|
Complainant, - versus - JUDGE
CRISOSTOMO L. GARRIDO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Respondent. |
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027 Present: pUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO, Corona, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION,* JJ. Promulgated: February 27, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In a
verified letter-complaint[1] dated
February 7, 2006 complainant Marietta Duque charged respondent, Judge
Crisostomo L. Garrido of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban
City, Leyte, with gross violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution for rendering a decision beyond ninety (90) days in Criminal Case
No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v
Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al.
Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered
victim in the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580. She claimed that the respondent Judge
violated Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a
decision beyond the 90 day reglementary period without requesting an extension
of time from this Court. She alleged
that the prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on
August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005
which was promulgated on January 27, 2006.
Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the
handling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.
In a 1st
Indorsement[2] dated
March 22, 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required respondent
Judge to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
In his
Omnibus Comment[3] dated
May 18, 2006, respondent judge denied the accusation that the decision in
Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 was rendered beyond the 90-day period as
prescribed by the 1987 Constitution.
He
explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for the Prosecution -
was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted for
resolution was issued on September 13, 2005.
Respondent further explained that the Decision dated December 12, 2005
was promulgated only on January 27, 2006 because he was on official leave from
December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he left for the
Respondent
maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity in the promulgation
of the decision even though the complainant and the handling prosecutor, Robert
M. Visbal, were not present at that time.
He reasoned that the complainant is not entitled to be notified of the
promulgation as she is neither the private complainant nor a witness, while the
prosecution was duly represented during the promulgation by Prosecutor Edgar A.
Sabarre who was also assigned in the RTC.
Respondent pointed out that the court had already set the schedule of
the promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor
Visbal opted not to attend, it was for a reason only known to him.
Reacting
to respondent's explanation regarding Prosecutor Visbal, the complainant
attached to her Reply[4] an
Affidavit[5]
executed by said prosecutor wherein the latter averred that he was never
informed of the date of the promulgation and that he was surprised to learn
that respondent judge promulgated the decision in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580
with Prosecutor Sabarre appearing in his behalf.
In his
Rejoinder[6]
respondent Judge claimed that his track record in deciding cases filed with the
OCA bear out that no case of his had been decided beyond the 90-day
reglementary period, as some were even decided within thirty (30) and sixty
(60) days from the date the case was submitted for decision
In a
Report[7]
dated September 6, 2006, the OCA found respondent judge administratively liable
for rendering a decision beyond the 90-day period in violation of Section 15,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Additionally,
respondent was found to have violated the franking privilege under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 26. The OCA thus
recommended:
1.
That the instant administrative case be Re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter.
2.
That respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido be found Guilty of Undue
Delay In Rendering A Decision, in which case he should be meted with a penalty
of Fine in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with a Stern Warning
that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
3.
That respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido be Admonished for violating
the franking privilege in filing his rejoinder to this administrative case.[8]
In the Resolution[9]
dated October 9, 2006, the Court noted the letter-complaint, the comment of the
respondent judge, the complainant’s reply, respondent’s rejoinder thereto and
the report of the OCA.
Subsequently,
by Resolution dated December 11, 2006[10],
this Court required the parties to manifest, within ten (10) days from notice,
their willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed. In compliance thereto,
both parties submitted their respective manifestations which the Court duly
noted in the Resolution dated March 12, 2007[11].
We
agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Time
and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing
less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge
of official duties.
Section
15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide
a case within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit:
(1) All cases or matters filed after the
effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by
the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (Emphasis ours)
Likewise,
the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:
Rule 3.05 — A judge shall dispose of the
court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless
delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to
decide cases is mandatory.[12] The Court has consistently emphasized strict
observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion
and delay that have long plagued our courts.[13] Any
delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the
litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does
it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and
confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.[14]
As
readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the
Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005[15]. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for
decision on that date. Accordingly, the
decision should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued it only on
December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had been
submitted for decision.
