Republic of
the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
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SYLVIA |
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A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2093 |
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Complainant, |
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(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2312-RTJ) |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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versus - |
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Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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PERALTA, JJ. |
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JUDGE EVELYN S.
ARCAYA- |
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CHUA, Regional
Trial Court, |
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Promulgated: |
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Branch 144, |
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Respondent. |
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February 13, 2009 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is the Complaint of
Sylvia Santos (complainant) dated
Complainant, an
aunt of respondent's husband, alleges: In the first week of September 2002, she
asked respondent's help, who was then the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 63 of Makati City, regarding the cases[2] of
complainant's friend, Emerita Muñoz, pending before the Supreme Court. Respondent, a former employee of the Court,
said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the Court;
she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the
Court for the speedy resolution of said cases.
In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondent P100,000.00
in the privacy of the latter's chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in
February 2003, respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other party
was offering P10 million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00;
however respondent could no longer be contacted.[3]
In her Comment dated August 19,
2005, respondent denies the charges against her and avers: In the months
adverted to by complainant, she (respondent) was facing protests, damaging
newspaper reports and administrative cases which caused her hypertension; thus,
she could not have agreed to the supposed transaction of complainant. When she became a judge, complainant asked a
lot of favors from her, and knowing that she worked as a Court Attorney of the
Supreme Court, complainant asked her to talk to a certain Mario Tolosa of the
Third Division, to whom complainant gave P50,000.00 for a favorable
resolution of Muñoz's cases. Respondent
declined; thereafter complainant started spreading malicious imputations
against her. On P100,000.00 complainant allegedly gave her, which letters were read by
respondent's Clerk of Court. Complainant
also told respondent's husband, outside respondent's house, that she
(respondent) was corrupt, as she asked for money in order to settle cases in
court. Respondent filed cases of Grave
Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against Honor and Unjust Vexation against
complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case against her.[4]
Complainant and respondent filed
several pleadings reiterating their respective claims.[5]
The Court in its Resolution dated
A preliminary conference was set for
In her Report dated
The Court, adopting the
recommendation of Justice Buzon, issued its Resolution dated
Complainant submitted her Compliance
dated
x x x x
2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable
Court, her administrative complaint against Judge Evelyn Argaya [sic] Chua is
not unfounded;
3. All the allegations therein are true and
based on respondent's personal knowledge;
4. The main reason why respondent did not
anymore pursue her complaint was because of the pressure of her family to
forgive Judge Chua, for the sake of unity and harmony in the family, given the
fact that Judge Chua's husband is her nephew;
5. On several occasions in August 2007, Judge
Chua, her husband and their children came to respondent's house and pleaded for
forgiveness. Later, respondent's sister,
husband and children, as well as her close friends persuaded her to forgive
Judge Chua and let bygones be bygones, for the sake of peace and unity in the
family;
6. It is solely due to the foregoing events as
well as for humane reasons that respondent gave up her complaint against Judge
Chua.[12]
(Emphasis supplied)
In its Resolution dated
Justice Salvador issued an order
setting the preliminary conference on April 9 and 10, 2008, and respondent
filed a motion to defer the proceedings pending her motion for reconsideration
of the Court's March 3, 2008 Resolution.[15] In a Resolution dated
In her Report dated September 23,
2008, Investigating Justice Salvador found sufficient grounds to hold
respondent liable for the offenses charged and recommended that “respondent be
administratively penalized for the grave misconduct and dishonesty charged by
complainant.”[18]
Justice Salvador found that:
complainant was able to present substantial evidence in support of her
complaint against respondent; while respondent denied that she asked for and
received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a
favorable decision on Muñoz's cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting
complainant in her office in September 2002, claiming only a different reason
for such meeting; that is, complainant was there to console her for the
protests against respondent at the time; respondent claims to have incurred
complainant's ire for declining complainant's request for favors in June 2004;
however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant asked her to talk
to Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not
heard of Tolosa before; however it was respondent's comment[19] and her
husband's affidavit[20] which
stated that complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on
absence without leave; it was respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme
Court who stood to know who Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to
believe that respondent knew and associated with Muñoz prior to the parties' falling
out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua (Robert), respondent's husband, stated
that Muñoz was introduced to them by complainant in September 2003, and that
they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed, however, that the topic
of case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint for
grave oral defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June 20,
2005 before complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it cannot
be denied, however, that respondent at the time had already been served complainant's demand letters dated April 28,
2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a lawyer,
to reply to complainant's first demand letter, was unusual; considering
complainant's advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim -- that
complainant's motive for filing the administrative case was respondent’s
refusal to give in to complainant's request to intercede in the cases of the
latter’s friend -- was too paltry an explanation for complainant's willingness
to expend the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the
administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her;
complainant's compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to
show cause why she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded
complaint against respondent, stated that the allegations in her complaint were
true and based on personal knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and
their family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that she gave up her
complaint against respondent.
