FIRST DIVISION
|
VIRGINIA A. SUGUE and THE HEIRS OF RENATO S. VALDERRAMA, Petitioners, -
versus - TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.), INC., Respondent. TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.), INC., Petitioner, -
versus - VIRGINIA A. SUGUE and THE HEIRS OF RENATO S. VALDERRAMA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 164804
G.R. No. 164784
Present: pUNO, C.J.,* CARPIO,** Acting Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*** CARPIO
MORALES,*** and LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: January 30, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before
us are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by both contending parties assailing the
Decision[1]
dated
In G.R. No. 164804, petitioners Virginia Sugue (Sugue) and the Heirs
of Renato Valderrama (Valderrama) question the CA decision which partly granted
their appeal but deleted the attorney’s fees and reduced the moral and
exemplary damages awarded to them.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 164784, petitioner Triumph
International (Phils.), Inc. (Triumph hereafter) assails the CA decision for
setting aside an earlier decision[3]
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated
The antecedents of the
case show that Triumph hired Sugue in May 1990 as its Assistant Manager for
Marketing and was subsequently promoted to Marketing Services Manager with a
monthly salary of P82,500.00. On the other hand, Valderrama was hired in
April 1993 as Direct Sales Manager with a monthly salary of P121,000.00.
Their main function/responsibility was to ensure that the company’s sales
targets and objectives were met.
Beginning sometime in
October 1999, Triumph’s top management began to notice a sharp decline in the
sales of the company. Moreover, in the following months, the actual sales
figures continued to be significantly below the sales targets set by Valderrama
himself. This persistent below target sales performance was the subject of
correspondence between Valderrama and his superiors from November 1999 to July
2000.[4]
On
On
On June 23, 2000,
Valderrama and Sugue were directed to submit a written explanation as to why
they used company time and the company vehicle and driver in attending the
preliminary conference at the NLRC and why they left the office without
advising the Managing Director. They explained that they believed they may use
company time and the company vehicle since the hearing they attended was
pursuant to a complaint that they filed as employees of the company.
On
In the pleadings,
Valderrama likewise complained that his request for an executive check-up on
Subsequently, on
On
Subsequently, on
Meanwhile, on
On
Prior to the actual
termination of their employment by Triumph, Sugue and Valderrama filed on July
31, 2000 a complaint for constructive dismissal against Triumph, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-03965-2000.[15]
The following day, on
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondent Triumph International (Phils.), Inc. to:
1)
Pay,
since reinstatement is not feasible, complainants Virginia A. Sugue and Renato
Valderrama their separation pay computed at one month salary for every year of
service from their initial engagement on May 1990 and April 1993, respectively.
2)
Pay both
complainants full backwages from the time that they were constructively
dismissed, i.e. from 17 July 2000 in the case of Valderrama and from 25 July
2000 in the case of Sugue until finality of judgment.
3)
Pay
P2,000,000.00 as moral damages to each of the complainants
4)
Pay
P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages to each of the complainants.
5)
Reimburse
the complainants the 20% of the amounts claimed as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved,
Triumph filed an appeal with the NLRC,[17]
and in a decision dated
Not
satisfied with the NLRC decision, Sugue and Valderrama elevated the matter to
the CA by way of a petition for certiorari. While the matter was pending with
the CA, Valderrama passed away (on
On
WHEREFORE, the
petition is partly granted. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.[19]
Triumph’s subsequent
motion for reconsideration as well as the motion for partial reconsideration
filed by Sugue and the heirs of Valderrama were both denied by the appellate
court in its resolution dated
Hence, the parties filed
the present petitions which were consolidated by this Court in a Resolution
dated
In G.R. No. 164804,
petitioners therein Sugue and the heirs of Valderrama allege that the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in deleting the labor arbiter’s award of attorney’s fees.[21]
In G.R. No. 164784,
petitioner therein Triumph cites the following reasons why the Court should
rule in its favor:
I
The
Court of Appeals gravely erred and contravened prevailing jurisprudence in
abandoning the NLRC’s findings of fact and making its own findings. The rule is
basic that the factual findings of the NLRC are accorded respect, if not
finality, considering that the same were based on evidence on record.
