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ROMEO D. LONZANIDA,
Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent. |
G.R. Nos. 160243-52 Present: pUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated:
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal to this Court by way of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the [1]
Decision[1] of
the Sandiganbayan dated July 25, 2003, convicting petitioner of ten (10) counts
of Falsification of Public Document defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and [2] Resolution[2] dated
September 24, 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Romeo D. Lonzanida, then Municipal
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, was among those criminally charged
with Falsification of Public Document as defined and penalized under Paragraph
2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on separate complaints[3]
filed on various dates by Efren Tayag, Elsie de Dios, Daniel Alegado and Rene
Abad. Also included in the complaints
was Romulo Madarang (Madarang), the Assistant Municipal Treasurer.
The complaints alleged that
petitioner, as Municipal Mayor of
The complaints also alleged that
petitioner notarized thirteen (13) identically worded Joint Affidavits[5]
of two disinterested persons purportedly executed and signed by Rufino Aniceto
who is an illiterate and Roberto Querubin who was already deceased at the time
of their execution.
On March 16, 1998, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor issued a Memorandum[6]
recommending that petitioner be charged with ten (10) counts of falsification,
one for the Joint Affidavits and nine
in connection with the Affidavits of
Ownership. The recommendation was
based upon the finding that of the thirteen (13) affiants in the Affidavits of Ownership, seven (7) were
minors.[7] Hence, their signatures appearing thereon and
the facts stated in the said documents were all false. In addition, two (2) affiants, Efren Tayag
and Elsie de Dios denied their participation in the Affidavits of Ownership.
Thus, ten (10) Informations for
Falsification of Public Document against petitioner were filed before the
Sandiganbayan.
Criminal Case Nos. 24644 to 24652,[8]
except for the names of the alleged affiants of the falsified Affidavits of Ownership, were similarly
worded, viz:
That on or about the 17th day of
October,
The Information in Criminal Case No.
23850[10] contained the following allegations:
That on or about the 17th day of
October,
Upon arraignment on November 5, 1998,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of “not guilty” to all the
charges.
During trial, the prosecution
presented as witnesses Municipal Assessor Leopoldo Cacho; complainants Efren
Tayag, Elsie de Dios and Daniel C. Alegado; and relatives of purported affiants
in the Joint Affidavits Rodolfo
Querubin and Lydia Aniceto y dela Cruz.
Municipal Assessor Leopoldo Cacho
testified that he is in charge of the preparation of Tax Declarations. He explained that for Tax Declarations of
undeclared lands, the applicant is required to submit a Joint Affidavit of the
neighboring owners of the property subject of the application together with the
Affidavit of Ownership, a sketch plan and a Certification from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). Cacho disclosed that in the latter part of
1995, Madarang filed 13 applications for Tax Declaration for Lot No. 5504. The applicants for the said parcel of land
were, as mentioned earlier, Edzel Lonzanida, et al. Attached to each
application were the Joint Affidavits
of Rufino Aniceto and Roberto Querubin, Affidavits
of Ownership of each of the applicants, Sketch Plan and the Certification
from the CENRO. According to Cacho,
after preparing the Tax Declarations, he advised Madarang to present to him the
applicants to personally sign their respective Tax Declaration. However, Madarang took the Tax Declarations
and assured Cacho that he [Madarang] would be the one to make the declarants
sign. Cacho found out later that the Tax Declarations were already approved by
the Provincial Assessor.
Efren Tayag testified that he is the
real occupant of Lot No. 5504. He has
been occupying the subject land since 1971 together with twenty-four (24) other
persons and that none of the individuals who executed the Affidavits of Ownership were ever in possession of the said parcel
of land.
Daniel C. Alegado, the Municipal
Planning and Development Officer of
Elsie de Dios testified that the
signature appearing in the Affidavit of
Ownership she purportedly executed was not hers and was in fact a forgery. She had not been in possession of any portion
of Lot No. 5504 for thirty (30) years and she did not apply for the issuance of
a Tax Declaration of the same.
Rodolfo Querubin, brother of Roberto
Querubin, testified that his brother Roberto could not have executed the Joint Affidavits on October 17, 1995
because Roberto died in Tarlac on May 3, 1981.
