THIRD
DIVISION
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LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (FORMERLY LA CAMPANA
FOOD PRODUCTS INC.), Petitioner, - versus - DEVELOPMENT BANK OF
THE Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 146157 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: February 13, 2009 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by La
Campana Development Corporation (petitioner La Campana) assailing the Decision[1]
and Resolution,[2]
promulgated on 31 August 2000 and 21 November 2000, respectively, by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48773, entitled, “Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. The Regional Trial Court, Branch No. 76, Quezon City, Presided
by the Hon. Monina A. Zeñarosa, La Campana Food Products Inc. (now known as La
Campana Development Corporation), and The Register of Deeds of Quezon City.”
The present Petition stemmed from a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution[3] filed by Development
Bank of the Philippines (respondent DBP) on 7 January 1997, which prayed for
the implementation of the 3 November 1994
Decision[4] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856, entitled, “La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Development Bank of the Philippines,
et al.”
The antecedents of the aforementioned Motion are as
follows:
Sometime in 1968, petitioner La Campana obtained a foreign
currency loan that was guaranteed by respondent DBP. To protect the latter, petitioner La Campana
executed a real estate mortgage over its properties. Petitioner La Campana,
however, failed to pay the interest due on said loan; thus, all the promissory
notes became due and respondent DBP, in compliance with the contract of
guaranty abovementioned, had to remit payment to petitioner La Campana’s
creditor. When respondent DBP demanded
reimbursement from petitioner La Campana to no avail, the former instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings for the mortgaged properties of the
latter.
In order to stay the foreclosure of its mortgaged
properties, petitioner La Campana filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch IX, for payment of the (1) retained portion of
the dollar loan; (2) damages for unearned and expected profits for the failure
of respondent DBP to release the proceeds of the dollar loan in its entirety;
(3) exemplary damages; and (4) attorney’s fees. The sale at public auction of the mortgaged
properties eventually pushed through, with
respondent DBP being the highest bidder. Accordingly, the complaint of petitioner La
Campana was amended to include the nullification of the foreclosure sale. On
On 27 May 1986, petitioner La Campana instituted another
complaint against respondent DBP, and impleaded the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, for the cancellation of real estate mortgage and release of titles of the
mortgaged properties on the ground that respondent DBP had already lost
whatever right it had to the foreclosed properties which it acquired at public
auction sometime in 1972 or more than ten (10) years ago, because it failed to
register the Certificates of Sale covering the same.[6]
The same was filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of
On
Upon motion of petitioner La Campana, however, in an Order[8]
dated
Respondent DBP appealed the aforementioned to the Court of
Appeals.
On 3 November 1994, the appellate court decided[9]
the appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 34856, in favor of the bank and declared
that “while non-registration of the certificates of title under the name of DBP
may not be binding on innocent third parties, La Campana – which has lost its rights
of ownership for its failure to redeem – cannot invoke such non-registration as
against DBP. After all, registration
under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring ownership.”[10]
The dispositive portion reads:
1. ORDERING La Campana Food Products, Inc.
to surrender to the Development Bank of the Philippines the possession of the
properties covered by the Transfer Certificate (sic) of Title Nos. 33035,
33036, 45869, 45870, 45871, 42868 and 23617;
2. ORDERING La Campana Food Products, Inc. to pay the
Development Bank of the Philippines such sums of money unlawfully collected
and/or received by way of rentals from the properties covered by the
aforementioned TCT’s;[11]
Undaunted, petitioner La Campana came to this Court and
filed two (2) petitions – a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 120257 and a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
L-124107.
On
In view of the foregoing, on 9 January 1997, respondent DBP
filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 76, a Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution[16]
for the implementation of the 3 November
1994 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856, i.e., for petitioner La Campana to 1)
surrender to respondent DBP the possession of the subject properties; and 2)
render an accounting of all the sums of money “unlawfully collected and/or
received by way of rentals from the properties” covering the period from 1 May
1976 until the possession thereof had been completely surrendered to it.
