FIRST DIVISION
MARIANO
NOCOM, G.R. No.
182984
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
AZCUNA,
and
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ.
OSCAR CAMERINO, EFREN CAMERINO, CORNELIO MANTILE and MILDRED
DEL ROSARIO, in her capacity as legal heir and representative of NOLASCO DEL
ROSARIO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
February
10, 2009
X
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X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated February 14, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and
Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and dismissed petitioner’s appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court for lack of jurisdiction and its Resolution dated May 23,
2008 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The present
case is an offshoot of the prior case, G.R. No. 161029, entitled “Springsun Management Systems Corporation v.
Oscar Camerino, Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, Nolasco Del Rosario, and
Domingo Enriquez,” which was promulgated on January 19, 2005 (449 SCRA 65) and
became final and executory on May 4, 2005 as recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
The factual
antecedents are as follows:
G.R. No. 161029:
Respondent Oscar Camerino and
respondents-intervenors Efren Camerino,
Cornelio Mantile, the deceased Nolasco Del Rosario, represented by Mildred Del
Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez were the tenants who were tilling on the
parcels of land planted to rice and corn previously owned by Victoria Homes,
Inc. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 289237, now S-6135
(109,451 square meters); S-72244 (73,849 square meters); and 289236, now S-35855
(109,452 square meters). On P9,790,612. The three deeds of sale were duly registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and new titles were issued in the name of SMSC.
Subsequently,
SMSC mortgaged to Banco Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its
loans amounting to P11,545,000. As
SMSC failed to pay the loans due, BF extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage
and, later, was adjudged the highest bidder.
On
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby as follows:
1. Declaring that plaintiffs are entitled (sic) to redeem, and ordering the
defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation (now petitioner) to allow
plaintiffs to redeem the landholdings in question within 180 days from finality
of this decision at the total price of P9,790,612.00; upon full payment
of the redemption price, the defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation
is ordered to deliver plaintiffs the titles and the corresponding Deed of
Redemption so that the titles to the properties in litigation can be
transferred in the name of the plaintiffs;
2. Declaring plaintiffs entitled to possession, and ordering the defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation and all persons claiming under it to vacate the lands in question and to surrender the same to the plaintiffs;
3. Dismissing the case against Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank;
4. Ordering the defendant Springsun Management
Systems Corporation to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[1]
On September 23, 2003, the CA, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 72475, affirmed with modification the RTC by declaring the respondents
to be tenants or agricultural lessees on the disputed lots and, thus, entitled
to exercise their right of redemption, but deleted the award of P200,000
attorney’s fees for lack of legal basis.
On
January 19, 2005, this Court, in G.R. No. 161029, affirmed the CA and
reiterated that being agricultural tenants of Victoria Homes, Inc. that had sold
the lots to SMSC without notifying them, respondents had the right to redeem the
subject properties from SMSC.
This
Court denied SMSC’s motions for reconsideration and for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration and, on
The present G.R. No. 182984:
On P500,000
each, which the latter encashed, representing the price of their “inchoate and contingent
rights” over the subject lots which they sold to him.
On
IRREVOCABLE POWER
OF
ATTORNEY[2]
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
WE, OSCAR CAMERINO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Teresita L. Magbanua: EFREN CAMERINO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Susana Camerino, CORNELIO MANTILE, of legal age, Filipino, married to Maria Fe Alon, NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Mildred Joplo, and DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ, of legal age, Filipino, married to Dionicia Enriquez whose residences are stated under our respective names, hereby APPOINT, NAME, and CONSTITUTE MARIANO NOCOM, of legal age, Filipino, married to Anacoreta Nocom and with office at No. 2315 Aurora Blvd, Pasay City, in an irrevocable manner, coupled with interest, for us and in our stead, to do all or any of the following acts and deeds:
1. To sell, assign, transfer, dispose of, mortgage and alienate the properties described in TCT Nos. 120542, 120541 and 123872 of the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City, currently in the name of Springsun Management Systems Corporation, consisting of 292,752 square meters subject matter of Civil Case No. 95-020 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. The said court, in its decision dated January 25, 2002 which was affirmed with modification of the Court of Appeals in its decision dated September 24, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72475, adjudged that we are legally entitled to redeem the lands from Springsun Management Systems Corporation;
2. To comply with the said decision by paying the redemption price to Springsun Management Systems Corporation and/or to the court, and upon such payment, to secure execution of the judgment so that the titles can be issued in the name of our attorney-in-fact;
3. To accept and receive for his exclusive benefit all the proceeds which may be derived from the sale, mortgage, transfer or deposition thereof;
4. To sign and execute all the necessary papers, deed and documents that may be necessary or the accomplishment of purposes of the Deed of Assignment, and to issue receipts and proper discharges therefor;
5. To negotiate, deal and transact with all the persons and entities involved in Civil Case No. 95-020, RTC, Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, with full power and authority to compromise with them;
