|
REPUBLIC OF
THE Petitioner, - versus - FERVENTINO U. TANGO, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 161062
Present: Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio Morales, CHICO-NAZARIO,* LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,** and PERALTA,*** JJ. Promulgated: July 31, 2009 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
QUISUMBING, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] dated
The
present controversy arose from the following facts:
On
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a
year before she stopped responding to his letters. Out of resentment, he burned all the letters
Maria wrote him. He claims to have
forgotten her address since.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria.
Upon inquiry from the latter’s uncle,
Antonio Ledesma, in Las Piñas, Ferventino learned that even Maria’s relatives were
unaware of her whereabouts. He also solicited
the assistance of a friend in
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino
filed a verified petition[5] dated
When the case was called for initial hearing on
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered, declaring MARIA JOSE V. VILLARBA, wife of
FERVENTINO U. TANGO, presumptively dead within the meaning of Article 41 of the
Family Code.
SO
ORDERED. [6]
This
prompted the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the Republic, to file a
Notice of Appeal.[7] Acting thereon, Presiding Judge
Romulo SG. Villanueva of the Ligao City RTC had the records of the case
transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
The
Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, affirmed the RTC’s Order. It held that Maria’s absence for 14 years
without information about her location despite diligent search by Ferventino was
sufficient to support a well-founded belief of her death. The appellate court observed that neither the
OSG nor the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor objected to the evidence which Ferventino
presented on trial. It noted, in
particular, that the OSG did not dispute the adequacy of Ferventino’s basis to
engender a well-founded belief that Maria is dead. Hence, in a Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
the appeal is hereby DENIED.
Accordingly, the
SO ORDERED.[8]
Before
us, petitioner anchors this petition for review on certiorari on the following
two grounds:
I.
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT ON THE ALLEGED EFFORTS MADE BY HIS FRIEND
AND RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, IS
HEARSAY AND DEVOID OF PROBATIVE VALUE[; AND]
II.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE AFORESAID TESTIMONY MAY BE CONSIDERED IN
EVIDENCE, THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT’S FRIEND AND RELATIVES IN LOCATING
HIS MISSING WIFE IN SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A
“WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF” THAT RESPONDENT’S ABSENT SPOUSE IS PROBABLY DEAD.[9]
Unadorned, the issues for our determination are: (1) whether the testimony of respondent Ferventino
is hearsay; and (2) whether respondent Ferventino has established a basis to
form a well-founded belief that his absent spouse is already dead.
The Republic, through the OSG, contests the appellate court’s holding
that the absence of respondent’s wife Maria for 14 years provides sufficient
basis to entertain a well-founded belief that she is dead. The OSG discounts respondent’s testimony, on the
steps he took to find Maria, as hearsay because none of the persons who
purportedly helped in his search testified in court. Notably, the OSG observes that only Capt. Aris
gave a detailed account of his efforts to track down Maria. According to Capt. Aris, he went over the
The OSG belittles its failure to object to the admissibility of
respondent’s testimony during trial. Instead,
it invokes Constitutional provisions that advocate the state policy of
preserving marital institutions.
On
Respondent’s apparent lack of desire to pursue
the proceedings notwithstanding, the Court is inclined to rule against the
Republic.
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle
the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the
Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title
XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that
govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART.
238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies
the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART.
253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed
under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they
are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART
247. The judgment of the court shall be
immediately final and executory.
By
express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory.
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may
file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if
the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the
RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction
an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[13]
From the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are
the proper subject of an appeal.[14]
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious
procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead
of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to
said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the
appellate court. By no means did the
Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC which,
by express provision of law, was immediately final and executory.
Adding
to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal and treated the
same as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it were, the Court of Appeals committed
grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the
Republic on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of
the law, the judgment was not appealable.[15]
Before
us, petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode
of appeal at this level, the hands of the Court are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the trial
court had long become final.
Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.[16] In light of the foregoing, it would be
unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised by petitioner.
The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the
judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
on some definite date fixed by law. The
only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the
so-called nunc
pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its
execution unjust and inequitable.[17] None
of the exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought.
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
|
WE CONCUR: CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
||
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
||
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 658.
** Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 635.
*** Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 664.
[1] Rollo, pp. 28-33. Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) concurring.
[2]
[3] Art.
41.
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code,
an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
[4] Records, p. 41.
[5]
[6] Rollo, p. 36.
[7] Records, p. 46.
[8] Rollo, p. 33.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] CA rollo, p. 40.
[13] Flaminiano v. Adriano, G.R. No.
165258,
[14] Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, G.R.
No. 147082,
[15] Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. No.
160258,
[16] Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, supra at 418.
[17]