Lydia Aniceto y dela Cruz, the widow
of the late Rufino Rafanan Aniceto who died on June 25, 1998, testified that
she had been married to Rufino for 16 years. According to Lydia, the signatures in the Joint Affidavits appearing over the typewritten
name Rufino R. Aniceto could not have been her husband’s because the latter was
illiterate and only used his thumbmark in affixing his signature on any
document. As proof thereof, she
presented a community tax certificate of Rufino with the latter’s thumbmark.
The prosecution also presented the
Counter-Affidavit of Cecilia Legrama, the mother of said Cedric Legrama wherein
Cecilia declared that her son Cedric Legrama was only eleven (11) months old at
the time of the execution of the purported Affidavits
of Ownership and could not have therefore executed the same.
On the other hand, petitioner
testified in his own defense. He
acknowledged the signatures in the Joint Affidavits
as his. According to petitioner, the documents
were brought to him by Madarang and he signed on each of the affidavits as oath
administering officer. He also admitted that
he did not know Roberto Querubin and Rufino Aniceto, the affiants therein.
Petitioner posited that the affidavits in question or the documentary exhibits
of the public prosecutor are not documents, as contemplated under Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code and therefore, they cannot be falsified and made a
criminal act thereunder. As to the Affidavits of Ownership, petitioner
insisted that no witness was presented to show and state under oath that the
signatures on the contested documents belong to him. He contended that in the absence of such
evidence, he should be acquitted.
On October 20, 2000, the
Sandiganbayan through its Fourth Division rendered a decision[11]
convicting petitioner of ten (10) counts of Falsification as charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 23850, 24644 to 24652.
On October 24, 2000, petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration. Again on December 22, 2000, without awaiting the
resolution of said motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion to Consider the
Motion for Reconsideration as a Motion for New Trial as per Rule VIII of the
Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan in relation to Section 2 (a) of Rule 121 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure.[12]
On January 8, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion for reconsideration.[13] On January 19, 2001, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Submission of Evidence
Which Became Available Only Recently.[14] The evidence consisted of affidavits of
recantation executed by Elsie de Dios, Rene Abad and Rodolfo Querubin.
In the resolution[15]
dated April 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan deferred ruling on the Manifestation with Motion to Consider the
Motion for Reconsideration as a Motion for New Trial and required Elsie de Dios, Rene Abad and
Rodolfo Querubin, to appear and testify before it.
In the resolution[16]
dated October 30, 2001, petitioner’s Motion
to Consider the Motion for Reconsideration as a Motion for New Trial was treated
as a second motion for reconsideration, and denied on the ground that the same
was filed without leave of court and that the filing of a second motion is
proscribed by the rules. With the denial
of his motion, petitioner filed a third motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the prosecution.
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Manifestation and/or Explanation with Leave
of Court to File a Motion for Reconsideration[17]
questioning the October 30, 2001 resolution.
In the resolution[18]
dated January 3, 2002, the Sandiganbayan gave in to petitioner’s plea for a new
trial and allowed him a last chance to present evidence in his behalf.
The prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction with this Court assailing the Sandiganbayan’s
January 3, 2002 resolution. The petition
was docketed as G.R. Nos. 152365-74 but eventually dismissed by the Court in
the resolution[19] dated
July 24, 2002.
Petitioner was thus given a new trial
and allowed to present, before the Sandiganbayan, witnesses Elsie de Dios,
Leopoldo Cacho and Rene Abad as part of his testimonial evidence.
The three claimed that they were
compelled by the political enemies of petitioner to testify against him and to
sign the document, the contents of which they did not understand. Principally, their testimony was geared
towards proving that no one was prejudiced with the issuance of the Tax
Declaration.
Elsie de Dios and Leopoldo Cacho
previously testified as witnesses for the prosecution. Recanting her previous testimony, Elsie de
Dios testified that the complaint-affidavit which she signed was already
prepared at the time she first laid eyes on it in the office of Atty. Hermana
Bactad, who was allegedly a political opponent of petitioner. She claimed that no prejudice had been caused
her by the execution of the Joint-Affidavits
and Affidavit of Ownership because
she did not apply for the issuance of a Tax Declaration on any portion of Lot
No. 5504.
