THIRD DIVISION
|
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner, - versus - ROWENA
ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE Oppositor. |
G.R. No. 161793
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: February 13, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O
N
NACHURA, J.:
Far
from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation
in our laws, has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much
ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated—free in form and devoid of
any definition.
For
the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August
5, 2003 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19,
2004 Resolution[2] denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The
relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te
first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to
Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young
man decided to court Rowena. That was in
January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a
freshman.[3]
Sharing similar angst towards their
families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. In March
1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that they elope. At first, he refused,
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus,
they left
However, Edward’s P80,000.00
lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance
fast depleted it. And they could not
find a job. In April 1996, they decided
to go back to
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle
brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6]
The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated
like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and
talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home
and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested
that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but
the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted
that Edward must go home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from
the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her
family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk
to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence
that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to
live separate lives. They then parted
ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on
January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of
As Rowena did not file an answer, the
trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted
an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was collusion
between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.[14]
The clinical psychologist who
examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made
the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD
KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born
Again Christian at
Petitioner
got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased
sister. Both his parents are also in the
business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to
be handed to each of the family member.
He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of
meeting people. After 1994, he tried his
luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as
being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor.
He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his
childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent
is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a
disobedient wife. She is said to have
not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with
her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In
January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became
the foundation of their intimate relationship.
After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is
having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that
she actually wanted to get out of their lives.
From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they
should elope and live together.
Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young
and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because
petitioner is rich. In the last week of
March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought
tickets for the boat going to
Respondent
decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the
parents of petitioner. But when the parents
of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways
with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they
will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a
declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at
his parents[ۥ] and relatives[ۥ] houses.
Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went
home. He told his parents about his
predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not
inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was
referred for counseling. Petitioner[,]
after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic]
the home of petitioner’s parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that
she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and
be away from his parents. She also
intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he
would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the
petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live with
petitioner where he chose for them to stay,
petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his
parents. He told her already that he was
disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to
support her. After knowing that
petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting
petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The
said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the
wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up
was caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their young
age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
M M P I
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both
petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly
impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by
different notions on marriage.
Edward
Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and
unready so as to commit himself to marriage.
He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and
mingling with other individuals. He is
seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and
uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type
of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time
alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is
said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in
her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour.
She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage
with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich
family. In order to have her dreams
realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow
weak-willed. Upon the realization that
there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the
relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really
get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows.
Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by
petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have
impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own
selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship
by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely
exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly
uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is
suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and
Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only
manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities
that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.[15]
The trial court, on July 30, 2001,
rendered its Decision[16]
declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both
parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.[17] The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely
filed its notice of appeal.[18]
On review, the appellate court, in
the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19]
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological
incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent,
and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements
stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina[21] needed
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.[22]
The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required
certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its
agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.[23] The
CA later denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the likewise
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before
this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15,
2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26]
petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court. He posits that the RTC
declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological
incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the
actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had
been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its
memorandum,[28] that
the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the
essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity
was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or
clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements
in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]
The Court now resolves the singular
issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between
the parties is null and void.[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision,
tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting
it.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32]
provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of
the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in
However,
as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of
the
“During its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft
of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the
IBP and the UP
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code
Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on
the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated
the definition of marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.’
With the above definition, and considering
the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any
provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an
action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds
available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare
a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage.
Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found
in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New
Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the
present Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
as well as the following implementing
provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage
may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.’
x x x x x x x x x
It is believed that many hopelessly broken
marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In
fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as
well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of “lack of due
discretion” for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because
of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the
foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting
physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.[34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35]
she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
“(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.”
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session was over:
“(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.”
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to “wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage” and to “mentally incapacitated.” It was explained that these phrases refer to “defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation.” There being a defect in consent, “it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.”
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term “psychological or mental impotence,” Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term “is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase.” He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as “psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . .” Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: “Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.”
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase “and is incurable” but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under “special cases and special situations,” hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: “3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage” provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal “annuls” a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church “annulments” are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code—and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: “Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.”
Favorable
annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof
necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The
Interestingly, the Committee did not
give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it
might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired
that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken
from the Canon Law.[37] The law is then so designed as to allow some
resiliency in its application.[38]
Yet, as held in
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave
lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential
obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal
judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and
on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such
contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality,
and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire
unbeknown to both of them. This is the
hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the
psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a
priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well
the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist.
The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both
valid and sufficient. The psychological
act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction:
the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing
the object of consent. The person may be
capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling
the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors
of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage
arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises
from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a
sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized,
thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so –
that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the
hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the
higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human
acts. The evidence from the empirical
sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which
may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with
respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it
is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a
person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what
marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person
can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be
able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage
issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity
to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been
hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were
not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity
to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the
conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented
from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the
intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this
irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision,
made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision
made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free
act. But this is precisely the question:
is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously
under such an irresistible compulsion?
