THIRD
DIVISION
|
VICENTE A. MIEL, Petitioner, -
versus – JESUS A. MALINDOG, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No.
143538 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, CARPIO,* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: February
13, 2009 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before
Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[2]
dated
The
facts gathered from the records are as follows:
On 19
July 1994, petitioner Vicente A. Miel, then employed as Engineer II of the
Samar Engineering District, Department of Public Works and Highways,
Catbalogan, Samar (SED-DPWH), filed with the Civil Service Commission, Region
Office No. 8, Tacloban City (CSC-RO No. 8), a Complaint for falsification of
official documents, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and grave misconduct, against respondent Jesus A. Malindog, then
employed also as Engineer II of SED-DPWH, Samar.
Petitioner
alleged in his Complaint that respondent submitted three separate Personal Data
Sheets (PDS), or Civil Service Form No. 212, pertinent portions of which are
reproduced below:
According
to the first PDS[4]:
PERSONAL DATA SHEET
(
x x x x
SERVICE RECORD (Include experience outside
government service)
INCLUSIVE DATES POSITION DEPARTMENT/
From To
AGENCY
x x x x
MINES
The
second PDS[5] stated:
PERSONAL DATA SHEET
(
x x x x
SERVICE RECORD (Include experience outside
government service)
INCLUSIVE DATES POSITION DEPARTMENT/
From To AGENCY
x x x x
Jan.1, 1984 –
And the third PDS[6]
declared:
PERSONAL DATA SHEET
(Year 1994)
x x x x
SERVICE RECORD (Include experience outside
government service)
INCLUSIVE DATES POSITION DEPARTMENT/
From To
AGENCY
x x x x
Petitioner
compared respondent’s three PDSs and pointed out the following contradictory
and apparently deceitful information therein: respondent stated under the
service record section of his first PDS that he worked for PHILPOS BAGACAY
MINES, a private company in Hinabangan, Samar, as C.E. Supervisor from 1 July 1984 up to 9 October 1986; then
respondent indicated under the service record section of his second PDS that he
worked at the Philippine-Japan Highway Loan Division (PJHLD) of the DPWH Region
8 from 1 May 1984 until 9 October 1986;
and, finally, respondent wrote under the service record section of his third
PDS that he was “on leave” from his job as civil engineer in DPWH Region 8 from
1 January 1984 up to 9 October 1986. By reason of these false statements made by
respondent in his PDS, he was granted an amount of P1,500.00 as loyalty
cash award by SED-DPWH. Respondent was
also recommended for promotion to the vacant position of Engineer III in
SED-DPWH, but petitioner contended that respondent should be disqualified from
the said promotion by reason of the falsification he made on his three PDSs. Petitioner, thus, prayed in his Complaint[7]
that appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent based on the foregoing
allegations.
On
After
conducting a preliminary investigation of petitioner’s Complaint, Lorenzo S.
Danipog (Danipog), Director III of CSC-RO No. 8, issued a Resolution[9]
formally charging respondent with dishonesty.
Director Danipog found that respondent had willfully and maliciously
written false information on his three PDSs.
He opined that respondent purposely fabricated his second and third PDSs
so he could be entitled to the loyalty cash award of P1,500.00. Director Danipog did not give much credence
to respondent’s defense of “frailty of memory,” because respondent’s false
statements on his PDSs were carefully written and complete as to days, months
and years, which could only be done by a conscious mind. The falsification of statements in the PDS
constituted dishonesty, and Danipog concluded that there was prima facie case to charge respondent
with the same.
On P1,500.00 from SED-DPWH; under
Section 7(e), Rule X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the 1987 Administrative
Code of the Philippines and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 42 dated 15 October
1992, the loyalty award shall be given only to a government employee who has
completed at least ten (10) years of continuous and satisfactory service to the
particular office granting the award.
The CSC-HO held that respondent’s actuation constituted dishonesty under
the Civil Service Rules. The dispositive
portion of the CSC-HO Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, Jesus A.
Malindog is hereby found guilty of Dishonesty. Accordingly, he is meted the
penalty of dismissal from the service with all the accessory penalties
including perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from taking
future government examinations.[11]
Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of CSC-HO Resolution No. 973301 dated
The
Court of Appeals promulgated on P1,500.00.
