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SPS. IGLECERIO MAHINAY and |
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G.R. No. 170349 |
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FIDELA MAHINAY, |
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Petitioners, |
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- versus - |
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THE HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, |
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Presiding Judge, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran; |
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SHERIFF LUDENILO S. ADOR, |
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DANILO VELASQUEZ III, VIRGILIO |
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VELASQUEZ, MERLE VELASQUEZ, |
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ETHEL VELASQUEZ, CIELO |
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VELASQUEZ, DR. GERTRUDEZ |
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VELASQUEZ and LINO REDOBLADO, |
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Present: |
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Represented by ATTY. GABINO A. |
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VELASQUEZ, JR., |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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Respondents. |
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Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
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SPS. SIMEON
NARRIDO and |
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NACHURA,
and |
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GLORIA E.
NARRIDO, |
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PERALTA,
JJ. |
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Petitioners, |
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- versus - |
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THE HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, |
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Presiding Judge, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran; |
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SHERIFF LUDENILO S. ADOR, |
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DANILO VELASQUEZ III, VIRGILIO |
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VELASQUEZ, LOLITA VELASQUEZ, |
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MARIA CIELO VELASQUEZ, DR. GERTRUDEZ VELASQUEZ, |
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GABINO VELASQUEZ IV, and LINO |
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REDOBLADO, represented by ATTY. |
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GABINO A. VELASQUEZ, JR., |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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February
12, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the June 6, 2005
Decision[1]
and October 20, 2005 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 84045 which affirmed the
January 28, 2004 Order[3]
and April 26, 2004 Order[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran.
The facts of the case:
On February 24, 1987, Danilo Gabino
III; Ethel, Virgilio, Lolito, Gabino IV, Gertudes, Merle, Maria Cielo, Jose,
all surnamed Velasquez; Lino Redoblado, Leo Redoblado (Leo), Jose Redoblado,
and Marilyn Tansingco (Marilyn), all represented by Gabino A. Velasquez Jr.
(Gabino, Jr.), collectively referred to as respondents, filed with the RTC of
Naval, Biliran, Branch 16 a complaint for recovery of possession of parcels of
lands against spouses Iglecerio and Fidela Mahinay (petitioners). This case was docketed as Civil Case No.
B-0647 (Mahinay Case).[5]
On
In both cases, respondents claimed
that they were the absolute owners of the subject parcels of lands, as
evidenced by the certificates of title issued in their names.
Meanwhile, on
On
In the meantime, on
While the appeal[11]
of the State in the Reversion Cases was pending, petitioners filed with the CA
a “Motion to Suspend Proceedings” in the appeal of their case until after the
appeal of the Reversion Cases shall have been resolved. The CA granted said
motion.[12]
On
x x x x
While
indisputably, the state owns the property, still the only entity that can
question plaintiffs-appellees' [herein respondents] colorable title to it is
the State. While the issuance of a certificate of title does not give the owner
any better title than what he actually has, it is a rule long standing that 'in
case where the State had granted free composition title to a parcel of land in
favor of certain individuals, and there were other persons who tried to show
that such land was cultivated by them for many years prior to the registration
thereof in the name of grantees, the Supreme Court held that such persons who
have not obtained title from the State cannot question the titles legally
issued by the State.'
However,
since it is the State that has dominion over the property, and it is not
impleaded herein as a party, We believe it not within Our province to order
defendants-appellants [herein petitioners] to return the property to
plaintiffs-appellees, as the same property should be given back to the State.
Yet, considering the damage inflicted upon plaintiffs-appellees by reason of
their dispossession of the subject lands, it is but fair that damages should be
awarded to them for their inability to utilize the property for their own gain.
WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED, in that
plaintiffs-appellees [herein respondents] are declared not the owner of the
subject lands but the State. Plaintiffs-appellees, however, are declared to
be better entitled to possession thereof, and as such entitled to actual damages
owing to their inability to use them. Considering the paucity of evidence
before Us on the value of damage sustained by plaintiffs-appellees, We
resolve to hereby remand this case to the trial court for determination and
computation of correct amount of damages due plaintiffs-appellees.
