RUFINA L. CALIWAN, G.R. No. 183270
Petitioner,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
MARIO OCAMPO,
OFELIA OCAMPO
and Promulgated:
RHODORA
PASILONA,
Respondents.
February 13, 2009
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review
on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the March 17, 2008 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99845 reversing the April 30, 2007
Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Special Civil Case No.
06-0020-CFM and reinstating the June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 47 which denied the Motion for Withdrawal of
Information filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, as well
as its June 5, 2008 Resolution[3]
denying the motion for reconsideration.
In 2004, petitioner Rufina L. Caliwan filed a complaint[4]
for attempted murder, multiple serious physical injuries, slander by deed,
grave threats, and grave oral defamation against respondents SPO4 Mario Ocampo,
Ofelia Ocampo, and Rhodora Pasilona before the Pasay City Prosecutor’s
Office. As counter-charges, respondents filed
complaints for grave threats, oral defamation, alarms and scandals,[5]
and physical injuries and oral defamation[6]
against petitioner.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the Office of
the Secretary of Justice are as follows:
Rufina Caliwan presents her evidence as follows: On September 4, 2004, at about 3:00 o’clock
in the afternoon, while she was singing inside her house and hosting a party on
the occasion of her birthday, stones were thrown on the roof of her house
coming from the direction of SPO4 Mario Ocampo’s house, her neighbor. She reported the incident to the barangay
officials, which called the parties for conciliation. However, the Ocampos refused to appear at the
barangay hall. In the evening of that
date, Rhodora Pasilona and Ofelia Ocampo, presumably irked by her complaint in
the barangay, shouted at her defamatory words like “pokpok, puta, bobo, sira ulo, tarantada” in the presence of her
guests, who were still attending the party.
Days later, and after the dismissal of the Ocampo’s complaint filed
before the DECS against her, SPO4 Mario Ocampo would make it a point to
intercept her whenever she passes by in front of their house. With threatening looks, he usually places his
hand in the position of drawing his service firearm.
The Ocampo’s, on the other hand, gave their version of the
incident as follows: At about 10:30 in
the morning of the (sic) September 4,
2004, they noticed the loud voices, laughing and singing of Rufina Caliwan and
her guests, which they later came to know was due to her on going birthday
celebration. SPO4 Mario Ocampo was on
duty at the police precinct at that time.
Despite the fact that they were being disturbed by the noise, they did
not anymore reacted (sic) to it just
to avoid any misunderstanding with Rufina Caliwan. Around 10:30 in the evening of the same day,
Rufina Caliwan went out of her house with her visitors. Apparently drunk, she suddenly shouted the
following: “Hoy bumaba kayong lahat dyan.
Anong gusto nyo, barilan o bugbugan?
Tama ang sabi ni Dahlia na mga inggetera kayo. Mga pangit kayo. Mga putang ina nyo. Masama ang mga ugali nyo. Bukas paglabas nyo pagpapatayin ko kayo.” To prevent any untoward incident, they just waited
when Rufina Caliwan went inside her house and just reported the matter to the
barangay. A conciliation proceeding was
set by the barangay regarding the matter on October 14, 2004 at the barangay
hall of Barangay 201 Kalayaan Village.
After the conciliation proceedings, Ofelia Ocampo and Rhodora Pasilona
were about to go home at about 12 noon, when Rufina Caliwan suddenly assaulted
Rhodora Pasilona, while uttering “Tarantada,
Putang ina mo. Hayop kang bata ka!” The barangay officials who were present
witnessed the whole incident. Rhodora
Pasilona, thereafter, went to the
The charges and
counter-charges being interwoven were consolidated and investigated
jointly. In its February 24, 2005
Resolution,[8]
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, through Assistant City
Prosecutor Eva C. Portugal-Atienza, recommended the dismissal of the complaint
filed by petitioner for lack of evidence, and recommended that petitioner be
charged with light threats and slight physical injuries. Two separate Informations for light threats
and slight physical injuries were filed against petitioner before the
Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
which issued a Resolution[9]
dated March 2, 2006 finding a prima facie case and/or probable cause for the
offense of light threats against SPO4 Mario Ocampo, and for the offenses of
grave oral defamation and slight physical injuries against Ofelia Ocampo and
Rhodora Pasilona, and consequently ordered the filing of corresponding informations
against the respondents.[10] The DOJ also ordered the dismissal of the
rest of the charges, as well as the withdrawal of the Informations for light
threats and slight physical injuries against petitioner.[11]
Consequently, a Motion for Withdrawal of Information[12]
was filed seeking the withdrawal of the Informations charging petitioner with
light threats and slight physical injuries.
