PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, -
versus - SAMUEL ALGARME y BONDA @ “Stingray” (deceased) and RIZALDY GELLE y BISCOCHO, Accused-Appellants. |
G.R. No. 175978
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, carpio MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ Promulgated: February 12, 2009 |
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D E C
I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We review in this appeal the
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the
appellants before the RTC with the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide under an Information that states:
That on or about 2:45 a.m. of September 19,
1995 at Cadiz City Park, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery
and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab to death one Loreto Batarilan y Ladiona, a
tricycle driver, in order to rob, steal, and take away a belt bag containing
money and the wrist watch Seiko 5; and inflicting upon the person of Loreto
Batarilan the following injuries, to wit:
Penetrating to perforating stab wounds:
*2 cm. at epigastric area
*1-2 cm. in the following areas of the back
=11th
rib scapular line, right
=4
wounds at right scapular area
=4
wounds at left scapular area
=1wound
at interscapular area, left
=2
wounds infrascapular area, left
*1 wound supraclavicular area, left
*1 wound infra-suricular area, left
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardio-pulmonary arrest due
to hypovolemic shock secondary to Multiple Stab wounds, which directly caused
the death of the said victim Loreto Batarilan, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the said victim in the amount, to wit:
P50,000.00 – as indemnity for the death of the victim.
ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The
appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented the
following witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Rudy Pepito (Rudy); Dr. Jimmily Aguiling (Dr. Aguiling); Norman Palma (
Rudy
narrated that he slept at the Maricom Detachment Office located in Punta
Cabahug,
He
further narrated that the victim was stabbed several times in front and at the
back and cried for help as he was being stabbed. The driver of the tricycle he
was riding, apparently afraid, increased the vehicle’s speed as they passed the
stabbing scene. When they reached the Ceres
Bus Terminal, he (Rudy) immediately boarded a bus bound for Sagay.[6] He
returned to
He
testified on cross-examination that the tricycle he was riding was “very near”
the scene of the stabbing incident,[8]
and that the park was very brightly lit that night.[9] He
stated that he did not immediately report the stabbing incident upon arriving
at the Ceres Bus Terminal because he was afraid and because the Ceres bus bound
for Sagay was already leaving.[10] When
he reported the stabbing incident to Cesar on
Dr.
Aguiling, Medical Officer III at the Cadiz City Emergency Clinic, testified that
he went to
Norman, a tricycle driver residing in
PO3 Acita, Duty Investigator at the
Cadiz City Police Station, testified that at around
Alicia, the victim’s wife, declared
on the witness stand that her husband was a tricycle driver; that her husband wore
a Seiko watch when he left to ply his route in the early morning of P1,200.00 plus loose change; the money was
intended for the purchase of spare parts for the tricycle.[21] She
further narrated that she only learned of the death of her husband from her
daughter in the morning of P200.00 a
day.[22]
The defense presented appellant Rizaldy
who gave a different version of events.
Rizaldy testified that he did not
know his co-accused, Samuel, prior to their arrest on
He admitted on cross-examination that
The RTC convicted appellants Samuel
and Rizaldy of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide in its
decision of
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this
Court finds accused Samuel Algarme y Bonda and Rizaldy Gelle y Biscocho (all
detained) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
as charged in the Information and there being an aggravating circumstance of
treachery attendant thereto without any mitigating circumstance to offset the
same, hereby sentences the accused to the penalty of DEATH.
The two accused are all hereby ordered
immediately committed to the National Penitentiary for the execution of their
sentence, and the Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby directed to
immediately forward the entire records of this case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.
The two accused are further ordered to
jointly and solidarily pay the heirs of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of indemnity for the death of LORETO BATARILAN,
together with the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) representing
the cash amount and the value of the wrist watch of the victim by way of
reparation, and the amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
PESOS (P374,400.00) by way of the loss of the earning capacity of the
victim, Loreto Batarilan, plus the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as moral damages, and the further amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)
as exemplary damages. The award for the loss of earning capacity together with
the moral and exemplary damages for which docket fees and legal fees, the Clerk
of Court of this Court is hereby directed to charge as liens on the award of
damages the said docket and other legal fees.
The case against alias “Stingray” who is
still at-large is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be immediately revived upon his
arrest.
Costs against accused Samuel Algarme and
Rizaldy Gelle.