It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think
that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can
understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it
implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that
he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually
regularity. It would seem more correct
to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective
because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground.
Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled
mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability
to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of
consent, on the other. It is his opinion
that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are
usually able to evaluate its implications.
They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent
consent. However, such persons, capable
as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty
in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing
the object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and
evaluating intact. What it affects is
the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object
of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited,
supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to
say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the
ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature
evaluation and weighing of things. The
decision coram Sabattani concerning a
nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with
regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such
a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity,
although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of
marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of
Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral
impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of
the will and the intellect. It is
qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence
that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject
incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that
the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
x x x x
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity.
There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where
one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that
he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to
maintain and sustain such a relationship.
A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are
incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to
the very substance of matrimony. Another
incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of
himself or of the other party. The canon
speaks, not of the bonum partium, but
of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party qua
persona rather than qua conjunx
would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be
quite capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the
other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are
general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual
description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of
the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious
sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential
obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his
“constitutional immorality.”
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and
capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is
determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during
the moment of execution of decision. And
when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the
actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was
in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party
to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and
especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985,
Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential
obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on
the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards
the rights of others that he had violated.
Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of
this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable
expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve
one’s ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations
considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are
basically centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have
to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or
several, or even all of these rights.
There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is
impossible. Some characteristic features
of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective
immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what
rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage – that is to
say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however,
rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with
charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is
said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium
totius vitae. The third paragraph of
C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly
seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the
spouse. Neither is it a mental
infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect
the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to
assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this
object of the matrimonial contract. In
other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in
the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A
last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by
the canon: causes of a psychological nature.
Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other
words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the
psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity
that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the
hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A
person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he
is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the
assumption of these obligations. A bad
habit deeply engrained in one’s consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a
source of this invalidating incapacity.
The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however
remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given one’s
psychic constitution. It would seem then
that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not
the fruit of some degree of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the law’s intention that
it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a
party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining
the lower court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason
v. Court of Appeals,[43]
ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial court’s
findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings,
the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45]
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court
and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
the form of testimony. Importantly, the
Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept
should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do's.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the
Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia
of then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred “in the result” and
another three—including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took pains to compose
their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that “each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.”[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving
subsequent cases,[49]
the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law’s
clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as “courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.”
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate
for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court
was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital
bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the “most
liberal divorce procedure in the world.”[50]
The unintended consequences of Molina,
however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic
social institutions. Far from what was intended
by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible
abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards
against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.[52]
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving
marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on
account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological
disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations,
from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of
physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is
no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of
nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage
by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its
business. And second, because the
judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a
lesson learned. On one hand, the normal
spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder recurring
in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not
suggesting the abandonment of Molina
in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio
v. Reyes,[55] there
is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate
once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship
lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider
as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, “not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
“The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to
the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with
the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.”
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
“At stake is a type of constitutional
impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality
with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3)
the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
x x x x
The psychological grounds are the best
approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on
any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time
of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating
on the parties' incapacity to assume or
carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that
at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure
to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage
was entered into.”[58]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60]
asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.[61]
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we
mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[62]
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the
inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to refer the
case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the
courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the
parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the
psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that
both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders
as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or
traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to
cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with
interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable
by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious
in middle or old age. An individual may
have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have
personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in
which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting
along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and
often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders
are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or
dependent. Such traits can lead to
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders
Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include
Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development
led to certain personality types. Thus,
some disorders as described in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from
his oral, anal and phallic character types.
Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was
thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity
and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage;
fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an
inability to engage in intimate relationships.
However, later researchers have found little evidence that early
childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.
Genetic
Factors Researchers have found that there may be a
genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline
personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related
to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic
Theories In individuals who have borderline
personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid
5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated
with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit
eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG)
have been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the
most widely reported abnormality. A
study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG
abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types
of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality
disorders are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A:
Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric
habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional,
erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C:
Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive
personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The
DSM-III-R also lists another category, “personality disorder not otherwise
specified,” that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for
mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality
disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]
Dependent
personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a
pattern of dependent and submissive behavior.
Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance
by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent
personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be
unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to
live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.[65]
and
antisocial personality disorder described, as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern
of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations
imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal
behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse
without remorse and a tendency to blame others.
There is often a façade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control
others.
Although
characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some
individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of
self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to
a public scandal.
During
the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to
as moral insanity. The term described
immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.
