LAND BANK OF THE
|
G.R. No. 157607
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, carpio-morales, *CHICO-NAZARIO, **LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ. Promulgated: July 7, 2009 |
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
|
|
|
|
D E C I S I O N
|
|
BRION, J.:
Before
us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Land Bank of the
(a) the Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
2002
(b) the Resolution of the CA dated
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On
1. That
I will be appointed as Executive Assistant I pursuant to Board Resolution No.
09-009 dated
2. That
on September 1, 1997, I will assume the duties of the position pending receipt
of my GSIS Medical Evaluation, NBI Clearance, Reference Check and other
requested clearances;
3. That
should there be derogatory information against me as later determined in my
GSIS Medical Evaluation, NBI Clearance, Reference Check and other required clearances,
I hereby waive my right to the aforementioned position as well as to all the
benefits and privileges appurtenant thereto except for compensation for
services rendered (actual number of days) by me;
4. That
this affidavit is being executed for purpose of assuming the position and
reporting for work pending receipt of corporate requirements for new hires.
In
the documents that she submitted to support her application, the respondent
indicated that she had no children and designated one Cyril Rose O. Paden (Cyril Rose) as her sister.[7] A subsequent background investigation revealed
that Cyril Rose is not the respondent’s sister but is really her daughter. Shortly thereafter, the respondent, in an Affidavit[8] dated
1.
I am an
employee of the Land Bank of the
2.
I have
been employed with Land Bank (DBPSC Contractual) as secretary since
3.
On
4.
This
Cyril Rose Paden was actually my daughter out of wedlock. Since her birth and
until now however, it was my mother who stood as mother to Cyril Rose Paden.
Shortly after giving birth to her (Cyril Rose), I left Bansalan, my hometown
and worked in
5.
The
following Monday, after realizing my mistake, I immediately called up Personnel
Department and was able to talk with Ms. Jojo Amarillo. I told her that Cyril Rose was actually my
daughter;
6.
It was
my mother who made it appear in our community that Cyril Rose Paden is her own
daughter and unwittingly, I also considered Cyril Rose as a sister;
7.
It was
my mother who caused the registration of the Birth of Cyril Rose with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar;
Based on this affidavit, the
petitioner gave notice to the respondent on
Dear Ms. Paden:
Please be informed that you will be dropped
from the rolls of the Bank effective
For your information.
Very
truly yours,
ETHEL
B. BALAALDIA
Assistant
Vice President
Personnel
Department
The respondent received this notice
on
In a letter[10]
dated
Dear Ms. Paden:
Please be informed that you have been
officially dropped from the rolls of the Bank effective
For your information.
Very truly yours,
ETHEL
B. BALAALDIA
Assistant
Vice President
Personnel
Department
The respondent sought reconsideration,
but the petitioner denied her request on
The
CSC, through Resolution No. 992039[13]
dated September 15, 1999, resolved to grant the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and to give due course to the appeal.
In
its Comment submitted to the CSC, the
petitioner argued that the respondent was dropped from the rolls based on the
findings of the background investigation conducted on the respondent; the
investigation revealed that the respondent misrepresented Cyril Rose as her sister,
when in fact, Cyril Rose was her daughter.[14]
The petitioner also stated that the respondent’s misrepresentation also led her
to make false entries in official and public documents; it was only after a
thorough and painstaking discussion among the members of its selection board
that it was decided that the respondent should be dropped from the rolls
effective
All such persons must serve a probationary
period of six months following their original appointment and shall undergo a
thorough character investigation. A probationer may be dropped from the service
for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any time before the expiration
of the probationary period.
The petitioner went even further to
argue that since the respondent “acknowledges that her appointment as Executive
Assistant I had to undergo a six-month probationary period, her status as such divests her of
the constitutional security of tenure against removal without cause during the
said period of time.”[15]
Lastly, the petitioner emphasized that the respondent was informed of her being
dropped from the service on February 25, 1998, which was before the expiration
of her probationary period.
In
her Answer to the petitioner’s Comment, the respondent reiterated that
her termination from the service was illegal, since it was done without due
process for failure of the petitioner to inform her of the reason why she was
being terminated from the service; the notice merely stated that she was being
dropped from the rolls effective
The CSC Ruling
The CSC, through Resolution No.
000896[17]
dated
against her. The CSC held:
The issue in this case is whether or not there is a ground for dropping from the rolls/dismissal from the service while undergoing probationary period.
