THIRD DIVISION
PETRONILA MAYLEM, Petitioner, |
G.R.
No. 162721 |
|
Present: |
- versus - |
Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, chico-nazario, VELASCO, JR., nachura, and PERALTA, JJ. |
|
|
CARMELITA ELLANO and ANTONIA MORCIENTO, |
Promulgated: |
Respondents. |
|
|
July 13, 2009 |
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PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70431, dated
Well-established are
the following facts.
Since 1963, Bonifacio
Abad had been tenanting a piece of private agricultural land less than a
hectare in size (0.8497 hectare) and situated in
It appears that
petitioner had instituted a certain Francico Morsiento as tenant-farmer to
cultivate the subject land after Abad surrendered his possession,[12] and that as early as 1990, petitioner had
been attempting to spare her landholdings from the operation of the agrarian
reform laws. For one, her 1991
correspondence with the Land Bank of the Philippines shows that she and her
children, as heirs of the deceased Segundino, refused to offer their land for distribution under the Operation
Land Transfer of the
government.[13] It also appears that, sometime in November
1997, petitioner had filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a petition for the retention of a 21,194-sq m
landholding covered by TCT No. T-42515.[14] The records show that said petition was
granted on
In the meantime, as
petitioner refused to return possession of the property, and when it came to
Abad’s knowledge that the same was mortgaged to a third person,[16]
Abad filed on
The Provincial Adjudicator,
nevertheless, proceeded to dispose of the complaint and, on
On appeal, the DARAB,
in its January 17, 2001 Decision,[20]
adopted the findings and conclusions of the Provincial Adjudicator.
Undaunted, petitioner
lodged an appeal[21]
with the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. In its
With the denial of her
motion for reconsideration,[26]
petitioner brought to this Court the present recourse.
In this petition for
review, petitioner advances the notion that while indeed EP No. A-216347 had
been issued in Abad’s name, the same was nevertheless recalled or cancelled
when her petition for retention was granted by the DAR. Hence, she believes that the said land may be
validly surrendered to her, especially in view of the waiver made by Abad of
his rights thereto allegedly for a total consideration of P57,000.00. Raising once again the issue of prescription,
she laments that it is patent from Abad’s complaint that the action had already
prescribed when the complaint was filed in 1997 and, hence, was dismissible on
that ground.
For their part,
respondents[27]
counter that there is no evidence showing that EP No. A-216347 was recalled or
cancelled by the DAR and, thus, Abad cannot be deemed to have abandoned the
landholding in favor of petitioner in a way that would sever the tenancy
relationship, especially considering that Abad merely surrendered possession of
the land temporarily upon petitioner’s promise to return the same to him after
one year. Anent the issue of
prescription, respondents aver that it must be deemed to have been
waived for failure of petitioner to timely raise the same before the DARAB.
The petition is
unmeritorious.
Prefatorily, it is
needless to state that in appeals in agrarian cases, long-standing is the rule
that when the appellate court has confirmed that the findings of fact of the
agrarian courts are borne out by the records, such findings are conclusive and
binding on this Court.[28] In other words, issues of fact that have
already been decided by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, when
supported by substantial evidence, will not be interfered with by this Court or
be reviewed anew, except only upon a showing that there was fraud, collusion,
arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of the department
head or a total lack of substantial evidence to support the decision.[29]
None of these circumstances which would
otherwise require an independent factual evaluation of the issues raised in the
present petition, obtains in this case.
On the contrary, we find that the decision of the DARAB, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, is substantially supported by the evidence on record.
Central to the
resolution of this petition is the undeniable fact that Abad had previously
been granted Emancipation Patent No. A-21347 covering the land in question,
which, in turn, constituted the basis for the issuance in his name of TCT No. T-028668. On this score, we agree with the ruling of
both the DARAB and the Court of Appeals that by reason of such grant, Abad
became the absolute owner in fee simple of the subject agricultural land.
Land transfer under P.D. No. 27 is effected in two
stages: (1) the issuance of a certificate of land transfer to a
farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding to him in
recognition of his being deemed an owner; and (2) the issuance of an emancipation
patent as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the
annual amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary.[30] No principle in agrarian reform law is indeed more
settled than that the issuance of an emancipation patent entitles the
farmer-beneficiary to the vested right of absolute ownership of the
landholding, and it constitutes conclusive authority for the issuance of an
original or transfer certificate of title in his name. It presupposes that the grantee or beneficiary
has, following the issuance of a certificate of land transfer, already complied
with all the preconditions required under P.D. No. 27,[31]
and that the landowner has been fully compensated for his property.[32] And upon the issuance of title, the grantee
becomes the owner of the landholding and he thereby ceases to be a mere tenant
or lessee.[33] His right of ownership, once vested, becomes
fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy.[34] Inescapably, Abad became the owner of the
subject property upon the issuance of the emancipation patents and, as such, enjoys
the right to possess the same—a right that is an attribute of absolute
ownership.[35]
Concededly, petitioner has not, at any time since the start
of the controversy, contested the fact that since the issuance of EP No. A-216347
in favor of Abad, the same has subsisted and remained valid. She, nevertheless,
claims that Abad, in effect, abandoned the subject land in her favor when he agreed
in 1990 to surrender possession thereof to her, allegedly for a monetary consideration. We are not convinced.