SO ORDERED.[28]
The RTC, after receiving an
information that one of the appellants had escaped confinement and subsequently
been killed in a shoot-out with the police, issued an Order directing the
counsels for both the prosecution and defense, as well as the BJMP Warden and
Chief of Police of PNP Cadiz City, to submit a report on the incident.[29] They
reported and confirmed that Samuel had indeed been killed on
On appeal, we endorsed this case to
the CA for appropriate action and disposition[31] pursuant
to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[32] The CA, in its decision of
In his brief,[33] the
appellant argues that the RTC erred –
1.
in giving credence to
the positive identification by the two (2) prosecution witnesses pointing to him
as the perpetrator of the crime charged;
2.
in finding that a
conspiracy existed between him and his co-accused Samuel;
3.
in imposing the death
penalty even if treachery had not been proven; and
4.
in convicting him of
the crime charged even if its elements had not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the appellant’s appeal as his guilt
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, but we modify the lower courts’
decision with respect to the crime committed, the penalty imposed, and the
awarded indemnities.
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
An
established rule in appellate review is that the trial court’s factual findings
– including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative
weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual
findings – are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect. In our review
of cases, these factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they
are affirmed by the CA. Despite this enhanced persuasive effect, we
nevertheless fully scrutinize the records (as we did in this case), since the
penalty of reclusion perpetua that
the CA imposed on the appellant demands no less than this kind of careful and
deliberate consideration.[34]
A
distinguishing feature of the present case is the presence of a witness – Rudy
– who, in his
PROSECUTOR FRANCES V. GUANZON
Q: So
when you were on board the tricycle and you were passing the
RUDY PEPITO
A: I
saw a tricycle.
Q: Aside
from the tricycle, what other things did
you see?
A: An old man was stabbed.
x x x
Q: You
said that an old man was stabbed? Did
you see the person who stabbed the old man?
A: I saw.
Q: How
many persons stabbed the old man?
A: Three persons.
Q: How
was the old man stabbed by these three (3) persons?
A: The old man was held by two persons while
the other one stabbed him.
Q: Can
you describe the person, the one who actually stabbed the victim?
A: Yes,
ma’am.
Q: How
does he look?
A: He
was the one who stabbed the old man. He was white and tall.
Q: You
said there were two persons who held the person while this white tall person
stabbed the old man. Can you describe the person who held the old man, their
appearance, their height, if you can recall?
A: The
two persons were short.
x x x x
Q: When
you arrived on
A: When
I arrived, I told Cesar that somebody was stabbed at the park.
Q: Who
is this Cesar?
A: A
Barangay Tanod.
Q: So,
when you told him about what you saw on
A: Cesar
brought me to the Jail and asked me to identify the person.
Q: So,
in other words, you were brought by barangay tanod Cesar to the Cadiz
City Jail to look at the persons who were inside the jail, is that what you
mean?
A: Yes.
Q: So,
at the City Jail, were you able to identify the person who stabbed Loreto
Batarilan on the evening of
A: Yes,
ma’m.
Q: How
many were they did you see inside the Cadiz City Jail? [sic]
A: Three
persons.
Q: When you said that there were three and the
one who actually stabbed was tall and white? If they are present in Court, can
you identify him? [sic]
A: Yes,
ma’am.
.
Q: Please look around and point to the person
who you described as tall and white?
A: (Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom
who when asked answer [sic] to the name Samuel Algarme)
Q: You mentioned also that out of these two
other persons who are short held the old man while he was being stabbed by a
white man. [sic] If one of these short men who held Loreto
Batarilan on
A: Yes,
ma’am.
Q: Please look around and point to one of
these two persons who held Loreto Batarilan on the evening of
A: (Witness pointing to a person sitting
inside the Courtroom who when asked answered to the name Rizaldy Gelle)
Q: You
said that there were three? What about the other persons who held Loreto
Batarilan when he was stabbed by Samuel Algarme, if he is present in court, can
you identify him?
A; Yes,
ma’am.
Q: Is
he present in Court today?
A: He
is not here, ma’am.[35] [Emphasis ours]
Rudy’s
testimony was clear and straightforward; he never wavered in pointing to the
appellants as the persons who held and stabbed Loreto in the morning of
These testimonies, when considered together,
lead to no conclusion other than the appellants’ direct participation in the
stabbing that led to the victim’s death.
To reiterate, the appellants and the victim were in the same vicinity
before the stabbing; soon after, the appellants were seen holding and stabbing
the victim; immediately thereafter, they were also seen walking away, carrying
the victim’s bag. In considering these
testimonies, we find it very significant that the defense failed to refute the
testimonies of Rudy and Norman through evidence showing motive that could lead
them to falsely testify against the appellants. In the absence of such evidence,
we can conclude that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[36]
Admissibility of Identification
Rizaldy challenges the reliability
and integrity of the positive identification Rudy made. He claims that his
“in-court identification was facilitated by a highly suggestive and irregular
out-of-court identification process.” He harps on the fact that the out-of-court
identification was not made in a police line up but in a mere show-up.
