THIRD
DIVISION
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ELISEO R. FRANCISCO, JR., Petitioner, - versus
- PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 177720 Present: QUISUMBING, J.,* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES,** and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: February 18, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Court of Appeals’ Decision[1]
dated
The facts
of the case are as follows:
In an
Amended Information dated
On
arraignment, petitioner Francisco pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The
prosecution’s evidence tends to establish the following facts:
Private
complainant Bankard, Inc. is a credit card company engaged in issuing credit
cards and in acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments
arising from the purchase of goods and services by credit card holders using
Mastercard or Visa credit cards issued by other banks and credit card
companies. Mastercard or Visa pays
Bankard for the amount Bankard has paid the commercial establishments for the
invoices it acquires. On the other hand,
Mastercard or Visa debits Bankard for the amount due to other credit card
companies or banks which acquire the invoices where the credit card used for
the purchase is issued by Bankard.
Petitioner
Francisco was an employee of Bankard at the time the alleged crime occurred. He was knowledgeable in computer programming,
and held the position of Acquiring Chargeback Supervisor.
Bankard
engaged the services of Equitable Computer Services, Inc. (Equicom) to encode
and post credit card transactions and submit reports on those services. Procedurally, Bankard transmits to Equicom
the invoices, instructions for debiting, credit advances and other documents relevant
to encoding and posting. Equicom then transmits through electronic mail
the reports on the transactions to Bankard.
Petitioner Francisco was tasked to convert the Equicom reports sent
through electronic mail from its original ARJ Text Format to the Amipro Format
used by Bankard. Petitioner Francisco
was the only one assigned to perform this task.
Sometime in
August 1999, Solidbank, one of the companies which issues credit cards, relayed
to Bankard that there were four questionable transactions reflected in
Solidbank Mastercard Account No. 5464 9833 0005 1922 under the name of
petitioner Francisco. An amount of P663,144.56
was allegedly credited to said account of petitioner Francisco, the credit
apparently being a reversal of charges from four establishments. The amount of P18,430.21 was also
credited to petitioner Francisco’s AIG Visa Card based on another supposed
credit advance.
Bankard
conducted an investigation. Upon
comparison of the original reports of Equicom with those converted by petitioner
Francisco, it was found that based on Equicom’s original Daily Transaction
Prooflist, there was a reversal of charges from Bankard Travel Services in the
amount of $5,989.60 which was credited to the credit card under the name of
petitioner Francisco, with a conversion date of 10 August 1999. The Outgoing Interchange Transaction also
reflected a reversal of a transaction with Bankard Travel and the credit of the
amount of $5,989.60 to Cardholder No. 5464 9833 0005 1922 on
There was
also no record of the transactions or purchases from the four establishments
charged against petitioner Francisco’s Mastercard Account No. 5464 9833 0005
1922 and AIG Visa Account No. 4009 9218 0463 3006 that may be reversed. Only those availments which have been charged
against the credit cards could be reversed, and the amount charged for such
availments would then be returned and credited to the same credit card. Since there were no original purchase
transactions charged against petitioner Francisco’s credit cards, the reversal
of charges and the crediting of sums of money to petitioner Francisco’s credit
cards appeared to be fictitious.
Petitioner
Francisco was the person who received the transmittals from Equicom of
documents including any purported cash advice at the time the credit
transactions were made in favor of his credit card accounts.
As a result
of the fraudulent crediting of the amount of P663,144.56 to petitioner
Francisco’s Solidbank credit card account, Bankard was made to pay the same to
Solidbank in the course of the settlement of transactions between the issuing
banks from the time of the crediting of the amount to petitioner Francisco’s
credit card account until the fraudulent credits were charged back to Solidbank
on 27 August 1999. Solidbank again
charged back Bankard for the said amount, from P18,430.21 which petitioner Francisco
fraudulently credited to his AIG Visa Card No. 4009 9218 0463 3006.
The defense
presented petitioner Francisco as its lone witness. Petitioner Francisco denied that he caused
the crediting of said amounts to his credit cards.
On
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, considering that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt that accused ELISEO FRANCISCO is GUILTY of the crime charged, the Court
hereby sentences said accused of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Accordingly, accused is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years 4 months of
arresto mayor as minimum to 6 years 2 months and 11 days of prision mayor as
maximum and ordered to reimburse private complainant Bankard, Inc., of the
amount of PhP18,430.21.[3]
Petitioner
Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial, praying for the re-opening
of the case in order that he may present the credit card statements and demand
letters. Petitioner Francisco contended
that Bankard’s line of business affected by the instant case was that of
acquiring credit card receivables.
According to petitioner Francisco, this meant that he, like any other
credit card holder, remained indebted to the issuers of the credit card, which were
Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa. He
should, therefore, be acquitted since private complainant Bankard was not the entity
that incurred damage, but Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa. In an Order dated
Petitioner
Francisco proceeded to the Court of Appeals.
