THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - AGUSTINO
TAMOLON and ANTONIO CABAGAN, Appellants. |
G.R.
No. 180169
Present: QUISUMBING,* J., CARPIO,** CHICO-NAZARIO,***
Acting Chairperson, NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: February 27, 2009 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated
August 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming, with modification, the
judgment[2]
dated February 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, Davao del
Sur, convicting Agustino Tamolon[3]
and Antonio Cabagan[4]
(appellants) of Multiple Murder.
The relevant facts and proceedings:
Appellants, with several others,[5]
were charged with Multiple Murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-377 (93),
before the RTC, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, in an Information which
reads:
That
sometime last March of 1984, in the Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with guns and bolos, with intent to kill, and taking
advantage of superior strength conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, shoot, hack and massacre Jaime Malabarbas, Ely Malabarbas, Judith
Malabarbas, Wilfredo Panton and Gerry Panton, the herein victims/offended
parties[,] which gunshot and hack wounds caused to their instantaneous death,
to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[6]
Upon arraignment, the appellants
pleaded not guilty.
The case was tried jointly with four
other cases, where the appellants were likewise charged under separate
informations, viz.: for arson,[7]
for other forms of arson,[8]
and for two counts of grave threats.[9] However, except for the herein appellants,
all the other accused in these criminal cases remain at large.
The conflicting versions of the
prosecution and the defense on the antecedent facts of the case, as summarized
by the appellants in their brief, follow:
Evidence
for the prosecution tend to establish that at about 8:00 p.m. of March 15,
1984, the group of ERNESTO DAMALI alias ALANG, AGUSTINO TAMOLON, ANTONIO
CABAGAN, SAMSON CABAGAN, KIMPO ANGGA, JOSEPH WAGIA, and MODESTO LANDAS were
supposed to conduct a roving patrol.
When they reached the house of the MALABARBAS in Sitio Maibu,
Magsaysay[,] Davao del Sur, except for LANDAS, they opened fire at the
MALABARBAS family and then hacked them which resulted to the death of JAIME,
ELY, JUDITH, all surnamed MALABARBAS, WILFREDO and GERRY, both surnamed PANTON
(T.S.N., pp. 8, 11 & 13, December 1, 1993).
EVIDENCE
FOR THE DEFENSE:
Accused-appellant
AGUSTINO TAMOLON who testified on April 5, 1995 stated that at the time of the
massacre of the Malabarbas family in Sitio Maibu, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur on
March 15, 1984, he was a resident of Santa Felomina, Makilala,
Accused-appellant
ANTONIO CABAGAN denied having participated in the massacre of the Malabarbas
Family. He was arrested and detained in
1993 in Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, where MODESTO LANDAS was also detained. During their detention, VILMA GANAD (whose
rubber plantation and copra dryer were set on fire) and ANTONIO MALABARBAS,
came to see him and LANDAS, and asked them to testify against DAMALI and
TAMOLON, and in exchange, they will help them get out of jail and GANAD
promised them money and support in the form of rice subsidy. He, however, refused because he “did not
actually see the persons who did the crime, but LANDAS agreed (T.S.N., pp. 6-9,
11-13, June 8, 1995).
GREGORIO
SUMAKBANG, the Barangay Captain of Magbuk, Tulunan, from 1965 to 1987,
testified that CABAGAN and TAMOLON were never linked to the massacre of the
MALABARBAS Family in 1984, and that it was only in 1993 that he came to know
that they were linked and arrested for the massacre. He knows MODESTO LANDAS and was a sponsor of
LANDAS at his wedding. LANDAS came to
see him twice in 1993 and requested him not to get involved in the cases. He further stated that LANDAS testified
against Tamolon and ANTONIO CABAGAN to free himself from jail and who was
subsequently released in February, 1993.
He also knows that MODESTO LANDAS died in September 1994, during the
fiesta of Malungon (T.S.N., pp. 7-10, September 15, 1995).
SUNGKADAN
AMIT, a pastor of the Christian Missionary alliance in Sta. Felomina, Makilala,
After trial, on February 12, 1996, the
RTC rendered its Decision convicting both appellants of multiple murder. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby pronounces Agustino Tamolon and
Antonio Cabagan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Multiple Murder
as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code for the death
of Ely Malabarbas, Wilfreda Panton, Judith Malabarbas, Jaime Malabarbas and
Jerry Panton and hereby sentences each accused to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Ely Malabarbas; Reclusion Perpetua, for the
death of Wilfreda Panton; Reclusion Perpetua, for the death of Judith
Malabarbas; Reclusion Perpetua, for the death of Jaime Malabarbas and Reclusion
Perpetua, for the death of Jerry Panton subject to the limitation provided for
under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code and to indemnify the heirs of each
victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS pursuant to recent
jurisprudence. x x x.