SO
ORDERED.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On
On
On
x
x x x
Finding the motion for execution to be with merit,
the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHERFORE,
issue a writ of execution in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants in
accordance with the above computation and further directing the Sheriff to
place the plaintiffs [herein respondents] in possession of the land immediately
being the registered owner (sic) thereof.
SO ORDERED.[23]
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24]
of the RTC Order. Petitioners argued that the Order varied the decision of the
CA it sought to execute when it ordered the sheriff to place the respondents in
possession of the lands. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.[25]
Petitioners then appealed[26]
the RTC Order to the CA.
On
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, we hold that public
respondent Judge was correct when he issued the questioned orders dated
However,
the trial court is ordered to conduct further proceedings to determine the
amount of expenses, duly supported by evidence that the petitioners allegedly
spent for the preservation and cultivation of the land. These expenses should
be deducted from the total amount of damages petitioners are liable to pay the
private respondents.
The
amount of Php1,800.00, representing the excess payment for the docket and other
legal fees is again ordered returned to the petitioners, as contained in Our
Resolution dated
Costs
against the petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.[28]
The CA likewise denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration through a Resolution[29]
dated
Petitioner filed with this Court the
present petition.
On
The Petition assigns a single
assignment of error of the CA, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ENRIQUE C. ASIS WAS CORRECT WHEN, IN EXECUTING THE
DECISION (ANNEX “C”) AND RESOLUTION (ANNEX “D”) OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, HE
ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDERS (ANNEXES “F” AND “H”) WHEREIN HE DIRECTED THE
RESPONDENT SHERIFF TO PLACE THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN POSSESSION OF THE LANDS
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASES THEY “BEING THE REGISTERED OWNER [SIC] THEREOF”[31]
The petition is meritorious.
The RTC, in executing the
To stress, the
The RTC justified its Order of
awarding possession of the lands in dispute to respondents by relying on the
x
x x x
Most
importantly, on
“At the time the Titles of
Plaintiffs subsisted, there was color of title in favor of Appellees [herein
respondents], and the same was an operative fact which granted them a better
right to possess the property, as against Appellants [herein petitioners] who,
being are practically squatters, do not have any possessory rights.”
This
Order of the Court of Appeals, clearly supports the Order of execution of this
Court, to include delivery of possession. Since the Rules of Procedure, are
the same in all Courts, the rule in Malolos vs. Dy, 325 SCRA 827, finds
appropriate applicability “that the Court, who ordered the execution exercises
general supervisory control over its processes of execution and this power
carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law involved
in the execution.” x x x x
“The finality of the decision
with respect to possession de facto cannot be affected by the pendency
on appeal of a case where ownership of the property is being contested. Carreon
vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 78; Moreover, it is now a musty principle of
justice that a right cannot arise from a wrong. (San Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan
340 SCRA 289)
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion
of Defendants praying for a Modification of the award for damages cannot be
granted, for Defendants admitted the areas they have occupied in their Comment
to the Commissioner's Report and that the computation of this Court of the
palay harvest was based on Government records from the Bureau of Agriculture
and from the National Food Authority. The order of the Court of Appeals, of
As a Court of Justice, we cannot
allow Appellants (Defendants herein) to take full advantage of their illegal
occupancy of the land be it private or of the public domain- without being
liable therefor; otherwise it would be unjust enrichment of the worst kind.”
Moreover, the prayer for the stay of execution is
DENIED by reason of law and jurisprudence. Therefore, the Provincial Sheriff is
directed to proceed with the Execution by delivering possession to the
Plaintiffs, notwithstanding appeal on the matter of damages, on the part of the
Defendants.