Reassessment of evidence is beyond the province of a writ of certiorari.
II
The
Court of Appeals gravely erred and contravened the law and jurisprudence in ruling
that Valderama and Sugue were constructively dismissed, and are entitled to
separation pay, backwages and damages. The facts of the case, as correctly
found by the NLRC based on evidence on record, clearly belie their contention
that they were constructively dismissed.[22]
From the allegations of
the respective parties in their pleadings, it is clear that the controversies
involved in the two consolidated cases center on the question of whether
Valderrama and Sugue were constructively dismissed by Triumph.
At the outset, it should
be stated that the main issue in this case involves a question of fact. It is
an established rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought
before it from the CA via Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of
law.[23] This
Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is
not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[24]
The above rule, however, is not
without exceptions. In Sta. Maria v.
Court of Appeals,[25]
we enumerated the instances when the factual findings of the CA are not deemed
conclusive, to wit: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admission
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
In the instant case, it appears that there
is a divergence between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of the CA.
Hence, we are constrained to review the factual findings made by the NLRC and
the appellate court.
After a thorough review of the evidence on
record, we find sufficient reasons to uphold Triumph’s position.
Constructive dismissal is
defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment
becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank
or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee.[26]
On a preliminary point, we note that Sugue
and Valderrama discuss extensively in their pleadings alleged denial of leave
applications and unpaid cash conversion of unused leaves and other monetary
benefits which moved them to file a complaint for monetary claims on
In the
case of Valderrama:
1.
The half-day he spent in
attending the NLRC hearing on
2.
His application for sick leave
for
3.
His request for executive
check-up was denied.
In the
case of Sugue:
1. The half-day she spent in attending the NLRC
hearing on
2. The approval of her application for leave of
absence for July 14 and 15, 2000 was made
subject to the condition that she should first
submit a report on the 2001 Marketing Plan;
3. The approval of her request for executive
check-up was deferred until after the
visit of the company’s regional marketing
manager; and
4. A memorandum was issued instructing her to
report to her former assistant,
Mr. Temblique, which was allegedly tantamount
to a demotion.
According to Sugue and Valderrama, this
series of discriminatory acts committed by Triumph created an adverse working
environment rendering it impossible for them to continue working for Triumph. Hence, their severance from the company was
not of their own making and therefore amounted to constructive dismissal which
is tantamount to an illegal termination of employment.
With respect to the first alleged
discriminatory act, we can conceive of no reason to ascribe bad faith or malice
to Triumph for charging to the leave credits of Sugue and Valderrama the
half-day that they spent in attending the preliminary conference of the case
they instituted against Triumph. It is fair and reasonable for Triumph to do so
considering that Sugue and Valderrama did not perform work for one-half day on
Indeed,
we find it surprising that Sugue and Valderrama would even have the temerity to
contend that the hours they spent in attending the hearing were compensable
time. As the NLRC correctly pointed out, as early as the case of J.B. Heilbronn Co. v. National Labor Union,[29]
this Court held that:
When the case of strikes, and according to the CIR even
if the strike is legal, strikers may not collect their wages during the days
they did not go to work, for the same reasons if not more, laborers who voluntarily absent themselves from work to attend the
hearing of a case in which they seek to prove and establish their demands
against the company, the legality and propriety of which demands is not yet
known, should lose their pay during the period of such absence from work. The age-old rule governing the relation
between labor and capital or management and employee is that a "fair day's
wage for a fair day's labor." If there is no work performed by the
employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course, the laborer was able,
willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended.
It is hardly fair or just for an
employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the employer's
time.
