THIRD
DIVISION
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RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus- HON. PABLO
C. FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 21, Naga
City, as Pairing Judge for Regional Trial Court Branch 22, Formerly Presided
By HON. NOVELITA VILLEGAS-LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May 2006), ROMEO Y. TAN,
ROBERTO L. OBIEDO and ATTY. TOMAS A. REYES,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 175914 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: February 10, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated
The present Petition arose from the
following facts:
Petitioner obtained a loan[3] in
the total amount of P95,700,620.00 from respondents Romeo Y. Tan (Tan)
and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo), secured by real estate mortgages over five parcels of land, all located in Triangulo,
Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 38376,[4]
No. 29918,[5]
No. 38374,[6]
No. 39232,[7]
and No. 39225,[8] issued
by the Registry of Deeds for Naga City, in the name of petitioner. When petitioner was unable to pay the loan
when it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and Obiedo agreed to an
extension of the same.
In a Memorandum of Agreement[9]
dated P74,678,647.00.
The Memorandum of Agreement required, in turn, that petitioner execute
simultaneously with the said Memorandum, “by way of dacion en pago,” Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents Tan
and Obiedo, covering the same parcels of land subject of the mortgages. The Deeds of Absolute Sale would be uniformly
dated
|
TCT No. |
Purchase Price |
|
38376 |
|
|
29918 |
|
|
38374 |
|
|
39232 |
|
|
39225 |
|
Petitioner could choose to pay off
its indebtedness with individual or all five parcels of land; or it could
redeem said properties by paying respondents Tan and Obiedo the following
prices for the same, inclusive of interest and penalties:
|
TCT No. |
Redemption Price |
|
38376 |
|
|
29918 |
|
|
38374 |
|
|
39232 |
|
|
39225 |
|
In the event that petitioner is able
to redeem any of the afore-mentioned parcels of land, the Deed of Absolute Sale
covering the said property shall be nullified and have no force and effect; and
respondents Tan and Obiedo shall then return the owner’s duplicate of the
corresponding TCT to petitioner and also execute a Deed of Discharge of
Mortgage. However, if petitioner is
unable to redeem the parcels of land within the period agreed upon, respondents
Tan and Obiedo could already present the Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the same
to the Office of the Register of Deeds for
The Memorandum of Agreement further
provided that should petitioner contest, judicially or otherwise, any act,
transaction, or event related to or necessarily connected with the said
Memorandum and the Deeds of Absolute Sale involving the five parcels of land,
it would pay respondents Tan and Obiedo P10,000,000.00 as liquidated
damages inclusive of costs and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner would likewise pay respondents Tan and Obiedo the condoned
interests, surcharges and penalties.[10] Finally, should a contest arise from the
Memorandum of Agreement, Mr. Ruben Sia (Sia), President of petitioner
corporation, personally assumes, jointly and severally with petitioner, the
latter’s monetary obligation to respondent Tan and Obiedo.
Respondent
Atty. Tomas A. Reyes (Reyes) was the Notary Public who notarized the Memorandum
of Agreement dated
Pursuant to the Memorandum of
Agreement, petitioner, represented by Mr. Sia, executed separate Deeds of
Absolute Sale,[11] over
the five parcels of land, in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo. On the blank spaces provided for in the said
Deeds, somebody wrote
Without payment having been made by
petitioner on
On
On the basis of the facts already
recounted above, petitioner raised two causes of action in its Complaint.
As for the first cause of action,
petitioner alleged that as early as 27 December 2005, its President already
wrote a letter informing respondents Tan and Obiedo of the intention of
petitioner to pay its loan and requesting a meeting to compute the final amount
due. The parties held meetings on 3 and
Asserting that the Deeds of Absolute
Sale over the five parcels of land were executed merely as security for the
payment of its loan to respondents Tan and Obiedo; that the Deeds of Absolute
Sale, executed in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement, constituted pactum commisorium and as such, were
null and void; and that the acknowledgment in the Deeds of Absolute Sale were
falsified, petitioner averred:
13. That by reason of the fraudulent actions by the [herein respondents], [herein petitioner] is prejudiced and is now in danger of being deprived, physically and legally, of the mortgaged properties without benefit of legal processes such as the remedy of foreclosure and its attendant procedures, solemnities and remedies available to a mortgagor, while [petitioner] is desirous and willing to pay its obligation and have the mortgaged properties released.[13]
In support of its second cause of
action, petitioner narrated in its Complaint that on P300,000.00 in actual damages by
reason of the physical invasion by respondents Tan and Obiedo and their armed
goons of the five parcels of land.