Hence, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the
Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is penalized to suffer one year suspension without
pay, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.[13]
In its
Resolution dated
Consequently,
petitioner lodged the instant Petition before us assigning the following
errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
SECTION 4, RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THAT THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENT WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME BY IGNORING OUR DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ISSUED BY THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION THAT RESPONDENT’S FORMER COUNSEL OR THROUGH RESPONSIBLE
PERSON IN HIS OFFICE ADDRESS RECEIVED CSC RESOLUTION DENYING HIS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FIFTY ONE (51) DAYS BEFORE FILING HIS PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH
THE COURT OF APPEALS. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
TANTAMOUNT TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION BY IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF ONE YEAR SUSPENSION INSTEAD OF AFFIRMING
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION’S PENALTY OF DISMISSAL AGAINST THE LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, SINCE IT COULD NOT FAULT THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION FOR HAVING COMMITTED ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Apropos the first issue, petitioner asserts that respondent’s appeal of
CSC-HO Resolution No. 980648 before the Court of Appeals was filed beyond the
period allowed for appeal and should have been therefore dismissed.[14]
Under
the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appeal from the judgments,
final orders or resolutions of the CSC shall be taken by filing a verified
petition for review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment, final order or resolution. Jurisprudence instructs that
when a party is represented by counsel, notice of the judgment, final order or
resolution should be made upon the counsel of record.[15] Thus, the
fifteen-day period to appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court commenced to
run from receipt of the judgment, final order or resolution by the party’s
counsel on record.[16]
Records
show that in the filing of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of CSC-HO
Resolution No. 973301, respondent was represented by Atty. Alexander L. Bulauitan.[17] The CSC-HO issued Resolution No. 980648
denying respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration on
The
rule is that failure to file or perfect an appeal within the reglementary
period will make the judgment final and executory by operation of law.[20] Perfection of an appeal within the statutory
or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional; failure
to do so renders the questioned decision/resolution final and executory, and
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the decision/resolution,
much less to entertain the appeal.[21]
Nonetheless, we have held that a delay in the filing of an appeal
under exceptional circumstances may be excused on grounds of substantial
justice and equity.[22]
Filing of an appeal beyond the reglementary
period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if the barring of the appeal
would be inequitable and unjust in light of certain circumstances therein.[23]
Courts may suspend its own rules, or
except a particular case from its operations, whenever the purposes of justice
require it.[24] In Baylon
v. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau,[25]
we laid down the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court
to resist strict adherence to procedure, to wit: (1) matters of life, liberty,
honor and property; (2) counsel’s negligence without the participatory
negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; and (7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
In the
case at bar, the CSC-HO found respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposed upon
him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
The penalty of dismissal is a severe punishment because it blemishes a
person’s record in government service. It
is an injury to one’s reputation and honor which produces irreversible effects
on one’s career and private life. Worse,
it implies loss of livelihood to the employee and his family. Respondent would certainly suffer grave
injustice if the penalty of dismissal imposed on him turned out to be erroneous
or disproportionate and such was not duly rectified because of mere
technicality. Further, it appears that
respondent was not able to file his appeal on time because Atty. Bulauitan
failed to immediately inform respondent of the notice of CSC-HO Resolution No.
980648. Atty. Bulauitan was so busy then
as campaign manager of a senatorial aspirant that he forgot to notify respondent
of the notice of said resolution. Generally,
respondent is bound by the negligence of Atty. Bulauitan. However, since respondent had nothing to do with
the negligence of Atty. Bulauitan, respondent’s case should be an exception to
the rule on the effects of the counsel’s negligence, as the application of such
rule would result in serious injustice to respondent.[26]
Hence,
it is in the greater interest of justice that the penalty of dismissal meted out
to respondent be meticulously reviewed by the Court of Appeals despite
procedural lapses in respondent’s appeal.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in giving due course to
respondent’s appeal.
With
regard to his second assigned error, petitioner argues that respondent was
guilty of dishonesty in making false statements in his PDS and, thus,
respondent should be dismissed from the service.[27]
Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest
discipline. Thus, a public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. No less than the Constitution sanctifies the
principle that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public
officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[28] The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees additionally provides that every public servant
shall at all times uphold public interest over his or her personal interest.[29]
A PDS is an official document
required of a government employee and official by the Civil Service
Commission. It is the repository of all information about any government
employee or official regarding his personal background, qualification, and
eligibility. Government employees are
tasked under the Civil Service rules to properly and completely accomplish
their PDS.[30] The act of making untruthful statements, or
concealment of any information in the PDS, constitutes dishonesty and is
punishable under the Civil Service rules.[31] Dishonesty is a “disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness.”[32] Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the
discipline and morale of the service.[33]
It appears that respondent prepared and submitted three
PDSs dated
There
is no reason for us to disturb the consistent finding of CSC-RO No. 8, CSC-HO,
and the Court of Appeals that respondent made untruthful statements when he
stated in his second PDS that he worked at the PHJLD of DPWH Region 8 from 1 May 1984 until 9 October 1986; and
when he indicated in his third PDS that he was “on leave” from his job as civil
engineer at DPWH Region 8 from 1 January
1984 up to 9 October 1986, when, in fact, he was working at PHILPOS BAGACAY
MINES during the same period according to his first PDS. Findings of fact of administrative agencies
and quasi-judicial bodies, such as the CSC, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only great respect but even finality. This is particularly true where the Court of
Appeals affirms such findings of fact.[36]
Respondent’s
act of making false statements in his second and third PDSs clearly displayed
dishonesty on his part. Respondent’s
dishonesty became more apparent when he received the unwarranted loyalty cash
award of P1,500.00[37]
for supposedly rendering 10 years of unbroken service. Evidently, the erroneous computation of
respondent’s years of service was caused by his varying and irreconcilable
statements in his three PDSs.