In a case where a laborer absents himself
from work because of a strike or to attend a conference or hearing in a case or
incident between him and his employer,
he might seek reimbursement of his wages from his union which had declared the
strike or filed the case in the industrial court. Or, in the present case, he might have his absence from his work
charged against his vacation leave. xxx
(Emphasis ours)
This doctrine in
Corollarily, we cannot uphold the CA’s
approval of the Labor Arbiter’s finding that the memoranda issued by Triumph in
connection with the June 19, 2000 hearing constitute undue harassment.
To begin with, the complained of Memorandum
dated
Anent Sugue and Valderrama’s claim that
they were unjustly denied availment of their leaves as part of a scheme on the
part of Triumph to harass them, we find the same patently without merit.
In the case of Valderrama, he applied for
sick leave for the period
For her part, Sugue condemns Triumph for
putting a condition on the approval of her two days vacation leave for July 14
and 15, 2000, when she was required to first submit a report on the 2001
Marketing Plan. To be very accurate, Mr. Escueta’s memorandum dated
As for the nature of the condition itself,
we do not see how it can be deemed unreasonable or in bad faith for the
employer to require its employee to complete her assignments on time or before
taking a vacation leave. Being the Marketing Services Manager, Sugue’s reports
were indispensable in the preparation of the 2001 Marketing Plan plus the fact
that the company had been experiencing a significant decline in sales at that
time which all the more emphasizes the need for her to submit an updated report
relative to the 2001 Initial Marketing Plan. For sure, she failed to show that
the company prevented her from availing of her vacation leave afterwards or at
some other time. Clearly then, there was no discrimination nor harassment to
speak of.
Third, both Sugue and Valderrama question
the denial by Triumph of their request for executive check-up. It should be
noted that Triumph did not completely turn down their request. Based on Sugue
and Valderrama’s own evidence, their request was merely deferred because the
2001 Initial Marketing Plan was due on
It is worth stressing that in the grant of
vacation and sick leave privileges to an employee, the employer is given leeway
to impose conditions on the entitlement to the same as the grant of vacation
and sick leave is not a standard of law, but a prerogative of management. It is
a mere concession or act of grace of the employer and not a matter of right on
the part of the employee.[37]
Thus, it is well within the power and authority of an employer to deny an
employee’s application for leave and the same cannot be perceived as
discriminatory or harassment.
Sugue next asserts that she was demoted
when she was directed to report to Mr. Efren Temblique who was her subordinate
and when she was stripped of her usual functions. We are far from convinced.
Demotion involves a situation where an employee is relegated to a subordinate
or less important position constituting a reduction to a lower grade or rank,
with a corresponding decrease in salaries, benefits and privileges.[38]
The evidence on hand belies Sugue’s
assertion, the truth being that prior to the reorganization, Mr. Temblique
occupied the position of Assistant Manager for Direct Sales,[39]
and as such was Valderrama’s subordinate and not of Sugue. Sugue likewise
failed to adequately prove her assertion that she reported directly to the
General Manager, Mr. Escueta, when she was Marketing Services Manager or that
she was not subordinate to Valderrama. To show that she was reporting directly
to Mr. Escueta, Sugue adverts to Annexes U and V of her Position Paper.
However, Annexes U and V were merely memoranda addressed to Mr. Escueta involving
Sugue’s application for leave and did not relate to the discharge of her
functions.[40] On the other hand, there is on record
memoranda issued by Sugue concerning work matters which were addressed to
Valderrama, not Mr. Escueta.[41]
The evidence on record suggests that the Marketing
Services Department was part of the Direct Sales Department. As Direct Sales
Manager, Valderrama’s responsibilities not only included sales but also
marketing for which he was tasked to closely coordinate with the regional
sales/marketing head office in Hongkong.[42]
The record would also show that Sugue considered herself as belonging to the
Direct Sales Department.[43]
It is unsurprising then that when the Direct Sales Department was reorganized
due to Valderrama’s unexpected departure on July 17, 2000, Sugue’s Marketing
Services Department was included in the reorganization. It would appear from
Mr. Escueta’s Memorandum dated July 18, 2000 (Re: Direct Sales Reorganization)
the sales and marketing responsibilities of Mr. Valderrama were taken over by Mr.