Ultimately, petitioner’s prayer in
its Complaint reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that upon the filing of this complaint, a 72-hour temporary restraining order be forthwith issued ex parte:
(a) Restraining [herein respondents] Tan and Obiedo, their agents, privies or representatives, from committing act/s tending to alienate the mortgaged properties from the [herein petitioner] pending the resolution of the case, including but not limited to the acts complained of in paragraph “14”, above;
(b) Restraining the Register of Deeds of Naga City from entertaining moves by the [respondents] to have [petitioner’s] certificates of title to the mortgaged properties cancelled and changed/registered in [respondents] Tan’s and Obiedo’s names, and/or released to them;
(c) After notice and hearing, that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued imposing the same restraints indicated in the next preceding two paragraphs of this prayer; and
(d) After trial, judgment be rendered:
1. Making the injunction permanent;
2. Declaring the provision in the Memorandum of Agreement requiring the [petitioner] to execute deed of sales (sic) in favor of the [respondents Tan and Obiedo] as dacion en pago in the event of non-payment of the debt as pactum commissorium;
3.
Annulling the Deed[s] of
4.
Ordering the [respondents] jointly and
solidarily to pay the [petitioner] actual damages of at least P300,000.00;
attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court
attendance of counsel as appearance fee; litigation expenses in the amount of
at least P10,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00,
plus the costs.
[Petitioner] further prays for such other reliefs as may be proper, just and equitable under the premises.[14]
Upon
filing its Complaint with the RTC on P13,644.25
for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of
Court. The Clerk of Court initially
considered Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according
to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Only respondent
Tan filed an Answer[15]
to the Complaint of petitioner.
Respondent Tan did admit that meetings were held with Mr. Sia, as the
representative of petitioner, to thresh out Mr. Sia’s charge that the
computation by respondents Tan and Obiedo of the interests, surcharges and
penalties accruing on the loan of petitioner was replete with errors and
uncertainties. However, Mr. Sia failed
to back up his accusation of errors and uncertainties and to present his own
final computation of the amount due.
Disappointed and exasperated, respondents Tan and Obiedo informed Mr.
Sia that they had already asked respondent Atty. Reyes to come over to notarize
the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Respondent
Atty. Reyes asked Mr. Sia whether it was his signature appearing above his printed
name on the Deeds of Absolute Sale, to which Mr. Sia replied yes. On
Respondent Tan
maintained that the Deeds of Absolute Sale were not executed merely as
securities for the loan of petitioner.
The Deeds of Absolute Sale over the five parcels of land were the
consideration for the payment of the total indebtedness of petitioner to
respondents Tan and Obiedo, and the condonation of the 15-month interest which
already accrued on the loan, while providing petitioner with the golden
opportunity to still redeem all or even portions of the properties covered by
said Deeds. Unfortunately, petitioner
failed to exercise its right to redeem any of the said properties.
Belying that
they forcibly took possession of the five parcels of land, respondent Tan
alleged that it was Mr. Sia who, with the aid of armed men, on board a Sports
Utility Vehicle and a truck, rammed into the personnel of respondents Tan and
Obiedo causing melee and disturbance.
Moreover, by the execution of the Deeds of Absolute Sale, the properties
subject thereof were, ipso jure,
delivered to respondents Tan and Obiedo.
The demolition of the existing structures on the properties was nothing
but an exercise of dominion by respondents Tan and Obiedo.