We find this challenge to be baseless as we fail to see any flaw that
would invalidate Rudy’s out-of-court identification of the appellants. We see no basis, too, to support the
conclusion that the in-court identification – an identification made
independently of the out-of court identification – is itself tainted with
invalidity.[37]
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[38] we explained the procedure for
out-of-court identification and the test to determine its
admissibility:
Out-of-court
identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose x x x x In resolving the admissibility of and
relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz:
(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Applying
the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Rudy’s out-of-court identification to
be reliable and thus admissible. First, Rudy testified that the
tricycle he was riding passed “very near” the place where the victim was
stabbed, and that the park at that time was “very bright.” Second, Rudy was simply riding a tricycle when the stabbing,
a very startling incident, happened; no competing incident took place to draw
his attention away from the incident; and the event, being startling, consumed
his full attention and gave him the chance to see clearly the features of the
person stabbed, the manner he was stabbed, and the appearance of the
assailants. Third, he stated
with certainty that he could identify the assailants’ faces when he reported
the incident to barangay tanod Cesar.
Fourth, the identification took place within two (2) days from the
stabbing incident; he explained fully why it took him two days to come forward
and report the stabbing. Finally, there was nothing
“suggestive” or irregular about Rudy’s out-of-court identification of the
appellants; it was not even a show-up
– as Rizaldy suggests where the suspects, tagged as the persons to be
identified, are brought face-to-face with the witness for confirmation of identification.
When Rudy arrived at the police station, he was asked to point to the
assailants from among the many prisoners inside the cell; he
was not compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. There
was also no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to Rudy
that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators. Thus, Rudy’s identification
was spontaneous, independent, and untainted by any improper suggestion.
We do not
agree that an identification is unreliable simply because it was not conducted
in a police line up. No law or police
regulation requires a police line up for proper identification in every
case. There can still be a proper and
reliable identification even in the absence of a line up, for as long as the identification
is unaffected by prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the
suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified.[39]
Granting arguendo that the out-of-court
identification was irregular as the appellants claim, this identification did not foreclose
the admissibility of Rudy’s independent in-court identification.[40] It must be stressed that in convicting the appellants for
the crime charged, the courts a quo did
not rely solely on Rudy’s identification at the city jail or on an in-court
identification based on the city jail identification. Rudy’s
Even assuming
arguendo the appellants’ out-of-court identification was
defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We emphasize that the “inadmissibility of a
police line-up identification x x x should not necessarily
foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.” We also
stress that all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the
prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.[42]
The Appellant’s Alibi
In stark contrast with the
prosecution’s case is Rizaldy’s weak and uncorroborated defense.
He claimed he was in front of his
house watching a billiard game in the early morning of
These
inconsistencies impact on a basic component that the defense of alibi requires –
that there be physical impossibility
for the accused to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission. If the appellant cannot be consistent about his
whereabouts, then he cannot hope to prove the physical impossibility that the
defense of alibi requires in order to merit serious consideration.
At any rate, the
physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime on the
date of its commission is negated by his own testimony that the Apuhin house is
a mere two-minute walk from the city park. More importantly, the appellant was
positively identified by Rudy. The
settled rule in weighing contradictory statements is that alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by a credible
witness, as in this case.[43]
The Crime Committed
Article 294, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 294. Robbery
with violence against or intimidation of
persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
A special complex crime of robbery
with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either
by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery.[44] To sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of
personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed.[45] A conviction requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery.[46] The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery.[47]
In People v. Salazar,[48] this Court expounded on the concept of robbery
with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
The
Spanish version of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code reads: “1.0--Con
la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion
In the case before us, the RTC
convicted the appellants of robbery with homicide based on the testimonies of Rudy,
Alicia, and Norman. The CA affirmed this finding without any explanation on how
the crime came to be the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. To be sure, Rudy’s testimony clinched the
case against the appellants with respect to the victim’s stabbing and resulting
death. The lower courts apparently deduced the intent to rob from the
testimonies of Alicia and Norman.
Alicia, in her testimony of P1,200.00, more or less, and wore a
Seiko watch when he left to ply his route in the early morning of
directly quote from the records:
PROSECUTOR FRANCES V. GUANZON
Q: So on
ALICIA BATARILAN:
A: Yes, ma’am. He went out to drive his tricycle.
x x x
Q: When he left your house was he carrying anything or did he
have anything in his possession?
A: He was [sic] with
him a belt bag and a watch.
Q: What was the content of the belt bag if you know?
A: His money.
Q: Did you know how much his money was?
A: P1,200.00 and loose change.
