Republic of
the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
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ROGELIA DACLAG
and |
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G.R. No. 159578 |
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ADELINO DACLAG
(deceased), |
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substituted by
RODEL M. DACLAG, |
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Present: |
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and ADRIAN M.
DACLAG, |
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Petitioners, |
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QUISUMBING,* J. |
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CARPIO,** J. |
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versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*** J., |
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Acting Chairperson, |
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ELINO MACAHILIG,
ADELA |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, and |
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MACAHILIG, CONRADO |
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NACHURA, JJ. |
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MACAHILIG,
LORENZA HABER |
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and BENITA |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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February 18, 2009 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration of our Decision dated
Records show that while the land
was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, respondents’ complaint
for reconveyance was filed in 1991, which was within the 10-year prescriptive
period.
We ruled that since petitioners
bought the property when it was still an unregistered land, the defense of
having purchased the property in good faith is unavailing. We affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in finding
that petitioners should pay respondents their corresponding share in the
produce of the subject land from the time they were deprived thereof until the
possession is restored to them.
In their Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioners contend that the 10-year period for reconveyance is applicable if
the action is based on an implied or a constructive trust; that since
respondents' action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action must be
filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud, citing Gerona v. De
Guzman,[1]
which was reiterated in Balbin v. Medalla.[2]
We do not agree.
In Caro v. Court of Appeals,[3] we have
explicitly held that “the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is 10 years reckoned from the date of the issuance of
the certificate of title x x x.”[4]
However, notwithstanding
petitioners' unmeritorious argument, the Court deems it necessary to make
certain clarifications. We have earlier
ruled that respondents' action for reconveyance had not prescribed, since it
was filed within the 10-year prescriptive period.
However, a review of the factual
antecedents of the case shows that respondents' action for reconveyance was not
even subject to prescription.
The deed of sale executed by
Maxima in favor of petitioners was null and void, since Maxima was not the
owner of the land she sold to petitioners, and the one-half northern portion of
such land was owned by respondents.
Being an absolute nullity, the deed is subject to attack anytime, in
accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code that an action to declare the
inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe. Likewise, we have consistently ruled that when
there is a showing of such illegality, the property registered is deemed to be
simply held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is
registered, and the former then has the right to sue for the reconveyance of
the property.[5]
An action for reconveyance based on a
void contract is imprescriptible.[6] As long as the land wrongfully registered
under the
Petitioners next contend that
they are possessors in good faith, thus, the award of damages should not have
been imposed. They further contend that
under Article 544, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received
before the possession is legally interrupted; thus, if indeed petitioners are
jointly and severally liable to respondents for the produce of the subject
land, the liability should be reckoned only for 1991 and not 1984.
We find partial merit in this
argument.
Article 528 of the Civil Code
provides that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character,
except in a case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor
is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Possession in good faith ceases from the
moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors, by extraneous
evidence or by suit for recovery of the
property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from
which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his
title or mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to show bad
faith.[8] Such interruption takes place upon service of
summons.[9]
Article 544 of the same Code
provides that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long
as his possession is not legally interrupted. Records show that petitioners received a
summons together with respondents' complaint on
Finally,
petitioner would like this
Court to look into the finding of the RTC that “since Maxima died in October
1993, whatever charges and claims petitioners may recover from her expired with
her”; and that the proper person to be held liable for damages to be awarded to
respondents should be Maxima Divison or her estate, since she misrepresented
herself to be the true owner of the subject land.
We are not persuaded.
Notably, petitioners never raised
this issue in their appellants' brief or in their motion for reconsideration
filed before the CA. In fact, they never
raised this matter before us when they filed their petition for review. Thus, petitioners cannot raise the same in
this motion for reconsideration without offending the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process, specially since Maxima was not substituted at all by
her heirs after the promulgation of the RTC Decision.
WHEREFORE, petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Special Third
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* In
lieu of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, per Special Order No. 564 dated
**
Carpio, J. designated
member in lieu of Reyes, J., (ret.) per Raffle dated
***
In lieu of Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, per Special Order No. 563 dated
[1] G.R. No. L-4258,
[2] 195 Phil. 475 (1981).
[3] G.R.
No. 76148,
[4]
[5] Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70263, May 14, 1990, 185 SCRA 352, 363.
[6]
[7]
[8] Wong v. Carpio, G.R. No.
50264,
[9]
[10] Records, pp. 5-6.