Respondent
Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code of Judicial
Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the
90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.
Whenever
a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for
a reasonable extension of time to resolve it.[16] In
this case, granting that it was for a justifiable reason to render a decision
or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary period, the respondent could have
sought additional time by simply filing a request for extension. Respondent, however, did not avail of such
relief.
Respondent did not proffer any tenable
justification for the delay in rendering the decision. He
insisted that it was proper and procedural to first resolve
the parties' memoranda before the case may be considered submitted for
decision. He, thus, would want the Court
to consider his Order[17]
dated September 13, 2005 resolving the memoranda of the parties and declaring
the case submitted for resolution as
the starting point of the 90-day period for deciding the case and not on August
10, 2005, the date when the last pleading was filed.
Administrative
Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the submission
of memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides:
x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding
the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without
memoranda; in case the court requires or
allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the
filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do
so, whichever is earlier. (Emphasis ours)
A judge
cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was
still awaiting the parties' memoranda.
In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,[18]
the Court held:
x x x judges should decide cases even if
the parties failed to submit memoranda within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a
justification for failure to decide cases. The
filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an
essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case may be submitted for
decision. As it is merely intended
to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and
evidence - which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of the
judge’s personal notes and the records of the case - non-submission thereof has
invariably been considered a waiver of the privilege. (Emphasis ours)
Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to
decide a case within the prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.[19]
Under
Section 9(1)[20], Rule
140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised Rules of Court, undue
delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less serious
charge. Under Section 11(B) [21]
of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
In a
case, we held the respondent judge administratively liable for gross
inefficiency for delay in the disposition of cases and fined him P20,000.00
considering that he failed to act promptly and decide eight (8) cases within
the time prescribed by law and it was not the first time that an administrative
case was filed against said judge.[22]
In
another, the respondent judge failed to decide three (3) cases and resolve eleven
(11) motions within the reglementary period.
Considering that it was the judge's first offense, the Court imposed a
fine of P15,000.00.[23]
For
failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No.
2000-10-580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the
mitigating circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
We
agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent must also be penalized for violation
of P.D. No. 26[24] because
he filed his Rejoinder to this administrative case taking advantage of the
franking privilege. Although such
privilege is extended to judges, the same refers only to official
communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial
proceedings which shall be transmitted in the mail free of charge. The respondent, in mailing his Rejoinder,
made it appear that the same is an official court process as the envelope used
bears his station and the words “FREE FROM POSTAGE”. We concur with the OCA that respondent be
admonished for such violation.
WHEREFORE,
respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS
INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and for which he is FINED
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He
is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Presidential Decree No. 26 for which he
is ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of the decision be attached to his personal record.
SO
ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
* Additional Member as per Special Order No. 570.
[1]
Rollo, p. 1.
[2] Id. at 38.
[3] Id. at 39-44.
[4] Id. at 141-142
[5] Id. at 143-144.
[6] Id. at. 150-151.
[7] Id. at. 154-157.
[8] Id. at 157.
[9] Id. at 158.
[10] Id. at 159.
[11] Id. at 163.
[12] OCA
v. Judge
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 121.
[15] Rollo, pp. 3-11.
[16] Supra at note 12, p. 121.
[17] Rollo, p. 416.
[18] A.M. No. 05-4-213-RTC, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 99, 111.
[19] Marites
O. Tam v. Judge Jocelyn G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban,
[20] Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges — Less serious charges
include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order,
or in transmitting the records of a case;
2. Frequent
and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
3. Unauthorized
practice of law;
4. Violation
of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars;
5. Receiving
additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;
6. Untruthful
statements in the certificate of service; and simple misconduct.
xxx
xxx xxx
[21]
Sec.
11. Sanctions.
xxx
xxx xxx
B. If the respondent
is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2.
A fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000;
xxx
xxx xxx.
[22] Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 55,
[23] Supra at note 12.
[24] Entitled Extending Franking Privilege To Papers Connected With Judicial Proceedings.