FIRST
DIVISION
|
SPOUSES GERMAN ANUNCIACION and ANA FERMA ANUNCIACION and GAVINO G. CONEJOS,
Petitioners, - versus - PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA and GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 152496
Present: PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and. BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated: July
30, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Decision,[1] dated November 19, 2001, and the Resolution,[2]
dated March 31, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65516. The CA decision affirmed the Orders dated February 19, 2001[3]
and May 16, 2001[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The
facts of the case are as follows:
On
September 29, 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC, Manila, a complaint for
Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT No. 122452, docketed as Civil Case
No. 00-98813. The complaint averred that
defendants (respondents) may be served with summons and legal processes through
Atty. Rogelio G. Pizarro, Jr., with office address at
Tondo,
August 19, 2000
Mr.
German Anunciacion, Mesdames
Liwayway
Nava, Evangeline Pineda,
and
Ana Ferma
Sta.
Cruz,
Dear
Sir and Mesdames:
I write in
behalf of my clients, MS. PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA and MR. GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA,
the registered owners of the parcel of land known as Lot 1-B (LRC) PSD-230517
located at
I would like to
inform you that your occupation and possession of the said land is based on
mere tolerance of the owners, and without any payment on your part of any
rental. Now, the owners need the subject
property for their own use.
In view thereof,
I hereby demand that you vacate the said land within a period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this letter.
Otherwise, much to our regret, I shall be constrained to institute the
proper criminal and/or civil action against you.
Trusting that
you will give this matter your most serious and preferential attention.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ROGELIO G. PIZARRO, JR.
On
October 27, 2000, respondents, through their counsel, Atty. Norby C. Caparas, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] on
the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. Petitioners filed their Comment on the Motion
to Dismiss[9] on
November 6, 2000.
A
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion to
Dismiss[10] dated
November 13, 2000 was filed by respondents, alleging an additional ground that
petitioners failed to pay the required filing fee. The petitioners filed, on November 27, 2000,
their Opposition to the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Comment to the Reply
to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss.[11]
Thereafter,
respondents filed a Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Manifestation
dated November 27, 2000,[12]
citing the following grounds:
1.)
That
the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party.
2.)
That
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.
3.)
That
the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
Petitioners
then filed their Additional Comment on the Motion to Dismiss, Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss and Comment on the Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.[13]
In
its order of February 19, 2001, the trial court sustained the respondents and
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the persons of
respondents as defendants. The trial court
ruled as follows:
However, the
Court finds for the defendants on the Second Supplemental Motion.
In point is
Section 3, Rule 3 of the same Rules, which reads –
“Where the
action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title
of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized
by law or these Rules. x x x x”
In the case at
bar Atty. Pizarro, Jr., has not been shown to be a trustee of an express trust,
a guardian, or any of the above for the action to be allowed to be defended by
a representative.
The fact that
Atty. Pizarro, Jr., was the lawyer of the defendants in the demand letters do
not per se make him their representative for purposes of the present
action. To this effect, service on
lawyer of defendant is an invalid service of summons. (Cordova v. Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, 89 SCRA 59)
Going to the
other raised issue, Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides –
“The defendant’s
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.”
The presentation
of all objections then available as was done by the movants subserves the
omnibus motion rule and the concomitant policy against multiplicity of suits.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants, the case is hereby DISMISSED.
The
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied for lack of
merit.
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, seeking the
nullification of the RTC Orders dated February
19, 2001 and May 16, 2001, on
the ground that the said orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On
November 19, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition upon finding that there was no
waiver of the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondents in the
form of voluntary appearance. Applying Section
20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA held that although the
grounds alleged in the two (2) earlier Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss were lack of cause of action and failure to pay the required
filing fee, the filing of the said motions did not constitute a waiver of the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on their persons as defendants. The CA then concluded that there was no
voluntary appearance on the part of respondents/defendants despite the filing
of the aforesaid motions. The CA also
rejected petitioners’ contention that the service made to Atty. Rogelio Pizarro,
Jr. was deemed service upon respondents/defendants, thus:
First of all,
Atty. Rogelio Pizarro cannot be considered as counsel of record wherein We
could apply the jurisprudential rule that notice to counsel is notice to
client. Atty. Pizarro cannot be deemed
counsel on record since Defendants were not the one’s (sic) who instituted the action, like plaintiffs who did the same
thru counsel and therefore, obviously the one who signed the pleadings is the
counsel on record. Sadly, the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Private Respondents were signed not by Atty. Pizarro but by
someone else. How then could Petitioners
claim that Atty. Pizarro represents Private Respondents?
Secondly, the
fact that Atty. Pizarro was the one who wrote and signed the August 19, 2000
letter, on behalf of Private Respondents, demanding that Petitioners vacate the
premises of the former’s land does not fall under the substituted service rule. To be sure, Section 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules, provide thus:
Sec. 7. Substituted Services – If, for justifiable
causes the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section; service maybe reflected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendants’ residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant (sic) office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
In the case at
bench, service upon Atty. Pizarro did not fall under the aforequoted rule and
therefore cannot qualify as substituted service. Since the service made by Petitioners was
defective, the Public Respondent court never did acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of defendants and therefore correctly ordered the dismissal of the
complaint.[14]
Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of the decision but it, too, was denied by the CA
in its Resolution of March 31, 2002.
