PERFECTO MACABABBAD, Jr.,* deceased, substituted by his heirs
Sophia Macababbad, Glenn M. Macababbad, Perfecto Vener M. Macababbad III and
Mary Grace Macababbad, and SPS.
CHUA SENG LIN AND SAY UN AY,
Petitioners, - versus - FERNANDO G. MASIRAG, FAUSTINA G. MASIRAG, CORAZON G. MASIRAG,
LEONOR G. MASIRAG, and LEONCIO M. GOYAGOY,
Respondents. Francisca Masirag Baccay, Pura Masirag
Ferrer-Melad, and Intervenors- Respondents. |
G.R. No. 161237
Present: QUISUMBING, J. Chairperson, carpio MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: January 14, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before us is the Petition
for Review on Certiorari filed by Perfecto Macababbad, Jr.[1]
(Macababbad) and the spouses Chua
Seng Lin (Chua) and Say Un Ay (Say) (collectively called the petitioners), praying that we nullify the Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the
Resolution[3]
denying the motion for reconsideration that followed. The assailed decision reversed the dismissal
Order[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
BACKGROUND
On April 28, 1999,
respondents Fernando Masirag (Fernando),
Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon
Masirag (Corazon), Leonor Masirag (Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio) (collectively called the respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint[5]
against Macababbad, Chua and Say.[6]
On
quieting of title, nullity of titles, reconveyance, damages
and attorney’s fees[8] against the defendants [petitioners here] x x x who cabal themselves in mala fides of badges of fraud dishonesty,
deceit, misrepresentations, bad faith, under the guise of purported instrument,
nomenclature “EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT WITH SIMULTANEOUS
The amended complaint
essentially alleged the following:[10]
The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona)
were the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the Cadastral Survey of
Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 1946.[11] Lot No. 4144 contained an area of 6,423 square
meters.
Pedro and Pantaleona had
eight (8) children, namely, Valeriano, Domingo,
The investigation
disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document entitled “Extra-judicial
Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (P1,800.00.[13]
Subsequently, OCT No. 1946 was cancelled
and
Subsequently, Macababbad
registered portions of Lot No. 4144 in his name and sold other portions to
third parties.[17]
On
Based on these allegations, the respondents asked: (1) that
the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale be declared null
and void ab initio and without force and effect, and that Chua be
ordered and directed to execute the necessary deed of reconveyance of the land;
if they refuse, that the Clerk of Court be required to do so; (2) the issuance
of a new TCT in respondents’ name and the cancellation of Macababbad’s and
Chua’s certificates of title; and (3) that the petitioners be ordered to pay
damages and attorney’s fees.
Macababbad filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint
on
On
THE RTC RULING
The RTC, after initially denying
the motion to dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and dismissed the complaint in
its Order[19]
dated May 29, 2000 on the grounds that: 1) the action, which was filed 32
years after the property was partitioned and after a portion was sold to
Macababbad, had already prescribed; and 2) there was failure to implead
indispensable parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the
persons who have already acquired title to portions of the subject property in
good faith.[20]
The respondents appealed the RTC’s order dated
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE CASE
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
INTERPRETING THE NATURE OF APPELLANTS’ CAUSE OF ACTION AS THAT DESIGNATED IN
THE COMPLAINT’S TITLE AND NOT IN (SIC)
THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT[21]
The petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal primarily on
the ground that the errors the respondents raised involved pure questions of
law that should be brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondents
insisted that their appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law and thus
fell within the purview of the CA’s appellate jurisdiction.
THE CA DECISION[22]
The
CA ignored[23]
the jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioners in their motion to dismiss,
took cognizance of the appeal, and focused on the following issues: 1) whether
the complaint stated a cause of action; and 2) whether the cause of action had
been waived, abandoned or extinguished.
