Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
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DOMINGA RUIZ, APOLONIA RUIZ, |
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G.R. No. 166386 |
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FLORENCIO RUIZ, CORNELIA |
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RUIZ, OLIMPIO RUIZ, and
HEIRS |
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Present: |
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OF TOMASA RUIZ, |
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Petitioners, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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Acting Chairperson, |
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TINGA,* |
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- versus - |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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DE CASTRO,** JJ. |
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CIRILA |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent.*** |
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January 27, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
and mandamus seeking that the Resolutions dated September 21, 2004[1]
and December 21, 2004[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85872 be reversed and set aside;
and that the CA be directed to give due course to the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus filed before it by herein petitioners.
A
brief factual background is necessary for a proper perspective in the
resolution of herein petition.
Dominga, Apolonia, Florencio,
Cornelia, Tomasa and Olimpio, all surnamed Ruiz (petitioners), were the original
owners of seven parcels of land with a total area of 194,284 square meters located in Barangay
Kaytinga, Alfonso, Cavite, covered by OCT No. P-4017 in the name of Tomasa, covering
46,235 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4018 in the name of Cornelia, 49,803 sq. meters;
OCT No. P-4288 in the name of Dominga, 19,649 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4289 in the
name of Apolonia, 19,649 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4290 in the name of Olimpio,
19,650 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4291 in the name of Florencio, 19,650 sq. meters;
and OCT No. P-4292 in the name of Cornelia, 19,648 sq. meters (collectively
referred to as “subject property”).
Cirila delos
Sometime
in 1995, Olimpio gave respondent the plan of the subject property and verbally
authorized her to sell the same. Thereafter, respondent referred in writing the
subject property to Odessa Antiporda (Antiporda), a realtor and a fellow estate
broker, who had earlier informed respondent that she had a prospective buyer
interested to buy a land with an area of about 15 to 20 hectares to be used as
a retirement village. Antiporda in turn
referred the subject property to one Alfred Tantiansu (Tantiansu). Olimpio then gave respondent a written
authority to sell the same.[3]
In
May 1996, respondent introduced Olimpio to Tantiansu and they all went together
to the location of the properties.
Tantiansu showed interest in the properties and asked for the lowering
of price, which Olimpio pegged at P315.00 per square meter. Respondent asked Olimpio for the renewal of
her authority, to sell to which the former obliged. In the authority to sell, it was specified
that she would still be paid her commission even after the said authority
expired, provided she registered in writing her prospective buyer with whom she
negotiated during the period of authority. Accordingly, respondent notified
petitioners in writing that Tantiansu was her buyer. [4]
A
meeting was subsequently held among Olimpio, respondent and Tantiansu in
Tantiansu's office where the prospective buyer showed interest in buying the
properties. A few weeks later, a meeting
was held between Olimpio and Tantiansu only, without respondent. Olimpio asked respondent to lower her
commission from 5% to 2.5%; otherwise, the sale would not push through. But respondent, through a letter sent to
Olimpio, answered that she was amenable to a commission of 4%.[5]
Respondent
later learned that the properties were sold to different corporations at P60.00
per square meter, as indicated in the deeds of sale. Upon her verification of the articles of
incorporation of the corporation-buyers with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, she found out that the corporations were owned by Tantiansu. Respondent then demanded the payment of her
broker's commission, but was unheeded.
Respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Piñas City, a
complaint[6] for
collection of sum of money and damages against all petitioners, alleging that
it was through her effort as a real estate broker that she was able to bring
about the consummation of the sale of the subject property, to petitioners'
immense gain and benefits; that despite the sale and her repeated demands,
petitioners refused to pay her broker's fee.
Petitioners
“Domingo Ruiz, et al.” filed their Answer with counterclaim and alleged as
affirmative defense that at the time of the consummation of the sale of the
subject properties, there was no longer any existing broker's agreement between them; that
respondent had no more authority from them to sell the properties or, assuming there was such authority, the same
had already lapsed or expired; that it was petitioners' understanding at the
time of the sale of the subject properties that Tantiansu, the buyer, would be
responsible for the payment of the broker's commission, whoever the broker may
be; that petitioners knew that respondent had initially claimed her broker's
commission from Tantiansu; but after Tantiansu's death, and failing to collect
any broker's commission from said buyer, respondent commenced the present
action against them.