On
Petitioner La Campana opposed[18]
the supplemental motion on the ground that the “decision (sought to be implemented) is incomplete”[19]
as it is “totally silent as to
what amount was unlawfully collected and from what period up to what period is
covered by the said decision x x x.”[20] Further, it was of the
view that since TCT Nos. 33035, 33036, 45069 (sic), 45870,
45871, 42868 and 23617 had all been cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City and new ones issued in the new name of petitioner La Campana, i.e., La Campana Development Corporation,
the portion of the decision involving said titles cannot now be executed.
In reply[21]
to the opposition, respondent DBP maintained that (1) reconstitution of the
titles would not render impossible a compliance with the decision, because what
was to be surrendered by petitioner La Campana was the possession of the
properties; and (2) the change of name of petitioner La Campana had no effect
on the execution of the decision. Respondent then manifested that on
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Former Title Nos. |
Reconstituted (La Campana) Title Nos. |
Present (DBP) Title Nos. |
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1. |
TCT No. 33035 |
TCT No. |
TCT No. N-171476 |
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2. |
TCT No. 33036 |
TCT No. |
TCT No. N-171475 |
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3. |
TCT No. 45869 |
TCT No. |
TCT No. N-171473 |
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4. |
TCT No. 45870 |
TCT No. RT- 1009 (45870) |
TCT No. N-171471 |
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5. |
TCT No. 45871 |
TCT No. |
TCT No. N-171472 |
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6. |
TCT No. 42868 |
TCT No. |
TCT No. N-171474 |
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7. |
TCT No. 23617 |
TCT No. |
TCT No. N-171477 |
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On
The Decision
is clear and unequivocal. The Court of Appeals orders La Campana to surrender
the possession of the properties to DBP and not the possession of the
certificate of titles (sic) covering said properties. Hence, the cancellation
of the titles by virtue of a reconstitution will not render it impossible for
La Campana to comply with the foregoing order, x x x. The properties mentioned
in the decision refer to no other than those which are the subject of this
instant case x x x.
While it is true that
the decision is silent as to the amount of money to be turned over to DBP, the
right of the latter (to) said sum is underscored when the Court of Appeals
declared that the buyer at the foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of
the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year
after the registration of the sale. Thus, being the absolute owner of the
subject realties, the DBP is entitled to receive the fruits thereof, which in
this case, are the rentals paid by the tenants for the use of the properties.
La Campana
insisted that the decision failed to state the period to be covered by the
unlawful collection of rentals. This contention is untenable. The Decision clearly points out that La
Campana lost its right of ownership when it failed to redeem the properties
within one year from the registration of the sale. Considering that the
Sheriff’s certificate of sale was annotated in the certificate of titles on
The dispositive portion of the same reads:
WHEREFORE,
let a writ of execution be issued in favour of defendant Development Bank of
the
In a scantily argued Motion for Reconsideration,[24]
petitioner La Campana prayed for the reversal of the aforequoted Order
of the RTC.
In resolving petitioner La Campana’s motion, on
Nowhere in the
dispositive portion nor in the body of the decision can be found any reference
to or that which indicates the amount of collections to be turned over by La
Campana to Development Bank of the
Settled is the rule that when the judgment of a superior
court is remanded to the trial court for execution, the function of the trial
court is ministerial only; x x x. Any pronouncement of this Court with respect
to the period of computation and the total amount of collections to be paid to
Development Bank of the
Thus, on
On
Respondent DBP then went to Court of Appeals to assail the
On
On
IN THE LIGHT
OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is given due course and is hereby
GRANTED. The Orders of the Public Respondent, Annexes “A”
and “B” of the Petition, are hereby set aside and nullified. Judgment
is rendered as follows:
1. The Public Respondent is hereby ordered
to set and conduct a hearing for the reception of the evidence of the parties
to ascertain the amounts of rentals/income collected/received by the Private
Respondent from the properties now titled under the name of the Petitioner
during the period from May 1, 1976 up to the time that the possession of the properties
is turned over to the Petitioner;
2. Once the total amount of said
rentals/income/fruits is ascertained by the Public Respondent, after said
hearing, the Public Respondent is hereby ordered to resolve the “Motion
for a Writ of Execution” and “Supplemental Motion for a Writ of
Execution” filed by the Petitioner.