Section 2(a), Rule VII of the Revised Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides that:
“All
such persons must serve a probationary period of six (6) months following their
original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation. A
probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want
of capacity any time before the expiration of the probationary period.”
Clearly, an employee undergoing probationary period of six (6) months may be dropped from the service anytime before the expiration of the probationary period on two grounds, to wit: 1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want of capacity.
Records show that
Land Bank of the
The Commission,
however, does not agree with the ground upon which the termination was
based. The ground relied upon by the Land Bank of the
Records further show
that Paden was informed of her termination only on
The Omnibus Rules provides, viz:
However, if no notice of termination or unsatisfactory conduct is given by the appointing authority to the employee before the expiration of the six-month probationary period, the appointment automatically becomes permanent.
Records clearly
reveal that Paden was informed only after the expiration of her probationary
period,
The submission by the LBP that Paden was actually informed of the denial of the “proposal to consider her for permanent status” on February 25, 1998 as recommended by Alfred G. Cabiguin, Acting Head, LBP Bansalan Branch, is immaterial to the instant case. The same does not amount to a notice of termination of service nor a notice of unsatisfactory conduct. Further, it is not the form of notice contemplated by law.
Clear also is the admission by the LBP in its Comment that it is immaterial to inform Paden of her being dropped from the service for any way the unsatisfactory conduct is already existing. This contention, however, is an open and blatant denial of due process of law.
Such being the case, the appointment of Paden as Executive Assistant I becomes permanent after six (6) months.
It may be pertinent
to stress that the least offense that could be charged against Paden is that of
Disgraceful, Immoral, or Dishonest Conduct Prior to Entering the Service found
in Section 52 (C) (7), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.
In the sum, the dismissal of Paden from the service is bereft of legal basis. [Emphasis supplied]
The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the CSC, but the same was
denied through Resolution No. 00-1995 dated
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated
In a Resolution dated
The Petition
In
the present petition, the petitioner faults the CA for:
1) declaring that the CSC was correct in
giving due course to the respondent’s appeal;
2) finding that the petitioner deprived
the respondent of due process; and
3) dismissing its petition in complete
disregard of applicable laws and existing jurisprudence respecting the facts
and evidence presented by the petitioner.
THE COURT’S RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The petitioner raises issues which are
factual in nature. The settled rule is that
factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the CSC, when affirmed by
the CA and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even
finality by this Court.[18]
Our review of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to the review of errors of law, unless the following
exceptions occur: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the CA, in making its findings, went
beyond the issue of the case and the same is contrary to the admission of both
appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those
of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; (j) when the finding of fact of the CA is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.[19] Petitioner failed to convince us that any of
these exceptions applies to the present case.
Specifically, we see no reason to
depart from the findings of the CSC, as affirmed by the CA, that the petitioner
did not give the respondent sufficient notice of termination or a notice of
unsatisfactory conduct prior to the expiration of her probationary period, and
that there was no basis to drop the respondent from the rolls on the cited
ground.
To put the case in its proper
perspective, we begin with a discussion on the respondent’s right to security
of tenure. Article IX (B), Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides
that “[n]o officer or employee of
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.”
At the outset, we emphasize that the aforementioned constitutional provision
does not distinguish between a regular employee and a probationary employee. In the recent case of Daza v. Lugo[20]
we ruled that:
The Constitution provides that “[N]o officer
or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.” Sec. 26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book
V, Title I-A of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 states:
All
such persons (appointees who meet all the requirements of the position) must
serve a probationary period of six months following their
original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation in
order to acquire permanent civil service status. A probationer may be
dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any
time before the expiration of the probationary period; Provided,
That such action is appealable to the Commission.
Thus, the services of respondent as a probationary
employee may only be terminated for a just
cause, that is, unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. [Emphasis
supplied]
The constitutional guaranty of
security of tenure in the civil service has two legal ramifications. In Tria v. Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas, et
al.,[21] we held
that the prohibition against suspension or dismissal of an officer or employee
of the Civil Service “except for cause provided by law” is “a guaranty of both procedural and
substantive due process.” “Not only
must removal or suspension be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, but also they can only be made on the
basis of a valid cause provided by
law.”[22]
Procedural due process basically
requires that suspension or dismissal comes only after notice and hearing.[23] Thus, the minimum requirements of due process
are: (1) that the employees or officers
must be informed of the charges preferred against them, and the formal way
by which the employees or officers are informed is by furnishing them with a
copy of the charges
made against them; and (2) that they must have a reasonable opportunity to
present their side of the matter, that is to say, their defenses against the
charges and to present evidence in support of their defenses.[24]
As part of its mandate to prescribe
and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of
Civil Service Laws and other pertinent laws,[25]
the CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2005,[26]
which lays down the Rules on Probationary Period for Permanent Appointment in
the Career Service. Section 12 of the
rules states:
Section 12. Notice of Termination of Service. The new appointees or probationers shall be
issued notice of termination of service
by the appointing authority within ten (10) days immediately after it was
proven that they have demonstrated
unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity
during the probationary period.