Issues
having been joined, a full-blown trial on the merits ensued.
On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff [respondent] and against the
defendants [petitioners], ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff jointly and
severally the sum of P2,447,524.80 plus legal interest thereon from the
filing of the complaint and moral damages of P500,000.00 as well as
exemplary damages of P200,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and P2,000.00
per court appearance and to pay the cost.[8]
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal.[9] On
In
an Order[10]
dated
With
the denial of their appeal, petitioners filed a petition for relief[11]
alleging that they were prevented from awaiting themselves of an appeal due to
mistake and excusable negligence of their counsel on record, and that they had
a good and substantial defense. Attached
to the petition was the Affidavit of Merit of Atty. Mark Edsel Ang (Atty. Ang),
petitioners' former counsel, wherein he stated that when he received the decision on September
30, 2003, he immediately sent copies thereof
to petitioners by registered mail, as four of the six petitioners live
abroad while the other two live in Cavite; that he communicated with the RTC
Clerk of Court the fact that a notice of appeal was already filed and the fees would
be paid as soon as he got the confirmation of petitioners' desire to appeal, to
which the clerk of court gave her assurance on the acceptance of the late
payment of docket fees; that he received a long distance call from petitioner
Cornelia on October 15, 2003 confirming petitioners' desire to appeal the
decision; thus, he paid the appellate fees on October 24, 2003. Atty. Ang admitted that it was through his
negligence that the appeal was belatedly filed.
In
its Decision[12]
dated
In
an Order[13]
dated
On
Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction with the CA, verified and certified by Dominga, seeking to set aside
the following: (1) Order dated January
16, 2004, which denied petitioners' notice of appeal; (2) Decision dated June
18, 2004 denying petitioners' petition for relief; (3) Order dated June 24,
2004 declaring the Decision as final and executory and granting the motion for
execution filed by respondent; (4)
notice of garnishment issued on July 5, 2004; and notice of sale.
On
WHEREFORE,
for being procedurally flawed, at the very least, this petition is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE, and consequently DISMISSED. And since the temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is merely an adjunct to
the main case, the same must be pro tanto denied. [16]
The reasons given by the CA
dismissing the petition outright are as follows:
(1)
No motion for
reconsideration was filed against the challenged Order issued by the respondent
judge on
(2)
The names of the heirs of
the petitioner Tomasa Ruiz are not indicated, in violation of the first par.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules, which requires that the “petition shall contain the full names and
actual addresses of all petitioners and
respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual
background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.”
(3)
There is no special power
of attorney executed by the said heirs authorizing Dominga to sign the
verification and certification in their own behalf.[17]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in
the assailed Resolution dated
Hence, herein petition raising
the following issues:
1.
WHETHER A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED BEFORE RESORTING TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE THE CA;
2.
WHETHER THE NAMES OF THE HEIRS OF THE PETITIONER TOMASA RUIZ ARE
INDICATED IN THE PETITION;
3.
WHETHER THERE IS NO
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY EXECUTED BY SAID HEIRS AUTHORIZING PETITIONER TO SIGN
THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ON THEIR OWN BEHALF.
4.
WHETHER THE CA ACTED WITH
HASTE ON ITS BASESLESS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
IS A VIRTUAL REHASH OF THOSE ALLEGED IN SUPPORT OF ITS PETITION.[18]
The parties filed their
respective memoranda.
Anent the first issue,
petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite for the institution of a special civil action
for certiorari.
Under the peculiar circumstances
of the present case, we agree with petitioners.
There is no question that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the court an
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of
re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.[19]
However, the filing of a motion
for reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorari is not
always a sine qua non[20]
requirement, as there are recognized exceptions: (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly, or are
the same as those, raised and passed upon by the lower court; (c) where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner, or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances,
a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in
a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were
ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law, or public interest is
involved.[21] We find this case falling under exceptions b,
c and d.