In granting the petition, the appellate court dealt with the
issues raised seriatim: First. As to the issue of the supposed
defective Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping of the Petition
filed by respondent DBP in CA-G.R. SP No. 48773, the Court of Appeals, after
scrutinizing the assailed certifications, held that:
It is as
clear as broad daylight that the affiants categorically and unequivocally
declared in said “Verification/Certification” that they (Vice-President/Head of
Special Accounts Management of DBP and a Senior Assistant
Vice-President/in-house counsel of DBP) were authorized to execute the same for
and in behalf of the Petitioner (DBP).[33]
Second.
With respect to the allegation that the petition was filed out of time or
beyond the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the appellate court made the
following pronouncements:
While it may be true
that the Petitioner (DBP) received on September 18, 1997 the Order of
the Public Respondent, x x x, however, it filed its first “Petition for
Certiorari” with this Court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 45749, on October
27, 1997, or thirty-nine (39) days from notice of the Order, x x x, well within the sixty (60) day period
provided for in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Petitioner (DBP) received on August 11, 1998 the Resolution of this Court in CA-G.R.
No. 45749 denying its “Motion for Reconsideration” declaring that
the dismissal of the Petition was “without prejudice” and, on August 27, 1998,
or barely sixteen (16) days from notice of said Resolution, the Petitioner
filed its “Petition for Certiorari” in the present recourse. Patently,
then, the Petition was filed well within the period therefore. Incidentally,
the Resolution of the Supreme Court in Bar Matter 803 was effective only on
And,
third. Anent the related issues of whether the second paragraph of the decretal
portion of the 3 November 1994 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856 was incomplete, as it failed to fix the amount of
rentals due from petitioner La Campana; and whether the trial court, in
resolving the motion for issuance of a writ of execution, was empowered to hold
hearings and receive evidence to ascertain the exact amount to be remitted to
respondent DBP, the appellate court discoursed:
[T]here is no need for a
“clarification” by this Court, in CA-G.R. No. 34856 (CV). Contrary
to the perception of the Public Respondent, its Decision, x x x, is
efficacious. The deficiency perceived by the Public Respondent does not involve
a clerical error in the Decision of this Court in said case or a correction or
amendment thereof. What is involved is x x x, described as a “logical follow
through of something set forth in the body” of the Decision of this Court
and in the dispositive portion thereof; “the inevitable follow through or
translation into, operational or behavioural terms, of the finding and
declaration,” by this Court in said case of the Petitioner (DBP) having
become the absolute owner of the property as of May 1, 1976, one (1) year after
the registration of the “Certificate of Sale,” executed by the Sheriff x
x x after the Private Respondent (La Campana) failed to redeem the property
within one (1) year thereafter, and the entitlement of the Petitioner to
rentals collected and/or received by the Private Respondent (La Campana),
during the period from May 1, 1976 up to the time the possession of said
properties is turned over to the Petitioner (DBP) x x x.
x x x x
It cannot be said that simply because this Court x x x
did not specifically order the Public Respondent to receive said evidence of
the parties after the records were remanded by this Court to the Public
Respondent, the Public Respondent is bereft of residual if not inherent
authority to receive the evidence of the parties to ascertain the precise
amount due to the Petitioner (DBP) x x x.
x x x x.
Neither is the Public Respondent proscribed from setting
a hearing for the purpose of receiving evidence on the amounts collected or
received by the Private Respondent (La Campana) from May 1, 1976 up to the time
the possession of the properties is turned over to the Petitioner (DBP) x x x.[35]
The Motion for Reconsideration[36]
of petitioner La Campana was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
Hence, this petition.
