THIRD DIVISION
|
MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ MRS.
VIOLETA T. CARIÑO, Petitioners, - versus - ADELAIDA P. MANALO, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 178835
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: February 13,
2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated January
31, 2007 and of the Resolution dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 93917 entitled Magis
Young Achievers’ Learning Center and Violeta T. Cariño v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 3rd Division, Quezon City, and Adelaida P.
Manalo.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On April 18, 2002, respondent
Adelaida P. Manalo was hired as a teacher and acting principal of petitioner
Magis Young Achievers’ Learning Center with a monthly salary of P15,000.00.
It appears on record that respondent,
on March 29, 2003, wrote a letter of resignation addressed to Violeta T. Cariño,
directress of petitioner, which reads:
Dear Madame:
I am tendering my irrevocable resignation
effective April 1, 2003 due to personal and family reasons.
I would like to express my thanks and
gratitude for the opportunity, trust and confidence given to me as an Acting
Principal in your prestigious school.
God bless and more power to you.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed)
Mrs. ADELAIDA P. MANALO[1]
On
March 31, 2003, respondent received a letter of termination from petitioner, viz.:
Dear Mrs. Manalo:
Greetings of Peace!
The Board of Trustees of the Cariño Group of
Companies, particularly that of Magis Young Achievers’
As agreed upon by the Board of Directors, the
position of PRINCIPAL will be abolished next school year. Therefore, we regret to inform you that we
can no longer renew your contract, which will expire on March 31, 2003. Thus, thank you for the input you have given
to Magis during your term of office as Acting Principal. The function of the said position shall be
delegated to other staff members in the organization.
Hoping for your understanding on this matter
and we pray for your future endeavors.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
Mrs. Violeta T. Cariño
School Directress
Noted by:
(Signed)
Mr. Severo Cariño
President[2]
On
April 4, 2003, respondent instituted against petitioner a Complaint[3]
for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay, with a
prayer for reinstatement, award of full backwages and moral and exemplary
damages.
In
her position paper,[4] respondent
claimed that her termination violated the provisions of her employment contract,
and that the alleged abolition of the position of Principal was not among the
grounds for termination by an employer under Article 282[5] of
the Labor Code. She further asserted
that petitioner infringed Article 283[6] of
the Labor Code, as the required 30-day notice to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and to her as the employee, and the payment of her separation
pay were not complied with. She also
claimed that she was terminated from service for the alleged expiration of her
employment, but that her contract did not provide for a fixed term or
period. She likewise prayed for the
payment of her 13th month pay under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
851.
Petitioner,
in its position paper,[7]
countered that respondent was legally terminated because the one-year
probationary period, from April 1, 2002 to March 3, 2003, had already lapsed
and she failed to meet the criteria set by the school pursuant to the Manual of
Regulation for Private Schools, adopted by the then Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), paragraph 75 of which provides that:
(75) Full-time teachers who have rendered three years
of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent.
On
December 3, 2003, Labor Arbiter (LA) Renell Joseph R. dela Cruz rendered a
Decision[8]
dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal, including the other claims of
respondent, for lack of merit, except that it ordered the payment of her 13th
month pay in the amount of P3,750.00.
The LA ratiocinated in this wise:
It
is our considered opinion [that] complainant was not dismissed, much less,
illegally. On the contrary, she
resigned. It is hard for us to imagine
complainant would accede to sign a resignation letter as a precondition to her
hiring considering her educational background.
Thus, in the absence of any circumstance tending to show she was probably
coerced her resignation must be upheld.
x x x
x
x x The agreement (Annex “1” to Respondent’s
[petitioner’s] Position Paper; Annex “A” to Complainant’s Position
Paper) by its very nature and terms is a contract of employment with a period
(from 01 April 2002 to 31 March 2003, Annex ‘1’ to Respondent’s Position
Paper). Complainant’s observation that
the space reserved for the duration and effectivity of the contract was left
blank (Annex ‘A’ to Complainant’s [respondent’s] Position Paper) to our mind is
plain oversight. Read in its entirety,
it is a standard contract which by its very terms and conditions speaks of a
definite period of employment. The
parties could have not thought otherwise.
