FIRST DIVISION
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, G.R. No. 159310
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Respondent. February 24, 2009
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D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
What are the rights of an alien (and
his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the country as
against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were
registered under the
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm
Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to
live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes,
Jambrich also formally
adopted respondent’s two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN,[4]
and per Decision of the
However,
the idyll lasted only until April 1991.
By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live
with another woman in
Jambrich
met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate
business. He also built and repaired
speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich
purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for
which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and
interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced
by a “Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment.”[6] On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to
register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots
have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property
has already been mortgaged.
On August
2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real
property before the
In her
Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo
of the purchase price. On the contrary,
she claimed that she “solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to
defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question,” and
that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property
in the
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found—
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the
purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under litigation that Wilhelm
Jambrich was still working and earning much.
This fact of Jambrich earning much is not only supported by documentary
evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a
Opalla. So that, Jambrich’s financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties
. . . is not disputed.[7]
x x x
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that
before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part of 1984, she was only
working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00
a month and was . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a]
squatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of her and
the situation of her children that he offered her a better life which she
readily accepted. In fact, this
miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are all stated
and reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. “G” and
“G-1”) which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same when
she was personally interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of her
two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that,
if such facts were not true because these are now denied by her . . . and if it
was also true that during this time she was already earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as
profit per month from her copra business, it would be highly unbelievable and
impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition since it is
the observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an
expensive person and not thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court in order
to have a big saving as clearly shown by her actuation when she was already
cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the allowance
given . . . by him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not enough to maintain
the education and maintenance of her children.[8]
This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the
properties under litigation or could contribute any amount for their
acquisition which according to her is worth more than P700,000.00 when while she was working as [a] waitress
at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more
or less P2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of
her family so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in
financial distress when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and
live with him because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her
children who were already abandoned by her husband.[9]
x x x
The only probable and possible reason why her name
appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell dated November 18, 1985 and
March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987]
as buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and
exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at
that time was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude shown
by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything she needs,
he being earning (sic) much yet at
that time. In fact, as observed by this
Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the time
when their relationship was still going smoothly and harmoniously.[10]
[Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over
the residential house of strong materials and three parcels of land designated
as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792
issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791
and 24792 issued in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in
the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name
of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
4) Declaring
the contracts now marked as Exhibits “I,” “K” and “L” as avoided insofar as
they appear to convey rights and interests over the properties in question to
the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
5) Ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of P25,000.00
and litigation expenses in the amount of
P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.[11]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002,[12] the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower court’s conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title to the subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.[13]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENT’S
JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING JAMBRICH’S
PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH HAS NO
TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN
ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
III.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-REASONED
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST HEREIN
PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).[14]
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The
evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between
respondent and Jambrich possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. At the time of
the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully
employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of
P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to P90,000.00.
On the
other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a
monthly salary of not more than P1,000.00.
In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as
admitted by her during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business
were unsubstantiated. The supposed copra
business was actually the business of her mother and their family, with ten
siblings. She has no license to sell
copra, and had not filed any income tax return.
All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last
one left standing was already scrap.
Further, the Child Study Report[15]
submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the
adoption proceedings of respondent’s two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the
children until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984.
At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers of
The DSWD Home Study Report[17]
further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz
when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of the said
Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the]
English language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of
additional income to support [her] 2 young children who were abandoned by their
father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the
residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and during the proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent
lived in
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject properties to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did not controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply.[19] In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.[20]
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.[21] It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.[22] Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,[23] and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.[24] However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.[25] This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
Respondent
argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution,[26]
which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution,[27]
and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.[28] The capacity to acquire private land is
dependent on the capacity “to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,[30] the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases[31] that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under
litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution
of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these
properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw
in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The trial
court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the
cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house
of strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and
5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates
of title in his name. The trial court
likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner P25,000 as attorney’s fees
and P10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of suit.
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Court’s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,[32] is this – since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C.
CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Exhibit “I,” Original Records, p. 104.
[2] Exhibit “K,” id. at 105.
[3] Exhibit “L,” id. at 106-109.
[4] Exhibit “C,” id. at 87-89.
[5] Exhibit “H,” id. at 101-103.
[6] Exhibit “O,” id. at 155.
[7] Decision, id. at 294.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] CA rollo, pp. 225-226.
[14] Rollo, p. 15.
[15] Exhibit “G,” Original Records, pp. 97-100.
[16]
[17] Exhibit “F,” id. at 92-96.
[18]
[19] Art. 144, Civil Code; Art. 147, Family Code.
[20] Art. 148, Family Code; Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva, G.R. No. 141501, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 135.
[21] Bollozos v. Yu Tieng Su, No. L-29442, November 11, 1987, 155 SCRA 506.
[22] Id. at 517, citing Bautista v. Dy Bun Chin, CA-L-6983-R, 49 O.G. 179.
[23] Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915).
[24] Government v.
[25] Ignacio v. Chua Beng, 52 Phil. 940 (1929); Acosta v. Gomez, 52 Phil. 744 (1929); Cruz v. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144 (1916).
[26] SECTION 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
[27]
SECTION 5. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the
[28] SECTION 14. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
[29] 1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7
of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
[30] G.R. No. L-34672, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 446.
[31] Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-33048, April 16, 1982, 113 SCRA 547; Godinez v. Pak Luen, G.R. No. L-36731, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 223, Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, 96 Phil. 447 (1955); Herrera v. Luy King Guan, G.R. No. L-17043, January 31, 1961, 1 SCRA 406; Yap v. Maravillas, G.R. No. L-31606, March 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 244; and De Castro v. Tan, G.R. No. L-31956, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 85.
[32] Hko Ah Pao v. Ting, G.R. No. 153476, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 551; Muller v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 65; Lee v. Republic, G.R. No. 128195, October 3, 2001, 366 SCRA 524.