Such notice shall state, among other
things, the reasons for the termination of service and shall be supported
by at least two of the following:
a) Performance Evaluation Report;
b)
Report
of the immediate supervisor (rater) on
job-related critical and unusual
incidents and on unsatisfactory conduct or behavior of the appointee; or
c)
Other
valid documents that may support the notice of termination of service.
Measured against these standards, the
February 25, 1998 notice to the respondent clearly does not amount to a valid notice of termination, as it merely stated
that the respondent was being dropped from the rolls; nowhere in the notice was a specification of the petitioner’s factual
and legal reasons for terminating the respondent’s services. This is a
violation of due process since it strikes at its essence – the opportunity to
be heard – or the opportunity for the respondent to adequately and
intelligently mount a defense against the charges made by the petitioner. Thus, the respondent was completely left in
the dark on why her services were being summarily terminated. In addition, the records of this case are
bereft of any evidence that the petitioner’s
The petitioner was apparently under
the mistaken impression that the services of a probationary employee can be
terminated at will, i.e., even
without cause.[27] The petitioner of course labored under a
misimpression as explained above;[28]
the only difference between regular and probationary employees from the
perspective of due process is that the latter’s termination can be based on the
wider ground of failure to comply with standards made known to them when they
became probationary employees.[29]
Substantive due process on the other
hand requires that the suspension or dismissal be “for cause.”[30] Delos Santos v. Mallare[31]
best expresses what is for
cause provided by law:
It means for reasons
which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient for removal, that
is legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the
exercise of discretion may deem sufficient.
It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those
vested with the power of removal or without cause. Moreover,
the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must
be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the
rights and interests of the public. [Emphasis supplied]
The constitutional guaranty of
substantial due process for probationary officers or employees in the civil
service is implemented in Section 2, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states:
Sec. 2. Original appointment refers to
initial entry into the career service under a permanent status of a person who
meets all the requirements of the position including the civil service
eligibility.
(a)
All such
persons must serve a probationary period of six (6) months following their
original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation. A probationer may be dropped from the
service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any time before the
expiration of the probationary period. Provided that such action is
appealable to the Commission.
(b)
All
original appointments of qualified persons to the position in the career
service shall henceforth be proposed as permanent. It is understood that the
first six (6) months will be probationary in nature. However, if no notice of termination of unsatisfactory conduct or want
of capacity is given by the appointing authority to the employee before the
expiration of the six month probationary period, the appointment automatically
becomes permanent. [Emphasis supplied]
From the above-quoted provision of
law, we draw the following conclusions:
First, that
the probationary period of a civil service employee shall be for a period of
six months, reckoned from the date of his or her original appointment. In the
present case, the respondent was appointed to the position of Executive
Assistant I on
Second, the
grounds for dropping a probationary employee from the service are either for unsatisfactory conduct or for want of capacity. Although the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 does not define nor delineate these two grounds,
resort can be had to the CSC Rules on Probationary Period for Permanent
Appointment in the Career Service[32]
which defines unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity as follows:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. For these rules on probationary period, the
terms used shall be defined as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Want of capacity refers to the failure of the appointee during the probationary period to perform
the duties and responsibilities based on standards of work outputs agreed
upon and reflected in the duly signed performance targets.
(d) Unsatisfactory conduct refers to the
failure of the appointees to observe the propriety in their acts, behavior and
human/public relations, and to irregular punctuality and attendance while performing their duties and
responsibilities during the probationary period. [Emphasis and italics
supplied]
Of course, the just causes for
termination of employment available against regular employees also apply to
probationary employees.
As aptly found by the CSC, the unsatisfactory conduct must necessarily
relate to conduct exhibited during the probationary period and should not refer
to conduct prior to entering the civil service. The reason for this is simple given the nature and consequences of probationary employment. Thus, we explained in the recent case of Woodridge School v. Pe Benito:[33]
A probationary employee is
one who, for a given period of time, is being observed and evaluated to
determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment affords the
employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of a
probationer. The word “ probationary,” as used to describe the period of employment,
implies the purpose of the term or period.