Leopoldo Cacho’s recantation was to
the effect that no one was prejudiced by the issuance of subject Tax
Declarations. He rationalized that the
government was not prejudiced by the issuance of the Tax Declarations in favor
of the thirteen (13) applicants because the taxes therefor had been duly
paid. He added that no person, other
than the thirteen persons who signed the applications and Affidavits of Ownership, has claimed ownership over Lot No. 5504
which remains a public land until a title is issued to cover it.
Rene Abad claimed that he was used as
a pawn by petitioner’s political adversaries.
According to him, he was brought by Atty. Hermana Bactad to the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales where he was made to sign a prepared
affidavit which he neither read nor fully comprehended. He likewise claimed that he was not prejudiced
by the execution of the affidavits of ownership and the issuance of the tax
declarations over the subject land.
On July 25, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated a Decision convicting petitioner of the crimes charged. In so ruling, the Sandiganbayan belittled the
recantation of the three prosecution witnesses. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Mayor Romeo Lonzanida y Dumlao guilty of ten (10) counts of
Falsification of Public Document defined and penalized under Article 171 par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code, and in the absence of any mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer in each of the cases the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) years and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor (sic) as maximum, and to
pay a fine of P5,000.00, in each of the cases without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
Considering that this decision is the result
of the new trial granted upon motion of the accused and notwithstanding that
the same finding of guilt was arrived at despite the evidence presented in the
new trial, the resolution of this court promulgated on January 21, 2003, ordering
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, and which is the
subject of accused’s Motion for
Clarification/Reconsideration (With
Prayer to Recall/Set Aside Warrant of Arrest), is hereby set aside and the
arrest accused is held in abeyance until such time that the new decision
becomes final and executory, pursuant to the provisions of Secs. 22 and 24,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[20]
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration but both motions were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[21] dated
September 24, 2003.
Unable to accept the judgment of
conviction, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari imputing the following
errors against the Sandiganbayan:
I
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE
FACTS THEREBY LEADING IT TO A CONCLUSION NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
II
THE COURT A QUO RELIED ON PURELY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN JUSTIFYING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED WHEN THE
FACTS FROM WHICH THE INFERENCE WERE DERIVED WERE NOT ESTABLISHED THEREBY
DEPARTING FROM THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN PEOPLE V. GENOBIA, 234 SCRA
699 ON JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III
ALL THE REQUISITES FOR CONVICTION OF AN
ACCUSED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE NOT PRESENTED/PROVEN, HENCE HE IS
ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL AS HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
In the Resolution[22]
dated July 14, 2004, the Court denied the petition, thus:
Considering the allegations, issues, and
arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 25, 2003 and September 24, 2003,
respectively, the Court further Resolves to DENY the petition for
failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan
committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution as to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction
in this case.
However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the Court, in its Resolution[23]
of January 26, 2005, reinstated and gave due course to the petition. We now take a second look at this case and the
facts and circumstances obtaining herein.
In handing down a verdict of guilty,
the Sandiganbayan appreciated against petitioner the following factual
circumstances:
1. Petitioner did not deny having signed
as subscribing officer the thirteen Joint
Affidavits;
2. Even as petitioner admitted that he
signed as subscribing officer the subject Joint
Affidavits, he denied that he knew Roberto Querubin and Roberto Aniceto,
the affiants therein;
3. A Joint Affidavit is an indispensable
requirement in an application for a tax declaration;
4. It was upon the submission of the Joint Affidavits, Affidavits of Ownership, Certification from CENRO and the sketch
plan that Tax Declarations were issued in favor of the thirteen applicants for
Tax Declaration;
5. Of the thirteen applicants for Tax
Declarations, three were minor children of petitioner; one was a two-month old
child of Municipal Treasurer Cecilia Legrama; and, three were the children of
Assistant Municipal Treasurer Romulo Madarang;
6. None of the 7 children were more than
thirty years old, yet, there was a declaration in the Affidavits of Ownership that the affiants were in possession of the
subject lot for more than thirty years;
7. Two of the alleged applicants for tax
declaration, Elsie de Dios and Efren Tayag, never applied for the issuance of a
Tax Declaration in their favor nor filed any document relative to the said
application;
8. Petitioner issued a Mayor’s Certification
dated February 19, 1996 attesting that the thirteen applicants for Tax
Declaration were the actual occupants of Lot No. 5504 and had been in
possession of the same for more than thirty years; and,
9. The applicants for Tax Declaration executed
a Special Power of Attorney giving Madarang the authority to sell the land
subject thereof and to receive the proceeds of the sale.