The
appellate court reversed and set aside the RTC’s dismissal of the
complaint. On
the first issue, it ruled
that the complaint “carve(d) out a sufficient and adequate cause of action
xxx. One can read through the verbosity of the initiatory pleading to discern
that a fraud was committed by the defendants on certain heirs of the original
owners of the property and that, as a result, the plaintiffs were deprived of
interests that should have gone to them as successors-in-interest of these
parties. A positive deception has been alleged to violate legal rights. This is
the ultimate essential fact that remains after all the clutter is removed from
the pleading. Directed against the defendants, there is enough to support a
definitive adjudication.”[24]
On the second issue, the CA applied the Civil Code provision on
implied trust, i.e., that a person who acquires a piece of property
through fraud is considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the person from whom the property came. Reconciling
this legal provision with Article 1409 (which defines void contracts) and
Article 1410 (which provides that an action to declare a contract null and void
is imprescriptible), the CA ruled that the respondents’ cause of action had not prescribed, because
“in assailing the extrajudicial partition as void, the [respondents] have
the right to bring the action unfettered by a prescriptive period.”[25]
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
The Third Division of
this Court initially denied[26]
the petition for review on certiorari for the petitioners’ failure to
show any reversible error committed by the CA. However, it subsequently
reinstated the petition. In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners
clarified the grounds for their petition, as follows:
A. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO PASS UPON AND RULE ON THE APPEAL
TAKEN BY THE RESPONDENTS IN CA-GR CV NO. 68541.[27]
In the alternative, ex
abundanti cautela, the petitioners alleged other reversible errors summarized
as follows: [28]
l
The RTC dismissal on the ground that indispensable parties were
not impleaded has already become final and executory because the CA did not
pass upon this ground;[29]
l
The respondents' argument that there was no failure to implead
indispensable parties since the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona who were
not impleaded were not indispensable parties in light of the respondents'
admission that the extra-judicial settlement is valid with respect to the other
heirs who sold their shares to Perfecto Macababbad is erroneous because innocent purchasers for
value of portions of Lot 4144 who are also indispensable parties were not
impleaded; [30]
l
The CA erred in reconciling Civil Code provisions Article 1456 and
Article 1410, in relation to Article 1409;[31]
l
The CA erred in saying that the Extra-judicial Partition was an
inexistent and void contract because it could not be said that none of the
heirs intended to be bound by the contract.[32]
The respondents
argued in their Comment that:[33]
·
The appeal was brought on mixed questions of fact and law
involving prescription, laches and indispensable parties;
·
The non-inclusion of indispensable parties is not a ground to
dismiss the claim;
·
The respondents’ action is not for reconveyance. Rather, it is an
action to declare the sale of their respective shares null and void;
·
An action for the nullity of an instrument prescribes in four (4)
years from discovery of the fraud. Discovery was made in 1999, while the
complaint was also lodged in 1999. Hence, the action had not yet been barred by
prescription;
·
Laches had not set in because the action was
immediately filed after discovery of the fraud.
OUR RULING
We find the petition devoid
of merit.
Questions of Fact v. Questions of Law
A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts.[34]
A question of law may be resolved by the court without reviewing or evaluating
the evidence.[35]
No examination of the probative value of the evidence would be necessary to
resolve a question of law.[36]
The opposite is true with respect to questions of fact, which necessitate a
calibration of the evidence.[37]
The nature of the issues to be raised
on appeal can be gleaned from the appellant’s notice of appeal filed in the
trial court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court.[38]
In their Notice of Appeal, the respondents manifested their intention to appeal
the assailed RTC order on legal grounds and “on the basis of the environmental facts.”[39] Further, in their Brief, the petitioners argued
that the RTC erred in ruling that their cause of action had prescribed and that
they had “slept on their rights.”[40] All these indicate that questions of facts
were involved, or were at least raised, in the respondents’ appeal with the
CA.
In Crisostomo v. Garcia,[41] this Court ruled that prescription may
either be a question of law or fact; it is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsity of an allegation of fact; it is a
question of law when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a
given state of facts. The test of whether a question is one of law or fact is
not the appellation given to the question by the party raising the issue; the
test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Prescription, evidently, is a question of
fact where there is a need to determine the veracity of factual matters such as
the date when the period to bring the action commenced to run.[42]
Ingjug-Tiro v. Casals[43] instructively
tells us too that a summary or outright dismissal of an action is not proper
where there are factual matters in dispute which require presentation and
appreciation of evidence. In this cited
case whose fact situation is similar to the present case, albeit with a very
slight and minor variation, we considered the improvident dismissal of a
complaint based on prescription and laches to be improper because the following
must still be proven by the complaining parties:
first, that they were the co-heirs and co-owners of the inherited property; second, that their co-heirs-co-owners sold their hereditary rights thereto without their knowledge and consent; third, that forgery, fraud and deceit were committed in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale since Francisco Ingjug who allegedly executed the deed in 1967 actually died in 1963, hence, the thumbprint found in the document could not be his; fourth, that Eufemio Ingjug who signed the deed of sale is not the son of Mamerto Ingjug, and, therefore, not an heir entitled to participate in the disposition of the inheritance; fifth, that respondents have not paid the taxes since the execution of the sale in 1965 until the present date and the land in question is still declared for taxation purposes in the name of Mamerto Ingjug, the original registered owner, as of 1998; sixth, that respondents had not taken possession of the land subject of the complaint nor introduced any improvement thereon; and seventh, that respondents are not innocent purchasers for value.
