FIRST DIVISION
HERNANIA “LANI” LOPEZ, G.R. No. 171891
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
GLORIA UMALE-COSME,
Respondent. February 24,
2009
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PUNO,
C.J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking a review
of the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 82808 reversing the decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City.
Respondent Gloria Umale-Cosme is the
owner of an apartment building at 15 Sibuyan Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon
City, while the petitioner is a lessee of one of the units therein. She was
paying a monthly rent of P1,340.00 as of 1999.
On April 19, 1999, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against petitioner before Branch 43 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City on the grounds of expiration of contract of lease and
nonpayment of rentals from December 1998. In her answer, petitioner denied that
she defaulted in the payment of her monthly rentals, claiming that respondent
did not collect the rentals as they fell due in order to make it appear that
she was in arrears. Petitioner also alleged that she had been depositing her
monthly rentals in a bank in trust for respondent since February 1999.
On March 19, 2003, the MeTC, Branch
43, rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds
for the plaintiff and the defendant Hernania “Lani” B. Lopez and all persons
claiming rights under her or instructions are hereby ordered:
1. to vacate
the leased premises located at 15-1, Sibuyan Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon
City Quezon City (sic), Metro Manila;
2. to pay the
plaintiff monthly rent in the amount of P1,340.00 starting December, 1998 up to
the time that they shall have vacated and surrendered the leased premises to the
plaintiff;
3. to pay the
plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as and be (sic) way of attorney’s
fees; and
4. costs of
suit.[4]
On appeal, the RTC reversed the
decision of the MeTC and ruled that the contract of lease between respondent
and petitioner lacked a definite period. According to the RTC, the lessee may
not be ejected on the ground of termination of the period until the judicial
authorities have fixed such period. It ratiocinated:
Under the law, there is a noticeable
change on the grounds for judicial ejectment as to expiration of the period.
Paragraph (f) of Section 5, only speaks of expiration of the period of lease
contract, deleting the phrase “of a written lease contract.” However, under its
Sec. 6, it provides:
SECTION 6. Application of
the Civil Code and Rules of Court of the
BP Blg. 877 was extended by RA No.
6643, RA No. 6828, RA No. 7644, and RA No. 8437 approved 22 December 1997
extending the law up to 31 December 2001, without changed (sic) in the
provision of the law except as to the period of maximum increase allowable.
The condition about the expiration
of the period as provided for under Act 877 was never change (sic)
despite the several extensionary (sic)
laws to it.
The law is so perspicuous to allow
other (sic) interpretation. It suspends the provisions of the first
paragraph of Article 1673 of the Civil Code, except when the lease is for a
definite period. Thus, if the lease has no period but to be fixed yet by the
judicial authorities, the lessee may not be ejected on ground of termination of
the period.
This particular provision
compliments the very purpose of the law prohibiting increase in rentals more
than the rates provided therefor.
If they could be ejected with ease
just the same by simply interpreting that if a lessee is paying his rentals
monthly, the lease is considered month to month, and month to month lease
contract is with a definite period, then what part of Article 1673 was
suspended?
The amendatory provisions of the
Rent Control Law, which the lawmakers had deemed proper to extend everytime (sic)
it is about to expire, is nothing but illusory!
In light of the above reasoning,
plaintiff-appellee’s ground based on the expiration of the lease contract must
fail. BP Blg. 877 as amended suspends the ejectment of lessees based on the
expiration of lease contract where there was no agreement as to a definite
lease period.
Finally, the plaintiff has, in
effect, abandoned her other ground of non-payment of rental having stipulated
on the consignation by defendant of the back rental from December 1998 to
September 2002 during the pre-trial.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated February 2, 2004.
Aggrieved, respondent repaired to the
CA, which found merit in her appeal, thus:
It is worthy to note
that in her answer, respondent admitted the allegations in paragraph 5 of the
complaint that the apartment unit was leased to her by petitioner on a month to
month basis.
Article 1673 (1) of the Civil Code
provides that the lessor may judicially eject the lessee when the period agreed
upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under articles 1682 and
1687, has expired. Article 1687 of the same Code provides that if the period
for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if
the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from
week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be
paid daily.
On the other hand, Section 6 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 877 reads:
Sec.