According
to the classification system used in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social
personality disorder is one of the four “dramatic” personality disorders, the
others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.[66]
The
seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the
Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the
expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and
void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further consider
that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’ deportment,
arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed,
petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume
the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned.[67]
As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him
by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of
his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals
and clear direction in life.
Although
on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard
for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover,
as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide.
Both
parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article
VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-36.
[2]
[3] TSN, September 12, 2000, p. 2.
[4]
[5]
[6] Records, p. 8.
[7] TSN, September 12, 2000, pp. 3-4.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Records, p. 1.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] The dispositive portion of the RTC’s July 30, 2001 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE and defendant ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ UY-TE, officiated by Honorable Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 82, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 23, 1996, NULL AND VOID, ab initio, on the ground of the couple’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; and dissolving their property regime in accordance with law, if there is any.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the City Civil Registry of Valenzuela City where the marriage took place and City Civil Registry of Quezon City where this decision originated for proper recording.
SO ORDERED. (
[18] Records, pp. 67-68.
[19] Supra note 1.
[20] The dispositive portion of the CA’s August 5, 2003 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed decision dated July 30, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 106,
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35.)
[21] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[22] Executive
Order No. 209, entitled “The Family Code of the
[23] Rollo,
pp. 28-35.
[24] Supra note 2.
[25] Rollo,
p. 79.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Supra note 21.
[30] Rollo,
pp. 86-92.
[31] Supra note 22.
[32]
[33] G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
[34]
[35] Supra note 21.
[36] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 681-685.
[37] Salita
v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108, quoting
Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family
Code of the
[38]
[39]
[40] Article 68 of the Family Code provides in full:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[41]
[42] Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage: Introductory Notes and Comments, 2000 ed., pp. 110-119.
[43] 326 Phil. 169 (1996).
[44]
[45] 334 Phil. 294, 300-304 (1997).
[46] Supra note 21.
[47] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 676-680.
[48]
[49] See Republic of the Philippines v. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008; Nilda V. Navales v. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008; Lester Benjamin S. Halili v. Chona M. Santos-Halili, et al., G.R. No. 165424, April 16, 2008; Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123; Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA 19; Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396; Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353; Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572; Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508; Carating-Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004); Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 626 (2003); Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002); Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001); Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000); Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76.
[50]
[51] Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, 2006 ed., pp. 14-16, cites the following:
“Canon 1095, 3 concerning psychological incapacity pointed out cases of various psychological disorders from the Roman Rota as enumerated below (Fr. Bacareza, 1999).
“6.1. From the 1917 Code of the Second
1.
Coram Teodori in
2.
Coram Heard on June 5, 1941 on Nymphomania.
3.
Coram Heard in
4.
Coram Mattioli in
5.
Coram Sabbatani in
6.
Coram Mattioli in
7.
Coram Lefebvre on December 19, 1959 on Nymphomania.
8.
Coram De Jorio on December 19, 1961 on Schizophrenia.
“6.2 From the Second
9.
Coram Monsigneur Charles Lefebre on the
following:
a. Homosexuality,
b. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania,
c. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis, and
d. Affective
Immaturity and Passive Dependent
Personality.
10. Coram
Monsigneur Lucien Anne on
February 25, 1969 on Lesbianism.
11. Coram
De Jorio on April 30, 1969 on Maturity of Judgment.
12. Coram
Jose Maria Pinto Gomez on the
following:
a. Serious Paranoid Schizophrenia (November
26, 1969),
b. Anti-Social Personality Disorder (March
18, 1971),
c. Vaginismus or Psychic impotence; Frigidity (July 15, 1977)
d. Neurasthenic Psychopath (April 20, 1979)
e. Sexual Disorder (December 3, 1982)
13. Coram
Bruno on the following:
a. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania (December 15,
1972)
b. Sexual Neurosis (March 27, 1981)
c. Psychoneurosis (December 17, 1982)
14. Coram
Jose Maria Serrano Ruiz on the
following:
a. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis (April 5,
1973)
b. Lack of Interpersonal Integration (April
15, 1973)
c. Immature Personality (July 9, 1976)
d. Psychic Immaturity (November 18, 1977)
e. Depressive Neurosis (July 12, 1978)
f. Obsessive-Compulsive Personality (May
23, 1980)
g. Frigidity (July 28, 1981)
h. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
15. Coram
Ewers on the following:
a. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
b. Sexual Neurosis (April 4, 1981)
16. Coram
Pariscella on the following:
a. Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis (February
23, 1978)
b. Homosexuality (June 11, 1978)
17. Coram
Fiore (May 27, 1981)
18. Coram Agustoni (March 23, 1982)
“6.3. After
the Promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law
19. Rotal
Case No. 41:c. Colagiovanni on
March 3, 1983 on Homosexuality
20. Rotal
Case No. 42 c. Huot on July
18, 1983 on Alcoholism and Immature Personality.
21. Rotal
Case No. 43: c. Giannechini on
July 19, 1983 on Homosexuality.