Edilberto S. Rivera and Temblique, as OIC for Direct Sales and Marketing,
respectively.
In view of Valderrama’s sudden severance of
his employment coupled with the substantially low sales Triumph had been
experiencing for the past nine months, the company saw an imperative need to
effect a reorganization in its sales department, and this included the
temporary designation of Temblique as OIC for Marketing concurrently with his
position as Assistant Manager for Direct Sales-SMSD.[44]
When Sugue was directed to report to Temblique, she was not being made to
report to Temblique as Assistant Manager for Direct Sales-SMSD but as the newly
designated OIC for Marketing, i.e., the officer chiefly responsible for all
marketing matters. Furthermore, we find no merit in Sugue’s contention that she
was in any way stripped of her usual functions. A careful perusal of Annexes EE
and FF of her Position Position shows that she continued to be the head of
Marketing Services, under the supervision of Temblique as OIC for Marketing.
As we see it, Triumph’s directive for Sugue
to report to Temblique was not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to her
considering that it did not entail a demotion in rank or diminution of
salaries, benefits and other privileges. Even assuming there was a change in
the personalities to whom Sugue is required to report, she continued to assume
her position as Marketing Services Manager and to exercise the same functions.
Neither did she assert, much less prove, that there was any diminution in her
salary or other benefits. We ruled in Philippine
Wireless, Inc. v. NLRC[45] that
there is no demotion where there is no reduction in position, rank or salary.
In fine, we find that Triumph’s
reorganization was intended to improve management operations especially in the
light of the poor sales performance of the company during that period. The act
of management in reorganizing the sales department in order to achieve its
objectives is a legitimate exercise of its management prerogatives, barring any
showing of bad faith which is absent in the instant case. Indeed, labor laws
discourage interference in employers’ judgments concerning the conduct of their
business. The law must protect not only the welfare of employees, but also the
right of employers.[46]
All told, Triumph did not act with
discrimination, insensibility or disdain towards Sugue and Valderrama, which
foreclosed any choice on their part except to forego their continued
employment. Purely conjectural are their assertions that the disapproval of
their leave applications, the denial of their request for executive check-up
and the alleged demotion, were carried out by Triumph in retaliation to their
filing of a complaint for unpaid money claims against the company. Sugue and
Valderrama offered insufficient proof to substantiate their allegations. For
this reason, their bare and self-serving charges of constructive dismissal,
when unsupported by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.
Worth noting at this point is that as early
as June 21, 2000, Valderrama had accepted employment with Fila Philippines,
Inc. as its Sales Director. Although his appointment was to take effect only on
Having failed to substantiate their claim
of constructive dismissal, Sugue and Valderrama should be deemed to have
abandoned their work, thus, their dismissal is warranted. Abandonment is the
deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment,
without any intention of returning. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a
just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For abandonment to be
a valid ground for dismissal, two elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship. The
second element is the more determinative factor and must be evinced by overt
acts.[48]
The abovementioned elements are present in
the instant case. First, Sugue and
Valderrama’s failure to report for work was without justifiable reason. As earlier discussed, their allegation of
discrimination and harassment lacks factual basis, thus, under the
circumstances, we find their absences to be unjustified and without any valid
reason. Second, their overt act of
writing letters informing Triumph that they considered themselves
constructively dismissed was a clear manifestation of their intention to desist
from their employment. Too, their
defiance and disregard of the memorandum sent by Triumph requiring them to
explain their unauthorized absences demonstrated a clear intention on their
part to sever their employer-employee relationship. This is particularly true with Valderrama who,
even before unilaterally terminating his employment with Triumph, had already
sought regular employment elsewhere and in fact was set to join a competitor,
Fila Phils., Inc.