On
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated
January 10, 2005 is affirmed, subject to the modification of the imprisonment sentence
which should be an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as the
minimum period, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum period.[4]
According
to the Court of Appeals, the total amount defrauded, P681,574.77, gave
rise to a minimum penalty under prision
correccional and a maximum penalty of twenty years, pursuant to Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 315. Swindling
(estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Petitioner
Francisco now comes before this Court, bringing forth the issue for our
consideration:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER AND DECISION
OF THE
The element
of estafa referred to by petitioner
Francisco is the third one under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code in
the following list provided by this Court in several cases:
(1) the accused uses a fictitious name, or
falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits;
(2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud;
(3) the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
(4) as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.[6] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner
Francisco argues that the prosecution failed to present evidence that he was
privy to the business deal between Bankard and the credit card companies
(Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa). Petitioner
Francisco seems to be implying that since he was not privy to the business deal
between Bankard and the credit card companies, he could not have induced
Bankard to part with its money or property because of any false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means committed by him, directed to the credit
card companies.
We
disagree.
The third
element of estafa under Article
315(a) merely requires that the offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
It does not require that the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party. Thus, in this case wherein a person pretended
to possess credit in order to defraud third persons (Solidbank Mastercard and
AIG Visa), but the offended party nevertheless relied on such fraudulent means
and consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof, such person is liable for estafa under Article 315(a), even though
the fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the offended party. A person committing a felony is criminally
liable although the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him.[7]
In any
case, the prosecution has successfully proven damage on the part of private
complainant Bankard. As held by the
Court of Appeals:
As a result of the fictitious credits
which the accused caused to be posted in his credit cards, private complainant
[Bankard] suffered damages when it was made to pay Solidbank the fictitious
credit in the course of the settlement of transactions between the issuing
banks from the time of the crediting of the said amount to the credit card of
the accused until the fraudulent credits where charged back to Solidbank on 27
August 1999. Solidbank again charged
back private complainant for the said amount from
Petitioner
Francisco further argues that Bankard had no personality to file the complaint,
since the credit card companies were the ones which really suffered damage in
the case at bar. Thus, argued petitioner
Francisco, the third element of estafa
under Article 315(a) was lacking:
Stated otherwise, this element speaks of
an offended party which undoubtedly may only refer to Solidbank Mastercard and
AIG Visa simply because it was these two credit card companies that extended
credit facilities to herein petitioner when the latter used his credit cards.
Despite this factual setup however, not
even one of these credit card companies appeared as private complainant in the
instant case. BANKARD Inc., the former employer of herein petitioner is the one
who lodged the criminal complaint after the latter filed an illegal dismissal
case against it before the National Labor Relations Commission. Worse, the assailed Decision of the Honorable
Court of Appeals even awarded civil liabilities in favor of BANKARD Inc.
corresponding to the accumulated credit balances of petitioner with Mastercard
and Visa, when in truth and in fact, Mastercard and Visa continues even up to
the present to exert collection effort against petitioner by sending him
corresponding demand letters.[9]
Firstly, as
discussed above, it was duly proven that Bankard also suffered damages by
reason of fraudulent acts committed by petitioner Francisco.
Secondly, even
assuming for the sake of argument that Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa were
the proper offended parties in this case, petitioner Francisco is mistaken in his
assertion that it was essential for either Solidbank Mastercard or AIG Visa to
have filed the complaint for estafa.
Except in
cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness,[10]
a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for the institution of
a criminal action. The Information filed
by the prosecutor with the proper court is sufficient.
A crime is
an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People
of the
The Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the penalty to
be imposed on petitioner Francisco. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty for estafa
is “(t)he penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.”
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of
the indeterminate penalty should be one degree lower than prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period, the period prescribed in the Revised Penal Code. One degree lower than the above penalty would
be prision correccional in
its minimum period to prision
correccional in its medium period, the inclusive imprisonment duration
for which is 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. The minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence imposed by the Court of Appeals, which is 4 years and 2 months, is
within the above-stated period.
The maximum term of the indeterminate penalty, according to
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is “that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Rules of the said
Code.” As held by the Court of
Appeals, the total amount defrauded is P681,574.77. This exceeds the threshold amount of P22,000
by P659,547.77. There are, thus, 65 additional P10,000.00s. This would have resulted in an additional 65
years, if not for the maximum imposable penalty of twenty years. The Court of Appeals, therefore, properly
pegged the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at twenty years.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Per Special Order No. 564, dated
** Associate
Justices Renato C. Corona and Conchita Carpio Morales were designated to sit as
additional members replacing Associate Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura and
Diosdado M. Peralta per Raffle dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Normandie B. Pizzarro, concurring; rollo, pp. 35-52.
[2] Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
[3] Rollo, p. 65.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
[8] Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[9] Rollo, pp. 162-163.
[10] Section 4, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
[11] Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
[12] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium (10th Ed., p. 274); Hernandez v.