SO
ORDERED.[35]
The RTC misapprehended the CA's
Resolution dated
While true it is that the title of appellees
[herein respondents] were subsequently annulled by the Supreme Court, nevertheless, at the time the Titles of Plaintiffs
subsisted, there was color of title in favor of Appellees, and the same was an
operative fact which granted them a better right to possess the property, as
against Appellants [herein petitioners] who, being are practically squatters,
do not have any possessory rights.
Since
the basis of appellees in exercising possession over the property in question
are Torrens titles, which should not be taken lightly, appellants violated the
rights of appellees when they, and not appellees, took and held the property,
depriving the appellees, who were the registered owners, of the use and fruits
of the property. In other words, before
the title to the property reverted to the Republic, appellees were the putative
owners thereof, entitled to all rights which are the full accouterments of
dominion, including possession. As a
Court of Justice, we cannot allow Appellants (Defendants herein) to take full
advantage of their illegal occupancy of the land be it private or of the public
domain- without being liable therefore; otherwise it would be unjust enrichment
of the worst kind. Thus, it would only be fair, since possession was wrested
by appellants [petitioners] from the appellees [respondents], to make the
former liable for whatever damages may have been occasioned appellees for the
unlawful usurpation their possession of the land.[36]
x x x x
4.
For the same reasons as those stated in the discussion of the Motion to implead
the Republic, the Motion of appellees for possession to be turned-over to
them whilst the instant case is pending, also cannot be granted. Briefly, it had already been
decided with finality that the title of appellees over the same are null and
void as of 11 August 1997; therefore, to award the appellees possession of
the same would not only be inconsistent with the 'becoming modesty' on the part
of this Court as only an appellate Court, but may be downright contumacious of
a final decision of the highest court in the land. It is for these reasons that
said motion must be denied.[37]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on the
December 5, 2001 Decision of the CA wherein possession was not awarded to
private respondents, just damages, it is clear that the RTC was mistaken when
it ruled that the CA had modified the latter’s December 5, 2001 Decision.
However, in the assailed Resolution dated
x x x x
Again,
we are stressing that Our decision is confined to the mere question of the
right of possession of said land by the petitioners as against the private
respondents and the proper amount of damages ought to be awarded to the latter.
It
bears emphasis that the private respondents had been in quiet, peaceable and
uninterrupted enjoyment of the possession of the land in question since 1946,
when Gabino Velasquez, Sr. bought the same from the parents of Rodrigo Arche
and Panfila Arche. When the land occupied by the petitioners was sold to them,
it was already previously disposed and sold to private respondents. In effect,
the second sale to the petitioners was a patent nullity and transmits no
rights. On this score, possession is [sic] ougth to be with the private respondents.
Furthermore,
Article 1477 provides that the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred
to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. The execution
of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the realty sold and its
possession by the vendee. Because after the sale of a realty by means of a
public instrument, the vendor, who resells it to another, does not transmit
anything to the second vendee and if the latter, by virtue of this second sale,
takes material possession of the thing, he does it as a mere detainer, and it
would be unjust to protect this detention against the rights to the thing
lawfully acquired by the first vendee.
Hence,
this Court is convinced that possession should also be awarded to the private
respondents to harmonize the decision of the court in granting the award of
damages to them. In the first place, had the petitioners been entitled to the
possession of the property, they should not be required to pay damages to the
private respondents. We are of the considered opinion that justice dictates for
us to award also the possession to the private respondents. It will be an empty
judgment if the petitioners will be just required to pay damages and yet
continue possessing the property. Possession of a piece of a property
may be wholly precarious or unrighteous, yet if the possessor has in his favor
priority of time, he has this security, that he is entitled to stay upon the
property until he is put off lawfully by a person having a better right. The
fact remains that respondents were first to possess the property and in fact
titles were issued in their favor as evidenced by Original Certificates of
Titles Nos. x x x. Despite the fact that their titles were nullified, between
two contending parties, possession should be given to one who had priority in
time. Petitioners are not the lawful possessors that can dispossess the
respondents for they are mere usurpers of the land.[38] (Emphasis
supplied)
It is a general
rule that the writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of
the decision to be executed, and that the execution is void if it is in excess
of and beyond the original judgment or award, for it is a settled general
principle that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential
particular of the judgment promulgated.[39] Where the judgment of an appellate court has
become final and executory and has been returned to the lower court, the only
function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the decision and
issuing the writ of execution.[40]
In addition, a final and executory
judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto a relief not originally
included.[41]
Thus, this Court finds that it was
improper for the RTC to award to respondents possession over the lands in
dispute, as the December 5, 2001 CA Decision it sought to execute and the April
11, 2002 CA Resolution clearly did not award possession to respondents, but instead held that
the owner of the subject lands is the State.