Further, they filed a complaint for
constructive dismissal without praying for reinstatement. By analogy, we point to the doctrine that
abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal is not applicable where the complainant does not pray for
reinstatement and just asks for separation pay instead.[49] In this case, Sugue and Valderrama opted not
to ask for reinstatement and even for separation pay, which clearly contradicts
their stance that they did not abandon their work, for it appears they have no
intention of ever returning to their positions in Triumph. In addition, we cannot subscribe to the CA’s
view that Triumph’s issuance of show cause memos and notices of termination for
abandonment were mere afterthought since they were preceded by Sugue’s and
Valderrama’s letters informing the company that they considered themselves
constructively dismissed. Logically, Triumph could not have issued show cause
memos or termination notices for abandonment before Sugue and Valderrama unilaterally declared themselves
constructively dismissed and stopped reporting for work without justifiable
reason.
Indeed, the law imposes many obligations on
the employer such as providing just compensation to workers, and observance of
the procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of
employment. On the other hand, the law also recognizes the right of the
employer to expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work
and diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be
compelled to continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the service
will patently be inimical to his interests.[50]
Triumph has adequately shown the existence of a just and valid cause in
terminating the employment of Sugue and Valderrama, and has faithfully complied
with the procedural requirements of due process for valid termination of employment.
Anent Sugue
and the heirs of Valderrama’s petition regarding the CA’s deletion of the award
of attorney’s fees, a discussion on the propriety of the award of damages and
attorney’s fees is rendered unnecessary in view of their failure to prove
constructive dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition
for review filed by Virginia Sugue and the Heirs of Renato Valderrama in G.R. No. 164804 is DENIED while the petition for review filed by Triumph International
(Phils.), Inc. in G.R. No. 164784 is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The National Labor Relations Commission’s Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Acting Chairperson |
|
|
Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
Conchita carpio morales Associate Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First
Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
** Acting Chairperson in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno as per Special Order No. 552-A.
*** Additional Members in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna as per Special Order No. 553.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (ret.) and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurring; Rollo, Vol. II, at 66-76.
[2]
[3]
[4] Rollo, Vol. I, at 94-114, 121-135, 141-143.
[5] Sugue and Valderrama’s Position Paper, p. 6; CA Rollo, at 44.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo, Vol. II, at 48-49.
[17] Docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 028290-01.
[18] Rollo, Vol. II, at 23.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 14.
[23] Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Alfa RTW Manufacturing Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 133877, November 14, 2001, 368 SCRA 611, 617.
[24] Gabriel
v. Mabanta, G.R. No. 142403,
[25] G.R. No. 127549,
[26] Francisco
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 170087,
[27] Docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-06-03008-2000 and raffled to Labor Arbiter Daisy G. Cauton Barcelona.
[28] Sugue and Valderrama’s Position Paper; CA Rollo, at 39.
[29] 92 Phil. 575, 577-578 (1953).
[30] 92 Phil. 997, 1000 (1953).
[31] Social Security System v. SSS Supervisors’ Union-CUGCO, G.R. No. L-31832 October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 746, 749; Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel, G.R. No. 158075, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 195, 214.
[32] Annex K of Valderrama and Sugue’s Position Paper; CA Rollo, at 70.
[33] Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, p. 467.
[34] Go
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922,
[35] CA Rollo, at 61.
[36]
[37] Sobrepeña v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111148, October 10, 1997, 280 SCRA 476, 489-490.
[38] Tinio
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171764,
[39] CA Rollo, p. 222.
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45] G.R. No. 112963,
[46] Mendoza
v. Rural Bank of Lucban, G.R. No. 155421,
[47] CA Rollo, p. 192.
[48]
[49] Jo
v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 121605,
[50] Agabon
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158693,