As in Ingjug-Tiro, the present case involves factual issues that require
trial on the merits. This situation rules
out a summary dismissal of the complaint.
Proper Mode of Appeal
Since the appeal raised mixed
questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on the respondents for
invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal. Rule 41, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Modes of
appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal - The appeal to the Court
of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party.
In
Murillo v. Consul,[44]
this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error,
where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the
exercise of original jurisdiction, covered by Rule 41; (2) petition for review,
where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, covered by Rule 42; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA
on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the
Supreme Court only on questions of law.
Prescription
A ruling on prescription necessarily requires
an analysis of the plaintiff’s cause of action based on the allegations of the
complaint and the documents attached as its integral parts. A motion to dismiss based on prescription
hypothetically admits the allegations relevant and material to the resolution
of this issue, but not the other facts of the case.[45]
Unfortunately, both the respondents’
complaint and amended complaint are poorly worded, verbose, and prone to
misunderstanding. In addition, therefore,
to the complaint, we deem it appropriate to consider the clarifications made in
their appeal brief by the petitioners relating to the intent of their complaint. We deem this step appropriate since there
were no matters raised for the first time on appeal and their restatement was
aptly supported by the allegations of the RTC complaint. The respondents argue
in their Appellant’s Brief that:
x x x Although reconveyance was mentioned in
the title, reconveyance of which connotes that there was a mistake in titling
the land in question in the name of the registered owner indicated therein, but
in the allegations in the body of the allegations in the body of the instant
complaint, it clearly appears that the nature of the cause of action of appellants,
[sic] they wanted to get back their
respective shares in the subject inheritance because they did not sell said
shares to appellee Perfecto Macababbad as the signatures purported to be theirs
which appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement with Simultaneo[u]s Sale of
Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) were forged.
As appellants represented 2 of the 8 children
of the deceased original owners of the land in question who were Pedro Masirag
and Pantaleona Talauan, the sale is perfectly valid with respect to the other 6
children, and void ab initio with
respect to the appellants.[46]
The respondents likewise argue that their action is
one for the annulment of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale bearing their forged signatures. They contend
that their action had not yet prescribed because an action to declare an
instrument null and void is imprescriptible. In their Comment to the petition for review,
however, the respondents modified their position and argued that the sale to
the petitioners pursuant to the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale was void because it was carried out through
fraud; thus, the appropriate prescription period is four (4) years from the discovery
of fraud. Under this argument,
respondents posit that their cause of action had not yet prescribed because
they only learned of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale in
March 1999; they filed their complaint the following month.
The petitioners, on the other hand,
argue that the relevant prescriptive period here is ten (10) years from the
date of the registration of title, this being an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust.
We
believe and so hold that the respondents’ amended complaint sufficiently
pleaded a cause to declare the nullity
of the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, as they claimed in their
amended complaint. Without prejudging
the issue of the merits of the respondents’ claim and on the assumption that
the petitioners already hypothetically admitted the allegations of the
complaint when they filed a motion to dismiss based on prescription, the transfer
may be null and void if indeed it is established that respondents had not given
their consent and that the deed is a forgery or is absolutely fictitious. As the nullity of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale has been raised and is the primary issue, the
action to secure this result will not prescribe pursuant to Article 1410 of the
Civil Code.
Based
on this conclusion, the necessary question that next arises is: What then is
the effect of the issuance of TCTs in the name of petitioners? In other words, does the issuance of the
certificates of titles convert the action to one of reconveyance of titled land
which, under settled jurisprudence, prescribes in ten (10) years?
