petitioners) for time to come up with an amicable settlement. When no amicable settlement was reached, the
sheriff issued on July 31, 2000 another notice of sale which was set for August
9, 2000. The report further states that
on the auction sale eventually conducted on August 9, 2000, the Tagles’ son,
Eric Tagle, was present. The Sheriff’s Report
is prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. Indeed, the fact that
petitioners were represented during the auction sale by their son confirmed
that they had actual notice of the said auction sale.
We need not emphasize that the
sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of the
functions of his office.[13]
This presumption prevails in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary and cannot be overcome by bare and self-serving
allegations. There was no showing that
there was any irregularity in the report submitted by the sheriff, neither was
there evidence that the sheriff was remiss in his duty to issue the said
notices.
As for the September 27, 2000
auction, the written notice thereof was served and signed by petitioner Ernesto
Tagle himself.[14] In the light of these circumstances, the
Tagles could not credibly feign ignorance of the contested auction sales.
Second, petitioners contend that the
proceeds of the auction sale were grossly inadequate.
In civil cases, he who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it. Having made such allegation that the proceeds of
the sale were grossly inadequate, the burden of proof was upon them. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. While this Court is
not unaware of petitioner Ernesto Tagle’s reputation as a known artist and
painter, mere claim of his renown in artistic circles is not proof of the
purported high value of his artwork and pieces that were auctioned or of the
inadequacy of the price when such works were sold during the questioned auction
sales. We note that the Tagles presented
several receipts to show the prices at which some of petitioner Ernesto Tagle’s
artworks had allegedly been sold. However,
there was no evidence that the artworks auctioned on execution were of the same
kind or worth as those sold to the buyers indicated in the said receipts. Ergo, there were no bases for comparison for
the value of the works mentioned in the said receipts and the value of those
sold at the execution sales questioned herein. What was incumbent upon petitioners was to
produce independent, competent and credible valuations or appraisals of the
artwork sold during the assailed public auctions in order to substantiate their
claim that the prices at which said paintings and artwork were sold were indeed
grossly inadequate.
Accordingly, the Court finds no grave
abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in upholding the regularity and
validity of the challenged August 9, 2000 and September 27, 2000 public auction
sales.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
|
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Justice Lucas P. Bersamin as per raffle dated June 29, 2009.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria (ret.) with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes and
Regalado
[2] Id. at 142-143.
[3]
[4] CA rollo, pp. 25-28.
[5] Id. at 46-48.
[6]
[7]
[8] Id. at 152-153.
[9] Rollo, pp. 99-112.
[10] Id. at 113.
[11] Id. at 114.
[12] CA rollo, p. 117.
[13] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3(m).
[14] CA rollo, p. 170.