|
HILARIO
P. SORIANO, |
|
G.R. No. 163178 |
|
Petitioner, |
|
|
|
|
|
Present: |
|
|
|
|
|
- versus - |
|
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,* J., |
|
|
|
Acting Chairperson, |
|
|
|
TINGA,** |
|
|
|
CHICO-NAZARIO,
|
|
OMBUDSMAN
SIMEON V. |
|
NACHURA,
and |
|
MARCELO;
HON. LOURDES S. |
|
PERALTA,
JJ. |
|
PADRE
JUAN, Graft Investigation |
|
|
|
Officer
II; and RAMON GARCIA, |
|
Promulgated: |
|
Respondents. |
|
January 30, 2009 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E
C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 3, 2002 Order[1]
of the Ombudsman (respondent) which dismissed the Complaint of Hilario Soriano
(petitioner) against Manila City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia (Garcia); and the July
14, 2003 Ombudsman Order[2]
which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The
antecedent facts are related to those involved
in Hilario Soriano v.
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (G.R. No. 163017) which the
Court decided on
Petitioner
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila an Affidavit-Complaint,[3]
docketed as I.S. No. 01F-22547, against Bank Examiner Mely Palad (Palad) of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for falsification of public document and use
of falsified document. Assistant City Prosecutor Celedonio P. Balasbas
(Balasbas) issued a Resolution[4]
dated
x x x [T]hat the preliminary investigation of this case be transferred to
the Department of Justice considering
that herein complainant has recently filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
separate complaints against the undersigned City Prosecutor and
Assistant City Prosecutor Celedonio P. Balasbas which are both presently
pending thereat, hereby requesting that a State Prosecutor be designated to
conduct the preliminary investigation thereof in order to avoid any suspicion
of partiality and bias against the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.[8]
(Emphasis supplied)
On
7. On August 5, 2002, or more than fourteen (14)
months after I filed my complaint against Ms. Palad, respondent Ramon Garcia
unilaterally endorsed and forwarded to the Honorable Jovencito R. Zuño, Chief
State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, for investigation and resolution
[of] said complaint against Mely Palad. A copy of the Indorsement dated
8. By refusing to allow the
The same deliberate
omission to perform the duties of his office which is evidently in bad faith
has caused me undue injury because the resolution of my complaint has been even
more unduly delayed, in effect denying me justice for justice delayed is
justice denied.[11]
Respondent issued the herein
assailed
It must be noted that the
violation of Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code requires the presence of the
following essential elements, to wit:
1.
That
the offender is a public officer or officer of the law who has a duty to cause
the prosecution of, or to prosecute, offenses;
2.
That
there is dereliction of the duties of his office; that is, knowing the
commission of the crime, he does not cause the prosecution of the criminal, or
knowing that a crime is about to be committed he tolerates its commission; and
3.
The
offender acts with malice and deliberate intent to favor the violator of the
law.
In addition thereto, however,
the Supreme Court in the case of
The
crime committed by the law-violator must be proved first. If the guilt of the
law-violator is not proved, the person charged with dereliction of duty under
this article is not liable.
Taking into account the
aforequoted jurisprudence and elements relative to the offense charged, it is
clear that the filing of the instant suit is still premature considering the
observation that the questioned controversy against Ms. Palad is still pending.
Even the element of malice
and deliberate intent to favor the violator of the law cannot be entrenched
without Ms. Palad’s guilt for the alleged defiance having been pronounced
first.
The referral of the dispute
against Ms. Palad to the DOJ by the herein respondent cannot be construed as
malicious constitutive of dereliction of duty since the same is being called
for under the circumstances in order not to invite doubts on the respondent’s
impartiality in the disposition of the subject case.
On the other hand, the
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended, requires that the undue injury
sustained as an element thereof must be actual and certain. This rule had been
pronounced by the Supreme Court in the case of Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan, et
al., G.R. No. 122166, promulgated on March 11, 1998 x x x.
x x x x
While it may be true that
justice delayed is justice denied, however, the damages caused thereby will not
fall within the meaning of the undue injury contemplated in Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019, as amended, as the same pertains to actual damages capable of pecuniary
estimation and is quantifiable as to its amount.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, let the instant complaint against City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia of
SO RESOLVED.[12]
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but respondent denied it in the herein assailed Order dated
By the present recourse, petitioner
seeks the annulment of the assailed Orders on the ground that respondent issued
the same with grave abuse of discretion.[13]
Petitioner argues that granting for
the sake of argument that his complaint against Garcia for violation of Article
208 of the Revised Penal Code is premature, considering that the complaint
against Palad is still in the preliminary investigation stage with
Investigating Prosecutor Liberato Cabaron (Cabaron),[14] his
other complaint against Garcia for violation of
Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 should have been sustained by respondent
because Garcia committed a clear dereliction of duty in referring I.S. No. 01F-22547 to the DOJ;
that the referral of the case was unilateral, for neither petitioner nor Palad
sought such relief; that Cabaron did not recommend the referral; that Garcia
should have awaited Cabaron's recommendation for the latter was already in the
process of conducting a preliminary investigation; and that, in referring the
case to the DOJ instead, Garcia caused an unwarranted delay of the
investigation, thereby inflicting upon petitioner a clear and ascertainable
injury.[15]
The Solicitor General filed his
Comment[16] and
Memorandum[17] for the respondent. He maintains that the respondent’s plenary
power to conduct a preliminary investigation cannot be interfered with by the
Court, especially when the validity of its finding of lack of probable cause is
discernible from the records of the case, such as in I.S. No. 01F-22547 where it is
clear that it was well within the discretion of Garcia to refer the case to the
DOJ after he was administratively charged by petitioner.[18]
The Court agrees with the Solicitor
General.