The notification requirement in the contract in case of “termination
before the expiration of the period” confirms it. x x x
On appeal, on October 28, 2005, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Third Division,[9] in
its Decision[10] dated October
28, 2005, reversed the Arbiter’s judgment.
Petitioner was ordered to reinstate respondent as a teacher, who shall
be credited with one-year service of probationary employment, and to pay her
the amounts of P3,750.00 and P325,000.00 representing her 13th
month pay and backwages, respectively.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the NLRC’s
Resolution[11] dated
January 31, 2006.
Imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, petitioner went up to the CA
via a petition for certiorari. The CA, in its Decision dated January 31,
2007, affirmed the NLRC decision and dismissed the petition. It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in the Resolution dated June 29, 2007. Hence, this petition anchored on the
following grounds—
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED
THAT THE RESIGNATION OF RESPONDENT MANALO DID NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE DUE TO
ALLEGED LACK OF ACCEPTANCE;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT RESPONDENT MANALO IS A PERMANENT EMPLOYEE;
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT DID NOT STIPULATE A PERIOD.[12]
Before
going to the core issues of the controversy, we would like to restate basic
legal principles governing employment of secondary school teachers in private
schools, specifically, on the matter of probationary employment.
A
probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer,
during which the latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent
employment. The probationary employment
is intended to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a
probationary employee while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become an
efficient and productive employee. While
the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to
ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer, on
the other hand, seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications
to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. Thus, the word probationary, as used to describe the
period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, not its
length.[13]
Indeed,
the employer has the right, or is at liberty, to choose who will be hired and
who will be declined. As a component of
this right to select his employees, the employer may set or fix a probationary
period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct of the former
before hiring him permanently.[14]
But the law regulates the exercise of
this prerogative to fix the period of probationary employment. While there is no statutory cap on the
minimum term of probation, the law sets a maximum “trial period” during which
the employer may test the fitness and efficiency of the employee.
The general rule on the maximum
allowable period of probationary employment is found in Article 281 of the
Labor Code, which states:
Art. 281. Probationary Employment. – Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
This upper limit on the term of
probationary employment, however, does not apply to all classes of occupations.
For “academic personnel” in private
schools, colleges and universities, probationary employment is governed by
Section 92 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools[15]
(Manual), which reads:
Section 92. Probationary Period. – Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis.[16]
This was supplemented by
DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. 1 dated February 7, 1996, which provides that
the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3)
consecutive school years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary
and secondary levels.[17] By this supplement, it is made clear that
the period of probation for academic personnel shall be counted in terms of
“school years,” and not “calendar years.”[18] Then, Section 4.m(4)[c] of the Manual
delineates the coverage of Section 92, by defining the term “academic
personnel” to include:
(A)ll school personnel who are formally engaged in actual teaching service or in research assignments, either on full-time or part-time basis; as well as those who possess certain prescribed academic functions directly supportive of teaching, such as registrars, librarians, guidance counselors, researchers, and other similar persons. They include school officials responsible for academic matters, and may include other school officials.[19]
The reason for this disparate
treatment was explained many years ago in Escudero
v. Office of the President of the Philippines,[20] where the Court declared:
However, the six-month probationary period prescribed by the Secretary of Labor is merely the general rule. x x x
It is, thus, clear that the Labor Code authorizes different probationary periods, according to the requirements of the particular job. For private school teachers, the period of probation is governed by the 1970 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools x x x.[21]
The probationary period of three
years for private school teachers was, in fact, confirmed earlier in Labajo v. Alejandro,[22] viz.:
The three (3)-year period of service mentioned in paragraph 75 (of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools) is of course the maximum period or upper limit, so to speak, of probationary employment allowed in the case of private school teachers. This necessarily implies that a regular or permanent employment status may, under certain conditions, be attained in less than three (3) years. By and large, however, whether or not one has indeed attained permanent status in one’s employment, before the passage of three (3) years, is a matter of proof.
Over the years, even with the
enactment of a new Labor Code and the revision of the Manual, the rule has not
changed.
Thus,
for academic personnel in private elementary and secondary schools, it is only
after one has satisfactorily completed the probationary period of three (3)
school years and is rehired that he acquires full tenure as a regular or
permanent employee. In this regard,
Section 93 of the Manual pertinently provides:
Sec. 93. Regular or Permanent Status. - Those who have served the probationary period shall be made regular or permanent. Full-time teachers who have satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent.