Petitioners' notice of appeal was
earlier denied by the RTC due to the late payment of docket fees, and it ruled that
its decision dated
Petitioners' subsequent petition
for relief from the denial of appeal was denied by the RTC in its Decision dated
Anent the second issue, the CA
erred in finding that the names of the heirs of petitioner Tomasa Ruiz were not
indicated in the petition. In the
petition filed before the CA, it was alleged that the petitioners are as
follows:
Dominga
Ruiz, resident of Kaytinga, Alfonso Cavite;
Apolonia
Ruiz, resident of
Cornelia
Ruiz, resident of
Olimpio
Ruiz, resident of 4510
Florencio
Ruiz, resident of Detecon Al Saudia Co.
Ltd., PO Box 31443, Jeddah, 21497;
Heirs
of Tomasa Ruiz, all the above residents of the above-mentioned addresses.[22]
In
their motion for reconsideration of the
CA Resolution dated September 21, 2004, petitioners alleged that there was
substantial compliance with the requirement that the full names and actual
residents of all petitioners must be stated,
since all the petitioners are the only children of the late Tomasa Ruiz,
a fact that they had sufficiently alleged in their petition. We find such explanation plausible,
considering that the phrase “heirs of Tomasa Ruiz” was followed by the words
“all the above,” which means that the heirs of Tomasa are the persons whose
names are immediately preceding.
As
to the third issue, we also find that the CA erred in finding that there were
no special powers of attorney (SPAs) executed by the heirs of Tomasa
authorizing petitioner Dominga to sign the verification and certification on
their behalf. However, an examination of the CA rollo shows that when
the petition was filed with the CA, attached were separate SPAs[23]
of petitioners Apolonia, Cornelia, Olimpio, Florencio, the heirs of Tomasa,
executed in favor of their co-petitioner Dominga, giving her the authority to
sign the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Anent
the fourth issue, we rule that the CA hastily concluded that the allegations in
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated
Thus,
the CA committed a reversible error in outrightly dismissing the petition and
not giving due course to it as well as in denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners
further claim that the RTC should have given due course to their notice of appeal
of the RTC Decision dated September 22, 2003 to the CA since the late payment
of appellate docket fees was due to the mistake and excusable negligence of
their counsel and they had a good and substantial defense.
Instead of remanding the case to
the CA which would only unduly prolong the disposition of the case between the
parties, we shall resolve[24] the substantive
issue raised in the petition for certiorari filed with the CA, to
wit: Whether the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' petition for relief from denial of
appeal.
To
begin with, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the RTC decision
dated
It is a well-settled rule that
the mere filing of the notice of appeal is not enough, for it must be
accompanied by the payment of the correct appellate docket fees.[27] Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory.[28] It is an essential requirement without which
the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has
been filed. Failure to perfect an appeal
within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality but jurisdictional, and
failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and executory.[29]
Hence,
there is no question that the RTC correctly dismissed petitioners' appeal
pursuant to Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC.
13. Dismissal of appeal. — Prior
to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the
appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion
dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time, or for non-payment of the
docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
However,
petitioners filed a petition for relief from the RTC Order that did not giving
due course to their notice of appeal on the grounds of mistake and excusable
negligence committed by their counsel.
They contend that their counsel mistakenly erred when he relied in good
faith on the affirmation made by the trial court's clerk of court that the
appeal fees would be accepted even after the period for the filing of the
notice of appeal; that counsel also mistakenly relied on jurisprudence that
technical rules of procedure would be relaxed provided that the same were
substantially complied with; that counsel's negligence should not be binding on
them; that they have good and substantial defenses which would result in the
dismissal of the complaint or a reduction of the monetary awards set forth in
the decision.
Section
2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section
2. Petition for relief from denial of
appeal. — When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a
case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course.
Negligence
to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not
have guarded against.[30] Petitioners' counsel filed a notice of appeal
within the reglementary period for filing the same without, however, paying the
appellate docket fees. Counsel very well
knew that under the Rules of Court, the full amount of appellate docket and
other lawful fees must be paid within the same period that the notice of appeal
was filed, as he even allegedly communicated to the clerk of court his request
for additional time in order to consolidate the confirmation of petitioners'
desire to appeal.
