FIRST DIVISION
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ATTY. EMMANUEL PONTEJOS, Petitioner, - versus - HON. ANIANO A DESIERTO and RESTITUTO
AQUINO, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 148600
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BERSAMIN,
JJ. Promulgated: July 7, 2009
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
In this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner seeks to set aside and annul the Decision[1]
dated August 21, 2000 as well as the Resolution[2]
dated June 15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 54474.
The CA decision dismissed the petition
filed by herein petitioner assailing the decision[3] of
Aniano Desierto in his capacity as Ombudsman which found petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal.
The factual antecedents of
the case are summarized by the CA thus:
On August 26, 1998, the Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB, for brevity) received a Notice of Appeal filed by Rasemco, Inc., represented by its president Restituto Aquino, in a case captioned as “Rasemco Construction Corp. vs. Hammercon, Inc.” docketed as HLURB Case No. 9817 decided by Arbiter Emmanuel Pontejos, petitioner herein. In said Notice of Appeal, Rasemco, through Aquino, asked for the nullification of all the proceedings conducted before Arbiter Pontejos for alleged extortion, bribery and graft and corruption committed by Pontejos in conspiracy with Director Wilfredo Imperial and Ms. Carmen Atos, both of HLURB and one Roderick Ngo, officer of Hammercon, Inc. Attached to the Notice of Appeal were a photocopy of Aquino’s letter to President Joseph Estrada dated August 12, 1998 and his complaint-affidavit. The complaint-affidavit imputed to the named officer and employee of HLURB the following acts, viz:
1. Demanding and receiving monetary
consideration in exchange for offers of assistance in securing a favorable
decision in a pending case;
2. Inaction of Director Imperial of
complainant’s opposition to the issuance of license to sell in favor of
Rasemco, Inc., and subsequently, his issuance of said license despite his
supposed knowledge about the existence of legal defect or impediment in
applicant’s title;
3. Arbiter Pontejos’ preparing
and/or editing pleadings such as draft petition for review as well as other
legal documents such as affidavits and contracts for Rasemco; and
4. Arbiter Pontejos and Ms. Atos’
(para-legal staff of Arbiter Pontejos meeting and conferring with Aquino and
his lawyer, Atty. Venturanza, outside of office premises.
The
gravity of the allegations contained in the complaint prompted the HLURB to
conduct an investigation despite the absence of a formal administrative
complaint. On August 28, 1998,
Commissioner Francisco L. Dagñalan of the Legal and Administrative Affairs of
HLURB directed Dir. Imperial, Atty. Pontejos and Ms. Atos to submit their
comments to Mr. Aquino’s affidavit complaint within five (5) days from receipt
of the memorandum dated August 28, 1998.
On September 2, 1998, petitioner and Ms. Atos submitted separate
explanations denying the allegations in the complaint and giving their own
version of the events. Meanwhile, Dir.
Imperial submitted a Manifesto written in Filipino, dated August 31, 1998, as
his answer to the complaint.
On
September 8, 1998, HLURB Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Commissioner Romulo
Q. Fabul issued HLURB Special Order No. 55 creating a fact-finding committee to
investigate the background and circumstances of Mr. Aquino’s complaint against
Dir. Imperial, Arbiter Pontejos and Carmen Atos and determine the remedial and
preventive management measures that HLRUB must undertake, if any. Commissioner Francisco Dagñalan was named
chairman of the fact-finding committee and Commissioners Roque Arrieta Magno
and Teresita A. Desierto as members.
While
the fact-finding committee of the HLURB was conducting their investigation, Mr.
Aquino filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against the same persons on alleged conspiracy to extort money form him under a
promise that a favorable decision will be rendered in a case pending before
HLURB. Attached to the complaint are the
sworn statements of Ruth Adel and Atty. Thaddeus E. Venturanza, Resemco’s
finance officer and legal counsel, respectively, and a photocopy of the check
allegedly received by Arbiter Pontejos through Ms. Atos. The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau (EPIB, for brevity) of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted a
preliminary investigation and directed the respondents to file their
counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence. On September 25, 1998, respondent Atos filed
her counter-affidavit denying the material allegations of the complaint and
raised the defense that the check given by Ruth Adel was in payment of a
personal transaction between them. The
counter-affidavit of respondent Pontejos submitted on December 4, 1998, also
denied the material allegations of the complaint and dismissed the complaint as
“nothing more than a disgruntled losing party seeking to gain leverage.” Repondent Imperial also denied the
allegations linking him to the alleged extortion perpetrated by Atty. Pontejos
and Ms. Atos and in the receipt of his alleged share in the bribe.