6: Application of the Civil Code and Rules of Court of the Philippines. – Except
when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of
Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, insofar as they refer to
residential units covered by this Act, shall be suspended during the
effectivity of this Act, but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules
of Court on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the
provisions of the Act shall apply.
In
Acab v. Court of Appeals, it was held that Section 6 of B.P. Blg. 877
does not suspend the effects of Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Lease
agreements with no specified period, but in which rentals are paid monthly, are
considered to be on a month-to-month basis. They are for a definite period and
expire after the last day of any given thirty-day period, upon proper demand
and notice by the lessor to vacate. In the case at bench, petitioner had shown
that written notices of termination of lease and to vacate were sent by her to
respondent, but the latter refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. In view
thereof, he caused the posting of said notice on the leased premises in the
presence of the barangay security officers on March 1, 1999.[6]
The CA denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in a resolution dated March 13, 2006.
As a consequence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, where she
argues that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that she may be ejected on the
ground of termination of lease contract.
The petition is utterly bereft of
merit.
It is well settled that where a
contract of lease is verbal and on a monthly basis, the lease is one with a
definite period which expires after the last day of any given thirty-day
period.[7] In
the recent case of Leo Wee v. De Castro where the lease contract between
the parties did not stipulate a fixed period,[8] we
ruled:
The rentals being paid monthly, the period of
such lease is deemed terminated at the end of each month. Thus, respondents
have every right to demand the ejectment of petitioners at the end of each
month, the contract having expired by operation of law. Without a lease
contract, petitioner has no right of possession to the subject property and
must vacate the same. Respondents, thus, should be allowed to resort to an
action for ejectment before the MTC to recover possession of the subject
property from petitioner.
Corollarily, petitioner’s ejectment, in this case, is
only the reasonable consequence of his unrelenting refusal to comply with the
respondents’ demand for the payment of rental increase agreed upon by both
parties. Verily, the lessor’s right to rescind the contract of lease for
non-payment of the demanded increased rental was recognized by this Court in Chua
v. Victorio:
The right of rescission
is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations, such as contracts of
lease. x x x under Article 1659 of the Civil Code, the
aggrieved party may, at his option, ask for (1) the rescission of the contract;
(2) rescission and indemnification for damages; or (3) only indemnification for
damages, allowing the contract to remain in force. Payment of the rent is one
of a lessee’s statutory obligations, and, upon non-payment by petitioners of
the increased rental in September 1994, the lessor acquired the right to avail
of any of the three remedies outlined above. (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it has been sufficiently established
that no written contract existed between the parties and that rent was being
paid by petitioner to respondent on a month-to-month basis. As the CA noted, petitioner admitted the lack
of such written contract in her complaint.[9]
Moreover, in the instant petition for review, petitioner herself alleged that
she has been occupying the leased premises and paying the monthly rentals
without fail since 1975.[10]
Hence, petitioner’s argument that the contract of lease between her and
respondent lacked a definite period–and that corollarily, she may not be
ejected on the ground of termination of period–does not hold water. Petitioner was merely grasping at straws when
she imputed grave error upon the CA’s decision to eject her from the leased
premises.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition
is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C.
CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice
[1] Promulgated on December 23, 2005.
[2] Dated March 13, 2006.
[3] Dated December 15, 2003.
[4] Rollo, p. 209.
[5] Rollo, pp. 166-167.
[6] Rollo, pp. 20-29.
[7] Leo Wee v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008, pp. 11-12; Dula v. Maravilla, G.R. No. 134267, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 249, 258-262; La Jolla, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115851, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 102, 110; De Vera v. CA, G.R. No. 110297, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 396, 400; Legar Management v. CA, G.R. No. 117423, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 335, 338-340; Acab v. CA, G.R. No. 112285, February 21, 1995, 241 SCRA 546, 550-551; Palanca v. IAC, G.R. No. 71566, December 15, 1989, 180 SCRA 119, 127-129; Uy Hoo v. CA, G.R. No. 83263, June 14, 1989, 174 SCRA 100, 103-107; Rivera v. Florendo, L-60066, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 278, 286-287; Baens v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57091, November 23, 1983, 125 SCRA 634, 644.
[8] Supra, see note 7.
[9] Rollo, p. 28.
[10] Rollo, p. 19.