Accordingly, as held in Escudero, no vested right to a permanent
appointment shall accrue until the employee has completed the prerequisite
three-year period necessary for the acquisition of a permanent status. Of course, the mere rendition of service for
three consecutive years does not automatically ripen into a permanent
appointment. It is also necessary that
the employee be a full-time teacher, and that the services he rendered are
satisfactory.[23]
The
common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a contract,
effective for one school year. At the
end of the school year, the employer has the option not to renew the contract,
particularly considering the teacher’s performance. If the contract is not renewed, the
employment relationship terminates. If
the contract is renewed, usually for another school year, the probationary
employment continues. Again, at the end
of that period, the parties may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. If renewed, this second renewal of the
contract for another school year would then be the last year – since it would
be the third school year – of probationary employment. At the end of this third year, the employer
may now decide whether to extend a permanent appointment to the employee,
primarily on the basis of the employee having met the reasonable standards of
competence and efficiency set by the employer.
For the entire duration of this three-year period, the teacher remains
under probation. Upon the expiration of
his contract of employment, being simply on probation, he cannot automatically
claim security of tenure and compel the employer to renew his employment
contract.[24] It is when the yearly contract is renewed for
the third time that Section 93 of the Manual becomes operative, and the teacher
then is entitled to regular or permanent employment status.
It is important that the contract of
probationary employment specify the period or term of its effectivity. The
failure to stipulate its precise duration could lead to the inference that the
contract is binding for the full three-year probationary period.[25]
All
this does not mean that academic personnel cannot acquire permanent employment
status earlier than after the lapse of three years. The period of probation may be reduced if the
employer, convinced of the fitness and efficiency of a probationary employee,
voluntarily extends a permanent appointment even before the three-year period
ends. Conversely, if the purpose sought by the employer is neither attained nor
attainable within the said period, the law does not preclude the employer from
terminating the probationary employment on justifiable ground;[26] or,
a shorter probationary period may be incorporated in a collective bargaining
agreement.[27] But absent any circumstances which
unmistakably show that an abbreviated probationary period has been agreed upon,
the three-year probationary term governs.
Be
that as it may, teachers on probationary employment enjoy security of
tenure. In Biboso v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc.,[28] we made the following
pronouncement:
This is, by no means, to assert that the security of tenure protection of the Constitution does not apply to probationary employees. x x x During such period, they could remain in their positions and any circumvention of their rights, in accordance with the statutory scheme, is subject to inquiry and thereafter correction by the Department of Labor.
The ruling in Biboso simply signifies that probationary employees enjoy security of tenure during the term of their probationary employment. As such, they cannot be removed except for cause as provided by law, or if at the end of every yearly contract during the three-year period, the employee does not meet the reasonable standards set by the employer at the time of engagement. But this guarantee of security of tenure applies only during the period of probation. Once that period expires, the constitutional protection can no longer be invoked.[29]
All these principles notwithstanding, we do not discount the
validity of fixed-term employment where –
the fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.[30]
It does not necessarily follow that
where the duties of the employees consist of activities usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are forbidden from
agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities.[31] Thus, in
Now,
to the issues in the case at bench.
There
should be no question that the employment of the respondent, as teacher, in
petitioner school on April 18, 2002 is probationary in character, consistent
with standard practice in private schools.
In light of our disquisition above, we cannot subscribe to the
proposition that the respondent has acquired regular or permanent tenure as
teacher. She had rendered service as
such only from April 18, 2002 until March 31, 2003. She has not completed the requisite
three-year period of probationary employment, as provided in the Manual. She cannot, by right, claim permanent
status.
There
should also be no doubt that respondent’s appointment as Acting Principal is
merely temporary, or one that is good until another appointment is made to take
its place.[33] An “acting” appointment is essentially a
temporary appointment, revocable at will.
The undisturbed unanimity of cases shows that one who holds a temporary
appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated any
time at the pleasure of the appointing power without need to show that it is
for cause.[34] Further, in La Salette of Santiago v. NLRC,[35] we acknowledged the customary
arrangement in private schools to rotate administrative positions, e.g., Dean or Principal, among
employees, without the employee so appointed attaining security of tenure with
respect to these positions.