The aforementioned
I.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 76 (SIC) ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS ASSAILED ORDERS DATED 13
JUNE 1997 AND 12 AUGUST 1997;
II.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RESOLVING THAT ITS EARLIER DECISION DATED
03 NOVEMBER 1994 IS COMPLETE AND CAN BE SUBJECT OF EXECUTION WITHOUT THE TRIAL
COURT BEING CLARIFIED OF HAVING TO DETERMINE THE EXACT AMOUNT DUE TO RESPONDENT
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES;
III.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN RESOLVING THE PETITION FILED BY THE RESPONDENT
ERRED IN GOING BEYOND THE PRAYER OF THE RESPONDENT’S PETITION BY CONSIDERING
THE PERIOD OF MAY 1, 1976 INSTEAD OF MAY 1, 1977; AND
IV.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EVEN CONSIDERING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI OF THE RESPONDENT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
At the outset, the procedural infirmity of the present
petition calls for the denial of the same. A perusal of the statement of material dates
herein indicates that petitioner La Campana received a copy of the 21
November 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying its motion for
reconsideration on 4 December 2000; thus, it had until 19 December
2000 within which to appeal by certiorari
the assailed decision and resolution or to move for extension of time to file
the said appeal. Petitioner La Campana
filed its motion for extension on
Having been filed late, the present petition should be
denied. The perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional as well, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of
rendering the judgment or resolution final and executory.[40]
After all, the right to appeal is not a
natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law.[41]
Be that as it may, this Court is of the view that the
procedural faux pas of petitioner La
Campana should not take precedence over the final resolution of the present
controversy that has long plagued the parties herein. The denial of the present Petition will have
put the instant case to rest, but this court has time and again ruled that
litigants should have the amplest opportunity for a proper and just disposition
of their cause – free, as much as possible, from the constraints of procedural
technicalities.[42] In the interest of our equity jurisdiction,
this court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on
its merits.[43]
Essentially two issues confront this Court, viz: (a)
whether the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 48773, erred in giving
due course to the Petition for Certiorari
of respondent DBP; and (b) whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting
aside and nullifying the 13 June 1997
and 12 August 1997 Orders of
the RTC and ordering the conduct of hearings for the reception of evidence to
determine the amount of rentals/fruits collected/received by petitioner La
Campana from the subject properties.
Petitioner La Campana urges this Court to set aside the 31 August 2000 Decision and 21 November 2000 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48773, as the latter erred in
holding that the 3
November 1994 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
34856 clearly defined how the amount of rentals/fruits collected/received
from the subject properties could be computed, considering that the dispositive
part of said decision was silent on this matter. It justified the issuance by the RTC of the 13 June 1997 and 12 August 1997 Orders by
contending that said court is not in a position to hear
evidence on the supposed ambiguity and/or deficiency of the 3 November 1994 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856, as it would be “contrary
to the well-settled rule that clarification of judgment is not the duty of the
trial court to make.”[44]
It further argued that if the RTC
proceeds with the hearing, the latter may unwittingly change, amplify, enlarge,
alter or modify the decision sought to be executed.
For petitioner La Campana, the issue of the amount to be
collected “is not merely simple mathematical computation, but determination of
the existence of the rentals and the period of time”;[45]
and the “portion of the period when collection was deemed unlawful is still to
be determined.”[46]
On the other hand, respondent DBP counters that the 3 November 1994 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856 was complete in itself and
enforceable by execution. It reasons
that the subject decision stated clearly why petitioner La Campana lost its
right of ownership over the properties, and at what point in time it occurred. Moreover, it maintains that the fact that the
subject decision has long attained finality is more than enough reason to
compel the RTC to order petitioner La Campana to render an accounting of the
collected and/or received rentals and/or fruits received from the subject
properties.