Q: Why do you know that he had with him P1,200.00 and
loose change at that time.
A: He had with him P1,200.00 because he was intending to
buy spare parts of the tricycle.[49]
PROSECUTOR FRANCES V. GUANZON
Q: While you were at
NORMAN
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: What was that?
A: I saw the tricycle of the old man
without anybody on it.
Q: Who is this old man you are referring
to?
A: I am referring to Loreto Batarilan.
Q: Where was the tricycle located?
A: Beside the
Q: And then what other things did you see?
A: I saw the old man lying down with
blood.
Q: And where was the old man situated?
A: Beside the City Hall.
Q: And what else did you see?
A: I
saw the three (3) persons walking towards the park with belt bag.
Q: And who were these (3) persons you saw
going towards the park carrying a belt bag?
A: Stingray.
Q: Who else?
A: Gelle.
Q: And you said there were three, who was
the other one?
A: I do not know his name but I can
recognize his face.
Q: What was the distance of these three
persons when you saw them from the body of the old man you said?
A: Maybe about two (2) extended arms
length away.
Q: Were there other persons walking also
towards the park at that time aside from these three (3) persons?
A: No more.
x x x x
Q: You mentioned that you saw three (3)
persons and you mentioned Stingray. If this Stingray is present in Court, can
you identify him?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Please look around and point to
Stingray?
A: He is not around.
Q: You said the other one is named Rizaldy
Gelle. Is he present in Court?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Please look around and point to Rizaldy
Gelle.
COURT:
Witness
pointing to a person sitting inside the courtroom who when asked answered to
the name of Rizaldy Gelle. x x x[50] [Emphasis ours]
Based on these testimonies, the RTC
concluded that the appellants’ primary criminal intent was to rob the victim. Thus it held:
Likewise, witness Alicia Batarilan also
testified that her husband, the victim herein, went out from their houses for
his usual schedule of driving, the victim had with him a belt bag containing
the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) plus loose change and
the victim was wearing a wrist watch valued at One Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos
(P1,800.00), and this fact was proven by the prosecution that a robbery took
place before the killing of the victim considering that after the incident the
belt bag containing cash and the wrist watch of the victim was seen being worn
by one of the three persons who perpetrated the crime, since as testified to by
witness Norman Palma that when he saw the three persons walking towards the
park with a belt bag, no other persons
were seen in the vicinity of the crime immediately before or after the commission of the crime, thus it is logical to conclude
that the three persons indeed perpetrated the robbery and the killing of the
victim x x x
To sustain a conviction for the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must establish with certitude that the killing was a mere incident
to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrators’ main
purpose and objective.[51]
It is not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the homicide was to rob; a mere
presumption of such fact is not sufficient.
In the case before us, the
testimonies of Norman and Alicia merely established two (2) facts: that the
victim carried a belt bag containing money on that fateful morning of
We have held
in several cases[52]
that where the evidence satisfactorily establishes that the appellant did kill
and unlawfully take the personal property of the victim, but the original
criminal design to commit robbery was not duly proven – the accused-appellant
should be held liable for the separate crimes of homicide or murder (as the case may be) and theft, and not for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
This Court recognizes
that the Information accused the appellants of the crime of “robbery with
homicide.” The established rule, however, is that the nature and character of
the crime charged are determined, not by the given designation of the specific
crime, but by the facts alleged in the Information.[53]
In this case, all the elements relevant
to the killing and the taking of property were properly stated in the
Information; only the statement of the specific crime committed – a conclusion
of law – remained to be correctly made.
This, we do in this Decision.
Homicide or Murder?
The
Information alleged the aggravating circumstance of treachery. However, we
cannot appreciate this circumstance as the prosecution failed to show proof
that the appellants made some preparation to kill the victim in a manner that
would ensure the execution of the crime or make it impossible or difficult for
the person attacked to defend himself.[54]
The
Information likewise alleged the aggravating circumstance of evidence
premeditation. For this aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the
following must be proven: 1) the time when the accused decided to commit the
crime; 2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to such
determination; and 3) between the decision and the execution, a sufficient lapse
of time that allowed for reflection on the consequences of the act
contemplated.[55] None of
these elements have been established in the case before us.
In
the absence of any circumstance which would qualify the victim’s killing to
murder, we hold that the appellant should be held liable only for the crime of
homicide.
The Proper Penalties
The
penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance proven by the prosecution or by the defense, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant can be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of prision
mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to that provided in Article 249)
and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its
medium period.
Article 309
of the Revised Penal Code provides the following penalties for the crime of
theft:
Art. 309. Penalties. -
Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
xxx
3.