Precedents
say it does not; the action remains imprescriptible, the issuance of the
certificates of titles notwithstanding. Ingjug-Tiro
is again instructive on this point:
Article 1458 of the New Civil Code provides: "By the contract of
sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself of transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent." It is essential that
the vendors be the owners of the property sold otherwise they cannot dispose
that which does not belong to them. As the Romans put it: "Nemo dat
quod non habet." No one can
give more than what he has. The sale of the realty to respondents is null and
void insofar as it prejudiced petitioners' interests and participation therein.
At best, only the ownership of the shares of Luisa, Maria and Guillerma in the
disputed property could have been transferred to respondents.
Consequently, respondents could not have acquired ownership over the
land to the extent of the shares of petitioners. The issuance of a certificate of title in their favor could not vest
upon them ownership of the entire property; neither could it validate the
purchase thereof which is null and void. Registration does not vest title; it
is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give
the holder any better title than what he actually has. Being null and void, the
sale to respondents of the petitioners' shares produced no legal effects whatsoever.
Similarly, the claim that Francisco Ingjug died in 1963 but appeared to
be a party to the Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale
executed in 1967 would be fatal to the validity of the contract, if proved by
clear and convincing evidence. Contracting parties must be juristic entities at
the time of the consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid
and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of
contracting and party capable of being contracted with. Hence, if any one party
to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of its execution, such
contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and therefore null and void by
reason of its having been made after the death of the party who appears as one
of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person terminates
contractual capacity.
In actions for
reconveyance of the property predicated on the fact that the conveyance
complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription
of action would be unavailing. "The action or defense for the declaration
of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe." Neither could laches be invoked in the
case at bar. Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically
courts of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described
as "justice outside legality," should be applied only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas
nunguam contravenit legis. The
positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the New Civil; Code conferring
imprescriptibility to actions for declaration of the inexistence of a contract
should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.
Certainly, laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an
imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can validly vindicate their
inheritance despite the lapse of time.[47]
We have a similar ruling in Heirs of Rosa Dumaliang v. Serban.[48]
The
respondents’ action is therefore imprescriptible and the CA committed no
reversible error in so ruling.
Laches
Dismissal
based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the
presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for its consideration were
merely the parties’ pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[49] Without solid evidentiary basis, laches
cannot be a valid ground to dismiss the respondents’ complaint.
Non-joinder of Indispensable parties is not a
Ground for a Motion to Dismiss
The RTC dismissed the respondents’
amended complaint because indispensable parties were not impleaded. The respondents
argue that since the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale was valid with respect to the other heirs who
executed it, those heirs are not indispensable parties in this case. Innocent
purchasers for value to whom title has passed from Macababbad and the spouses Chua
and Say are likewise not indispensable parties since the titles sought to be
recovered here are still under the name of the petitioners.
We also find the RTC dismissal Order on
this ground erroneous.
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground
for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor
non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
In Domingo v. Scheer,[50]
this Court held that the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead
the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a
party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff
opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include
the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion.[51] Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to
obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.[52]
Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court
defines indispensable parties as those who are parties in interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action.[53] They are those parties who possess such an
interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence.[54] A party is indispensable if his interest in
the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably
intertwined with the other parties’ interest.[55]
In an
action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property sought to be recovered
are indispensable parties. Thus, if
reconveyance were the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad
and the spouses Chua and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action
is for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale, all of the parties who executed the same
should be impleaded for a complete resolution of the case. This case, however,
is not without its twist on the issue of impleading indispensable parties as
the RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly in light
of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, there can be no basis for the
immediate dismissal of the action.
In
relation with this conclusion, we see no merit too in the petitioners’ argument
that the RTC ruling dismissing the complaint on respondents’ failure to implead
indispensable parties had become final and executory for the CA’s failure to
rule on the issue. This argument lacks
legal basis as nothing in the Rules of Court states that the failure of an
appellate court to rule on an issue raised in an appeal renders the appealed
order or judgment final and executory with respect to the undiscussed issue. A court need not rule on each and every issue
raised,[56]
particularly if the issue will not vary the tenor of the Court’s ultimate
ruling. In the present case, the CA
ruling that overshadows all the issues raised is what is stated in the
dispositive portion of its decision, i.e., “the order of the lower court
dismissing the case is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded for further
proceeding.”