Respondent Tan,
thus, sought not just the dismissal of the Complaint of petitioner, but also
the grant of his counterclaim. The
prayer in his Answer is faithfully reproduced below:
Wherefore, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed
that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint, and on
the counterclaim, [herein petitioner] and Ruben Sia, be ordered to indemnify,
jointly and severally [herein respondents Tan and Obiedo] the amounts of not
less than P10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages and the further sum of
not less than P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees. In the alternative, and should it become
necessary, it is hereby prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to pay herein
[respondents Tan and Obiedo] the entire principal loan of P95,700,620.00,
plus interests, surcharges and penalties computed from March 17, 2005 until the
entire sum is fully paid, including the amount of P74,678,647.00
foregone interest covering the period from October 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005
or for a total of fifteen (15) months, plus incidental expenses as may be
proved in court, in the event that Annexes “G” to “L” be nullified. Other relief and remedies as are just and
equitable under the premises are hereby prayed for.[16]
Thereafter,
respondent Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended
that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 involved real properties, the docket fees for
which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1),
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took
effect on 16 August 2004. Since
petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030,
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue
an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate docket fees
pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended; and
should petitioner fail to do so, to deny and dismiss the prayer of petitioner
for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale for having been executed in
contravention of the law or of the Memorandum of Agreement as pactum commisorium.
As required by the RTC, the parties
submitted their Position Papers on the matter. On
It must be noted that under paragraph (b) 2. of the said Section 7, it is provided that QUIETING OF TITLE which is an action classified as beyond pecuniary estimation “shall be governed by paragraph (a)”. Hence, the filing fee in an action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed which is also classified as beyond pecuniary estimation, must be computed based on the provision of Section 7(A) herein-above, in part, quoted.
Since [herein respondent], Romeo Tan in his Answer has a counterclaim against the plaintiff, the former must likewise pay the necessary filling (sic) fees as provided for under Section 7 (A) of Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 issued by the Supreme Court.[18]
Consequently, the RTC decreed on the
matter of docket/filing fees:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [herein petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay additional filing fee and the [herein respondent], Romeo Tan is also ordered to pay docket and filing fees on his counterclaim, both computed based on Section 7(a) of the Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Naga City and for the latter to compute and to collect the said fees accordingly.[19]
Petitioner moved[20]
for the partial reconsideration of the 24 March 2006 Order of the RTC, arguing
that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 was principally for the annulment of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale and, as such, incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner submitted that the RTC erred in
applying Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to
petitioner’s first cause of action in its Complaint in Civil Case No.
2006-0030.
In its Order[21]
dated
Analyzing,
the action herein pertains to real property, for as admitted by the [herein
petitioner], “the deeds of sale in question pertain to real property” x x x. The Deeds of
Compared with Quieting of Title, the latter action is brought when there is cloud on the title to real property or any interest therein or to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to the real property (Art. 476, Civil Code of the Philippines) and the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action (Art. 447, ibid.), and yet plaintiff in QUIETING OF TITLE is required to pay the fees in accordance with paragraph (a) of Section 7 of the said Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, hence, with more reason that the [petitioner] who no longer has title to the real properties subject of the instant case must be required to pay the required fees in accordance with Section 7(a) of the Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 afore-mentioned.
Furthermore, while [petitioner] claims that the action for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and memorandum of agreement is one incapable of pecuniary estimation, however, as argued by the [respondent Tan], the issue as to how much filing and docket fees should be paid was never raised as an issue in the case of Russell vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[22]
In a letter dated P720,392.60
as docket fees.[23]
Petitioner, however, had not yet
conceded, and it filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals; the petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
94800. According to petitioner, the RTC[24]
acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it issued its Orders dated 24 March 2006 and 29 March 2006
mandating that the docket/filing fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, an action
for annulment of deeds of sale, be assessed under Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. If the
Orders would not be revoked, corrected, or rectified, petitioner would suffer
grave injustice and irreparable damage.