6. To procure all documents and papers in government agencies relative to the said properties and case in court; and
7. To procure the necessary transfer certificate of titles in his name as the absolute owner of said properties.
GIVING AND GRANTING full power and authority to our said attorney-in-fact to do all things requisite and necessary with legal effects as if done by us when present.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto affixed [our] signatures this 18th day of December, 2003.
(Sgd.) OSCAR CAMERINO (Sgd.) EFREN CAMERINO
Principal Principal
Sparrow
(Sgd.) CORNELIO
MANTILE (Sgd.) NOLASCO
Principal Principal
(Sgd.) DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ
Principal
Tunasan Proper, Arandia
Tunasan,
WITH OUR MARITAL CONSENT:
(Sgd.) TERESITA MAGBANUA (Sgd.) SUSANA CAMERINO
Wife of Oscar Camerino Wife of Efren Camerino
(Sgd.) MARIA FE ALON ALON (Sgd.) MILDRED JOPLO
Wife of Cornelio Mantile Wife of Nolasco del Rosario
(Sgd.) DIONICIA ENRIQUEZ
Wife of Domingo Enriquez
CONFORME:
(Sgd.) MARIANO NOCOM
Attorney-in-Fact
Meanwhile,
on P9,790,612 plus P147,059.18 as commission
given by the petitioner, the respondents deposited, on August 4, 2005, the amounts
of P9,790,612, P73,529.59, and P73,529.59, duly evidenced
by official receipts, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. The RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 granted
respondents’ motion for execution and, consequently, TCT Nos. 120542, 120541
and 123872 in the name of SMSC were cancelled and TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and
15897 were issued in the names of the respondents. It also ordered that the “Irrevocable Power
of Attorney,” executed on
On October 24, 2005, respondent Oscar
Camerino filed a complaint against petitioner, captioned as “Petition to Revoke
Power of Attorney,” docketed as Civil Case No. 05-172, in the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 203, seeking to annul the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney” dated
December 18, 2003, the turnover of the titles to the properties in his favor, and
the payment of attorney’s fees and other legal fees.
Respondent Oscar Camerino’s complaint
alleged that he and co-respondents were asked by their counsel, Atty. Arturo S.
Santos, to sign a document with the representation that it was urgently needed
in the legal proceedings against SMSC; that the contents of the said document were
not explained to him; that in the first week of September 2005, he learned that
TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 were issued in their favor by the Register of
Deeds; that he discovered that the annotation of the “Irrevocable Power of
Attorney” on the said titles was pursuant to the Order of the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 256 dated August 31, 2005; that the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney”
turned out to be the same document which Atty. Santos required him and the other
respondents to sign on December 18, 2003; that despite repeated demands,
petitioner refused to surrender the owner’s duplicate copies of the said
titles; that petitioner had retained ownership over the subject lots; that he
had no intention of naming, appointing, or constituting anyone, including petitioner,
to sell, assign, dispose, or encumber the subject parcels of land; and that he
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was annotated on the titles
involving the subject lots.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,
petitioner countered that on September 3, 2003, Atty. Santos informed him of
the desire of his clients, herein respondents, to sell and assign to him their “inchoate
and contingent rights and interests” over the subject lots because they were in
dire need of money and could no longer wait until the termination of the proceedings
as SMSC would probably appeal the CA’s Decision to this Court; that they did
not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed to redeem the subject lots;
that on December 18, 2003, he decided to buy the contingent rights of the
respondents and paid each of them P500,000 or a total of P2,500,000
as evidenced by Philtrust Bank Manager’s Check Nos. MV 0002060 (for respondent
Oscar Camerino), MV 0002061 (for respondent Efren Camerino), MV 0002062 (for
respondent Cornelio Mantile), MV 0002063 (for Nolasco Del Rosario), and MV
0002064 (for Domingo Enriquez) which they personally encashed on December 19,
2003; that on August 4, 2005, he also paid the amount of P147,059.18 as
commission; that simultaneous with the aforesaid payment, respondents and their
spouses voluntarily signed the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney” dated December
18, 2003; that being coupled with interest, the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney”
cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the parties; and that having
received just and reasonable compensation for their contingent rights,
respondents had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
and the payment of P1,000,000 moral damages, P500,000 exemplary
damages, and P500,000 attorney’s fees plus costs.