The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
In the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty, which is prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, should be imposed in the medium period or one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and
ten (10) days. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower,
or arresto mayor, in its medium and maximum periods which is two (2)
months and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Civil Indemnity
a. Homicide
The
award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of
the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.[56] Pursuant to current jurisprudence,[57]
an award of P50,000.00 to the victim’s heirs is in order.
Moral
damages are
mandatory in cases of murder and homicide without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim. Consistent with this rule, we award the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[58]
We likewise
award loss of earning capacity to the victim’s heirs. As a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of
earning capacity. By way
of exception, damages may be awarded despite the absence of documentary
evidence, provided testimony exists that the victim was either (1)
self-employed, earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that no
documentary evidence is usually available in the victim’s line of work; or (2)
employed as a daily wage worker, earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws.[59]
Given Alicia’s testimony that her
husband was a tricycle driver earning P200.00 a day, we hold
that the heirs are entitled to an award representing the loss of the victim’s
earning capacity computed under the following formula:
Net Earning
Capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of
the victim at the time of death) x (Gross
Annual Income less the Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses)
The records
show that Loreto’s annual gross income was P72,000.00 per annum computed
from his monthly rate of P6,000.00 (or P200.00 per day). His
reasonable and necessary living expenses are estimated at 50% of this gross
income, leaving a balance of P36,000.00. His life expectancy, on the
other hand is assumed to be 2/3 of the age 80 less 62, his age at the time of
death. Applying the formula yields the net earning capacity of P432,000.00.
We can only award actual damages to the extent
actually proven by evidence, i.e., upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party.
In this case, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the
claim for expenses incurred in relation with the victim’s death. Nevertheless, we can
award P25,000.00 as temperate damages pursuant to our ruling in People
v. Abrazaldo[60] that temperate
damages of P25,000.00 may be awarded in place of actual damages, where the
amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined with
certainty under the rules of evidence.
b. Theft
The
only evidence of the amount stolen from the victim is the belt bag that,
according to Alicia contained P1,200.00, more or less. No valuation was
ever made on the cost of the belt bag. While the victim also had a Seiko watch
when he left home before he died, no proof exists that the appellants took the
watch. Hence, we can only order the
heirs indemnified to the extent of P1,200.00.
WHEREFORE,
in view of these considerations, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No.
00239 is MODIFIED as follows:
(1)
Appellant Rizaldy Gelle is found GUILTY of the separate crimes of homicide and theft.
(2)
For the crime of
homicide, the appellant is SENTENCED to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; he is
likewise ORDERED to PAY the victim’s heirs the following amounts:
(a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and (d) P432,000.00
as indemnity for loss of earning capacity.
(3)
For the crime of
theft, the appellant is SENTENCED to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional, as maximum; he is likewise ORDERED to PAY the
victim’s heirs the amount of P1,200.00 representing the value of the
money stolen.
Costs against appellant Rizaldy Gelle
y Biscocho.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice Chairperson |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, and concurred in by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla; rollo, pp. 3-9.
[2] Penned by Judge Renato D. Muñez; CA rollo, pp. 64-72.
[3] Records, pp. 1-2.
[4] TSN,
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] TSN,
[14]
[15]
[16] TSN,
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] TSN,
[21]
[22]
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] CA rollo, pp. 64-72.
[29] Records, p. 141.
[30]
[31] Per our Resolution dated
[32] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[33] CA rollo, pp. 41-62.
[34] People v. Ballesteros, G.R. No. 172696, August 11, 2008 citing People v. Garalde, G.R. No. 173055, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 327, 340.
[35] TSN,
[36] See People
v. Laurente, G.R. No. 116734,
[37] People
v. Navales, G.R. No. 135230,
[38] G.R. Nos. 111206-08,
[39] See People
v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756,
[40] See People
v. Almanzor. G.R. No. 124916,
[41] G.R. Nos. 97841-42,
[42]
[43] People v. Navales, supra note 37.
[44] People
v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 115809,
[45] People
v. Barreta, G.R. No. 120367,
[46] People
v. Daniela, G.R. No. 139230,
[47] People v. Escote, Jr., supra note 39, p. 630.
[48] G.R. No. 99355,
[49] TSN,
[50] TSN,
[51] See People v. Lara, G.R. No. 171449,
[52] People
v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 131477,
[53] People v. Salazar, id.
[54] People
v. Ilo, G.R. No. 140731,
[55] People
v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32,
[56] People
v. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 179278,
[57] People
v. Tabuelog, G.R. No. 178059,
[58] People
v. Eling, G.R. No. 178546,
[59] People
v. Agudez, G.R. Nos. 138386-87,
[60] G.R. No. 124392,