On
Clearly, the petitioner’s complaint involves not only the annulment of the deeds of sale, but also the recovery of the real properties identified in the said documents. In other words, the objectives of the petitioner in filing the complaint were to cancel the deeds of sale and ultimately, to recover possession of the same. It is therefore a real action.
Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be paid cannot be assessed in accordance with Section 7(b). As a real action, Section 7(a) must be applied in the assessment and payment of the proper docket fee.
Resultantly, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough – it must be grave. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically.
Such a situation does not exist in this particular case. The evidence is insufficient to prove that the court a quo acted despotically in rendering the assailed orders. It acted properly and in accordance with law. Hence, error cannot be attributed to it.[25]
Hence, the fallo of the Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Orders of the court a quo are AFFIRMED.[26]
Without seeking reconsideration of
the foregoing Decision with the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed its Petition
for Review on Certiorari before this
Court, with a lone assignment of error, to wit:
18. The herein petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave and serious reversible error in affirming the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court which are clearly contrary to the pronouncement of this Honorable Court in the case of Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104796, March 6, 1998, not to mention the fact that if the said judgment is allowed to stand and not rectified, the same would result in grave injustice and irreparable damage to herein petitioner in view of the prohibitive amount assessed as a consequence of said Orders.[27]
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[28]
the Court explicitly pronounced that “[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.” Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL)
v. Asuncion,[29] the
Court laid down guidelines for the implementation of its previous pronouncement
in
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
In the Petition at bar, the RTC
found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that petitioner did not pay the
correct amount of docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030. According to both the trial and appellate
courts, petitioner should pay docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Consistent with the liberal tenor of Sun
Insurance, the RTC, instead of dismissing outright petitioner’s Complaint
in Civil Case No. 2006-0030, granted petitioner time to pay the additional
docket fees. Despite the seeming
munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the additional docket fees
assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct amount
before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
Relevant to the present controversy
are the following provisions under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC[30]
and Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004[31]:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. –
(a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES, LITIGATIO NEXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is:
[Table of fees omitted.]
If the action involves both a money claim and relief pertaining to property, then THE fees will be charged on both the amounts claimed and value of property based on the formula prescribed in this paragraph a.
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated
2. Special civil actions, except judicial foreclosure of mortgage, EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, PARTITION AND QUIETING OF TITLE which will
3. All other actions not involving property
[Table of fees omitted.]
The docket fees under Section 7(a),
Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of
the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees
due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule
141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
In order to resolve the issue of
whether petitioner paid the correct amount of docket fees, it is necessary to
determine the true nature of its Complaint.
The dictum adhered to in this
jurisdiction is that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations
in the body of the pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by its title or
heading.[32] However, the Court finds it necessary, in
ascertaining the true nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030, to take into account
significant facts and circumstances beyond the Complaint of petitioner, facts
and circumstances which petitioner failed to state in its Complaint but were
disclosed in the preliminary proceedings before the court a quo.
Petitioner persistently avers that
its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 is primarily for the annulment of the
Deeds of Absolute Sale. Based on the
allegations and reliefs in the Complaint alone, one would get the impression
that the titles to the subject real properties still rest with petitioner; and
that the interest of respondents Tan and Obiedo in the same lies only in the
Deeds of Absolute Sale sought to be annulled.
What petitioner failed to mention in
its Complaint was that respondents Tan and Obiedo already had the Memorandum of
Agreement, which clearly provided for the execution of the Deeds of Absolute
Sale, registered on the TCTs over the five parcels of land, then still in the
name of petitioner. After respondents
Tan and Obiedo had the Deeds of Absolute Sale notarized on
It is, thus, suspect that petitioner kept
mum about the afore-mentioned facts and circumstances when they had already
taken place before it filed its Complaint before the RTC on
No matter how fastidiously petitioner
attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in its
Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action,
involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession
of the five parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo.