The failure of counsel to pay the
appellate docket fees on time constitutes negligence. Despite receiving an overseas call on
It bears stressing that the Rules
of Court explicitly provides for the procedure for the perfection of
appeal. The counsel of petitioners
should not have relied on the alleged assurance by the clerk of court of the
acceptance of the late payment of docket fees.
As an officer of the court, he should know that the affirmation of the
clerk of court could not prevail over the specific requirement of the
rules. The rules of procedure are meant
to be followed and not to be subjected to the whims and convenience of the
parties and their counsels or by mere opinions of the clerk of court.
Atty. Ang should not have
presumed that the rules of procedure would be relaxed in favor of his
clients. His reliance on jurisprudence that
the application of the technical rules of procedure would be relaxed if the
same was subsequently complied with is not justified. The liberal application of rules of procedure
for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and not the rule; and it is only
allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice.[31] Atty. Ang's negligence in not paying the
docket fees on time cannot be considered as excusable. The circumstances
surrounding this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules.
Petitioners
insist that they are not bound by the mistake of their counsel, citing De
Guzman v. Sandiganbayan[32] and Samala
v. Court of Appeals.[33]
In
De Guzman, petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of anti-graft and corrupt practices act for
his failure to account for the P200,000.00 he received for certain
training programs of the Department of Agriculture based on the testimony of
the lone prosecution witness that no such training program was held at the
designated places. Petitioner sought to be relieved from what he considered as
the serious and costly mistake of his former lawyers in demurring to the
prosecution evidence after leave was denied, the effect of which deprived him
of presenting the pieces of documentary evidence showing due disbursement of the
P200,000 received for the training program which was actually conducted. The original documents were all along kept in
the records section of the Bureau of Plant Industry; and these original copies were readily available, which if
presented would have completely belied the accusation against him. We ruled
that since no less than petitioner's liberty was at stake, the higher interests
of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly mistake
of his previous counsel.
In
contrast, the present case does not involve the life or liberty of petitioners,
and they were adequately heard with all the issues fully ventilated and
evidence presented before the decision was rendered.
In
Samala, the last day for filing the notice of appeal fell on a
In
the case of herein petitioners, the payment of the docket fees was done nine
days after the lapse of the period to appeal. In fact, in the affidavit of
merit of petitioners' counsel attached to the petition for relief, he stated
that on
Petitioners
also allege that subsequent and substantial compliance with the rule may call
for the relaxation of the rules of procedure, citing our ruling in Jaro v.
Court of Appeals.[34]
We
are not persuaded.
In
Jaro, the CA dismissed the petition filed before it for being defective,
as it was not in the form of a petition for review and the annexes thereto
attached were certified as true xerox copies by counsel, not by the proper
public official who had custody of the records. Petitioner subsequently filed
an amended petition in the proper form accompanied by annexes, all of which
were certified true copies by the Department of Agriculture Regional Adjudication
Board. This Court ruled that there was
more than substantial compliance, and the hard stance taken by the CA was
unjustified under the circumstances. Notably, petitioner therein committed a
lapse in the formal requirement which was curable by amendment. In the present
case, however, petitioners failed to pay the appellate docket fees on time,
which is jurisdictional and which divests the trial court of jurisdiction to
act on the appeal. The payment of the
appellate docket and other lawful fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure.[35] It is
an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed
from would become final and executory, as if no appeal was filed at all.[36]
The
failure of petitioners' counsel to perfect the appeal binds petitioners. It is
settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of
their counsel.[37] While, exceptionally, the client may be
excused from the failure of counsel, the factual circumstances in the present case
do not give us sufficient reason to suspend the rules of the most mandatory
character. Petitioners themselves may
not be said to be entirely faultless.
Atty.
Ang, petitioners' counsel, claims that as soon as he received the decision, he
sent copies to petitioners. Records show
that at that time, while some of the petitioners were already abroad, Dominga
and Tomasa were still living in
The
Court may deign to veer away from the general rule only if, in its assessment,
the appeal on its face appears absolutely meritorious.[40] Indeed,
the Court has, in a number of instances, relaxed procedural rules in order to
serve and achieve substantial justice.[41]
However, the instant case does not warrant the desired relaxation.