On January 17, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion for
Preliminary Hearing on his special and/or affirmative defense that respondent
Oscar Camerino had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots
because the latter and his wife received the proceeds of the Philtrust Bank
Manager’s check in the sum of P500,000 which they personally encashed on
December 19, 2003 and that being coupled with interest, the “Irrevocable Power
of Attorney” cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the parties.
On January 26, 2006, respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio
Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir and
representative of Nolasco Del Rosario, filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
Admit the Complaint-in-Intervention with the attached Complaint-in-Intervention,
dated January 26, 2006, seeking the nullification of the “Irrevocable Power of
Attorney” for being contrary to law and public policy and the annotation of the
“Irrevocable Power of Attorney” on the titles of the subject lots with prayer that
petitioner be ordered to deliver to them the copies of the owner’s duplicate certificate
of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897.
Their Complaint-in-Intervention alleged that they had a legal interest
in the subject matter of the controversy and would either be directly injured
or benefited by the judgment in Civil Case No. 05-172; that they were
co-signatories or co-grantors of respondent Oscar Camerino in the “Irrevocable
Power of Attorney” they executed in favor of the petitioner; that their consent
was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, machination, mistake and undue
influence perpetrated by their own counsel, Atty. Santos, and petitioner; that
sometime in December 2003, Atty. Santos called for a meeting which was attended
by petitioner and one Judge Alberto Lerma where petitioner gave them checks in
the amount of P500,000 each as “Christmas gifts”; and that the “Irrevocable
Power of Attorney” was void ab initio
as the same was contrary to law and public policy and for being a champertous
contract.
On January 30, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment alleging that since the existence of the “Irrevocable
Power of Attorney” was admitted by petitioner, the only issue to be resolved
was whether the said document was coupled with interest and whether it was revocable
in contemplation of law and jurisprudence; that Summary Judgment was proper
because petitioner did not raise any issue relevant to the contents of the “Irrevocable
Power of Attorney”; and that in an Affidavit dated January 23, 2005, he
admitted receipt of a check amounting to P500,000.00 which was given to
him by petitioner as financial assistance.
On
On
February 14, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the petition for the cancellation of the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney”
was actually an action to recover the titles and ownership over the properties;
that since respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in paragraph 29 of his Motion for
Summary Judgment that the assessed value of the subject lots amounted to P600,000,000,
the case partook of the nature of a real action and, thus, the docket fees of P3,929
was insufficient; and that due to insufficient docket fee, his complaint should
be dismissed as the RTC was not vested with jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint.
On
On March 9, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino filed his Reply
to petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that the
determinative issue of whether or not the amount of P500,000 given to
him by petitioner rendered the power of attorney irrevocable can be determined
from the allegations in the pleadings and affidavits on record without the need
of introduction of evidence.
On
On June 9, 2006, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 admitted
the Complaint-in-Intervention because the movants-intervenors ([herein
respondents] Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and Mildred Del Rosario as legal
heir of Nolasco Del Rosario) “have legal interest in the subject properties in
litigation and in the success of the petitioner [herein respondent Oscar
Camerino], who was precisely their co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 95-020,
entitled ‘Oscar Camerino, et al. v. Springsun Management Systems Corporation
et al.,’ where they
are the prevailing parties against the defendant therein [SMSC], with respect
to the same properties, subject of this case, in a decision rendered by Branch
256 of this Court.” The RTC, Branch 203,
also granted the Motion for Summary Judgment because “a meticulous scrutiny of
the material facts admitted in the pleadings of the parties reveals that there
is really no genuine issue of fact presented therein that needs to be tried to
enable the court to arrive at a judicious resolution of a matter of law if the
issues presented by the pleadings are not genuine issues as to any material
fact but are patently unsubstantial issues that do not require a hearing on the
merits.” Thus,
The instant Motion to Dismiss by the respondent is therefore DENIED, PROVIDED, the petitioner should pay the balance of the docket fees remaining unpaid, if any, pursuant to Rule 141, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The “Motion for Intervention” timely filed by intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario, as opposed by the respondent, is hereby GRANTED.
x x x
Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.