Abandonment or
neglect, as a ground for the cancellation of an emancipation patent or
certificate of land award, according to Castellano
v. Spouses Francisco,[36] requires
a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim, or to abandon a
right or property coupled with an external act by which that intention is
expressed or carried into effect. Intention to abandon, as held in Corpuz v. Grospe,[37] implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming
or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. It consists in any
one of these conditions: (a) failure to
cultivate the lot due to reasons other than the non-suitability of the land to
agricultural purposes, for at least two (2) calendar years, and to pay the
amortizations for the same period; (b) permanent transfer of residence by the
beneficiary and his family, which has rendered him incapable of cultivating the
lot; or (c) relinquishment of possession of the lot for at least two (2)
calendar years and failure to pay the amortization for the same period.[38] None of the
instances cited above obtains in this case.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it is thus implausible that the surrender of the land by Abad could be
interpreted as abandonment in contemplation of the law, in view of the understanding
between him and petitioner that the surrender of possession would be merely
temporary. Suffice it to say that the allegation of abandonment is negated by
the undisputed fact that Abad actually demanded the return of the property to
him after the lapse of the one-year period.
Indeed, petitioner’s act of dispossessing Abad of the land
awarded to him was merely calculated to impair the latter’s vested right of
ownership.[39]
More importantly, as holder of an emancipation patent, Abad is
bound by the proscription against transfers of land awards to third persons,
which is prohibited by law. Paragraph 13
of P.D. No. 27 materially states:
Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the
Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by
hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of
this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reform and other existing laws and
regulations.
This prohibition
has been carried over to Section 27 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides:
Section 27. Transferability
of Awarded Lands. – Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may not
be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to
the government, or to the LBP (Land Bank of the Philippines), or to other
qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That
the children or the spouse of the transferor, shall have a right to repurchase
the land from the Government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. x x x
Hence, even if we must assume that Abad for a consideration had
waived his rights to the property when he surrendered possession thereof to
petitioner, such waiver is nevertheless ineffective and void, because it
amounts to a prohibited transfer of the land award. As the Court held in Lapanday Agricultural & Development
Corp. v. Estita,[40] the waiver of rights and interests over
landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being violative of
agrarian reform laws.[41] And in Torres
v. Ventura,[42] the Court declared that the object of
agrarian reform is to vest in the farmer-beneficiary, to the exclusion of
others, the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself;
hence, to insure his continued possession and enjoyment thereof, he is
prohibited by law to make any form of transfer except only to the government or
by hereditary succession.[43]
Moreover, it bears stressing that
petitioner has not shown that she had actually taken positive measures to cause
the cancellation of EP No. A-216347 or, at
least, the certificate of land transfer previously issued to Abad. Nowhere in the records does it appear that a
direct action seeking the cancellation of Abad’s emancipation patent or
certificate of land transfer has ever been formally filed with the DAR
office. A charge of abandonment or
neglect of land awards under the agrarian reform program necessarily requires
factual determination and evaluation by the DARAB, in which is vested the
exclusive and original jurisdiction over the cancellation of emancipation
patents and certificates of land award.[44] In other words, the cancellation of an
emancipation patent does not ipso facto arise from the mere fact that
the grantee has abandoned or neglected to cultivate the land; such fact must be
so declared and the consequent cancellation must be so ordered by competent
authority.[45]
There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s averment that the November
30, 1998 Order[46]
of the DAR, which granted her petition for retention, had the effect of
canceling EP No. A-216347. To begin with, in her petition for
retention, it must be noted that there was no allegation that part of the land
sought to be retained included the property previously awarded to Abad, or that,
at least, petitioner was seeking to place under her retention rights properties
that had already been transferred to farmer-beneficiaries including those
awarded to Abad. What is clear from the
said petition is that petitioner was seeking to spare from being further placed
under the Operation Land Transfer her remaining 2.9194-hectare landholding
covered by TCT No.T-42515[47]—a
title that is different from any of the two TCTs that were issued in favor of
Abad by virtue of his emancipation patents.