Respondent
has sufficiently shown that she was authorized in writing by petitioners to
sell the subject property; that respondent was instrumental in bringing about
the meeting of petitioner Olimpio and Tantiansu and the transaction concerning
the sale of subject property; and that it was proven by evidence that the buyer
of the subject property was Tantiansu. Thus,
respondent is entitled to the broker's commission as agreed upon between her
and the petitioners. Petitioners' claim
that Tantiansu had explicitly bound himself to pay the broker's commission
after the consummation of the sale would not relieve petitioners of their
liability to respondent since, as correctly held by RTC, whatever Tantiansu and
petitioners agreed relative to the payment of broker's commission is binding
only upon themselves and not binding on respondent who does not appear to have consented
thereto.
Thus,
we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in denying
petitioners' petition for relief, since they were not prevented from filing
their notice of appeal and payment of docket fees by mistake or excusable
negligence that would have deprived them of their day in court. Such relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own
negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which
has already been lost, because of either inexcusable negligence or counsel’s mistake
in procedure.[42]
It
bears stressing that appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege.[43]
Corollary to this principle is that the appeal must be exercised strictly in
accordance with the provisions set by law.[44]
WHEREFORE,
the petition for review is DENIED.
Cost
against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
Acting
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* In lieu of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
per Special Order No. 555 dated
** In
lieu of Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per Special Order No. 560 dated
*** The Court of Appeals and the Presiding Judge are deleted from the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[1] Penned by Justice Renato
C. Dacudao and concurred in by Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C.
Librea-Leagogo; rollo, pp. 28-29.
[2]
[3] RTC Decision, p.10.
[4] RTC Decision.
[5]
[6] Docketed as Civil Case No. LP
98-0084.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] CA rollo, pp 139-142.
[16] Rollo,
p. 29.
[17]
[18]
[19] Villena v. Rupisan, G.R. No. 167620, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 346,
358-359, citing Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corporation, G.R. No.
99047, 16 April 2001, 356 SCRA 451, 462.
[20]
[21] Sevillana v. I.T.
[International] Corp., supra note 19, at 462.
[22] CA rollo, p. 2.
[23]
[24] Perez v. Hermano, G.R.
No. 147417,
[25] Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 3.
SEC.
3. Period of ordinary appeal,
appeal in habeas corpus cases. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record of appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order. x x x
[26] Section
4, Rule 41.
SEC.
4. Appellate court docket and
other lawful fees. — Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant
shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court
together with the original record or the record on appeal.
[27] M.A. Santander
Construction Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477, November 10, 2004, 441
SCRA 525, 528, citing Rodillas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
119055, July 10, 1995, 245 SCRA 702, 705, citing Galang v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 76221, July 29, 1991, 199 SCRA 683; Guevara v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 43714, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 32.
[28]
[29]
[30] Regalado v. Regalado,
G.R. No. 134154, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 473, 484, citing Insular Life
Savings and Trust Company v. Runes, Jr., G.R. No. 152530, August 12, 2004, 436
SCRA 317, citing Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144813,
August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 262.
[31] Heirs
of Gaudiano v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 174247,
[32] G.R.
No. 103276,
[33] G.R. No. 128628,
[34] G.R.
No. 127536,
[35] Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company, G.R. No. 138031, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 439,446.
[36]
[37] Fukuzumi v. Sanritsu
Great International Corporation, G.R. No. 140630,
[38] Philhouse
Development Corporation v. Consolidated
Orix Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 135287, April 14, 2001, 356
SCRA 281, 285 citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106153, July
14, 1997, 275 SCRA 413; Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 112850, June 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 384.
[39] Id.
citing Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, G.R. No. 129442, March 10,
1999, 304 SCRA 440.
[40] Land
Bank of the
[41]
[42] Fukuzumi v. Sanritsu
Great International Corporation, supra note 37, at 233, citing Ibabao v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-74848,
[43] Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, supra note 35, citing Badillo v. Tayag, G.R. No. 143976, April 3, 2003, 400 SCRA 494.
[44]