SO
ORDERED.[11]
The RTC decision was elevated directly
to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
However, conformably with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[12] the case was, by Resolution dated
December 13, 2004, referred to the CA.
Parenthetically, no appeal was taken by the appellants in the other
cases against them.[13] Accordingly, insofar as the other criminal
cases are concerned, the Decision of the RTC of Davao del Sur had become final
and executory.
On August 23, 2007, the CA promulgated
its Decision, disposing as follows:
FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appealed
Judgment dated February 12, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Davao
del Sur in Criminal Case No.
XXI-377(93), is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused is
ORDERED to pay the heirs of each of
the victim[s] P50,000.00 as indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Thus, this appeal, assigning the
following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AGUSTINO TAMOLON AND ANTONIO CABAGAN GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MULTIPLE MURDER ON THE LONE, FABRICATED,
ILL-MOTIVATED, AND POLLUTED TESTIMONY OF
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF EACH OF THE FIVE (5) VICTIMS THE
SUM OF FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS.[15]
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The appellants cast aspersion on the
credibility of lone prosecution witness, Modesto Landas, who admitted having
been with the armed group that massacred the Malabarbas family. Moreover, they question the motive of Landas
who, they said, told the authorities of the alleged criminal activities of the
group only after he had been arrested and detained, nine years after the
alleged incident. They then submit that
“the evidence presented by the prosecution came from a polluted source,”
harping on Landas being with the roving team at the time of the commission of
the crime, making him a co-conspirator.
However, the trial court gave full
weight and credence to Landas’ testimony.
Evaluating the same, the court said:
Witness
Modesto Landas was likewise very positive, direct, straight-forward and
convincing in his testimony against accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio
Cabagan. This witness never faltered or
wavered in his claim about the participation of accused Agustino Tamolon and
Antonio Cabagan in the massacre of the Malabarbas family and in setting fire to
the dr[y]er of Vilma Ganad.[16]
The CA also held that, by way of
exception, the testimony of a co-conspirator may, even if uncorroborated, be
sufficient for conviction when it is shown to be sincere in itself, because it
is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and is full of details
by which their nature could not have been the result of a deliberate
afterthought.[17]
In this regard, worthy of reiteration
is the doctrine that on matters involving the credibility of witnesses, the
trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses,
since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grueling examination. Absent any showing
of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have
been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the
factual findings on and assessment of the credibility of a witness made by the
trial court remain binding on an appellate tribunal.[18] A trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, even conclusive and
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence.[19] Thus, in Valcesar
Estioca y Macamay v. People of the Phils.,[20] we held:
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.
By the foregoing standards especially because
the trial court’s findings were concurred in by the CA, we are obliged to adopt
the trial court’s evaluation of Landas’ credibility.
As to the appellants’ defense which is
based mainly on denial and alibi, nothing is more settled in criminal law
jurisprudence than that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony of the witness.[21] In People
of the Phils. v. Carlito Mateo y Patawid,[22] we had occasion to state:
Accused-appellant’s bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and affirmative testimony offered by the prosecution. x x x. A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters. x x x.
Indeed, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed
with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is
viewed with suspicion and received with caution, because it can easily be
fabricated.[23] For alibi to prosper, appellant must prove
not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed but that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission.[24]
In the case at bench, no
convincing evidence was presented by the defense to reinforce the appellants’
denial and alibi.
As to the award of
additional damages, the CA is correct in ordering the appellants to pay the sum
of P50,000.00, as moral damages, to the heirs of each of the
victims. We held in People v. Panado:[25]
We grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the heirs of the victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages may be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional suffering. x x x. With or without proof, this fact can never be denied; since it is undisputed, it must be considered proved.
Given the foregoing disquisition, we
find no reason to reverse the Decision of the CA upholding the conviction of
accused-appellants.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00463 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice Acting
Chairperson |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
Acting
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 564 dated February 12, 2009.
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. 568 dated February 12, 2009.
*** In lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 563 dated February 12, 2009.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Elihu A. Ybańez, concurring; rollo, pp. 4-12.
[2] Promulgated by RTC Judge Rodolfo A. Escovilla.
[3] Also referred to as “Agustino Tamulon” in the information for multiple murder.
[4] Referred to as “Tony Cabagan” in the information for multiple murder.
[5] The other accused are Ernesto Dawali alias Alang, Samson Cabagan, Kimpo Angga and Joseph Wagia.
[6] CA rollo, p. 5.
