THIRD DIVISION
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ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE, petitioner, - versus - SPS. MARTIN MAGLUNOB and
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 178906 Present: QUISUMBING, J.,* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Acting Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: February 18, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision[1]
dated
Elvira
T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Ray Mars E. Arangote,
is the registered owner of the subject property, as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. CLOA-1748.[6] Respondents Martin (Martin II) and Romeo are
first cousins and the grandnephews of Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan (Esperanza),
from whom petitioner acquired the subject property.
The
Petition stems from a Complaint[7]
filed by petitioner and her husband against the respondents for Quieting of
Title, Declaration of Ownership and Possession, Damages with Preliminary
Injunction, and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order before the MCTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 156.
The
Complaint alleged that Esperanza inherited the subject property from her uncle
Victorino Sorrosa by virtue of a notarized Partition Agreement[8]
dated
The
Complaint further stated that on
In
1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a house on the subject
property. On
As
a consequence thereof, petitioner and her husband were compelled to institute
Civil Case No. 156.
In
their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 156, respondents averred that
they co-owned the subject property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her siblings, Tomas and
Inocencia, inherited the subject property, in equal shares, from their father
Martin Maglunob (Martin I). When Tomas
and Inocencia passed away, their shares passed on by inheritance to respondents
Martin II and Romeo, respectively.
Hence, the subject property was co-owned by Esperanza, respondent Martin
II (together with his wife
Respondents also asserted in their
Counterclaim that petitioner and her husband, by means of fraud, undue
influence and deceit were able to make Esperanza, who was already old and
illiterate, affix her thumbmark to the Affidavit dated
After
trial, the MCTC rendered its Decision dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
A. Declaring the [herein petitioner and her husband] the true, lawful and exclusive owners and entitled to the possession of the [subject property] described and referred to under paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint and covered by Tax Declaration No. 16666 in the names of the [petitioner and her husband];
B. Ordering the [herein respondents] and anyone hired by, acting or working for them, to cease and desist from asserting or claiming any right or interest in, or exercising any act of ownership or possession over the [subject property];
C. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the
[petitioner and her husband] the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fee. With cost against the
[respondents].[13]
The
respondents appealed the aforesaid MCTC Decision to the RTC. Their appeal was docketed as Civil Case No.
5511.
Respondents argued in their appeal
that the MCTC erred in not dismissing the Complaint filed by the petitioner and
her husband for failure to identify the subject property therein. Respondents further faulted the MCTC for not
declaring Esperanza’s Affidavit dated
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) The appealed [D]ecision is REVERSED;
2) [Herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob are declared the lawful owners and possessors of the whole [subject property] as described in Paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint, as against the [herein petitioner and her husband].
3) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to immediately turn over possession of the [subject property] to the [respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob; and
4) [Petitioner and her
husband] are ordered to pay [respondents] attorney’s fees of P5,000.00,
other litigation expenses of P5,000.00, moral damages of P10,000.00
and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.[14]
Petitioner
and her husband filed before the RTC, on 26 September 2000, a Motion for New
Trial or Reconsideration[15]
on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of a Deed of Acceptance[16]
dated 23 September 2000, and notice[17]
of the same, which were both made by the petitioner, for herself and in behalf
of her husband,[18] during
the lifetime of Esperanza. In the RTC
Order[19]
dated
The
petitioner and her husband then filed a Petition for Review, under Rule 42 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, before the Court of Appeals, where
the Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64970.
In their Petition before the
appellate court, petitioner and her husband raised the following errors
committed by the RTC in its
I. It erred in reversing the [D]ecision of the [MCTC];
II. It erred in declaring the [herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob as the lawful owners and possessors of the whole [subject property];
III. It erred in declaring [OCT] No. CLOA-1748 in the name of [herein petitioner] Elvie T. Arangote as null and void;
IV.