A real action is one in which the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what is now
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting
title to or recovery of possession of real property.[33]
Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, had a specific paragraph
governing the assessment of the docket fees for real action, to wit:
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
It was in accordance with the
afore-quoted provision that the Court, in Gochan
v. Gochan,[34] held
that although the caption of the complaint filed by therein respondents
Mercedes Gochan, et al. with the RTC
was denominated as one for “specific performance and damages,” the relief
sought was the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the
execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties
enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case before
the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did title to or possession
of real property. Consequently, the
basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of
the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged in the complaint. But since Mercedes
Gochan failed to allege in their complaint the value of the real
properties, the Court found that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
same for non-payment of the correct docket fees.
Likewise, in Siapno v. Manalo,[35]
the Court disregarded the title/denomination of therein plaintiff Manalo’s
amended petition as one for Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages; and
adjudged the same to be a real action, the filing fees for which should have
been computed based on the assessed value of the subject property or, if there
was none, the estimated value thereof.
The Court expounded in Siapno that:
In his amended petition, respondent Manalo prayed that NTA’s sale of the property in dispute to Standford East Realty Corporation and the title issued to the latter on the basis thereof, be declared null and void. In a very real sense, albeit the amended petition is styled as one for “Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages,” it is, at bottom, a suit to recover from Standford the realty in question and to vest in respondent the ownership and possession thereof. In short, the amended petition is in reality an action in res or a real action. Our pronouncement in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals is instructive. There, we said:
A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948)
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v. Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760, 1954)
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950).
While it is true that
petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for
damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building
which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which
is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for
the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to
recover said real property. It is a real action.
Unfortunately, and evidently to evade payment of the correct amount of filing fee, respondent Manalo never alleged in the body of his amended petition, much less in the prayer portion thereof, the assessed value of the subject res, or, if there is none, the estimated value thereof, to serve as basis for the receiving clerk in computing and arriving at the proper amount of filing fee due thereon, as required under Section 7 of this Court’s en banc resolution of 04 September 1990 (Re: Proposed Amendments to Rule 141 on Legal Fees).
Even the amended petition, therefore, should have been expunged from the records.
In fine, we rule and so hold that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over its Civil Case No. Q-95-24791.[36]
It was in Serrano v. Delica,[37]
however, that the Court dealt with a complaint that bore the most similarity to
the one at bar. Therein respondent
Delica averred that undue influence, coercion, and intimidation were exerted upon
him by therein petitioners Serrano, et al.
to effect transfer of his properties.
Thus, Delica filed a complaint before the RTC against Serrano, et al., praying that the special power
of attorney, the affidavit, the new titles issued in the names of Serrano, et al., and the contracts of sale of the
disputed properties be cancelled; that Serrano, et al. be ordered to pay Delica, jointly and severally, actual,
moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00, as well as
attorney’s fee of P200,000.00 and costs of litigation; that a TRO and a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued ordering Serrano, et al. to immediately restore him to his possession of the parcels
of land in question; and that after trial, the writ of injunction be made
permanent. The Court dismissed Delica’s
complaint for the following reasons:
A careful examination of respondent’s complaint is that it is a real action. In Paderanga vs. Buissan, we held that “in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real action is one ‘affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property.’”
Obviously, respondent’s complaint is a real action involving not only the recovery of real properties, but likewise the cancellation of the titles thereto.
Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that “the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.”
We
note, however, that neither the “assessed value” nor the “estimated value” of
the questioned parcels of land were alleged by respondent in both his original
and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended complaint is that
the disputed realties have a “BIR zonal valuation” of P1,200.00 per
square meter. However, the alleged “BIR zonal valuation” is not the kind
of valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of the realty.
Having utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that he
shall allege in his complaint the assessed value of his real properties in
controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, his
complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule
that it has not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for failure of
herein respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone,
respondent’s complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.[38]
Brushing aside the significance of Serrano, petitioner argues that said
decision, rendered by the Third Division of the Court, and not by the Court en banc, cannot modify or reverse the
doctrine laid down in Spouses De Leon v.
