PEOPLE OF THE - versus - ELMER BALDO y SANTAIN, Appellant. |
G.R. No. 175238 Present: Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio
Morales, NACHURA,* BRION, and
PERALTA,** JJ. Promulgated: February 24, 2009 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is
the Decision[1]
dated
On
That on or about the 10th day of February 2000 in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a fan knife, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one [AAA],[3] against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon
arraignment on
The facts as
established by the prosecution are as follows:
Twenty-nine-year-old AAA, appellant, and Norman Echani were housemates
in a small one-room house in Purok Maligaya II, Mambugan,
On
According to
AAA, appellant repeated his beastly act the following day, February 11 and on
the next day,
In the evening
of
The medico-legal police officer who examined AAA on
Appellant, in
his own defense, denied the charges against him. He claimed that he and AAA were lovers since
November 1999, and that she had consented to have sex with him even prior to
February 2000. He contended that she
charged him because her parents were against their affair, and that her parents
learned of their relationship because two of their neighbors saw them having
sexual intercourse. He likewise denied
poking a knife at her when they “made love.”
To prove they are lovers, appellant presented two witnesses: Benjamin Eubra, Purok Maligaya Chairman,
and Simeon de los
Eubra and De
los
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ELMER BALDO y SANTAIN is hereby found guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 00-18080 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
He is further ordered to pay to the complainant, [AAA], the amount of Php 50,000 as indemnity.
Criminal Cases No[s]. 00-18081 and 00-18082 are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Since the
penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, the case was
elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Pursuant to People v. Mateo,[10]
however, we referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
On
WHEREFORE,
the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION
by ordering accused-appellant Elmer Baldo y Santain to likewise pay [AAA] the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence
this instant petition based on a lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN [PROVEN] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[12]
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether the
crime of rape, particularly the element of force or intimidation, has been
proved sufficiently.
Appellant
insists that he and AAA are lovers and what happened between them was
consensual. He likewise capitalizes on AAA’s
admission that he was no longer holding the knife when he inserted his finger
and subsequently his penis into AAA’s vagina.
Thus, she had all the opportunity to resist his alleged sexual
assault. Appellant further claims that AAA’s
failure to make an outcry to call the attention of their neighbors, as the
partition between the rooms was only made of plywood, and to immediately
disclose the incident to her cousin Echani, showed she consented to the sexual congresses. As he was not covering her mouth, she should
have made her protestations in a voice loud enough for others to hear.
The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that findings of fact of the trial court
deserve respect and that witnesses are usually reluctant to volunteer
information. It stresses that the
elements of simple rape, to wit, carnal knowledge and force or intimidation, were
proven during trial. Even granting that
appellant and AAA were lovers, such fact was not a valid defense as a man
cannot force his sweetheart to have sexual intercourse with him. The OSG adds that AAA’s account evinced
sincerity and truthfulness and she never wavered in her story, consistently
pointing to appellant as her rapist. Besides,
no woman would willingly submit herself to the rigors, humiliation and stigma
attendant in a rape case if she was not motivated by an earnest desire to punish
the culprit.
In our
considered view, the prosecution has proven all the elements of the offense of
simple rape, including the use of force or intimidation. We affirm appellant’s conviction.
For conviction
in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that
said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.[13]
In this case,
the presence of the first element is undisputed since appellant admits
his sexual congress with complainant.
While making such admission however, he contends that there is no force
or intimidation to speak of as it was consensual. Appellant alleges that AAA willingly
participated in the sexual act because they are lovers. He even presented two witnesses to
corroborate his claim. Their testimony,
however, leaves us unconvinced of appellant’s alleged innocence.
The
“sweetheart theory” or “sweetheart defense” is an oft-abused justification that
rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests our patience.[14] For the Court to even consider giving
credence to such defense, it must be proven by compelling evidence.[15] The defense cannot just present testimonial
evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required -- such as
tokens, mementos, and photographs.[16] There is none presented here by the defense.
Moreover,
even if it were true that they were sweethearts, a love affair does not justify
rape. As wisely ruled in a previous
case, a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his
carnal desires.[17]
In a
desperate attempt to prove the alleged consensual nature of the sexual
intercourse, appellant capitalizes on AAA’s failure to offer resolute
resistance despite the fact that he was no longer holding the knife while
consummating the sexual act. Appellant
also points to AAA’s failure to shout or make an outcry so that their neighbors
can come to her rescue.
AAA’s failure
to shout or to tenaciously resist appellant should not be taken against her
since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make voluntary her
submission to appellant’s criminal act.[18] In rape, the force and intimidation must be
viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime. As already settled
in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way.[19] Some people may cry out, some may faint, some
may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the
intrusion.[20] Some may offer strong resistance while others
may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all.[21] Moreover, resistance is not an element of
rape.[22] A rape victim has no burden to prove that she
did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her.[23] As long as the force or intimidation is
present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.[24] In this case, the presence of a fan knife on
hand or by his side speaks loudly of appellant’s use of violence, or force and
intimidation.
As to the
civil indemnity and damages, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate
court, correctly awarded P50,000 civil indemnity and P50,000
moral damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[25] Likewise, the award of P25,000
exemplary damages due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of use of
a deadly weapon (fan knife) is proper.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga who is on sabbatical leave.
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. who is abroad on official business.
[1] CA rollo,
pp. 116-124. Penned by Associate Justice
[2] Dated
[3] This
appellation is pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, Sec. 44, otherwise known as
the “Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004” and our ruling
in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA
419, wherein this Court has resolved to withhold the real name of the
victim-survivor and to use fictitious initials instead to represent her in its
decisions. Likewise, the personal
circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to
establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate
family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
[4]
[5]
[6] Records, p. 133.
[7]
[8] TSN,
[9] Records, pp. 123-124.
[10] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[11] CA rollo, p. 123.
[12]
[13] Revised Penal Code, Art. 266-A as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8353; People v. Barangan, G.R. No. 175480,
[14] People v. Barangan, id. at 593.
[15] People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566,
[16] People v. Batiancila, G.R. No.
174280,
[17] People v. Barangan, supra at 594.
[18] People v. Calongui, supra at 85; People v. Dadulla, G.R. No. 175946, March 23, 2007, 519 SCRA 48, 58-59.
[19] People v. Balonzo, G.R. No. 176153,
[20] People v. Ilao, G.R. Nos. 152683-84,
[21] People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 172118,
[22] People v. Durano, G.R. No. 175316,
[23] People v. Balonzo, supra at 770.
[24] People v. San Antonio, Jr., G.R. No.
176633,
[25] People v. Natan, G.R. No. 181086,
[26] People v. Barangan, supra at 596.