It erred in denying [petitioner and her
husband’s] [M]otion for [N]ew [T]rial or [R]econsideration dated [
V. It erred in not declaring the [petitioner and her husband] as possessors in good faith.[20]
On
Hence,
petitioner[21] now
comes before this Court raising in her Petition the following issues:
I. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared the [petitioner and her husband’s title to the subject property] null and void;
II. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it declared the Affidavit of Quitclaim null and void; and
III. Whether the [RTC] and the Honorable Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rejected petitioner’s claim as possessors (sic) in good faith, hence, entitled to the rights provided in [Article] 448 and [Article] 546 of the Civil Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that the
aforesaid OCT No. CLOA-1748 was issued in her name on
Petitioner
additionally posits that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals committed a
mistake in declaring null and void the Affidavit dated
Finally,
petitioner argues that, assuming for the sake of argument, that Esperanza’s
Affidavit is null and void, petitioner and her husband had no knowledge of any
flaw in Esperanza’s title when the latter relinquished her rights to and
interest in the subject property in their favor. Hence, petitioner and her husband can be
considered as possessors in good faith and entitled to the rights provided
under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
This
present Petition is devoid of merit.
It
is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for
strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. It is not a
function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence by the parties all over
again. This Court’s jurisdiction is, in
principle, limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the Court of Appeals.[23] This rule, however, is subject to several exceptions,[24]
one of which is present in this case, i.e.,
when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory.
In
this case, the findings of fact of the MCTC as regards the origin of the
subject property are in conflict with the findings of fact of both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Court
will have to examine the records to determine first the true origin of the
subject property and to settle whether the respondents have the right over the
same for being co-heirs and co-owners, together with their grand aunt,
Esperanza, before this Court can resolve the issues raised by the petitioner in
her Petition.
After a careful scrutiny of the records,
this Court affirms the findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals as
regards the origin of the subject property and the fact that respondents, with
their grand aunt Esperanza, were co-heirs and co-owners of the subject
property.
The records disclosed that the
subject property was part of a parcel of land[25]
situated in Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, consisting of 7,176 square meters and commonly
owned in equal shares by the siblings Pantaleon Maglunob (Pantaleon) and
Placida Maglunob-Sorrosa (Placida). Upon
the death of Pantaleon and Placida, their surviving and legal heirs executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate in July 1981,[26]
however, the Deed was not notarized.
Considering that Pantaleon died without issue, his one-half share in the
parcel of land he co-owned with Placida passed on to his four siblings (or
their respective heirs, if already deceased), namely: Placida, Luis, Martin I,
and Victoria, in equal shares.
According to the aforementioned Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate, the surviving and legal
heirs of Pantaleon and Placida agreed to have the parcel of land commonly owned
by the siblings declared for real property tax purposes in the name of
Victorino Sorrosa (Victorino), Placida’s husband. Thus, Tax Declarations No. 5988 (1942),[27]
No. 6200 (1945)[28] and No.
7233 (1953)[29] were
all issued in the name of Victorino.
Since Martin I already passed away
when the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate was executed,
his heirs[30] were
represented therein by Esperanza. By
virtue of the said Deed, Martin I received as inheritance a portion of the
parcel of land measuring 897 square meters.
After the death of Victorino, his heirs[31]
executed another Partition Agreement on
The [subject property] which is claimed by the [herein petitioner and her husband] and that which is claimed by the [herein respondents] are one and the same, the difference in area and technical description being due to the repartition and re-allocation of the parcel of land originally co-owned by Pantaleon Maglunob and his sister Placida Maglunob and subsequently declared in the name of [Victorino] under Tax Declaration No. 5988 of 1949.[32]
It is clear from the records that the
subject property was not Esperanza’s exclusive share, but also that of the
other heirs of her father, Martin I. Esperanza
expressly affixed her thumbmark to
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of July 1981 not only for herself, but
also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I.
Though in the Partition Agreement dated
Further, it bears emphasis that the
Partition Agreement was executed by and among the son, grandsons,
granddaughters and cousins of Victorino.
Esperanza was neither the granddaughter nor the cousin of Victorino, as
she was only Victorino’s grandniece. The
cousin of Victorino is Martin I, Esperanza’s father. In effect, therefore, the subject property
allotted to Esperanza in the Partition Agreement was not her exclusive share,
as she holds the same for and on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, who was
already deceased at the time the Partition Agreement was made.