We
are also inclined to agree with the CA that the resignation of the respondent[36]
is not valid, not only because there was no express acceptance thereof by the
employer, but because there is a cloud of doubt as to the voluntariness of
respondent’s resignation.
Resignation
is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he
believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of
the service, and that he has no other choice but to dissociate himself from
employment.[37] Voluntary resignation is made with the
intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.[38] It is the acceptance of an employee’s
resignation that renders it operative.[39]
Furthermore,
well-entrenched is the rule that resignation is inconsistent with the
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.[40]
To be valid, the resignation must be unconditional, with the intent to operate as such;
there must be a clear intention to relinquish the position.[41] In this case, respondent actively pursued her illegal
dismissal case against petitioner, such that she cannot be said to have
voluntarily resigned from her job.
What
is truly contentious is whether the probationary appointment of the respondent
on April 18, 2002 was for a fixed period of one (1) year, or without a fixed
term, inasmuch as the parties presented different versions of the employment
agreement. As articulated by the CA:
In plain language, We are confronted with two (2) copies of an agreement, one with a negative period and one provided for a one (1) year period for its effectivity. Ironically, none among the parties offered corroborative evidence as to which of the two (2) discrepancies is the correct one that must be given effect. x x x.[42]
The CA resolved the impassé in
this wise:
Under this circumstance, We can only apply Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that, in case of doubt, all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the laborer. Then, too, settled is the rule that any ambiguity in a contract whose terms are susceptible of different interpretations must be read against the party who drafted it. In the case at bar, the drafter of the contract is herein petitioners and must, therefore, be read against their contention.[43]
We
agree with the CA.
In this case, there truly existed a
doubt as to which version of the employment agreement should be given
weight. In respondent’s copy, the period
of effectivity of the agreement remained blank.
On the other hand, petitioner’s copy provided for a one-year period,
surprisingly from April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003, even though the pleadings
submitted by both parties indicated that respondent was hired on April 18,
2002. What is noticeable even more is that the handwriting indicating the
one-year period in petitioner’s copy is different from the handwriting that
filled up the other needed information in the same agreement.[44]
Thus, following Article 1702 of the
Civil Code that all doubts regarding labor contracts should be construed in
favor of labor, then it should be respondent’s copy which did not provide for
an express period which should be upheld, especially when there are
circumstances that render the version of petitioner suspect. This is in line
with the State policy of affording protection to labor, such that the lowly
laborer, who is usually at the mercy of the employer, must look up to the law
to place him on equal footing with his employer.[45]
In addition, the employment agreement
may be likened into a contract of adhesion considering that it is petitioner
who insists that there existed an express period of one year from April 1, 2002
to March 31, 2003, using as proof its own copy of the agreement. While contracts of adhesion are valid and
binding, in cases of doubt which will cause a great imbalance of rights against
one of the parties, the contract shall be construed against the party who
drafted the same. Hence, in this case,
where the very employment of respondent is at stake, the doubt as to the period
of employment must be construed in her favor.
The
other issue to resolve is whether respondent, even as a probationary employee,
was illegally dismissed. We rule in the
affirmative.
As
above discussed, probationary employees enjoy security of tenure during the
term of their probationary employment such that they may only be terminated for
cause as provided for by law, or if at the end of the probationary period, the
employee failed to meet the reasonable standards set by the employer at the
time of the employee’s engagement.
Undeniably, respondent was hired as a probationary teacher and, as such,
it was incumbent upon petitioner to show by competent evidence that she did not
meet the standards set by the school.
This requirement, petitioner failed to discharge. To note, the termination of respondent was
effected by that letter stating that she was being relieved from employment
because the school authorities allegedly decided, as a cost-cutting measure,
that the position of “Principal” was to be abolished. Nowhere in that letter was respondent
informed that her performance as a school teacher was less than satisfactory.