In sum,
the CA correctly reversed the RTC dismissal of the respondents’ complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
DENY the petition for review for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Macababbad is spelled Macabadbad in some pleadings.
[1] In view of the death of Macababbad, the Court
of Appeals ordered that he be substituted by his legal heirs and representatives
Sophia Macababbad, Glenn M. Macababbad, Perfecto Vener M. Macababbad III and
Mary Grace Macababbad in its Resolution dated September 20, 2001; see Annex “A” of the Motion for Reconsideration; rollo, p. 160.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 31-39.
[3]
[4]
[5] Docketed as
Civil Case No. 5487; id., pp. 40-41.
[6] The respondents
also impleaded the Registry
of Deeds of
Cagayan as a nominal party being the
custodian of all land records.
[7] Rollo,
pp. 76-93.
[8]
[9] Underscoring supplied, parenthetical notes
ours.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 76-92.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] TCT No.
13408 identified the following owners: CHUA SENG LIN, married to SAY LIN AY -
1/8; GUILLERMO TAMBAUAN; VICTORIA DAYAG, married to FELICIANO TAMBAUAN; ESTEBAN
DAYAG, married to LUISITA CATOLIN; IRENE DAYAG, married to ELADIO TUPPIL;
MARGARITA DAYAG; GABINA DAYAG, married to GASPAR CARANGMIAN, Jr. - 1/8; PURA
GOYAGOY; LUCIA MASIRAG, married to ACKING RONDOLOY; CORAZON MASIRAG, married to
FRANCISCO CASIPAG - 1/8; PETRA TUGAD; JUAN MASIRAG, married to LEONILA BAACAY;
PEDRO MASIRAG - 1/8; CLARO FERRER; PEDRO FERRER, married to ANGELA CORDON; PURA
FERRER, married to DANIEL MELOD - 1/8; BRAULIO GOYAGOY; LEONCIO GOYAGOY, married
to ISABEL BADEJOS; PROCOPIO DAYAG; GENOVEVA DAYAG, married to HERMIGILDO
CATOLIN; ESTANISLAO DAYAG, married to TEOFISTO STO. TOMAS; MAGNO DAYAG, married
to VILMA MARAMAG; ISABEL DAYAG, married to ROGELIO MABBARONG - 1/8; DOMINGO
MASIRAG, married to PRIMA DANAN - 1/8.
[16] Rollo,
pp. 68-69.
[17] For
example, the sale of Lot No. 4144-C to Nestor E. Calubaquib, evidenced by a
Deed of Sale of a portion of Registered Land, Annex “H” of the Complaint; id.,
pp. 68-69.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Penned by Justice Mario L. Guarina III, with
the concurrence of Justice Martin S. Villarama and Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion.
[23] The CA,
in note 10 of its decision stated that “A further consideration has been raised
by the appellees to the effect that this appeal should have been brought to the
Supreme Court. We note, however, that this issue was already discussed before
another Division of our Court through a motion to dismiss appeal and was
denied.” A perusal of the resolution denying the motion to dismiss (see Annex
“A,” Motion for Reconsideration [Re: Resolution dated
[24]
Rollo, p. 35.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] Ibid.
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] Suarez
v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 124512,
[35]
Regalado, Florenz, D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 2000 ed., p. 596.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., citing Bernardo v. CA, 216 SCRA 224 (1992).
[38] Ibid.
[39] Rollo, pp. 95-96.
[40]
[41] G.R.
No. 164787,
[42] Ibid.
[43] G.R.
No. 134718,
[44] Resolution of
the Court En Banc in UDK-9748 dated March 1, 1990; See also Macawiwili Gold Mining and
Development Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 602.
[45] Halimao v. Villanueva, A.M. No. 3825,
[46] Rollo, p. 110.
[47] Supra
note 43. Underscoring supplied.
[48] G.R.
No. 155133,
[49] Abadiano v. Spouses Martir, G.R. No.
156310,
[50] G.R.
No. 154745,
[51] RULES
OF COURT, Rule 17, Sec. 3.
[52] Cortez v.
[53] Uy v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157065,
[54] Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339,
[55] Uy v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 53.
[56] See Novino
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-21098,