To further bolster the truth that the
subject property was not exclusively owned by Esperanza, the Affidavit she
executed in favor of petitioner and her husband on
That I hereby renounce, relinquish, waive and quitclaim all my rights, share, interest and participation whatsoever in the [subject property] unto the said Sps. Ray Mars Arangote and Elvira T. Arangote, their heirs, successors, and assigns including the improvement found thereon;[35]
Logically, if Esperanza fully owned
the subject property, she would have simply waived her rights to and interest
in the subject property, without mentioning her “share” and “participation” in
the same. By including such words in her
Affidavit, Esperanza was aware of and was limiting her waiver, renunciation,
and quitclaim to her one-third share and participation in the subject property.
Going to the issues raised by the
petitioner in this Petition, this Court will resolve the same concurrently as
they are interrelated.
In this case, the petitioner derived
her title to the subject property from the notarized Affidavit executed by
Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished her rights, share, interest and
participation over the same in favor of the petitioner and her husband.
A careful perusal of the said
Affidavit reveals that it is not what it purports to be. Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in fact, a
Donation. Esperanza’s real intent in
executing the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the subject property to
petitioner and her husband.
As no onerous undertaking is required
of petitioner and her husband under the said Affidavit, the donation is
regarded as a pure donation of an interest in a real property covered by
Article 749 of the Civil Code.[36] Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable
may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this
step shall be noted in both instruments.
From the aforesaid provision, there
are three requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real property,
to wit: (1) it must be made in a public instrument; (2) it must be accepted,
which acceptance may be made either in the same Deed of Donation or in a
separate public instrument; and (3) if the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor must be notified in an authentic form, and the same must
be noted in both instruments.
This
Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavit executed
by Esperanza relinquishing her rights, share, interest and participation over
the subject property in favor of the petitioner and her husband suffered from
legal infirmities, as it failed to comply with the aforesaid requisites of the
law.
In Sumipat v. Banga,[37]
this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the
donor to the donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the
donor duly notified thereof. The
acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another.
Where the Deed of Donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the
formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not
given to the donor or else not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is
null and void.[38]
In
the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of
Donation, met the first requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a
public instrument. Nevertheless, it failed
to meet the aforesaid second and third requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not
made by the petitioner and her husband either in the same Affidavit or in a
separate public instrument. As there was no acceptance made of the said donation,
there was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor,
Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of petitioner
and her husband is null and void.
The subsequent notarized Deed of
Acceptance[39] dated
It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any
time during the lifetime of the donor.
And granting arguendo that
such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was
received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of Donation and the separate
instrument embodying the acceptance.[41] At the very least, this last legal requisite
of annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled
by the petitioner. Neither the Affidavit
nor the Deed of Acceptance bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the
acceptance of the donation by petitioner.
For this reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject
property cannot be adjudicated to the petitioner.
With the foregoing, this Court holds
that the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring null and void
Esperanza’s Affidavit.
The next issue to be resolved then is
whether the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, erred in declaring OCT No.
CLOA-1748 in the name of petitioner and her husband null and void.
Again, this Court answers the said
issue in the negative.
Section 48 of Presidential decree No. 1529
states:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Such
proscription has long been enshrined in Philippine jurisprudence. The judicial action required to challenge the
validity of title is a direct attack, not a collateral attack.[42]
The attack is considered direct when
the object of an action is to annul or set aside such proceeding, or enjoin its
enforcement. Conversely, an attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
Such action to attack a
certificate of title may be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a
certificate of title is assailed as void.[43]
A counterclaim is considered a new suit
in which the defendant is the plaintiff and the plaintiff in the complaint
becomes the defendant. It stands on the same footing as, and is to be
tested by the same rules as if it were, an independent action.[44]
In their Answer to the Complaint for Quieting of Title filed by the petitioner and her husband before the MCTC, respondents included therein a Counterclaim wherein they repleaded all the material allegations in their affirmative defenses, the most essential of which was their claim that petitioner and her husband -- by means of fraud, undue influence and deceit -- were able to make their grand aunt, Esperanza, who was already old and illiterate, affix her thumbmark to the Affidavit, wherein she renounced, waived, and quitclaimed all her rights and interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband. In addition, respondents maintained in their Answer that as petitioner and her husband were not tenants either of Esperanza or of the respondents, the DAR could not have validly issued in favor of petitioner and her husband OCT No. CLOA-1748. Thus, the respondents prayed, in their counterclaim in Civil Case No. 156 before the MCTC, that OCT No. CLOA-1748 issued in the name of petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote, be declared null and void, insofar as their two-thirds shares in the subject property are concerned.
