ARTHUR
ZARATE, Petitioner, -
versus - REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 152263 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,
and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: July 3, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari
of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20710
dated September 28, 2001, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 43 (trial court), finding
petitioner Arthur Zarate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
frustrated homicide.
The
Information[2] dated
That on or about the 1st day of April 1994, at more
or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay 9, Gingoog City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this HonorabIe Court, the above-named accused,
with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Ernesto
A. Guiritan, with the use of an automatic hunting knife with which the accused
was conveniently provided, thereby wounding the victim on [the] epigastric area
and other parts of his body, thus, performing all the acts of execution which
could have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused,
namely, the timely and able medical assistance rendered the victim which
prevented his death.
The
facts are as follows:
The
evidence of the prosecution established that at about
Guiritan
was brought to the
At
In
the morning of P11,580.50.[7]
Guiritan
testified that he recognized Zarate because he used to see him during the town fiestas of Consuelo, Magsaysay, Misamis
Oriental playing hantak. Guiritan’s friend named Maximo, who was a
parlor proprietor, told him Zarate’s name. Moreover, a month before the incident,
Guiritan had an accidental “sexual affair” with Zarate, who thereafter asked
him for money, but Guiritan had no money at that time.[8]
Petitioner
Zarate
put up the defense of alibi. He
declared that he came to know Guiritan only in court.
Zarate
testified that at
Zarate
declared that his house at
Zarate
testified that he does not smoke. He
also did not know of any reason why
Guiritan testified that he (Zarate) was
the one who stabbed him.[11]
Geronima
Cuerdo corroborated Zarate’s testimony. She
admitted that Zarate’s mother was her second degree cousin. She testified that on
In
the Decision[13]
dated
WHEREFORE, the
accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
frustrated homicide and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Likewise, he is
ordered to indemnify the victim the sum of P11,580.50 for medicines and hospital expenses.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Zarate
appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the challenged decision of the
Zarate
filed
before this Court a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which shall be treated as a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court because of
the nature of this case.
Zarate
raised this lone issue:
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING [PETITIONER] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE ON THE SOLE BASIS OF THE ANTE-MORTEM STATEMENT OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, TREATING IT AS PART OF THE RES
GESTAE.[16]
Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred
in upholding the trial court’s decision that the ante-mortem statement of
Guiritan was part of the res gestae
since the statement was taken after the operation of Guiritan in the hospital,
which operation affected his mental and physical condition. Moreover, there were no witnesses presented to support the claim of
Guiritan that petitioner stabbed him.
The
contention is without merit.
Section
42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, which includes
statements given as part of the res
gestae. The pertinent provision reads:
SEC. 42. Part of
the res gestae. - - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place,
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
A declaration made
spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.[17]
In this case, Guiritan
lost consciousness when he was brought to the hospital and regained
consciousness the following morning after the operation. The hospital records[18] showed that the operation started at
x x x x
Q.
Nakaila ka ba kun kinsay
nagdunggab nimo?
(Do you know who stabbed you?)
A.
Ho-o, si Tating
Cuerdo Zarate ug aduna siyay kauban.
(Yes, Tating Cuerdo Zarate and he had a
companion.)
x x x x
Q.
Ikamatay mo ba kining imong samad?
(Are you going to die of your wound?)
A.
Morag.
(As if.)
SPO1 Alecha testified that
he had to put his ear near Guiritan’s mouth so that he could hear Guiritan’s answers as he was catching his breath. The foregoing circumstances reveal that the statement was taken a few hours after
the operation when he regained consciousness.
His statements were still the reflex
product of immediate sensual impressions so that it was the shocking event
speaking through him, and he did not
have the opportunity to concoct or
contrive the story. Thus, his statement is admissible as part of the res gestae. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the
statement was signed by Guiritan and its date was established by SPO1 Alecha.
Petitioner erred in stating that Guiritan’s
statement, which was admitted as part of the res gestae, was the sole basis for his conviction. Apart from the
written statement, Guiritan, who
survived the stabbing incident, positively identified appellant in open court
and testified that petitioner was the one
who stabbed him and that he knew petitioner
even before the stabbing incident. Conviction of the accused may be had on the
basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness.[20]
The trial court correctly disregarded petitioner’s
alibi and denial that he was the perpetrator of the crime. For alibi to prosper as a defense, one must
not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but must
also show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime.[21]
Petitioner claimed that at the time of
the stabbing incident, which occurred at
It
is well settled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of
ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails
over alibi and denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving weight in law.[23]
For this reason, the defense of alibi and denial cannot prosper in the light of
the positive identification by complainant Guiritan that it was petitioner who
stabbed him.[24]
It is also a well-settled doctrine that
findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree
of respect.[25] If found positive and credible by the trial
court, the testimony of a lone eyewitness, like complainant Guiritan, is
sufficient to support a conviction.[26] Having observed the deportment of witnesses
during the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the
issue of credibility; hence, his findings will not be disturbed on appeal in
the absence of any clear showing that he overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could have
altered the conviction of petitioner.[27] This Court has carefully reviewed the records
of this case and agrees with the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
Finally, the trial court correctly found
petitioner guilty of the crime of
frustrated homicide instead of the charge of frustrated murder, absent any
proof of treachery or evident premeditation alleged in the Information to
qualify the crime to frustrated murder.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime of homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. Article
50 of the Code states that the penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony like in this case. The penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal is prision mayor. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
imposable penalty for frustrated homicide, absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years of prision correccional,
as the minimum term, to eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision
mayor in the medium period,[28]
as the maximum term. Hence, the trial
court correctly sentenced petitioner to
an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as the
minimum term, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum term.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20710, dated on September
28, 2001, which upheld the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 43, dated April 1, 1997, finding petitioner Arthur Zarate GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide and sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate prison term
of from four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as the minimum term, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum term, and ordering Arthur Zarate to
indemnify private complainant Ernesto A. Guiritan the amount of P11,580.50
for medical and hospitalization
expenses, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-35.
[2] Records,
p. 2.
[3] RTC
Decision, rollo, pp. 15-16.
[4]
[5] Id. at 19; Exhibit “A-3,” folder of exhibits, p. 4; Exhibit “A-23,”
folder of exhibits, p. 24.
[6] Exhibit “C,” folder of exhibits,
p. 32.
[7] RTC Decision, rollo, pp. 17, 29-30.
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo,
p. 21.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[15]
[16]
[17] People
v. Peña, 427 Phil. 129, 137 (2001).
[18] Exhibit “A-3,” folder of exhibits,
p. 4; Exhibit “A-23,” folder of exhibits, p. 24.
[19] Exhibit “C,” folder of exhibits, p.
32.
[20] People
v. Bulan, G.R. No. 143404,
[21] People
v. Juan, 379 Phil. 645, 666 (2000).
[22] TSN,
[23] People v. Aliben, 446 Phil. 349, 385 (2003).
[24]
[25]
[26] People
v. Segobre, G.R. No. 169877,
[27] Supra
note 21, at 376.
[28] The
maximum penalty is prision mayor in
the medium period in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
pursuant to Art. 64(1) of the Revised
Penal Code.