More importantly, a
perusal of the DAR Order reveals that nothing therein specifically cancelled or,
at least, ordered the cancellation of Abad’s EP No. A-216347.[48] Hence, we fail to be swayed even by
petitioner’s reliance on a stipulation
in a compromise agreement she allegedly entered into with Abad, whereby they
admitted that the DAR Order directed among others the cancellation of existing
emancipation patents included in the landholding subject of the petition for
retention.[49] Clearly, these arguments are merely
petitioner’s last-ditch attempt to defeat Abad’s right of ownership over the
subject property, which had been vested in him as early as
Anent the issue of
prescription, we find the ruling in Omadle
v. Casuno[50] to
be instructive. That case, likewise,
involved a complaint for recovery of possession filed with the DARAB by farmers
who had already been issued emancipation patents. The complaint, however, was filed a year
after the three-year prescriptive period had lapsed, but the Court—noting that
the complainants therein had already acquired ownership over the property upon
the issuance of the emancipation patents in their names and, hence, had severed
their tenancy relationship with the landowner—held that the prescriptive period
under the agrarian reform law did not apply to them. The Court said:
As to petitioners’ claim that respondents’
(complainants’) cause of action had prescribed, let it be stressed that since
respondents (complainants) have been issued Emancipation Patent No. A-042463
and TCT No. ET-5184 as early as
As a final note, it is useful to reiterate the appellate
court’s conclusion that the registration of Abad’s emancipation patents with
the Register of Deeds in accordance with law had indeed put petitioner on
notice of the fact that Abad had already acquired a vested right of ownership of
the landholding under the agrarian reform law.
This notwithstanding, inasmuch as registration is nothing more than a
mere species of notice, we need not further expound on this subject, since it
is overwhelmingly shown by the records and by petitioner’s own admissions that
she had actual knowledge of the fact that Abad became the absolute owner of the
land in question merely upon the issuance in his favor of EP Nos. A-216347 and
A-216348. Hence, he and his heirs may no
longer be dispossessed of their rights of possession and ownership.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 70431, dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals), with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Arsenio J. Magpale, concurring, rollo, pp. 22-29.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Segundino Maylem allegedly died on
[7] Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor.
[8] Certificate of Land Transfer Nos. 0-69324 and 0-69323; records, pp. 3-4.
[9] Covering 3,959 sq m (0.3959 hectares); id. at 4.
[10] Covering 4,538 sq m (0.4538 hectares); id. at 3.
[11] Records, pp. 70-71; CA rollo, pp. 126-127.
[12] CA rollo, p. 54.
[13] See the
[14] CA rollo, p. 32.
[15] See DAR Order dated
[16] Records, pp. 70-71; CA rollo, pp. 126-127.
[17] Records, pp. 1-2.
[18]
[19] CA rollo, p. 39. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding plaintiff to be now the owner of the land in suit by virtue of the Emancipation Patent issued in his favor;
2. Ordering defendant to surrender possession and cultivation thereof to the plaintiff; and
3.
Ordering defendant to pay actual damages of P126,000.00
and litigation expenses of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 45-48. The DARAB, however, deleted the Provincial Adjudicator’s award of actual damages and litigation expenses. It disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
[21] Via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; CA rollo, pp. 9-18.
[22] CA rollo, p. 130.
[23] The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, effective
[24] Quoting from the decision of the DARAB; CA rollo, pp. 131-132.
[25] CA rollo, p. 132.
[26]
[27] Respondents are the heirs of Bonifacio Abad who substituted the latter upon his death.
[28] Perez-Rosario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140796, 494 SCRA 66, 89, citing Planters Development Bank v. Garcia, 477 SCRA 185 (2005); Milestone Realty and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 431 Phil. 119, 130 (2002).
[29] Dela Cruz v. Abille, 405 Phil 357, 369 (2001), citing Pearson, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 295 SCRA 27, 48 (1998).
[30] Del
Castillo v. Orciga, G.R. No. 153850,
[31] See Omadle v. Casuno, G.R. No. 143362, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 108, 113; Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 9, 1990, 183 SCRA 252, 259.
[32]
See
Coruña
v. Cinamin, G.R. No. 154286,
[33] See Omadle v. Casuno, supra note 31, at 112.
[34] Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, supra note 31, at 259.
[35] De
[36] G.R. No. 155640, May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 63.
[37] 388 Phil. 1100 (2000).
[38] Rules Governing the Correction and Cancellation of Registered/Unregistered Emancipation Patents (EPs), and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) Due to Unlawful Acts and Omissions or Breach of Obligations of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs) and for other causes.
[39] CA rollo, pp. 47, 130.
[40] G.R. No. 162109,
[41]
[42] G.R. No. 86044,
[43]
[44] See R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 50 and DARAB Rules of Procedure (May 30, 1994), Rule II, Sec. 1(f).
[45] See Rovillos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113605,
[46] CA rollo, pp. 57-60.
[47]
[48] The dispositive portion of the
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, ORDER is hereby issued:
1. Granting the herein petitioners right to retain the 2.9194 hectares, more or less, being applied [for] in the instant petition;
2. Directing the MARO concerned to initiate the execution of leasehold contracts by and between the herein petitioners and the tenant-beneficiaries affected;
3. The rights of the tenant-beneficiaries to security of tenure shall be respected by the herein petitioner; and
4. Directing the conduct of a final survey of the retained area.
SO ORDERED. (
[49] Rollo, p. 70. See Compromise Agreement, CA rollo, p. 111. The Compromise Agreement was attached to respondents’ memorandum to the Court of Appeals.
[50] Omadle v. Casuno, supra note 31.
[51]