Meanwhile,
the fact-finding committee of the HLURB proceeded with their own investigation,
limiting their inquiry into the administrative aspect of the complaint. On January 29, 1999, the committee submitted
its report on the investigation proposing among others to indorse the report to
the Office for the Ombudsman for its consideration.
On
February 18, 1999, public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto issued an
order placing petitioner Pontejos under preventive suspension for a period of
six (6) months without pay and further directing him and Dir. Imperial to file
their counter-affidavits and other controverting evidence to the
complaint. Thereafter or on February 19,
1999, the EPIB of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a joint resolution
recommending that: 1) an Information for Estafa (one count) be filed against
respondent Atty. EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS befor the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City; 2) an Information for Direct Bribery be filed against respondent Atty. EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City; 3) an Information for Unauthorized Practice of Profession
in violation of R.A. 6713 to be filed against Atty. EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City; 4) the complaint against Director
WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL and RODERICK NGO be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence; and 5) respondent CARMENCITA ATOS y. RUIZ be extended immunity from
criminal prosecution in accordance with Section 17 of R.A.A 6770 and be utilized
as a state witness. Respondent Pontejos
(petitioner, herein) moved to reconsider the Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman dated February 18, 1999 which motion was denied in an Order dated
March 5, 1999. In accordance with the
recommendation of the EPIB, the Office of the Ombudsman filed criminal
informations for bribery and estafa against respondent Atty. Emmanuel T.
Pontejos. Meanwhile, in a Resolution
dated June 21, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman granted Carmencita Atos
immunity from criminal prosecution for bribery and estafa filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City.
On
June 29, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman disposed of the administrative
complaint as follows:
“WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing premises, we hereby declare respondent Emmanuel
Pontejos guilty of Grave Misconduct, and as such, the penalty of dismissal from
the service is hereby meted on him.
We
hereby absolve respondent Wilfredo Imperial of the charges for lack of
substantial evidence.
SO
ORDERED.”
Petitioner moved to reconsider the
above decision but this was denied by the Ombudsman in an Order dated July 21,
1999. Thereafter,
he filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in the
CA. On August 21, 2000, the CA dismissed
the petition and upheld the Ombudsman’s decision finding petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied his
motion.
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
1.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN;
2.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN WAS TAINTED WITH ILL-MOTIVES;
3.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE GRANT OF IMMUNITY TO MS. CARMENCITA R.
ATOS WAS IMPROPER;
4.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUSMAN SINGLED OUT HEREIN PETITIONER FOR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
5.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
AFFIDAVIT DATED 18 FEBRUARY 1999 OF MS. ATOS;
6.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THERE
WAS A FAILURE TO PROSECUTE ON THE PART OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
At the outset,
it
must be stated that petitioner had already raised the same issues and arguments
before this Court in the case of Pontejos
v. Office of the Ombudsman[4] decided
on February 22, 2006. That case involved
exactly the same set of facts and issues as in this case, except that what was
challenged therein was the February 19, 1999 Joint Resolution of the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman
which found probable cause against petitioner for estafa, direct bribery and
illegal practice of profession, whereas what is assailed in the instant case is
the decision of the Ombudsman finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
dismissing him from service. We held in
that case, penned by former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban:
Petitioner
theorizes that the OMB resolved the Complaint against him for reasons other
than the merits of the case. He
specifically charges HLURB Commissioner Teresita Desierto, the spouse of
Ombudsman Desierto, as the “unseen hand” behind the filing of the criminal
cases. Commissioner Desierto allegedly
harbored resentment against him for signing a Manifesto issued by some lawyers
in the HLURB. He also recalls Commissioner Desierto threatening him if he did
not resign from the HLURB. Thus, he
concludes that the proceedings before the OMB were tainted with ill motives.
We
cannot accept petitioner’s arguments. The
Court observes that his arguments are merely conjectures bereft of any
proof. He presented absolutely no evidence of any irregularity in the
proceedings before the OMB. There was no
showing that Commissioner Desierto interfered in any manner in the proceedings
before the OMB. Other than petitioner’s
bare assertions, there was also no proof that Commissioner Desierto bore a
grudge against Pontejos.
x x x
The
decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in
character. It is the prosecution that
could essentially determine the strength of pursuing a case against an
accused. The prosecutorial powers
include the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange for
testimony against another. xxx
It
is constitutionally permissible for Congress to vest the prosecutor with the
power to determine who can qualify as a witness and be granted immunity from prosecution. Noteworthy, there are many laws that allow
government investigators and prosecutors to grant immunity. In relation to
this, the Court has previously upheld the discretion of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), Commission on Elections (Comelec), and the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) to grant immunity from prosecution on the basis of
the respective laws that vested them with such power.