However, the motion was denied by the
A perusal of the records and a careful evaluation of the
factual allegations in the information including the supporting documents
attached thereto will show that there exists probable cause to continue with
the proceedings of the case. The matters
raised by the accused are evidentiary in nature which should be properly
threshed out in a full blown trial. The
findings of the Department of Justice is not a rubber stamp for the court to
follow.
x x x x
As correctly pointed to by the private prosecutor, the
instant motions failed to comply with the three-day notice rule provided for
under Sections 4 and 5 (Rule 15) of
the Rules of Court. These motions are
considered litigated motions as the rights of the private complainant may be
clearly impaired, hence they cannot be heard ex-parte. As the requirement for notice was not
followed, the same is fatal and the motion is just a mere scrap of paper with
no legal effect.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari of petitioner Rufina
Caliwan is hereby granted. The assailed
Order dated June 6, 2006 of MTC, Branch 47, Pasay City is reversed and set
aside and the Motion to Withdraw Information dated March 15, 2006 of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City is granted and Criminal Case No. 05-517
CFM for slight physical injuries and Criminal Case No. 05-518 CFM of light
threats against Accused Rufina Caliwan are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Respondents thus appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan
Trial Court denying the motion to withdraw Information. At the same time, the court a quo was ordered to proceed with the
trial of the case with dispatch.
Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, however it was denied.
Hence, the instant petition
for review on certiorari raising the following issues:[16]
WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE MOTION FILED WAS DEFECTIVE, AND WITHOUT
CONSIDERATION TO THE RIGHTS OF THEREIN NAMED ACCUSED.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.
The petition lacks merit.
The charges against
petitioner are light threats[17]
and slight physical injuries,[18]
to which the applicable rule is the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Section 19 thereof provides:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The
following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule:
x x x x
(g) Petition
for certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
An interlocutory order is
one that does not finally dispose of the case and does not end the Court’s task
of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court.[19] The word “interlocutory” refers to something
intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some
point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.[20] Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental
issue and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave
something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits.[21]
The June 6, 2006 Order of
the Metropolitan Trial Court is an interlocutory order. Similar to an order denying a motion to
dismiss, an order denying a motion for withdrawal of information is
interlocutory as it does not finally dispose of the case nor does it determine
the rights and liabilities of the parties as regards each other.
The June 6, 2006 Order of
the Metropolitan Trial Court being interlocutory and the case falling under the
1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Regional Trial Court erred in
taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari despite the clear prohibition in
Section 19.
Indeed, as held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Estoque,[22]
there can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 19 (e) of the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and judges have no option but to obey. When the law is clear, there is no room for
interpretation.
Instead of filing a
petition for certiorari, petitioner could ventilate her defenses before the Metropolitan
Trial Court during the trial of the case.
In the event that the Metropolitan Trial Court’s decision is adverse to
her cause, she could avail of the remedy of appeal as provided in Section 21 of
the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.[23]
The 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases.[24] It was conceptualized to facilitate the
immediate resolution of cases. Respect
for the Rule on Summary Procedure as a practicable norm for the expeditious
resolution of cases like the one at bar could have avoided lengthy litigation
that has unduly imposed on the time of the Court.[25]
We need not discuss whether
the Metropolitan Trial Court erred in denying the Motion for Withdrawal of
Information because to entertain said issue would, in effect, give due course
to the prohibited petition for certiorari.
Suffice it to say that although the institution of criminal actions
depends on the sound discretion of the fiscal, once a case is filed in court,
it can no longer be withdrawn or dismissed without the court’s approval. Moreover, while the Secretary of Justice has
the power to alter or modify the resolution of his subordinate and thereafter
direct the withdrawal of the case, he cannot, however, impose his will on the
court.[26]
Indeed, once a complaint
or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case, i.e., its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of the criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The determination of the case is within the
court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court which has the option to grant or deny the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 17, 2008 reinstating the June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan
Trial Court which denied the Motion for Withdrawal of Information filed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, as well as the Resolution dated
June 5, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 44-53; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
[2]
[3]
[4] I.S. No. 04-J-5238.
[5] I.S. No. 04-K-5343.
[6] I.S. No. 04-K-5344.
[7] Resolution of the Department of Justice dated March 2, 2006; rollo, pp. 35-36.
[8] Rollo, pp. 29-32.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Penned by Judge Gina M. Bibat-Palamos.
[14] Rollo, pp. 112-113.
[15]
[16]
[17] Punishable by arresto mayor
[18] Punishable by arresto menor
[19] Rudecon Management Corporation v. Singson, G.R. No. 150798, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 612, 628.
[20]
[21] Repol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161418, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 321, 327-328.
[22] A.M. No. RTJ-99-1494, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 230, 234.
[23] SEC. 21. Appeal. – The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.
[24] 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, foreword.
[25]
[26] Dumlao, Jr. v. Hon. Rodolfo Ponferrada, G.R. No. 146707, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 426, 433.