The general rule is that the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.[24]
A perusal of the records reveals that
none of the above exceptions obtains in this case. There is no showing that the conclusion made
by the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution is
manifestly mistaken or grounded entirely on speculation and conjectures.
Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, for falsification of a public document to be established, the following
elements must concur:
1.
That the offender
is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2.
That he takes
advantage of his official position;
3.
That he falsifies
a document by committing any of the following acts:
a)
Counterfeiting or
imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
b)
Causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate;
c)
Attributing to
persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
d)
Making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts;
e)
Altering true
dates;
f)
Making any
alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
g)
Issuing in
authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary
to, or different from, that of the genuine original;
h)
Intercalating any
instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or
official book x x x [25]
Undeniably,
the foregoing elements of the crime were proven in the present case. The accusedPetitioner
is a public officer who has taken advantage of his position to commit the
felonious acts charged against him, i.e. knowingly
subscribing or signing the oath as administering
officer the affidavits mentioned in the informations
under false circumstances. The accused’spetitioner’s
acts of signing the oaths as administering
officer in the said affidavits were
clearly in abuse of the powers of his office for his authority to do so was
granted to him by law as municipal mayor and only in matters
of official business.[26]
As alleged in the
Informations and proven during the trial of the
cases, the accused was exercising his
authority to administer oath as a municipal mayor when he committed the acts
complained of. The Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by R.A.
No. 6733 (July 25, 1989), pertinently provides:
Sec. 41. Officers
Authorized to Administer Oath. — The following officers have general authority
to administer oaths: President; Vice-President; Members and Secretaries of both
Houses of the Congress; Members of the Judiciary; Secretaries of Departments;
provincial governors and lieutenant-governors; city mayors; municipal mayors; bureau
directors; regional directors; clerks of courts; registrars of deeds; other
civilian officers in the public service of the government of the Philippines
whose appointments are vested in the President and are subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments; all other constitutional officers; and
notaries public.
Sec. 42. Duty to Administer Oath. - Officers
authorized to administer oaths, with the exception of notaries public, municipal
judges and clerks of court, are not obliged to administer oaths or execute
certificates save in matters of
official business; and with the exception of notaries public, the
officer performing the service in those matters shall charge no fee, unless specifically
authorized by law. (emphasis supplied)26
As for the accused’spetitioner’s
defenses, this Court finds them to be without merit.
In Lumancas v. Intas,[27]
this Court held that in the falsification of public or official documents,
whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there
be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the
reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth
as therein solemnly proclaimed.
Petitioner is consistent in hisrepeatedly
decries stand that there wasis
no proof that he authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under
his direction. This argument is without
merit. Under the circumstances, there
was no need of any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the
forgery. As keenly observed by the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner notarized the Joint Affidavits
allegedly executed by Querubin and Aniceto whom
petitioner admittedly never met and who were later proven to have been
incapable of signing the said affidavits.
Petitioner’s signature also appeared as the attesting officer in the Affidavits of Ownership,
n. Nine of which were undoubtedly
without the participation of the indicated affiants.
As attesting officer, petitioner was
required to verify and ascertain from the affiants whether they voluntarily
executed their affidavits; whether they understood the contents of their
affidavits; and, whether the allegations contained therein are true. In addition to these, and as evidenced by the
questioned affidavits, petitioner attested to the fact
that the affiants swore and signed their affidavits in his presence
when in fact they never did. Petitioner likewise issued a Mayor’s Certification
falsely attesting to the fact that
the alleged applicants for tax declaration (three of whom are his children
while the other four are the minor children of his municipal officials) hadve
been occupying the said lot for thirty years.
These Affidavits of Ownership and Joint
Affidavits were material to the issuance of a Tax Declaration after which,
the alleged applicants arewould
then considered the ownersbe
able to use as proof of ownership of the lot subject thereof. Here, the Tax Declarations were successfully
obtained and the applicants, in the exercise of their purported right of
ownership over the subject land, executed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Madarang to sell their respective lots.