Given the foregoing
discourse, the threshold issue then that must be resolved is whether the 3 November 1994 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856 was complete and capable of
execution even if the dispositive part of the same, which reads:
1. ORDERING La Campana Food Products, Inc.
to surrender to the Development Bank of the Philippines the possession of the
properties covered by the Transfer Certificate (sic) of Title Nos. 33035,
33036, 45869, 45870, 45871, 42868 and 23617;
2. ORDERING La Campana Food Products, Inc. to pay the
Development Bank of the Philippines such sums of money unlawfully collected
and/or received by way of rentals from the properties covered by the
aforementioned TCT’s; x x x.[47] (Emphasis supplied.)
does not state the precise amount to be paid
by petitioner La Campana and the particular date from whence to begin computing
such amount.
In refusing to issue a writ
of execution against petitioner La Campana for the remittance of
collected/received rentals/fruits from the subject properties, the RTC in its
It is a
settled general principle that the execution of judgment must conform to that
which is ordained and decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision
(citation omitted). In the present case, nowhere in the dispositive portion of
the decision dated
We disagree.
The controversy between the
parties herein has been dragging for close to four decades already, and this is
the third time this case has reached us. What should have been a simple implementation
of the 3 November 1994 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
34856 in 1997 was delayed by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration raising the issue of ambiguity of the fallo of said decision, when a simple reading of the body
thereof could have easily exposed the motion for what it really was – nothing
more than a dilatory move.
Having read the entirety of
the subject decision abovementioned, we find neither insufficiency nor
ambiguity in its fallo so as to
justify the issuance of the
In foreclosure proceedings,
the buyer becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not
redeemed during the prescribed period of redemption,[53] which
is one year from the date of registration of the sale.[54] In the case at bar, the 3 November 1994 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856 not only determined and declared that
the foreclosure sale of the subject properties occurred on 25 March 1976; it
also acknowledged that there existed in the record a Certificate of Sale
dated 31 March 1976 issued by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subsequently
annotated on the titles of the subject properties. Hence, although the said decision did not
categorically state the date of the registration of sale, which was 30 April
1976, and while the inclusion of this piece of information in the decision
would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary nor the lack
thereof fatal to the certainty of the judgment. Besides, fixing the date at one year from said
registration, or on
That there was need for an
accounting of the monies representing rentals/fruits collected/received from
the subject properties should have alerted the trial court of the need to look
into the record of the case, specifically the body of the decision being
executed, from which it would have learned the parameters in calculating the
amount to be satisfied, as well as the fact that the amount to be satisfied
could only be determined after due accounting that petitioner La Campana was
yet to make. Just because the means for
determining the exact amount payable by petitioner La Campana to respondent DBP
was not definitively stated in the judgment does not make the same ambiguous,
hence, unenforceable. The accounting of
the books and records of petitioner La Campana during the time frame material
to the issue is a practical and expedient means of determining with specificity
the amount to be paid by it to respondent DBP. For the RTC to require such accounting and
submission of the results thereof would only give effect to the 31 August 1997 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48773, and there is no apparent and
immediate danger of the RTC modifying said judgment.