Consequently, respondent’s Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his Special and Affirmative Defenses is deemed moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On
Irrespective of whether the Power of Attorney in question is coupled with interest, or not, the same can be revoked or annulled, firstly, because it is contrary to law and secondly it is against public policy.
As aptly pointed out by the intervenors, the assailed Special Power of Attorney which under its ultimate paragraph among others, authorizes the respondent (Nocom) ‘to procure the necessary Transfer Certificate of Title in his name, as the absolute owner of the said properties is a disguised conveyance or assignment of the signatories’ statutory rights of redemption and therefore prohibited under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3844, Sec. 62 which provides:
Sec. 62. Limitation on Land Rights.
Except in case of heredity succession by one heir, landholdings acquired under this Code may not be resold, mortgaged, encumbered, or transferred until after the lapse of ten years from the date of full payment and acquisition and after such ten year period, any transfer, sale or disposition may be made only in favor of persons qualified to acquire economic family-size farm units in accordance with the provisions of this Code xxx. (underlining supplied)
The assailed “power of attorney”
which was executed on
If pursuant to the spirit of the Agrarian Reform Law, the tenant cannot even sell or dispose of his landholding within ten (10) years after he already acquired the same or even thereafter to persons not qualified to acquire economic size farm units in accordance with the provisions of the Agrarian Reform Code, with more reason should the tenant not be allowed to alienate or sell his landholding before he actually acquires the same.
The right of redemption of the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 as upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is founded on a piece of social legislation known as Agrarian Reform Code.
Enunciated in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the
Furthermore, the assailed Special
Power of Attorney is a champertous contract and therefore void for being
against public policy. The pleadings of
the parties show that the same special power of attorney was executed by the
petitioner, et al. through the
intercession of Atty. Arturo Santos and at the behest of the respondent. In his own answer to the instant petition
which he is estopped to deny, the respondent alleges that the actual agreement
was for the respondent to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the
rights of the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 without
any provision for reimbursement. In
other words, the respondents, through the intercession of Atty. Santos,
petitioner’s attorney, had agreed to carry on with the action for the
petitioner et al. at his own expense
in consideration of procuring for himself the title to the lots in question as
the absolute owner thereof, with the respondent paying the redemption price of
said lots, as well as separate amounts of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
to each of the five (5) co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, including
herein petitioner, or a total sum of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00).
Under the premises, the aforesaid contract brokered by Atty. Arturo Santos has all really the earmarks of a champertous contract which is against public policy as it violates the fiduciary relations between the lawyer and his client, whose weakness or disadvantage is being exploited by the former. In other words, the situation created under the given premises is a clear circumvention of the prohibition against the execution of champertous contracts between a lawyer and a client.
A champertous contract is defined as
a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the stranger
pursues the party’s claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the
proceeds recovered under the judgment; a bargain by a stranger with a party to
a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his
own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the
proceeds or subject sought to be recovered.
(Blacks Dictionary; Schnabel v.
Taft Broadcasting Co., Inc.
The intention of the law in prohibiting this kind of contract is to prevent a lawyer from acquiring an interest in the subject of the litigation and to avoid a conflict of interest between him and his client.
In the instant case, it seems that Atty. Santos and the respondent colluded and conspired to circumvent these prohibitions. Considering therefore that Atty. Santos, then petitioner’s counsel, brokered the alleged deal between petitioners et al. and the respondent with respect to the lands subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 95-020, the deal contracted is illegal for being a champertous agreement and therefore it cannot be enforced.