Justice
Salvador particularly observed the demeanor of complainant at the
Justice Salvador also gave weight to
complainant's testimony that the return of the money by respondent, in addition
to familial interests, induced her to withdraw the complaint.[22]
Respondent filed a Motion dated
October 10, 2008 claiming that there were significant omissions of testimonies
in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSNs) particularly on the
statement “Ibinalik naman ho nila ang
pera”; such question was also beyond the scope of clarificatory questions
that may be propounded, as nowhere in the previous testimonies of complainant,
either in the direct or the cross-examination, did she mention the return of
the money, and it was only during the clarificatory hearing that it surfaced;
thus, she (respondent) was deprived of her right to cross-examine
complainant. Respondent prayed that
corrections on the TSN be made, or that the testimonies of complainant -- that
“the money was returned to me” and “ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera” -- be
stricken off; and in case the correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her
manifestation that the said testimony of complainant was given only during the
clarificatory hearing and, in effect, without an opportunity for her to cross-examine
the complainant.
In the Court's Resolution dated
The Court agrees with the findings
and recommendation of Justice Salvador.
It is settled that in administrative
proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[23]
In this case, Justice Salvador found
that substantial evidence existed to support the allegations against
respondent.
Try as she might to show the
implausibility of complainant's claims, respondent could not deny that she and
complainant met at her office sometime in September 2002; that she and her
husband knew Muñoz and associated with her on several occasions, and that it
was she (respondent), being a former employee of the Supreme Court, who stood
to know who Tolosa was.
But most telling of all the circumstances
pointing to respondent's guilt is the unwavering stance of complainant that
respondent did solicit and receive P100,000.00 from her in order to
facilitate a favorable ruling in Muñoz's cases.
As aptly observed by Justice
Salvador, complainant, when repeatedly asked during the hearing, was consistent
in her testimony:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
x
x x At the start of this afternoon's proceedings, you affirmed the truth of the
matters stated in your verified complaint?
MS. SANTOS:
Opo.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
And
according to you they are based on your personal knowledge?
MS. SANTOS:
My
complaint is true. That is all true.[24]
x x x x
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Ano
ang totoo?
MS. SANTOS:
Ang
sabi ko sa kanya, “Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi napakatagal na ng
kaso niya. Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi.” Ang sabi niya,
“Sige Tita, tutulungan ko.”
Evelyn,
sasabihin ko ang totoo ha. Huwag kang
magagalit sa akin.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Just
tell us what happened.
MS. SANTOS:
Sabi
niya, “Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng P100,000.00 at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa loob ng tatlong buwan walang nangyari
ibabalik ko sa iyo ang P50,000.00.” Which is true ha. Sinabi ko doon sa humihingi ng pabor sa akin.
Okay siya. Dumating ang panahon. It took already years walang nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang ginigipit nung
tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya. Sabi ko, “Evelyn, kahit konti magbigay ka sa
akin para maibigay ko kay Emerita.” Unang-una iyang Emerita may utang sa akin
ng P20,000.00 sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng alahas. Bumili sya.
JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:
Your
honor, at this point, may I request that the complainant be told not to
continue with her testimony because she is already through with her direct
examination.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the
record.[25]
Complainant's testimony during the
clarificatory hearing also revealed her true reasons for withdrawing her
complaint. As borne out by the records
and correctly pointed out by Justice Salvador in her Report:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
I
have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel.
Alright,
we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on
MS. SANTOS:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
So
it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which you
misunderstood or misapprehended?
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan
ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun
na nga ho, sa pakiusap po nila na magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman
ho nila ang pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan po ang buong katotohanan, Justice.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
The findings of investigating
magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are generally given by this Court
great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of
the witnesses as they testified.[27] As Justice Salvador's observations and
findings are well supported by the records, the Court finds no reason to depart
from such rule.
Indeed, complainant's claim that
respondent returned the money to her was given during a clarificatory
hearing. And respondent's belated
objections to said testimony, through a motion submitted to the Court a month
later, were accordingly noted. But respondent
could not deny that she was present during the clarificatory hearing and could have
very well objected to and refuted complainant's declaration on the matter. Respondent, however, did not make any
objection at the time, which failure is truly damaging.
As well explained by Justice
Salvador:
Unrefuted by respondent, it
would appear from the foregoing declarations that the return of the money
complainant claims to have given the former was, in addition to the familial
interests cited therefor, part of the reason the latter withdrew her complaint
and acceded to the amicable settlement of the case. If it is true that she received no money in
consideration of the favorable and expeditious resolution of G.R. Nos. 142676
and 146718, it necessarily and logically follows that respondent would not have
returned – as in fact she would not have anything to return – said money to
complainant. More so, when it is borne
in mind that, as per respondent's
Clearly, substantial evidence exists
in this case to hold respondent liable for gross misconduct.
As defined, misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act,
a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior; while “gross,” has been defined as “out of all measure; beyond
allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.[29]
Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140,[30] a judge
found guilty of gross misconduct may be punished with any of the following
sanctions: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
This is respondent's first
administrative offense.[31] In view
of such circumstance and the sanctions provided under Rule 140, the Court finds
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six months to be
proper in this case.[32]
As a final word, let it be stressed
once again that the office of a judge is sacred and imbued with public
interest. The need to maintain the
public’s confidence in the judiciary cannot be made to depend solely on the
whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses
therein.[33] Thus, withdrawal of a complaint or desistance
from a complaint will not deprive this Court of its power under the
Constitution to ferret out the truth and discipline its members accordingly.[34]
WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S.
Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144,
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 1-4.
[2] G.R.
No. 142676 entitled “Emerita Muñoz v. Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr. et al.”
and G.R. No. 146718 entitled “Emerita Muñoz v. Sps. Samuel and Aida Go Chan
and Bank of the Philippine
[3] Rollo,
pp. 1-3.
[4]
[5] Rollo,
pp. 61-62, 68-70, 75-79, 91-92, 107-109.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo,
p. 292.
[12]
[13] In
lieu of Justice Buzon, who was to retire on
[14] Rollo,
p. 308.
[15]
[16]
[17] Report
dated
[18]
[19] Dated
[20] Dated
[21] Report,
pp. 12-27.
[22] Report,
p. 28; TSN
[23] Vidallon-Magtolis
v. Salud, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P,
[24] TSN,
[25] TSN,
[26] TSN,
[27] Vidallon-Magtolis
v. Salud, supra note 23.
[28] Report,
pp. 28-29.
[29] Vidallon-Magtolis
v. Salud, supra note 23, at 469.
[30] As
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC.
[31] Per
OCA Docket Legal Office.
[32] See
Dulay v. Lelina, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516,
[33] Carman
v. Zerrudo, 466 Phil. 569, 580
(2004).
[34]