While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a
probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the
probationer at the same time, seeks to prove to the employer that he has the
qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. [Emphasis
supplied]
Since probationary employees are
evaluated for their fitness to assume permanent employment only for a specific
term or period,[34] it
necessarily follows that the parameters for which the appointing authority must
gauge whether probationary employees committed an unsatisfactory conduct should
refer only to conduct while performing their duties and responsibilities during
the probationary period.
Third, should
there be no notice of termination on the grounds of unsatisfactory conduct or
want of capacity given to the probationary employee by the appointing authority
prior to the expiration of the six months probationary period, the probationary
employee’s appointment to the position, by operation of law, becomes permanent. Since the petitioner’s
We are not unmindful of the petitioner’s
contention that the respondent’s designation of her child out of wedlock as her
sister in submitted documents merits the supreme penalty of dismissal from
service for dishonesty and falsification of official documents. We significantly note that dishonesty and
falsification of official documents are both classified as grave offenses that
merit the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service, even if committed as a
first offense.[35]
However, the respondent’s
administrative liabilities for dishonesty and falsification of official
documents are not the matters before us now.
They may be the proper subjects of separate administrative disciplinary
proceedings which this Decision does not foreclose since the issue here is
confined to the validity of the respondent’s termination as a probationary
employee.
In sum, we find that the ground the
petitioner invoked is not sufficient basis for the respondent’s dismissal, and
that her dismissal was effected without the observance of both procedural and
substantive due process. We therefore affirm the assailed CA decision and the
underlying resolutions that this decision affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60972 dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Second
Division effective
** Designated additional Member of the
Second Division effective
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-29.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz (retired), with Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired) and Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring; id., p. 30.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Personal Data Sheet, Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Application for Membership /Designation of Dependents/Beneficiaries for LBP Mutual Aid Benefit Program/Life and Disability Benefit Plan; id., pp. 108-110.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Section 49 of the Uniform Rules in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation in the Civil Service Commission (CSC Resolution No. 94-0521, January 25, 1994):
Section 49. Complaint or Appeal to the Commission. – Other personnel actions, such as separation from the service due to unsatisfactory or poor performance, dropping from the rolls, disapproval of appointments, claims for back salaries and other benefits, may be brought to the Commission by means of a formal complaint or appeal subject to the following:
x x x
(d) A complaint/appeal involving non-disciplinary actions shall be dismissed outright on any of the following grounds:
x x x
(2) The appeal is filed beyond the reglementary period; and
(3) No appeal fee is paid.
[13] Rollo, pp. 61-63.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Binay v. Odeña, G.R. No. 163683,
[19] Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao, G.R.
No. 144458,
[20] G.R. No. 168999,
[21] G.R. No. 85670,
[22] Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer Primer (2006 ed.), p. 420.
[23] Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
[24] Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86083, September 24, 1991, 201 SCRA 661, 671.
[25] REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE of 1987, Book IV, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, No. 2.
[26] Dated
[27] Rollo, p. 68.
[28] Supra note 20.
[29] Section 7 of the CSC MC No. 3, s. 2005, or the Rules on Probationary Period for Permanent Appointment in the Career Service provides for “performance targets and standards to facilitate the review and monitoring of employee performance” which “shall be set, agreed upon and duly signed by the probationer, the immediate supervisor (rater), and the head of agency within five (5) working days upon appointee’s assumption to duty.”
[30] Supra note 24.
[31] 87 Phil. 293 (1950).
[32] Supra note 26.
[33] G.R. No. 160240,
[34] Section 3 of the Rules on Probationary Period for Permanent Appointment in the Career Service states:
Section 3. Objectives of the Probationary Period. The probationary period for permanent appointment in the career service shall have the following objectives:
(a) to serve as an on-the-job assessment of new appointee’s knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position as enumerated in the PDF and specified in the approved performance targets and work output standards;
(b) to provide the appointees with appropriate technical assistance through human resource interventions, such as training, coaching, mentoring and other applicable interventions; and to closely supervise and monitor their performance;
(c) to monitor and assess the conduct of the appointees and act appropriately on any incidence of unsatisfactory behavior; and
(d) to determine whether the appointees shall continue to hold permanent appointment or be separated from the service within or at the end of the probationary period due to want of capacity or unsatisfactory conduct.
[35] CSC RESOLUTION NO. 991936, Rule IV, Section 52, par. A(1) and A(6).