THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF G.R. No. 180206
REINALDO BAUTISTA, JR., Present:
City Mayor; THE
ANTI-SQUATTING
COMMITTEE, represented by
ATTY. QUISUMBING, J.,
MELCHOR
CARLOS R. RAGANES, Chairperson,
ARCHITECTURE
office, represented TINGA,
by
OSCAR FLORES; and PUBLIC VELASCO,
JR., and
ORDER
and SAFETY OFFICE, BRION, JJ.
Represented by EMMANUEL REYES,
Petitioners.
- versus
-
Promulgated:
February 4, 2009
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional
Officer-National Commission
on
Indigenous People-CAR, ELVIN
GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN
and LAZARO BAWAS,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Petitioners,
the City Government of Baguio City, represented by its Mayor, Reinaldo
Bautista, Jr., the Anti-Squatting Committee, represented by Atty. Melchor
Carlos R. Rabanes; the City Buildings and Architecture Office, represented by
Oscar Flores; and the Public Order and Safety Office, represented by Emmanuel
Reyes and later substituted by Gregorio Deligero, assail the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895, dated April 16, 2007, and its
Resolution[2]
dated September 11, 2007, which affirmed the injunctive writ issued by the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) against the demolition orders
of petitioners.
The following undisputed facts are
culled from the assailed Decision:
The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and in violation of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1096 and Republic Act No. 7279.
Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated September 19, 2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon of the intended demolition of the erected structures on October 17 to 20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas (hereinafter private respondents) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City through its Acting City Mayor, Reynaldo Bautista, the City Building and Architecture Office, the Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division, among others, (collectively called petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as Case No. 31-CAR-06.
In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained.
On October 16 and 19, 2006, Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP issued the two (2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all persons acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September 18, 2006; Demolition Order dated September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004; Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series of 2004, for a total period of twenty (20) days.
Subsequently,
the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated P10,000.00.[3]
Acting on
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners,[4]
the Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP over the action filed
by private respondents and affirmed the temporary restraining orders dated
October 16[5]
and 19, 2006,[6]
and the Resolution dated
Petitioners
assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for
injunction such as the one filed by private respondents. They claim that the
NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction only as auxiliary remedies to cases pending before it.
Further, the
IPRA provides that
Petitioners
contend that private respondents are not entitled to the protection of an
injunctive writ because they encroached upon the Busol Forest Reservation and
built structures thereon without the requisite permit. Moreover, this Court, in
Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals,[8] had already declared that the Busol
Forest Reservation is inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long,
cannot convert the same into private property.
Even assuming that private respondents have a pending application for
ancestral land claim, their right is at best contingent and cannot come under the
protective mantle of injunction.
Petitioners
also claim that the Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from ancestral claims as
it is needed for public welfare. It is allegedly one of the few remaining
forests in
Finally,
petitioners contend that the demolition orders were issued pursuant to the
police power of the local government.
In their
Comment[9]
dated
As members
of the Ibaloi Indigenous Community native to
Private
respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation is subject to ancestral land
claims. In fact, Proclamation No. 15[10]
dated
Lastly,
private respondents assert that the power of the city mayor to order the
demolition of certain structures is not absolute. Regard should be taken of the
fact that private respondents cannot be issued building permits precisely
because they do not have paper titles over their ancestral lands, a requirement
for the issuance of a building permit under the National Building Code.
Petitioners’
Reply to Comment[11]
dated
We shall
first dispose of the elemental issue of the NCIP’s jurisdiction.
The NCIP is
the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the
rights and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs)
and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.[12] In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the
NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the
rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition
precedent to the NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that
the parties thereto shall have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws and have obtained a certification from the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
same has not been resolved.[13]
In
addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive
Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional
Hearing Officer:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.
(3) Exclusive and Original
Jurisdiction of the Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.
In order to
determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute in accordance with
the foregoing provisions, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of the
allegations in their petition, whether private respondents are members of ICCs/IPs. In their petition[14]
filed before the NCIP, private respondents, members of the Ibaloi tribe who
first settled in
Clearly
then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically determine the nature
of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal,[16]
squarely qualify it as a “dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs” within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the NCIP-RHO.
The IPRA,
furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction. Sec. 69 thereof
states:
Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.—The NCIP shall have the power and authority:
a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;
b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements, and other document of similar nature as may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act;
c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and
d)
To
enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it
which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to
any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic activity.
[Emphasis supplied]
NCIP
Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted provision in Sec. 82,
Rule XV, which provides:
Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.—A writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Sections 59 and 69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of sworn allegations in a petition, that the acts complained of involving or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or seriously affect social or economic activity. This power may also be exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties.
As can be
gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of
the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue temporary
restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over
which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may
cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer
issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect
and preserve the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.
Parenthetically,
in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the IPRA even provides that no
restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued by any inferior court
against the NCIP in any case, dispute or controversy
arising from or
necessary to the
interpretation
of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.[17]
Petitioners
argue that
SEC. 78. Special Provision.—The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by its Charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles recognized and/or acquired through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall remain valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act. [Emphasis supplied]
The foregoing provision indeed states
that
The crucial
question to be asked then is whether private respondents’ ancestral land claim
was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their
right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are violative
of said right.[18]
Proclamation
No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents’ ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the
Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does
not acknowledge vested rights over the same.
In fact, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest
Reservation from sale or settlement. It provides:
Pursuant
to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven[,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be administered
by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and protecting water
and timber, the protection of the water supply being of primary importance and
all other uses of the forest are to be subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or settlement
the following described parcels of the public domain situated in the
The fact
remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as
inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court
of Appeals.[19] The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation
as such precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts
are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.
All told,
although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and
writs of injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are entitled
to the relief granted by the Commission.
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895 dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo, pp. 30-37; Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Lucas P. Bersamin.
[16]Abacus Securities Corporation v. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 315; Ballesteros v. Abion, G.R. No. 143361, February 9, 2006; 482 SCRA 23.