Court of Appeals.[39] Petitioner relies heavily on the declaration
of this Court in Spouses De Leon that
an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Court, however, does not perceive
a contradiction between Serrano and
the Spouses De Leon. The Court calls attention to the following
statement in Spouses De Leon: “A
review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether
an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought.” Necessarily, the determination must be done on
a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances of each. What petitioner conveniently ignores is that
in Spouses De Leon, the action
therein that private respondents instituted before the RTC was “solely for
annulment or rescission” of the contract of sale over a real property.[40] There appeared to be no transfer of title or
possession to the adverse party. Their
complaint simply prayed for:
1. Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale (Supplementary Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or violation of the terms and conditions of the said contract.
2. Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for being absolutely simulated; and
3. Ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay
plaintiffs (private respondents) attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00.[41]
As this Court has previously
discussed herein, the nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030 instituted by
petitioner before the RTC is closer to that of Serrano, rather than of Spouses
De Leon, hence, calling for the application of the ruling of the Court in
the former, rather than in the latter.
It is also important to note that,
with the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which became effective
on
A real action indisputably involves
real property. The docket fees for a
real action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real
property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the
acceptable value. In computing the
docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying
on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax
Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever
is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.
In sum, the Court finds that the true
nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is the
recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving
real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance with
Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not
commit any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay
additional docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
The Court does not give much credence
to the allegation of petitioner that if the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
allowed to stand and not rectified, it would result in grave injustice and
irreparable injury to petitioner in view of the prohibitive amount assessed
against it. It is a sweeping assertion
which lacks evidentiary support.
Undeniably, before the Court can conclude that the amount of docket fees
is indeed prohibitive for a party, it would have to look into the financial
capacity of said party. It baffles this
Court that herein petitioner, having the capacity to enter into multi-million
transactions, now stalls at paying P720,392.60 additional docket fees so
it could champion before the courts its rights over the disputed real
properties. Moreover, even though the
Court exempts individuals, as indigent or pauper litigants, from paying docket
fees, it has never extended such an exemption to a corporate entity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo with Associate Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; rollo, pp. 109-120.
[2] Penned
by Judge Novelita Villegas-Llaguno; id. at 74-79.
[3] Records do not disclose other
details regarding the said loan, i.e.,
when it was obtained, if it was reduced to writing, and when it exactly became
due and demandable.
[4] With
an area of 4,343 square meters.
[5] With
an area of 17,183 square meters.
[6] With an area of 8,203 square
meters.
[7] With
an area of 1,043 square meters.
[8] With
an area of 616 square meters.
[9] Rollo, pp. 39-42.
[10] According
to paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Agreement, the condoned interests,
surcharges and penalties amounted to “P55,167,000.00 (as stated in
paragraph 2 hereof);” but paragraph 2 of the said Memorandum computed the
interests, penalties and surcharges from 1 October 2004 to 31 December 2005
condoned or written-off by respondents Tan and Obiedo to be P74,678,647.00.
[11] Rollo, pp. 43-52.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Penned
by Judge Novelita Villegas-Llaguno; id. at 85-88.
[22] Id.at
86-88.
[23]
[24] Judge Pablo C. Fomaran, Presiding
Judge of RTC Branch 21, Naga City, was named as a respondent in CA-G.R. SP No.
94800 in his capacity as the Pairing
Judge for RTC Branch 22, Naga City, which was formerly presided by Judge
Novelita Villegas-Llaguno, who retired on 1 May 2006.
[25] Rollo,
pp. 118-119.
[26]
[27]
[28] G.R.
No. L-75919,
[29] G.R.
Nos. 79937-38,
[30] Re: Proposed Revision of Rule 141,
Revised Rules of Court
[31] Guidelines in the Allocation of
Legal Fees Collected Under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as Amended, between
the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund and the Judiciary Development
Fund.
[32] Gochan
v. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491, 501 (2001).
[33]
[34] Gochan
v. Gochan, id.
[35] G.R. No. 132260,
[36]
[37] Supra note 33.
[38] Rollo, pp. 88-89.
[39] 350 Phil. 535 (1998).
[40]
[41]