It is clear, thus, that respondents’
Answer with Counterclaim was a direct attack on petitioner’s certificate of
title. Furthermore, since all the
essential facts of the case for the determination of the validity of the title
are now before this Court, to require respondents to institute a separate
cancellation proceeding would be pointlessly circuitous and against the best
interest of justice.
Esperanza’s Affidavit, which was the
sole basis of petitioner’s claim to the subject property, has been declared
null and void. Moreover, petitioner and
her husband were not tenants of the subject property. In fact, petitioner herself admitted in her
Complaint filed before the MCTC that her husband is out of the country,
rendering it impossible for him to work on the subject property as a
tenant. Instead of cultivating the
subject property, petitioner and her husband possessed the same by constructing
a house thereon. Thus, it is highly
suspicious how the petitioner was able to secure from the DAR a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) over the subject property. The DAR awards such certificates to the
grantees only if they fulfill the requirements of Republic Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).[45] Hence, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did
not err in declaring null and void OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of the
petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote.
Considering that Esperanza died
without any compulsory heirs and that the supposed donation of her one-third
share in the subject property per her Affidavit dated 9 June 1985 was already
declared null and void, Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property passed
on to her legal heirs, the respondents.
As
petitioner’s last-ditch effort, she claims that she is a possessor in good
faith and, thus, entitled to the rights provided for under Articles 448 and 546
of the Civil Code.
This claim is untenable.
The
Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
Possession
in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor by extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of the property by
the true owner. Every possessor in good
faith becomes a possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that
what he believed to be true is not so.[46]
In the present case, when respondents came to know that an
OCT over the subject property was issued and registered in petitioner’s name on
26 March 1993, respondents brought a Complaint on 7 August 1993 before the Lupon of Barangay Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, challenging the title of petitioner
to the subject property on the basis that said property constitutes the inheritance
of respondent, together with their grandaunt Esperanza, so Esperanza had no
authority to relinquish the entire subject property to petitioner. From that moment, the good faith of the
petitioner had ceased.
Petitioner cannot be entitled to the rights
under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, because the rights mentioned
therein are applicable only to builders in good faith and not to possessors in
good faith.
Moreover, the petitioner cannot be
considered a builder in good faith of the house on the subject property. In the context that such term is used in
particular reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not being the owner of the land,
builds on that land, believing himself to be its owner and unaware of any
defect in his title or mode of acquisition.[47]
The various provisions of the Civil
Code, pertinent to the subject, read:
Article
448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted
in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing
or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Under the foregoing provisions, the
builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the
builder to pay the price of the land.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with
the principle of accession, i.e.,
that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.
He must choose one. He cannot,
for instance, compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the
land. In order, however, that the
builder can invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to
demand that a choice be made by the landowner, he should be able to prove good
faith on his part.[48]
Good faith, here understood, is an
intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage. An
individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore,
may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry. The essence of good faith lies
in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior
claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in
good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.[49]
In this case, the subject property waived and quitclaimed by Esperanza to the petitioner and her husband in the Affidavit was only covered by a tax declaration in the name of Esperanza. Petitioner did not even bother to look into the origin of the subject property and to probe into the right of Esperanza to relinquish the same. Thus, when petitioner and her husband built a house thereon in 1989 they cannot be considered to have acted in good faith as they were fully aware that when Esperanza executed an Affidavit relinquishing in their favor the subject property the only proof of Esperanza’s ownership over the same was a mere tax declaration. This fact or circumstance alone was enough to put the petitioner and her husband under inquiry. Settled is the rule that a tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership; it is, at best, an indicium of possession in the concept of ownership. Neither tax receipts nor a declaration of ownership for taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of a right to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.[50]
With the foregoing, the petitioner is
not entitled to the rights under Article 448 and 546 as the petitioner is not a
builder and possessor in good faith.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64970, dated
SO ORDERED.
|
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Per Special Order No. 564, dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring; rollo, pp. 20-31.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Agustin S. Dizon, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-41.