The insistence of the RTC
on a literal reading of the dispositive portion of the subject decision shows a
lack of familiarity with the congruent interplay of the provisions of
procedural law. The
It cannot
be said that simply because this Court, in CA-G.R. No. 34856 (CV) did
not specifically order the Public Respondent (trial court) to receive said
evidence of the parties after the records were remanded by this Court to Public
Respondent, the Public Respondent is bereft of residual if not inherent
authority to receive the evidence of the parties to ascertain the precise
amount due to the Petitioner (DBP), under the second paragraph of the Decision
of this Court in CA-G.R. No. 34856 (CV) x x x [r]esort must be made to
the true intent and meaning of the Decision of the Court.[56]
Notably, the
La
Campana insisted that the decision failed to state the period to be covered by
the unlawful collection of rentals. This contention is untenable. The Decision clearly
points out that La Campana lost its right of ownership when it failed to redeem
the properties within one year from the registration of the sale. Considering
that the Sheriff’s certificate of sale was annotated in the certificate of
titles (sic) on
but for some reason or another, it “chose” to
err on the side of caution; hence, its
It must be remembered that it is to the interest of the public that
there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly
adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata
is a rule that pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely:
(1) public policy and necessity, which dictates that it would be in the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation – republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause – nemo debet
bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine
would subject public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and
prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to
the preservation of public tranquillity and happiness.[57]
It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the
suit and is the life of the law.[58]
A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the
prevailing party.[59]
Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration
of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be
not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to
prolong them.[60]
Instead of allowing itself to be used by petitioner La
Campana in its schemes to evade execution of the judgment against it, the RTC
should exert the utmost effort, permitted by law, equity, and reason, to see to
it that respondent DBP shall enjoy the fruits of the final and executory
decision in its favor.
With respect to the issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition filed before it, considering
the allegations, issues and arguments adduced and our disquisition thereof,
suffice it to state that to reverse the assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals is to disregard the error of the RTC. In so doing, great injustice and undue
prejudice would be caused respondent DBP who has long awaited the fruit of the
verdict in its favor; a verdict that has long attained finality.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for
lack of merit. The case at bar is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings in consonance with our discussion as
abovestated. With costs against petitioner La Campana Development Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. with
Associate Justices Salome A. Montoya and Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 28-49.
[2] Rollo, p. 51.
[3] Records, pp. 1103-1110.
[4] Penned by Associate Justice Hector
L. Hofileña with Associate Justices Gloria C. Paras and Salome A. Montoya, concurring;
rollo, pp. 57-75.
[5] Development Bank
of the
[6] Petitioner La Campana contended that the complaint was
predicated on Arts. 1142 and 1144 of the New Civil Code, which provides that a
mortgage action prescribes within ten (10) years. Specifically, it alleged: “In
as much as the registration of the Certificate of Sale is an indispensable
requirement required by law for the validity of any extra-judicial foreclosure
proceeding and in order to perfect whatever rights the defendant Development
Bank (DBP) may have had by virtue of the auction sale held on June 20, 1975,
its failure to effect the registration of the certificate of sale within the
period of ten (10) years inevitably resulted in the extinguishment of its right
over the mortgaged properties of the plaintiff.”
[7] Records, pp. 1111-1116
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] RTC, Branch 76,
[23] Records, pp. 1220-1223.
[24]
[25]
[26] 2. ORDERING La Campana Food Products, Inc. to
pay the Development Bank of the
[27] Records, p. 1280.
[28]
[29] 1. ORDERING
La Campana Food Products, Inc. to surrender to the Development Bank of the
[30] Rollo, pp.
55-56.
[31]
[32] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo with Associate Justices Salome A. Montoya and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
concurring; rollo, pp. 28-49.
[33] Rollo, p. 40.
[34]
[35]
[36] CA rollo, pp.
287-297.
[37] Rollo,
pp. 10-26.
[38]
[39]
[40] Manipor v. Sps.
Ricafort, 454 Phil. 825, 832 (2003).
[41] Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 100-101 (2000).
[42] Cando v. Olazo, G.R.
No. 160741,
[43]
[44] Rollo, p. 18.
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48] Records, p. 1352.
[49] Heirs of
[50] Republic v. De
[51]
[52] De Ralla v.
Director of Lands, 83 Phil. 491 (1941).
[53] Samson v. Rivera,
G.R. No. 154355,
[54]
[55] Now a retired Supreme Court Associate Justice.
[56] Rollo, pp.
45-46.
[57] Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 164797,
[58] Florentino v.
Rivera, G.R. No. 167968,
[59] Garcia v. Yared, id.
[60] Ho v. Lacsa, G.R.
No. 142664,