Possession was not a relief granted by the aforementioned CA
Decisions. It is therefore not a relief
which the RTC may grant on execution.
Accordingly, the CA seriously erred in issuing its
This Court is not unmindful of a
number of decisions[42]
wherein the Court affirmed writs of execution awarding possession of land,
notwithstanding that the decisions sought to be executed did not order its
delivery to the parties. In Perez v.
Evite,[43]
the Court ruled that where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the
judgment, the delivery of possession of the land should be considered included
in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party's claim to the possession
thereof is based on his claim of ownership. Moreover, in Baluyut v. Guiao,[44]
the Court held that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of
the decision, but also covers those necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. The foregoing ruling, however,
find no application to the case at bar, as it is necessary that the decision
sought to be executed must have at the very least awarded ownership of the
lands to the parties. To reiterate,
respondents are not the owners of the land in dispute, but the State.
Respondents
insist that possession should be awarded to them, as they allege that the
government has slept on their rights and has not moved to execute[45]
the CA judgment, which declared the disputed lands part of the public
domain. Such argument deserves scant
consideration, considering that the inaction of the State does not detract from
the fact that it is the owner of the lands in dispute and, therefore,
respondents have no standing or right to demand their return.
Thus,
as far as the December 5, 2001 Decision of the CA is concerned, the Court
upholds the pronouncement that the subject lands are State-owned and
inalienable, and possession is not to be awarded to private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted. The Decision dated June 6,
2005 and Resolution dated October 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 84045 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, only insofar
as it affirmed the Order dated January 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of
Naval, Biliran (Branch 16) directing the Sheriff to place the respondents in
possession of the subject land in Civil Case No. B-0647.
The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court on
Let the original records be remanded
to the said Regional Trial Court for further proceedings to determine the
amount of expenses, as directed by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
June 6, 2004, within ten (10) days from the date of finality of this Decision.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
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MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
diosdado
m. peralta
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with the concurrence of Executive
Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., rollo,
pp. 71-81.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo,
p. 88.
[8] CA
rollo, pp. 245-249.
[9]
[10] Rollo,
p. 88.
[11] Docketed
as CA-G.R. CV Nos. 28745-28756.
[12] Rollo
pp. 88-89.
[13]
[14] Rollo,
p. 89.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Penned
by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., id. at 84-93
[19]
[20] Rollo,
pp. 94-99.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Docketed
as CA-G.R.SP No. 84045.
[27] Penned
by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with the concurrence of Executive
Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., rollo, pp. 71-81.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Rollo,
p. 64.
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] Rollo,
pp. 112-113.
[36] Rollo,
p. 96.
[37]
[38] Rollo,
pp. 79-80.
[39] See
Ex-Bataan Veteran Security Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 121428, November 29, 1995, 250 SCRA 418; Equatorial
Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 136221, May 12,
2000, 332 SCRA 139; Philippine Veterans Bank of Communications v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 126158, September 28, 1997, 279 SCRA 364.
[40] Sia
v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 152921,
[41] Civil Procedure Annotated, Justice Jose
Feria and Maria Concepcion Noche, 2001 Edition, p.13.
[42] Perez v. Evite, No. L-16003,
[43] Supra note 42.
[44] Supra note 42.
[45] Rollo,
p. 293.