[3] Penned by Judge Marietta J. Homena-Valencia; rollo, pp. 96-105.
[4] Penned by Designated Judge Raul C. Barrios; CA rollo, pp. 29-34.
[5] In its Decision dated
[6] Rollo, p. 56.
[7]
[8] CA rollo, pp. 144-146.
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 54-55.
[11]
[12] CA rollo, p. 135.
[13]
[14] Rollo, pp. 104-105.
[15] CA rollo, pp. 15-23.
[16] In the RTC Decision dated
[17] CA rollo, pp. 25-26.
[18] The Deed of Acceptance was signed only by the petitioner. In the said Deed of Acceptance, however, petitioner accepted the donation not only for herself but also in behalf of her husband.
[19] CA rollo, p. 28.
[20]
[21] On 21 April 1994, Ray Mars E. Arangote, herein petitioner Elvira T. Arangote’s husband, executed a Special Power of Attorney in her favor to represent him in any proceedings involving the subject property. The case before the lower courts, however, was still entitled Sps. Ray Mars E. Arangote and Elvira T. Arangote v. Sps. Martin Maglunob and Lourdes S. Maglunob and Romeo Salido. But, when the case was elevated to this Court, it was only Elvira T. Arangote who stood as petitioner.
[22] In petitioner’s Memorandum she stated almost the same issues she had mentioned in her Petition before the Court of Appeals. (Rollo, p. 14.)
[23] Local Superior of the Servants of Charity (Guanellians), Inc. v. Jody King Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 141715, 12 October 2005, 472 SCRA 445, 451.
[24] Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the finding of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 400 Phil. 1349, 1356-1357 [2000]; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, 390 Phil. 1228, 1243 [2000]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries [Phils.], Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 [1999]; Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 [1998]; Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.)
[25] It consists of 7,176 square meters.
[26] CA rollo, pp. 161-164.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] The heirs of Martin I other than the respondents are the other great-grandchildren of Martin I, namely: Jerry, Benita, Feliciano, Andrew, Abdon, Gilbert, Enrique, Tomas, Donato, Felicidad, and Prescila, all surnamed Maglunob.
[31] His cousins, son, granddaughters, and grandsons.
[32] Rollo, p. 103.
[33] CA rollo, p. 147.
[34] It consists of 7,176 square meters.
[35] CA rollo, p. 53.
[36] Supra note 25.
[37] G.R. No. 155810,
[38] J.L.T.
Agro, Inc. v. Balansag, G.R. No. 141882,
[39] CA rollo, p. 24.
[40]
[41] Lagazo v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 449, 462 (1998).
[42] Natalia
Realty Corporation v. Vallez, G.R. Nos. 78290-94, 23 May 1989, 173 SCRA
534, 542; Cimafranca v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-68687,
[43] Leyson.
v. Bontuyan, G.R. No. 156357,
[44] Supra note 34.
[45] The basic requirements under Republic Act No. 6657 in order that the Certificate of Land Ownership may be awarded to the applicant are: (1) he/she must be a qualified beneficiary, i.e., he/she she must be an agricultural lessee and share tenant, regular farmworker, seasonal farmworkers, or any other farmworker, actual tiller or occupant of a public land, collective or cooperative of the above beneficiary, or any other person directly working on the land; and (2) he/she must have willingness, attitude, and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible (Section 22, Republic Act No. 6657).
[46] Ballesteros
v. Abion, G.R. No. 143361,
[47] Philippine National Bank v. De Jesus, 458 Phil. 454, 459 (2003).
[48] Leyson. v. Bontuyan, supra note 43 at 113.
[49]
[50] De
Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103,