The
OMB was also vested with the power to grant immunity from prosecution, thus:
“SEC. 17. x x x.
“Under
such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity
from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and
production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the
truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or
under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its
constitutional functions and statutory objectives. x x x.”
According
to Pontejos, the OMB’s authority to grant immunity is subject to the “pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court.” He
claims that the procedural rules allow the discharge of an accused as state
witness only upon conformity of the trial court. An information against the accused must first
be filed in court prior to the discharge.
Moreover, the prosecution could only recommend and propose, but not
grant immunity.
The
pertinent provision of the Rules of Court reads:
“Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be
state witness. –When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when after requiring
the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied
that:
‘(a)
There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
‘(b)
There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
‘(c)
The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
‘(d)
Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
‘(e)
Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
‘Evidence
adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the
trial. If the court denies the motion
for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be
inadmissible in evidence.’”
The
Court has already held that this provision is applicable only to cases already
filed in court. The trial court is given
the power to discharge an accused as a state witness only because it has
already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
As
stated earlier, the power to choose who to discharge as state witness is an
executive function. Essentially, it is
not a judicial prerogative. The fact
that an individual had not been previously charged or included in an
information does not prevent the prosecution from utilizing said person as a
witness.
Section
17 of the Ombudsman Act requires conformity with the Rules of Court. Accordingly, this should be read as requiring
the following circumstances prior to the discharge: (1) absolute necessity for
the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged; (2) no direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except the
testimony of the said accused; (3) the testimony of the said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points; (4) said accused does not
appear to be most guilty; and (5) said accused has not any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Indeed,
there must be a standard to follow in the exercise of the prosecutor’s
discretion. The decision to grant
immunity cannot be made capriciously. Should
there be unjust favoritism, the Court may exercise its certiorari power.
In
the present case, certiorari is not proper.
Pontejos’ allegations do not show, much less allege, grave abuse of
discretion in the granting of immunity to Atos.
The OMB considered Atos’ position, record and involvement in the case
prior to the discharge.
Pontejos
also claims that he was not furnished a copy of Atos’ Affidavit that connected
him to the crimes. Since he was not
afforded the opportunity to challenge the assertions in said Affidavit, his
right to due process had allegedly been violated.
The
alleged denial of due process is controverted by the facts. It appears from the records that Pontejos
eventually received a copy of the aforementioned Affidavit. More importantly, he had challenged the
Affidavit in his Motion for Reinvestigation and request for reconsideration of
the Review and Recommendation of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman. Pontejos’ contention must necessarily fail because
-- as shown -- he had the opportunity to be heard and in fact, availed of it.
The foregoing
ruling is the law of the case and thus lays to rest the issues posed by
petitioner in his assignment of errors. We
see no reason in this case to deviate therefrom. It is a basic legal principle that whatever
is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.[5]
We are now left
to discuss petitioner’s liability for grave misconduct and the propriety of the
penalty of dismissal imposed upon him.
Petitioner
contends that he was denied of his right to due process when he was not able to
confront Aquino who failed to appear in two hearings. He further avers that Aquino’s absence in
those hearings constitutes failure to prosecute and a ground for the dismissal
of the administrative case against him.
Petitioner insists that no substantial evidence existed to hold him
liable for grave misconduct as the
Ombudsman merely relied on the affidavits of Carmencita Atos and respondent
Aquino’s subordinates namely Ruth Adel, Rowena Alcovendas and Atty. Thaddeus
Venturanza, in determining his administrative liability.
Due
process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.[6]
In the instant case, petitioner had
ample opportunity to ventilate his case. On the administrative complaint filed
by Aquino against him with the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner had received
sufficient information which, in fact, enabled him to prepare his defense. He submitted his counter-affidavit denying
the allegations in the complaint. He was also able to seek reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s Order placing him under preventive suspension for six (6)
months. Finally, he was able to appeal
the Ombudsman’s ruling to the CA.
Clearly, petitioner had all the opportunity to be heard, present his
case and submit evidence in his defense.
We have consistently held that the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured
by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.[7]
As the records would show, petitioner
had filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence, petitioner’s protestations that he had
been deprived of due process must
necessarily fail.