Petitioner maintains that he had no
participation in the preparation and/or execution of the Affidavits of Ownership, and no witness was presented to prove that
he signed said Affidavits. We quote with
approval the findings of the Sandiganbayan on this matter:
Interestingly, the accused maintains that his signatures appearing in the thirteen Affidavits of Ownership were forged. The Court cannot accept the claim of the accused that he has no knowledge of the Affidavit of Ownership. Besides, his signatures appearing in the thirteen Joint-Affidavits appear to be the same as those of his signatures appearing in the Affidavit of Ownership. But what the accused cannot deny, however, is that while he maintains that he has no knowledge that his three (3) children had been included as applicants for the issuance of a tax declaration, the Certification, (Exh. “TT”), shows that it was signed by him (accused), declaring that his children, among others, were the actual occupants of the subject land. Clearly, therefore, as Mr. Romulo Madarang appears to be only a subordinate to the herein accused who was undeniably the municipal mayor when he signed the documents as subscribing officer, he then took advantage of his position as municipal mayor.[28]
Petitioner singles out the Affidavit of Ownership pertaining to
Dolores Joy Madarang and capitalizes on the absence of his signature therein to
get an acquittal. It must be pointed out
that this Affidavit of Ownership is
inextricably connected with the rest of the documents i.e., the Joint Affidavit, the
other Affidavits of Ownership
purportedly executed on the same date and Mayor’s Certification of 30-year
occupancy, all of which were intended to enable the purported
affiants to obtain the Tax Declarations over Lot No. 5504
in favor of the purported affiants. There is no other
logical conclusion butwould be
that petitioner wais also
the author of the supposed Affidavit
of Ownership of Dolores Joy Madarang or that he caused its preparation
albeit unsigned by him.
Petitioner would belatedly, at this stage of
the case, pointed out the prosecution’s failure to
present the original of the Mayor’s Certification,[29] asand
complained in his petition that only a certified xerox copy of the xerox copy on file was submitted
in the proceedings a quo.
It must be stressed that the Mayor’s Certification was not even the subject of
any of the criminal cases against petitioner.
It is only one among equally damning evidence presented by the
prosecution.
WhileAlthough
petitioner contested the authenticity of his signature in the Mayor’s
Certification as well as those appearing in the Affidavits of Ownership,. hHe
nonetheless, however, admitted having signed the Joint Affidavits and upon comparison of
the signatures thereon, the Sandiganbayan found that they were made by one and
the same person. We find no reason to
deviate from this factual finding of the Sandiganbayan.
To overcome the presumption that the
person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the documents is the
material author of the falsifications, petitioner points out that it was
Madarang, not him, who was authorized to sell and receive the proceeds of the
sale of the land. Thus, he would not
have benefited from the issuance of the Tax Declaration.
True, Madarang was the one designated
as attorney-in-fact in the Special Power of Attorney, but it is a fact that
Madarang was petitioner’s Assistant Municipal Treasurer. Undeniably, petitioner wcould
not have allowed the falsification of these documents if he would not benefit
from them. As aptly pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, all the acts of herein petitioner, i.e.,
from administering the oath of the alleged affiants, which
included
the accused’spetitioner’s
minor children, in the questioned documents to his act of issuing
a Mayor’s CetificationCertification
attesting to the fact that the applicants, which again
included the petitioner’saccused’s
minor children, for tax declaration have been in possession of the
lot for more than thirty years, prove beyond cavil that he was the one who
falsified the documents and would benefit therefrom.
Petitioner contends that the subject
lot remains public and that no damage resulted from the issuance of the tax
declaration.
Jurisprudence[30]
has already settled that in the falsification of public or official documents,
whether by public officials or by private persons, it is not necessary that
there be present the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person. This notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that
petitioner consummated his act in falsifying the documents, and which documents
petitioner used in successfully obtaining the tax declaration in the names of
the alleged applicants causing prejudice to the real occupant, Efren Tayag.
Circumstantial evidence may be
resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting
felons free.[31] The standard that should be observed by the
courts in appreciating circumstantial evidence was extensively discussed in the
case of People of the Philippines v.
Modesto, et al.[32]
thus:
. . . No general rule can be laid down as to
the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
It has been said, and we believe correctly,
that the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
From all the circumstances, there should be a combination of evidence
which in the ordinary and natural course of things, leaves no room for reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. Stated in another
way, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with
guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to convict the accused.