Respondent’s
contention that the false statements in his second and third PDSs were caused
by his frail memory deserves scant consideration. It should be noted that the gaps among the
dates he accomplished his three PDSs, i.e.,
Section
52, A(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (Civil Service Rules), classifies dishonesty as a grave offense with a
corresponding penalty of dismissal even if committed for the first time.
Be that
as it may, we observed that respondent had been in the government service for
more or less 20 years, during which he made a steady ascent from a lowly
laborer at the National Irrigation Administration, Catbalogan, P1,500.00.[40] We can consider the foregoing as mitigating
circumstances[41] to
lower the penalty imposable on respondent pursuant to Section 53 of the Civil
Service Rules, viz:
Section 53. Extenuating,
Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. – In the
determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to
the commission of the offense shall be considered.
The following
circumstances shall be appreciated:
x x x x
g. habituality
x x x x
j. length of service in the government
x x x x
l. other analogous circumstances.
In Apuyan, Jr. v. Sta. Isabel,[42] a
government employee was charged with and found guilty of dishonesty. Nonetheless, instead of dismissing respondent,
we imposed the penalty of one-year suspension without pay considering that his dishonesty
was his first offense. In Civil Service Commission v. Belagan,[43] a
government employee was found guilty of grave misconduct, the penalty for which
was dismissal from the service. However,
we did not impose the penalty of dismissal upon respondent, considering the
presence of the following mitigating circumstances: (1) his long years of
service in the government; and (2) his unblemished record in the past. We likewise ruled therein that the
appropriate penalty for respondent was one-year suspension from service without
pay.
Pursuant
to the aforementioned jurisprudence, we hold that instead of imposing the
penalty of dismissal upon respondent in the instant case, we are penalizing him
for his dishonesty with one-year suspension from service without pay and with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
* Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio was designated to sit as additional member replacing
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-22.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna with Associate Justices Conchita Carpio
Morales (now a member of this Court) and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-29.
[3] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[4] Records,
p. 137.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 36-40.
[11]
[12] Records,
pp. 32-34.
[13] Rollo, p. 28.
[14]
[15] Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 302, 325 citing Spouses Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 369
Phil 655, 664 (1999); Magno v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-58781,
[16] RULES
OF COURT, Rule 13, Section 2.
[17] Records,
p. 38.
[18] Rollo, p. 75.
[19] CA
rollo, pp. 2-9.
[20] Sapitan v. JB Line Bicol Express, Inc.,
G.R. No. 163775,
[21] Sehwani Incorporated v. In-N-Out Burger, Inc.,
G.R. No. 171053,
[22] Legasto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
76854-60,
[23] Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,
316 Phil. 371, 384 (1995).
[24] C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 63
Phil. 275, 278 (1936).
[25] 442
Phil. 217, 231 (2002).
[26]
[27] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[28] 1987
Constitution, Article XI, Section
1.
[29] Republic
Act No. 6713, Section 2.
[30] Advincula
v. Dicen, G.R. No. 162403, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 696, 708; Bautista v. Navarro, 200 Phil. 278, 283
(1982); Inting v. Tanodbayan, 186 Phil. 343, 348 (1980).
[31] Ratti
v. Mendoza-De Castro, A.M. No. P-04-1844,
[32] Gillamac-Ortiz
v. Almeida, Jr., A.M. No. P-07-2401,
[33] Alabastro
v. Moncada, Sr., A.M. No. P-04-1887,
[34] Records,
pp. 137-139.
[35]
[36] Pabu-aya v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil.
782, 788 (2001).
[37] Records,
p. 145.
[38] Respondent
was 38 years old in March 1992 and 40 years old in 1994.
[39] Records,
pp. 41 and 48.
[40]
[41] Civil Service Commission v. Manzano,
G.R. No. 160195, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 113, 132; Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, 19 October
2004, 440 SCRA 578, 601.
[42] Adm.
Matter No. P-01-1497,
[43] Supra
note 41.