The absence of Aquino in two
hearings is not a sufficient ground to say that due process was not afforded
petitioner. Administrative bodies are
not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in courts of law. In
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. In fact, it is
well-settled that, in administrative cases, the requirement of notice and
hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings.[8] Thus, petitioner was not denied due
process when he failed to cross-examine Aquino since he was given the
opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. To repeat, in
administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices
to meet the requirements of due process.[9]
Petitioner
cites Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to support his
argument that the administrative case against him should have been dismissed
for failure to prosecute because Aquino failed to appear in two hearings of the
EPIB of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, states –
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant
or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant
to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
The provisions
of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise
provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative agency
concerned. The Rules of Court, which are
meant to secure to every litigant the adjective phase of due process of law,
may be applied to proceedings before an administrative body with quasi-judicial
powers in the absence of different and valid statutory or administrative
provisions prescribing the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and
adjudication of cases before it.[10]
However,
even if Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is applied to the subject
administrative proceedings, petitioner’s argument on the matter of failure to
prosecute still lacks merit. Section 3, Rule 17 provides for three instances
where the complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he
fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time; and (3) if he fails to comply with the
rules or any order of the court.[11]
While a court
can dismiss a case on the ground of non
prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under
the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in
failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on
the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to
dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.[12]
Aquino, who
initiated the complaint against petitioner, has not shown culpable negligence that
would warrant the dismissal of his complaint.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his Comment filed with this
Court, records show that Aquino appeared at the clarificatory hearing called by
the EPIB.[13] He even brought to the attention of the
proper authorities petitioner’s misconduct.
Likewise, the CA noted that respondent had not manifested a lack of
interest to prosecute. Besides, in an administrative
case, the complainant, like Aquino, is a mere witness. No private interest is involved in an
administrative case as the offense is committed against the government.[14] Thus, his absence in two hearings is not a
ground for the dismissal of the case against petitioner.
We agree with
the conclusions of the Office of the Ombudsman as affirmed by the CA that there
was sufficient evidence to support the finding of administrative liability on
the part of petitioner. It has been
substantially established that petitioner demanded and received the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) in exchange for a favorable
decision of a case[15]
then pending in the HLURB where petitioner was an Arbiter. The money was given in installments from
January to March 1998.[16] The statements of witnesses Atos, Adel and
Atty. Venturanza are clear, categorical and replete with the details
establishing how the offense was perpetrated by petitioner. Their statements corroborated the allegations
of complainant Aquino. The petitioner
failed to present any evidence to counter the aforesaid positive and unequivocal
declarations of these witnesses, same, and as such, his guilt has been
adequately shown. His bare denial
undoubtedly paled in comparison with the witnesses’ categorical declarations.
The Office of
the Ombudsman and the appellate court invariably found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct. The Court affirms this
finding following the salutary rule that factual findings of administrative
bodies are accorded not only respect but even finality by the Court. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of
evidence required is only substantial. The
gauge of substantial evidence is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to
believe that petitioner is guilty of misconduct, even if the evidence might not
be overwhelming. Here, there is
substantial evidence to support the Ombudsman’s finding, as sustained by the
CA, that petitioner is guilty of the offense charged against him. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion, the findings of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive and shall not be disturbed by the Court.[17] It is not the task of this
Court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before administrative bodies
and to substitute its own judgment for that of the latter.[18]
We thus find petitioner
guilty of grave misconduct. By his actuations, he violated the policy of the
State to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.[19] Public servants must bear in mind this
constitutional mandate at all times to guide them in their actions during their
entire tenure in the government service.
Under the Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from service.
Specifically, Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Sec.
22. Adiministrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified
into grave, less grave, and light, depending on the gravity of its nature and
effects of acts on the government service.
The
following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties:
xxx
(c) Grave Misconduct
1st
Offense – Dismissal
xxx.
To end, it must
be stressed that grave misconduct has always been and should remain anathema in
the civil service. It inevitably reflects
on the fitness of a civil servant to continue in office. When an officer or employee is disciplined,
the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith
and confidence in the government.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition
for review is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 54474 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by then Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now a member of this Court, with Associate Justice Bernardo LL. Salas (ret.) and Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (ret.) concurring; rollo, pp. 40-54.
[2] Id. at 55-56.
[3] Id. at 98-103.
[4] G.R. Nos. 158613-614, February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA 83.
[5] Cucueco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139278, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 290, 301.
[6] Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 462, 472.
[7] Ibid.
[8]
[9] Autencio v. Mañara, G.R. No. 152752, January 19, 2005, 449 SCRA 46, 55.
[10] Supra note 6 at 469.
[11] Belonio v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 161379, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 557, 577.
[12] Marahay v. Melicor, G.R. No. 44980, February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 811, 817.
[13] Rollo, p. 174.
[14] Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88177, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84, 98-99.
[15] HLURB Case No. 9817 entitled, “Rasemco Construction Corp. v. Hammercon, Inc.”
[16] Rollo, p. 86.
[17] Basuel v. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 143664, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 118, 127.
[18] Santos v. Manalili, G.R. No. 157812, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 679, 687.
[19] 1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 1.
[20] Civil Service Commission v. Cortez, G.R. No. 155732, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 593, 607-608.