The evidence presented by the
prosecution, albeit mostly circumstantial, is sufficient to warrant petitioner’s
conviction. The following requisites for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction were met, to wit:
(a) There
is more than one circumstance;
(b) The
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[33]
All told, the Court finds no reason
to disagree with the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction. With the overwhelming evidence presented by
the prosecution and applying Sec. 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court,
there are more than enough bases to sustain the findings of the Sandiganbayan
that herein petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10)
counts of Falsification under Article 171, particularly paragraph
2, “causing it to appear that persons have participated in an act or proceeding
when in fact and in truth, they did not participate in the act or proceeding.”
and paragraph 4, “making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.”
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003
and Resolution dated September 24, 2003 of the Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
|
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Rodolfo G. Palattao (ret.) with Associate Justices Gregory
S. Ong and Ma.
Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada, concurring; rollo, pp. 44-54.
[2] Id. at 40-42.
[3] Sandiganbayan rollo, volume I, pp. 43-46, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 52-53.
[4] Id. at 14-22.
[5] Id. at 1-13.
[6] Sandiganbayan rollo, volume I, pp. 3-10.
[7] Edzel
L. Lonzanida, Leo Lonzanida, Japhet Lonzanida, Peter John Madarang, Leo
Madarang, Dolores Joy Madarang, and Cedric Legrama.
[8] Criminal Case No. 24645 – Edzel L. Lonzanida; Criminal Case No. 24646 – Leo Madarang; Criminal Case No. 24647 – Elsie de Dios; Criminal Case No. 24648 – Efren Tayag; Criminal Case No. 24649 – Leo Lonzanida; Criminal Case No. 24650 – Cedric Legrama; Criminal Case No. 24651 – Japhet Lonzanida; and, Criminal Case No. 24652 – Peter John Madarang; rollo, pp. 61-75.
[9] Criminal Case No. 23850, id. at 56-57.
[10] Id. at 56-58.
[11] Rollo, pp. 77-97.
[12] Id. at 105-106.
[13] Id. at 110-113.
[14] Id. at 114-117.
[15] Id. at 118-119
[16] Id. at 120-122.
[17] Id. at 123-125.
[18]
[19]
[20] Supra note 1.
[21] Supra note 2.
[22] Rollo, p. 526.
[23] Id. at 624-625.
[24] Florante
Soriquez v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division), G.R. No. 153526, October 25, 2005,
474 SCRA 222, 231.
[25] Andres
S. Suero v. People,
G.R. No. 156408, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 350, 358-359.
[26] The
Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by R.A. No. 6733 (July 25, 1989), pertinently provides:
Sec. 41. Officers Authorized
to Administer Oath. — The following officers have general authority to
administer oaths: President; Vice-President; Members and Secretaries of both
Houses of the Congress; Members of the Judiciary; Secretaries of Departments; provincial
governors and lieutenant-governors; city mayors; municipal mayors; bureau
directors; regional directors; clerks of courts; registrars of deeds; other
civilian officers in the public service of the government of the Philippines whose appointments are vested in the
President and are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
all other constitutional officers; and notaries public.
Sec. 42. Duty to Administer Oath. -
Officers authorized to administer oaths, with the exception of notaries public,
municipal judges and clerks of court, are not obliged to administer oaths or
execute certificates save in matters of official business; and with the
exception of notaries public, the officer performing the service in those matters shall charge no fee, unless
specifically authorized by law. (emphasis supplied)
Sections
41 and 42 were later further amended by R.A. No. 9406
to include lawyers of the Public Attorneys’ Office in the enumeration of
officers authorized to administer oaths in
connection with the performance of
their duties.
26 Sections 41 and 42 were later
further amended by R.A. No. 9406 to include lawyers of the Public Attorney’s Office in the enumeration of officers authorized
to administer oaths in connection with the performance of their duties.
[27] G.R. No. 133472, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 22, 33-34.
[28] Supra note 11 at pp. 93-94.
[29] Folder of Exhibits, p. 59.
[30] People
v.
[31] Solomon
Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141801, 25 June 25, 2001,
359 SCRA 550.
[32] No. L-25484, 21 September 21, 1968,
25 SCRA 36.
[33] Rule 133, Section 5, Rules on Evidence.