Sections 12 and 13, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution and R. A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)
endow the respondent with plenary powers to investigate and prosecute public officers or employees for acts or
omissions which appear to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Its power is virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention, and insulated from outside
pressure and improper influence. Thus, the Court generally adheres to a
policy of non-interference in the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the
respondent.[19]
However, where
the findings of the respondent on the existence of probable cause in criminal
cases are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,[20]
upon a showing that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, or more
specifically, that it exercised its power arbitrarily or despotically by reason
of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise was so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform it
or to act in contemplation of law.[21]
Much like G.R. No. 163017, petitioner herein
failed to establish that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing his complaint against Garcia.
To justify an
indictment under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, there must be a showing of the
existence of the following elements: a) that the accused are public officers or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them; b) that said public officers committed
the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in
relation to their public positions; c) that they caused undue injury to any
party, whether the Government or a private party; d) that such injury was
caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties;
and e) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[22]
In
x x x Unlike in actions for
torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be
presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its
existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the
causing of undue injury, or the giving of
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act
punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue
injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of
moral certainty.
In
jurisprudence, “undue injury” is
consistently interpreted as “actual damage.” Undue has been defined as “more
than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;” and injury as “any wrong or damage
done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property[;that is,
the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another.” Actual damage, in
the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.
In
turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by Article 2199 of the Civil
Code as follows:
Art.
2199. Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.[25]
It naturally follows that the rule that
should likewise be applied in determining undue injury is that in determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere
assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding
specific facts that could afford some basis for measuring compensatory or actual damage.[26]
The foregoing rule is made more
concrete in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan.[27] Therein
respondent Leticia Fuertes (Fuertes) accused therein petitioner Cresente
Llorente (Llorente) of causing her undue injury by delaying the release of
salaries and allowances. The Sandiganbayan
convicted Llorente based, among others, on the testimony of Fuertes on the
distress caused to her family by the delay in the release of her salary.
Reversing the conviction of Llorente, the Court held:
Complainant’s testimony
regarding her family’s financial stress was inadequate and largely speculative.
Without giving specific details, she made only vague references to the fact
that her four children were all going to school and that she was the
breadwinner in the family. She, however, did not say that she was unable to pay
their tuition fees and the specific damage brought by such
nonpayment. The fact that the “injury” to her family was unspecified or
unquantified does not satisfy the element of undue injury, as akin to actual damages. As in civil
cases, actual damages, if not supported by evidence
on record, cannot be considered.[28]
In the
present case, petitioner
claims that the form of injury he suffered from the act of Garcia in referring his
case to the DOJ is the resultant delay in the resolution of his Complaint
against Palad. However, other than such
assertion, petitioner failed to adduce evidence of the actual loss or damage he
suffered by reason of the delay. While
it is not necessary that a specific amount of the damage be proven
with absolute certainty, there must be some reasonable basis by which the court
can measure it.[29] Here, petitioner utterly failed to support
his bare allegation of undue injury.
Moreover, the fourth element is not alleged in the Affidavit-Complaint,
which contains no statement that in referring the case to the DOJ, Garcia gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to Palad. Such omission of a basic element of the
offense renders the Affidavit-Complaint all the more defective.
Finally, in his Indorsement, Garcia explained that, in view of petitioner's filing of an
administrative case against him before the Ombudsman, he was referring the case
to the DOJ to avoid
suspicion of partiality and bias. The
Court finds the reason given by Garcia for referring the case not completely
acceptable: the mere filing of an administrative case is not a ground for
disqualification or inhibition; a contrary rule would encourage parties to file
administrative cases against judges or prosecutors in the hope that the latter
would recuse himself and refer their cases to friendlier fora.[30]
Thus, the reason cited by Garcia
in referring the case was erroneous. However,
in the absence of evidence that Garcia was motivated by malice or ill will, his
erroneous referral of the case does not put him in violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. Hence, respondent's dismissal
of the complaint against Garcia did not constitute
grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate Justice |
diosdado
m. peralta
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* In
lieu of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave, per Special
Order No. 555 dated
** In lieu of Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave, per Special Order No. 556 dated
[1] Rollo,
p. 14.
[2]
[3] Rollo,
p. 29.
[4]
[5] See Hilario Soriano v. Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo, G.R. No. 163017,
[6] The propriety of the re-opening of the case was the subject matter in Hilario
Soriano v. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo.
[7] Rollo,
p. 46.
[8]
[9] Art. 208. Prosecution of
offenses; negligence and tolerance. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any
public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his
office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the
punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of
offenses.
[10] Sec. 3. Corrupt
practices of public officers – In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
[11] Records, pp.
2-3.
[12] Rollo, pp.
16-18.
[13]
[14] Petition, rollo,
p. 9.
[15] Memorandum, id.
at 109-110.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Jimenez
v. Tolentino, Jr., G.R. No. 153578,
[20] Enemecio
v. Ombudsman, 464 Phil. 102, 113 (2004); Baylon v. Ombudsman, 423 Phil. 705, 720 (2001); Nava
v. Commission on Audit, 419 Phil. 544, 553 (2001);
[21] Tejano v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 560,
567-568; Cabrera
v. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 55, 66; Suero v. People,
G.R. No. 156408,
[22] Suero v. People of the Philippines, supra
note 21; Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 21, at 720;
[23] G.R. No. 161877,
[24] 350 Phil. 820 (1998).
[25]
[26] Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 172406, October
11, 2007, 535 SCRA 633-642; MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong
Corporation, G.
R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408, 468.
[27] Supra
note 24.
[28]
[29] G.Q. Garments, Inc. v. Miranda, G.R. No. 161722, July 20,
2006, 495 SCRA 741, 757.
[30] Dumo v. Espinas, G.R. No. 141962,