Hence,
the instant petition which raises the following assignment of errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE FILING OF THE MOTION
TO DISMISS AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS BY RESPONDENTS AMOUNTS TO
VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE CONFERS
JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ON THE PERSON OF RESPONDENTS.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE SECOND
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION ALLEGING THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION
OF THE PERSONS OF THE DEFENDANTS IS ALREADY LATE FOR THE FIRST MOTIONS, NAMELY,
THE “MOTION TO DISMISS” AND THE “SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS AND REPLY TO
THE COMMENT TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS”, WHICH HAD BEEN OPPOSSED, ONE AFTER THE
OTHER, BY PETITIONERS, HAD ALREADY CONFERRED JURISDICTION OF THE HONORABLE
TRIAL COURT ON THE PERSONS OF DEFENDANTS.
3. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CONSIDERED THAT THESE 3 MOTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ARE BEING TREATED AS OMNIBUS
MOTION AND ARE COVERED BY SECTION 20 RULE 14 OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE.
4. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID
NOT CONSIDER ATTY. ROGELIO PIZARRO, JR., AS THE AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF
RESPONDENT TO RECEIVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT.
In
the Resolution dated July 14, 2003, the Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In compliance, the respondents filed their
Memorandum on September 8, 2003,[15]
while the petitioners filed their Memorandum on September 24, 2003.[16]
We
find merit in the petition.
While
it is a settled doctrine that findings of fact of the CA are binding and not to
be disturbed, they are subject to certain exceptions for very compelling
reasons, such as when: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court; (6) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and (7)
the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.[17]
The Court finds here cogent reason to take exception from the general
rule.
Respondents,
through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss dated October 25, 2000,[18]
with only one ground, i.e., that the
pleading asserting the claim “states no cause of action.”
Under this ground, respondents raised the issues quoted hereunder:
I.
Defendants[19]
anchored their complaint on a WRONG Decree of Registration;
II.
The
Government of the Republic of the
III. Plaintiffs do NOT have the legal
personality to ‘quiet the title’ of the subject property.
Section
20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) states:
Sec. 20.
Voluntary Appearance – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. (Underscoring ours)
The
filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without invoking the lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary
appearance on the part of the respondents under the aforequoted provision of
the Rules. The same conclusion can be
drawn from the filing of the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the
Comment on the Motion to Dismiss dated November 13, 2000 which alleged, as an
additional ground for the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint, the failure of
plaintiffs to pay the required filing fee again but failed to raise the alleged
lack of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the respondents.
It
was only in respondents’ Second Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss dated November 27, 2000 that respondents for the first time raised the
court’s lack of jurisdiction over their person as defendants on the ground that
summons were allegedly not properly served upon them. The filing of the said Second Supplemental Motion
to Dismiss did not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents who had earlier voluntarily appeared before the trial court by
filing their motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion to dismiss. The dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents after they had
voluntarily appeared before the trial court clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the RTC.
Quite
apart from their voluntary appearance, respondents’ Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss and Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were clearly in violation of
Rule 15, Section 8 in relation to Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules.
Rule
15, Section 8 of the Rules provides:
Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. – Subject to the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include
all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived. (emphasis ours)
Rule 9,
Section 1, in turn, states:
Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by
prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
(emphasis ours)
Applying
the foregoing rules, respondents’ failure to raise the alleged lack of
jurisdiction over their persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal
to their cause. They are already deemed
to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. The trial court plainly abused its discretion
when it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendants. Under the
Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in the motion to
dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b)
existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
We likewise
cannot approve the trial court’s act of entertaining supplemental motions to
dismiss which raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and
litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or
frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Although
the CA correctly observed that Atty. Pizarro, as the lawyer of the respondents
in the demand letters, does not per se
make him their representative for purposes of the present action, a scrutiny of
the record shows that the address of Atty. Pizarro and Atty. Norby Caparas,
Jr., (the counsel who eventually entered his appearance for respondents) is the
same. This circumstance leads us to
believe that respondents’ belated reliance on the purported improper service of
summons is a mere afterthought, if not a bad faith ploy to avoid answering the
complaint.
At
this point, we find it appropriate to cite Philippine
American Life & General Insurance Company v. Breva,[20]
where this Court held that:
The
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion
to dismiss filed by the petitioner due to lack of jurisdiction over its person.
In denying the motion to dismiss, the CA correctly relied on the ruling in Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, thus:
A
case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully
served. It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant
personally appears before a Court complaining that he had not been validly
summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons
can be actually served on said defendant
In the
recent case of Teh vs. Court of Appeals,
the petitioner therein also filed a motion to dismiss before filing his answer
as defendant in the trial court on the ground of failure to serve the summons
on him. In that case, the Court agreed with the appellate court's ruling that
there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when the latter
denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the
issuance of an alias summons.
To be sure, a trial court should be
cautious before dismissing complaints on the sole ground of improper service of
summons considering that it is well within its discretion to order the issuance
and service of alias summons on the correct person in the interest of
substantial justice.
Accordingly,
the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition and affirming the challenged orders of the
RTC which dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the respondents who were the defendants.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby GRANTED. The CA’s
Decision dated November 19, 2001 and
the Resolution dated March 31, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65516 affirming the Orders dated February 19, 2001 and May 16, 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 00-98813 are
reversed and set aside. Consequently, Civil
Case No. 00-98813 is hereby ordered REINSTATED.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R
T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justice Perlita J. T. Tria Tirona (ret.) and Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 6-13.
[2]
[3]
[4] CA Record, p. 25.
[5] Rollo, pp. 45-51.
[6] Paragraph 3 of the Complaint, id. at 45.
[7]
[8] Id. at 53-60.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Danan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132759, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 113, 124.
[18] Supra note 8.
[19] Should be Plaintiffs.
[20] G.R. No. 147937, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 217, 223.