[7] Docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-365 (93), in an information which reads:
That on or about December 15,
1991 at Tacul, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the said accused with intent to gain, motivated by spite or hatred towards the
owner of the property and acting as a syndicate, conspiring, confederating,
helping one another and acting in concert did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously set on fire or burn the copra dryer (pugon) owned
by Mrs. Vilma vda. de Ganad valued at P30,000.00 to the damage and prejudice
of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (
[8] Docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-364 (93), in an information which reads:
That sometime in March 1992, or
thereabout, at Tacul, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused with intent to gain, motivated by spite or hatred to
the property owner, and acting as a syndicate, conspiring, confederating and
acting in concert, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set
on fire or burn the rubber plantation and/or farm of one Mrs. Vilma vda. de
Ganad to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of P20,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (
[9] Docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-342 (92), in an information which reads:
That sometime on January 1, 1992
at Tacul, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
said accused conspiring, confederating, helping one another and acting in
concert with other persons, whose identities are still to be determined but who
will be charged appropriately once established later, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously send a written note or letter to one
Vilma Serapion vda. de Ganad demanding from the latter the amount of P60,000.00
and threatening, should she fail to deliver the sum, to burn her rubber trees
and to kill her and other members of her family, to her damage and prejudice;
that the threat letter was sent to the offended party through a middleman.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (
[10]
[11]
[12] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[13] The
RTC disposed of the other criminal cases as follows:
In Criminal Case No. XXI-343(92) for Grave Threats,
the Court finds accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Threats as defined and penalized under
Article 282 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since the accused in threatening the complainant imposed a condition
that of demanding the amount of P60,000.00 and killing the members of
Vilma Ganad’s family if the demand is not met, and therefore the crime
threatened to be committed is Homicide, the Court has to lower the penalty by
two degrees from Reclusion Temporal which is the penalty provided for the crime
of Homicide, and since the threat was made through a middleman, the Court
hereby imposes upon said accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan the
Indeterminate Penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum.
In
Criminal Case No. XXI-343(92) the Court is at a loss as to the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused considering that the crime the accused intended to
commit is that of Malicious Mischief, should the private complainant fail to
meet the demand but the prosecution failed to allege in the said Information
the damage that the private complainant will suffer as a result of the crime of
Malicious Mischief. Considering that the
penalty in Malicious Mischief would depend on the amount of the damage
occasioned thereby, and the Information failed to allege the amount of the
damage, the Information aforesaid suffers from a very substantial defect. In view hereof, the Court ACQUITS accused
Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan of Grave Threats in Criminal Case No.
XXI-342(92).
In
Criminal Case No. XXI-365(93) for Arson this Court finds accused Agustino
Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arson defined and penalized under Art. 322 par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by P.D. 1613, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum
and to indemnify private complainant Vilma Ganad the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
PESOS for the burned copra dr[y]er.
In
Criminal Case No. XXI-364(93) this Court finds accused Agustino Tamolon and
Antonio Cabagan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Other Forms of
Arson defined and penalized under Art. 321 par. 2, sub-par. C of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by P.D. 1613 and hereby sentences each accused to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum
and to indemnify private complainant Vilma Vda. de Ganad the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS for the damage caused to the partially
burned rubber plantation. Both accused
being detained are entitled to full credit of the preventive imprisonment they
had undergone if they have signed their conformity to abide by the rules and
regulations imposed upon inmates by the Provincial Jail authorities of Davao
del Sur, otherwise, they shall be entitled only to four-fifths (4/5) of the
preventive imprisonment they had undergone.
The case with respect to accused Romy Solutan in Criminal Case No.
XXI-365(93) for Arson is hereby ordered DISMISSED in view of the death of said
accused and the cases against accused Ernesto Damali alias Alang, Samson
Cabagan, Kimpo Angga, Joseph Wagia, Boy Cabagan and Joseph Madot are hereby
ordered placed in the archive to be retrieved therefrom as soon as these
accused shall have been arrested.
SO ORDERED. (CA rollo,
pp. 26-28.)
[14] Rollo, p. 11.
[15]
[16] CA rollo, p. 75.
[17] Citing People v. Cuya, Jr., 141 SCRA 351, 354 (1986).
[18] People of the Phils. v. Budoy Gonzales y Lacdang, G.R. No. 180448, July 28, 2008.
[19] Rene Soriano
@ “Renato” v. People of the Phils., G.R.
No. 148123, June 30, 2008.
[20] G.R. No. 173876, June 27, 2008.
[21] People of the Phils. v. Donato Bulasag y Arellano alias “Dong,” G.R. No. 172869, July 28, 2008.
[22] G.R. No. 179036, July 28, 2008.
[23] People v. Penaso, 383 Phil. 200, 210 (2000).
[24] People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 134762, July 23, 2002, 385 SCRA 38, 51.
[25] G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 690-691.