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MANILA MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - MIGUEL TAN, doing business under the name and
style of MANILA MANDARIN MARKETING, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 171702
Present: Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio
Morales, Tinga,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated: February
12, 2009 |
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QUISUMBING,
J.:
Assailed
in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated
The
facts of the case are as follows:
Miguel
Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing, was
engaged in the business of selling electrical materials.
From August 19 to P2,347,880. MMC
agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery, or be charged
interest of 18% per annum, and in case of suit to collect the same, to pay
attorney’s fees equal to 25% of the claim.[4]
MMC made partial
payments in the amount of P464,636.
But despite repeated demands, it failed to give the remaining balance of
P1,883,244, which was covered by nine invoices.[5]
On
After
Tan completed presenting evidence, MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence.[7] On
MMC offered as sole
witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to 2002. Ibarrola confirmed that it was standard
office procedure for a supplier to present the original sales invoice and
purchase order when claiming to be paid.
He testified that the absence of stamp marks on the invoices and
purchase orders negated receipt of said documents by MMC’s representatives.[9]
On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de
los
I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your
statement of account with you for the period and the amount stated below,
together with the corresponding original copies of the invoices, purchase order
and requisition slip attached for purpose of verification, bearing
acknowledgment of my/our receipt of goods.[10]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and against the
defendant, ordering the defendant to pay the principal amount of ONE MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,883,244.00),
with interest thereon at the rate of eighteen [percent] (18%) per annum starting
after thirty (30) days from each date of delivery of the merchandise sold until
finality hereof, and thereafter, at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
and the further sum equal to [twenty five percent] (25%) of the principal
amount as liquidated damages.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On
On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision. The decretal portion of the Court of Appeals
Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the RTC dated
SO ORDERED.[12]
Hence, this petition, which raises as sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S
OBLIGATION TO PAY HAD ALREADY LEGALLY ACCRUED CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT HAS
NOT FULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL THE PREREQUISITES FOR PAYMENT IMPOSED UNDER
PETITIONER’S PURCHASE ORDERS, THERE BEING NO PROOF THAT RESPONDENT HAD ACTUALLY
DONE SO.[13]
Simply
stated, we are now called upon to address the question of whether MMC should
pay for the electrical materials despite its allegation that Tan failed to
comply with certain requisites for payment.
Petitioner
contends that respondent’s claim for payment was premature inasmuch as the
original invoices and purchase orders were not sent to its accounting
department. Consequently, Tan’s claims
were not verified and processed. MMC
believes that mere delivery of the goods did not automatically give rise to its
obligation to pay. It relies on Article
1545 of the Civil Code to justify its refusal to pay:
ART. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a
contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party
may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the
condition.…
Petitioner also assails
the probative value of the documentary evidence presented during trial. MMC claims that the unauthenticated
photocopies of invoices and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence
Rule,[14]
which requires the production of the original writing in court. It adds that by Tan’s failure to yield the
original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed evidence under Section
3(e),[15] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
In
its Memorandum dated
In
his Memorandum dated
After serious consideration, we are in agreement that the
petition lacks merit.
Petitioner poses a question of fact
which is beyond this Court’s power to review.
This Court’s jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of
law that may have been committed by the Court of Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated and fully
established rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, especially when
they are in agreement with those of the trial court, are accorded not only
respect but even finality, and are binding on this Court. Barring a showing that the findings
complained of were devoid of support, they must stand. For this Court is not expected or required to
examine or refute anew the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties. The trial court, having heard
the witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is admittedly
in a better position to assess their credibility.[18] We cannot weigh again the merits of their
testimonies.
Having
thoroughly reviewed the records of this case, we find no persuasive much less
compelling reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the trial court
and appellate court. We hereby sustain
their findings and conclusions.
Worth
stressing, Article 1475 of the Civil Code provides the manner by which a
contract of sale is perfected:
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing
the form of contracts.
In this case, the purchase orders constituted accepted
offers when Tan supplied the electrical materials to MMC.[19] Hence, petitioner cannot evade its obligation
to pay by claiming lack of consent to the perfected contracts of sale. The invoices furnished the details of the
transactions.
As regards respondent’s failure to present the original
documents, suffice it to say that the best evidence rule applies only if the
contents of the writing are directly in issue.
Where the existence of the writing or its general purport is all that is
in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced in proof.[20] MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices
and purchase orders. Its lone contention
was that Tan did not submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement that photocopies of
the documents were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale between
the parties.
Neither is there merit to petitioner’s contention that respondent was
guilty of delay in filing the collection case.
A careful examination of the records shows that Tan brought suit against
MMC less than a year after the latter stopped making partial payments. Tan is, therefore, not guilty of laches.
Laches is the neglect to assert a right or
claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in a court of equity.[21] Here, Tan had no reason to go to court while
MMC was paying its obligation, even if partially, under the contracts of sale.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-14. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rules of Court, Rule 130,
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. − When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, ….
x x x x
[15] SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. − The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x x
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
x x x x
[16] Rollo, pp. 259-276.
[17]
[18] Amante v. Serwelas, G.R. No. 143572,
[19] H. Black, Black’s Law Dictionary 1235 (6th ed., 1990).
[20] S. Apostol, Essentials of Evidence 66 (1991 ed.).
[21] H. Black, Black’s Law Dictionary 875 (6th ed., 1990).