Be that as it may, granting the agency established in the assailed Power of Attorney is coupled with interest, the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, who are the present intervenors, are not revoking the Power of Attorney at will but have precisely gone to court and filed the instant petition for its cancellation or revocation. What is prohibited by law and jurisprudence is the arbitrary and whimsical revocation of a power of attorney or agency coupled with interest, at will by a party, without court declaration.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Nullifying the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney” in question dated December 18, 2003, signed by the petitioner [herein respondent Oscar Camerino] and his co-plaintiffs [herein respondents who were the movant-intervenors] in Civil Case No. 95-020 in favor of the respondent [herein petitioner];
(2) Ordering the respondent to turnover the Certificates of Title Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 covering the lots, the subject of this case, to the petitioner and the intervenors;
(3) Ordering the respondent to pay the petitioner attorney’s fees and all other legal fees incurred by the latter in connection with this case;
(4)
Ordering the petitioner and the intervenors to return to the respondent the
amount of P7,790,612 paid by the latter as redemption price of the lots
in question plus commission of P147,049.18; and
(5)
Ordering the petitioner Oscar Camerino and the intervenors Efren Camerino,
Cornelio Mantile, Nolasco Del Rosario or his heirs and Domingo Enriquez, who
are petitioner’s co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, to return to the
respondent the total amount of P2,500,000.00 or P500,000.00 from
each of them paid by the respondent to them under Philtrust Bank Check Nos. MV
0002060, MV 0002061, MV 0002062, MV 0002063, and MV 0002064 which checks were
encashed by them with the drawee bank.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On
On
On
On
In
its Resolution of
Hence, this present petition.
Petitioner raises the following
issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED AN ERROR IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S APPEAL.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT
RAISED IN PETITIONER’S ANSWER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN NOT
VOIDING THE ASSAILED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO IMPLEAD AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 05-172 FOR NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES.
Petitioner
contends that the CA erred in dismissing his appeal as the case involves
questions of fact; that summary
judgment was not proper as there were genuine issues of fact raised in his Answer;
that respondents failed to implead their lawyer, Atty. Arturo S. Santos, as an
indispensable party-defendant, who, according to them, allegedly connived with
him in making them sign the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney” in his favor; and
that since the case partakes of the nature of an action to recover ownership
and titles to the properties, respondents’ complaint should be dismissed for
failure to pay the correct docket fees.
Respondent
Oscar Camerino argues that the sole issue to be resolved pertains to the legal
issue of whether the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) denominated as irrevocable
may be revoked; that three material facts have been established, i.e., that the SPA was executed, that
Atty. Santos facilitated the signing and execution of the SPA, and that
petitioner paid P500,000 to each of the respondents in consideration for
the signing of the SPA and, thus, summary judgment was proper; and that pure
questions of law are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules.
Respondents
Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and
Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario, aver
that petitioner’s petition is insufficient in form, i.e., due to defective verification as the word “personal” was not
stated when referring to “personal knowledge,” and in substance, i.e., there is no genuine issue to be
resolved as the factual allegations of the petitioner are unsubstantial and
that Atty. Santos is not an indispensable party to the case.
The
petition has merit.
In
dismissing petitioner’s appeal, the CA erroneously relied on the rationale that
the petitioner’s appeal raised questions of law and, therefore, it had no
recourse but to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. The summary judgment rendered by the trial
court has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and, thus, the
petitioner, being the aggrieved party, correctly appealed the adverse decision
of the RTC to the CA by filing a notice of appeal coupled with the appellant’s
brief under Rule 41 of the Rules.
Contrary
to the findings of the RTC and the CA, the present case involves certain
factual issues which remove it from the coverage of a summary judgment.
Under Section
1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A “genuine issue” is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[5] A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.[6]
The
present case should not be decided via a summary judgment. Summary judgment is not warranted when there
are genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. The party who moves for summary judgment has
the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact,
or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may
do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place
of trial.[7]
Summary
judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits,
depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties. In this present case, while both parties
acknowledge or admit the existence of the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney,” the
variance in the allegations in the pleadings of the petitioner vis-à-vis that
of the respondents require the presentation of evidence on the issue of the
validity of the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney” to determine whether its
execution was attended by the vices of consent and whether the respondents and
their spouses did not freely and voluntarily execute the same. In his Answer
with Counterclaim, petitioner denied the material allegations of respondent
Oscar Camerino’s complaint for being false and baseless as respondents were
informed that the document they signed was the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney”
in his favor and that they had received the full consideration of the
transaction and, thus, had no legal right over the three parcels of land. Indeed, the presentation of evidence is
necessary to determine the validity and legality of the “Irrevocable Power of
Attorney,” dated P500,000 each were in consideration of the “inchoate and
contingent rights” of the respondents in favor of the petitioner; whether Atty.
Santos connived with petitioner in causing the preparation of the said document
and, therefore, should be impleaded as party-defendant together with the
petitioner; whether respondents deposited the amount of P9,790,612.00
plus P147,059.18 with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256; and
whether the sale of respondents’ inchoate and contingent rights amounted to a
champertous contract.