22. Rotal
Case No. 45: c. Colagiovanni
on November 22, 1983 about an ex-priest who was a “liar, cheat and swindler” (Anti-Social
Personality)
23. Rotal
Case No. 46: c. Stankiewiez on
November 24, 1983 on Homosexuality.
24. Rotal
Case No. 47: c. Egan on March
29, 1984 on Hysterical Personality.
25. Rotal
Case No. 48: c. Di Felice on
June 9, 1984 on Psychic Immaturity.
26. Rotal
Case No. 49: c. Pinto on May
30, 1986 on Alcoholism and Gambling.
27. Rotal
Case No. 50: c. Giannecchini
on December 20, 1988 on Hypersexuality-Nymphomania.
[52] Justice Padilla’s Dissenting Opinion, Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 36-37; Ancheta v. Ancheta, supra note 49, at 917.
[53] Supra note 34.
[54] See Article 36 of the Family Code; see also Justice Carpio’s Dissenting Opinion, Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272, 299.
[55] Supra note 49, at 370.
[56] Records, pp. 54-55; TSN, November 7, 2000, pp. 5-6.
[57] Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D., of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-Dagupan, explains in Marriage Tribunal Ministry, 1992 ed., that “[s]tandard practice shows the marked advisability of Expert intervention in Marriage Cases accused of nullity on the ground of defective matrimonial consent on account of natural incapacity by reason of any factor causative of lack of sufficient use of reason, grave lack of due discretion and inability to assume essential obligations—although the law categorically mandates said intervention only in the case of impotence and downright mental disorder x x x.” (p. 106).
[58] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 685-688.
[59] Supra note 49, at 88; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note 49, at 743.
[60] Supra note 49, at 850; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note 49, at 742; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 49, at 526; Zamora v. Court of Appeals, supra note 49, at 27; Paras v. Paras, supra note 49, at 96-97.
[61] The
Court, however, by saying—
[T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based
merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never
conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to
have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement “[I]f
what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x”
x x x x
Obviously, Dr. Guanzon had no personal knowledge of
the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand
information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be
dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Guanzon tried to save his credibility by asserting
that he was able to assess petitioner’s character, not only through the
descriptions given by respondent, but also through the former’s at least
fifteen hours of study of the voluminous transcript of records of this case.
Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the
records of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioner’s psychological
state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
in Choa v. Choa (Supra note 49, at 190-191), in effect, required the personal examination of the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
[62] Psychologists
of the Psychological Extension Evaluation
Research Services (PEERS) enumerate
the segments of the psychological evaluation report for psychological
incapacity as follows:
Current
Life Situation: Presenting complaint (personal and marital conflict),
history of problem, and consequences in client’s life.
Life
History Information: Childhood development, educational history, vocational
history, medical history, sexual and marital history, personal goals.
·
Behavior Observations: Description of client, relationship with examiner, and test related
behaviors.
·
Interpretation of Test Results:
Intellectual
Functioning: Wechsler tests, Stanford-Binet, etc. Obtained IQ
scores and specific strengths and deficits.
Cognitive
Functioning: Rorschach, TAT, MMPI, etc. Perception of reality or perceptual
efficiency, conceptual organization, psychological needs, conflicts,
preoccupations, suspiciousness, hallucinations, or delusions.
Emotional
Functioning (MMPI, Rorschach, etc.): Liability of emotions, impulse control, predominant
concerns like aggression, anxiety, depression, guilt, dependency, and
hostility.
Relationship
Patterns (MMPI, Rorschach, TAT, etc.): Problem areas in work or
school, friendships, intimate relationships, difficulties such as immaturity,
irresponsibility, cooperativeness, sociability, introversion, impulsivity,
aggression, dangerousness to self or others.
Defenses
and compensations: Evidence of any strength, any coping
mechanisms, or any useful compensation that might be helping the client
maintain himself/herself.
Summary: Emphasis
should be on conciseness and accuracy so that the reader can quickly find the
essential information and overall impression.
Conclusion: Integrating
the material (data) into a more smoothly stated conceptualization of the
client’s personality and problem areas as regards root causes and
characteristics as ground for nullity of marriage.
Diagnosis: Diagnostic
impression is evolved form the data obtained, formed impression of personality
disorders, and classified mental disorders based on the criteria and multi
axial system of the DSM IV.
Prognosis: Predicting
the behavior based on the data obtained that are relevant to the current functioning
of the client, albeit under ideal conditions.
[63] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.
[64] Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of
Mental Health, 1993 ed., pp. 291-292. See
Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, Roy, Psychology, 7th ed.,
2006, pp. 613-614, defining personality disorders as “long-standing, inflexible
ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional
styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and,
beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display
them and for others. Some psychologists view personality disorders as
interpersonal strategies or as extreme, rigid, and maladaptive expressions of
personality traits.” (Citations omitted.)
[65]
[66]
[67] Supra note 65.
[68] Supra note 66.