Thus,
in light of our ruling of Espiritu Santo
Parochial School v. NLRC[46]
that, in the absence of an express period of probation for private school
teachers, the three-year probationary period provided by the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools must apply likewise to the case of
respondent. In other words, absent any
concrete and competent proof that her performance as a teacher was
unsatisfactory from her hiring on April 18, 2002 up to March 31, 2003,
respondent is entitled to continue her three-year period of probationary
period, such that from March 31, 2003, her probationary employment is deemed
renewed for the following two school years.[47]
Finally,
we rule on the propriety of the monetary awards. Petitioner, as employer, is entitled to
decide whether to extend respondent a permanent status by renewing her contract
beyond the three-year period. Given the
acrimony between the parties which must have been generated by this
controversy, it can be said unequivocally that petitioner had opted not to
extend respondent’s employment beyond this period. Therefore, the award of backwages as a
consequence of the finding of illegal dismissal in favor of respondent should
be confined to the three-year probationary period. Computing her monthly salary of P15,000.00
for the next two school years (P15,000.00 x 10 months x 2), respondent
already having received her full salaries for the year 2002-2003, she is
entitled to a total amount of P300,000.00.[48] Moreover, respondent is also entitled to
receive her 13th month pay correspondent to the said two school
years, computed as yearly salary, divided by 12 months in a year, multiplied by
2, corresponding to the school years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, or P150,000.00
/ 12 months x 2 = P25,000.00.
Thus, the NLRC was correct in awarding respondent the amount of P325,000.00
as backwages, inclusive of 13th month pay for the school years
2003-2004 and 2004-2005, and the amount of P3,750.00 as pro-rated 13th
month pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated January 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated
June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 85.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Art. 282. Termination by Employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[6] Art. 283. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. - The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry (Department) of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
[7] Rollo, pp. 77-82.
[8]
[9] Penned by Presiding Commissioner
[10] Rollo, pp. 53-60.
[11]
[12]
[13] International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC, G.R. No. 72222, January 30, 1989, 169 SCRA 606.
[14] Grand Motor Parts Corporation v. Minister of Labor, et al., 215 Phil. 383 (1984).
[15] Pursuant to Sec. 2, B.P. 232, the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools applies to formal and non-formal education in the private sector at all levels of the educational system. This is not to be confused with the Manual of Policies and Guidelines on the Establishment and Operation of Public and Private Technical-Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Institutions, which governs tech-voc education.
[16] Technically, private tertiary education may be removed from the coverage of this Manual, since authority over higher education has been transferred from the Department of Education to the Commission on Higher Education by R.A. 7222, or the “Higher Education Act of 1994”.
[17] DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. 1, s. 1996, Sec. 2.
[18] With this change, our ruling in Colegio San Agustin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 87333, September 6, 1991, 201 SCRA 398, no longer applies.
[19] Emphasis supplied.
[20] G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 783.
[21] Emphasis supplied.
[22] G.R. No. L-80383, September 26, 1988, 165 SCRA 747.
[23] Sec.
93, Manual; St. Theresa’s School of
Novaliches Foundation v. NLRC, 351 Phil. 1038, 1043 (1998); Cagayan Capitol College v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 90010-11, September 14,
1990, 189 SCRA 658.
[24] Lacuesta v. Ateneo de Manila University, G.R. No. 152777, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 217.
[25]
[26] Lacuesta v. Ateneo de Manila, supra note 24, cited in Woodridge School
v. Pe Benito, G.R. No. 160240, October 29, 2008.
[27] See Escorpizo
v.
[28] 166 Phil. 717 (1977).
[29] See
Escudero v. Office of the President, supra note 20, at 793.
[30] Brent School, Inc. v.
[31] St. Theresa’s
[32]
[33] Castro v. Solidum, 97 Phil. 278 (1955).
[34] Aklan College, Inc. v. Guarino, G.R. No.
152949, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 40, 49.
[35] G.R.
No. 82918, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 80.
[36] Rollo, p. 85.
[37] Globe Telecom v. Crisologo, G.R. No.
174644, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 811, 819.
[38] Vicente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
175988, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 240, 249.
[39] BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. v. Aparecio, G.R.
No. 153290, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 300.
[40] Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 153750, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 100, 110.
[41] Blue Angel Manpower and Security Services v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161196, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 157.
[42] Rollo, p. 47.
[43]
[44]
[45] Labor Code, Art. 3. Declaration of Basic Policy. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
[46] Supra note 25.
[47] DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. 1, s. 1996, Sec. 2, supra.
[48]