The
incongruence and disparity in the material allegations of both parties have
been evident. Respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in his complaint that he and
his co-respondents were required by their counsel, Atty. Santos, to sign a
document on the representation that it was urgently needed in the legal
proceedings against SMSC which turned out to be the “Irrevocable Power of
Attorney”; but petitioner disproved the vitiated consent on the part of the
respondents as they knew fully well that the document they signed, voluntarily and
intelligently, on December 18, 2003, was the said “Irrevocable Power of
Attorney.” Respondent Oscar Camerino alleged
in his complaint that he has no intention of naming, appointing or constituting
anyone, including the petitioner, to sell, assign, dispose or encumber the lots
in question; but petitioner maintained that respondent Oscar Camerino agreed to
sell and assign to him his “inchoate and contingent rights and interests” over
the subject lot for and in consideration of the sum of P500,000, plus
the redemption price of P9,790,612.
Respondents claimed that the amount they received was grossly
disproportionate to the value of the subject land; but petitioner countered
that the respondents did not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed to
redeem the subject lots, so he decided to buy their contingent rights and paid
each of them P500,000 or a total of P2,500,000 as evidenced by
five (5) Philtrust Bank Manager’s Check which they personally encashed on
December 19, 2003, that he also paid the amount of P147,059.18 as
commission on August 4, 2005, that simultaneous with the aforesaid payment,
respondents and their spouses voluntarily signed the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney”
dated December 18, 2003, and that being coupled with interest, the “Irrevocable
Power of Attorney” cannot be revoked at will by any of the parties.
Respondents
maintain that they were deceived into executing the “Irrevocable Power of
Attorney” in favor of the petitioner which was done through the maneuverings of
their own lawyer, Atty. Santos, who, according to them, had connived with
petitioner in order to effect the fraudulent transaction. In this regard, respondents should have
impleaded Atty. Santos as an indispensable party-defendant early on when the
case was still with the RTC, but they failed to do so. However, their procedural lapse did not constitute
a sufficient ground for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172.
In Domingo v. Scheer,[8]
the Court explained that the non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules, as amended, requires indispensable
parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable
parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the
suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case
are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void. There is lack of authority to act not
only of the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of
impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner or plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be
added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner or plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint or petition for the
petitioner or plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. In the present case, the RTC and the CA did
not require the respondents to implead Atty.
Santos as party-defendant or respondent in the case. The operative act that would lead to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172 would be the refusal of respondents to
comply with the directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable
party to the case.
In his petition, petitioner prays for
the reversal of the Decision dated
February 14, 2008 of the CA which affirmed the Joint Order dated June 9, 2005
and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch
203 and dismissed petitioner’s appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules for lack of
jurisdiction and its Resolution dated May 23, 2008 which denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration; the annulment of the RTC’s Summary Judgment rendered
on June 15, 2006; and the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172 filed with the RTC on the ground that
respondents failed to pay the correct docket fees as the action actually sought
the recovery of ownership over the subject properties.
The record shows that Civil Case No.
05-172 is a complaint filed by respondent Oscar Camerino against petitioner,
denominated as “Petition to Revoke Power of Attorney,” that seeks to nullify
the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney” coupled with interest dated December 18,
2003; that petitioner be ordered to turn over TCT No. 15898, 15896, and 15897
to him; and that petitioner be ordered to pay the attorney’s fees and other
legal fees as a consequence of the suit.
This case is therefore not an action to recover the titles and ownership
over the subject properties. For now, the
nature of the suit remains that of personal action and not a real action in contemplation
of Rule 4 of the Rules. Hence, the
docket fees paid by the respondents were in order. Should the complaint be amended to seek
recovery of ownership of the land, then the proper docket fees should be paid
and collected.
While the RTC erred in rendering the
summary judgment, Civil Case No. 05-172 should not perforce be dismissed. Instead, this present case should be remanded
to the RTC for further proceedings and proper disposition according to the
rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an abbreviated
termination of the case by summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 14, 2008 which affirmed the Joint
Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and dismissed petitioner’s
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 2008
which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No.
87656 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[2] Rollo, pp. 154-155.
[3] Rollo, pp. 188, 190.
[4] Rollo, pp. 500-503.
[5] Solidbank Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 120010,
[6] Ong v. Roban Lending Corporation, G.R.
No. 172592,
[7] Tan v. De la Vega, G.R. No. 168809,
[8] G.R. No. 154745,