SECOND DIVISION
|
CENTRAL BANK OF THE Petitioner,
- versus - CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent. |
G.R. No.
141835 Present: CARPIO MORALES,*
J., Acting
Chairperson, TINGA, NAZARIO, NACHURA,** and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: February
4, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Pursuant to
Republic Act No. 625, the old Central Bank Law, respondent Citytrust Banking
Corporation (Citytrust), formerly Feati Bank, maintained a demand deposit account
with petitioner Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas.
As
required, Citytrust furnished petitioner with the names and corresponding signatures
of five of its officers authorized to sign checks and serve as drawers and indorsers
for its account. And it provided petitioner
with the list and corresponding signatures of its roving tellers authorized to
withdraw, sign receipts and perform other transactions on its behalf. Petitioner later issued security identification
cards to the roving tellers one of whom was “Rounceval Flores” (
On July 15,
1977, Flores presented for payment to petitioner’s Senior Teller Iluminada dela
Cruz (Iluminada) two Citytrust checks of even date, payable to Citytrust, one in
the amount of P850,000 and the other in the
amount of P900,000, both
of which were signed and indorsed by Citytrust’s authorized signatory-drawers.
After the
checks were certified by petitioner’s Accounting Department, Iluminada verified
them, prepared the cash transfer slip on which she affixed her signature, stamped
the checks with the notation “Received Payment” and asked Flores to, as he did,
sign on the space above such notation. Instead
of signing his name, however,
Iluminada thereupon
sent the cash transfer slip and checks to petitioner’s Cash Department where an
officer verified and compared the drawers’ signatures on the checks against their
specimen signatures provided by Citytrust, and finding the same in order,
approved the cash transfer slip and paid the corresponding amounts to
Flores. Petitioner then debited the
amount of the checks totaling P1,750,000 from Citytrust’s demand deposit account.
More than a
year and nine months later, Citytrust, by letter dated April 23, 1979, alleging
that the checks were already cancelled because they were stolen, demanded petitioner
to restore the amounts covered thereby to its demand deposit account. Petitioner did not heed the demand, however.
Citytrust
later filed a complaint for estafa, with reservation on the filing of a
separate civil action, against Flores.
Citytrust thereafter
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a complaint for recovery
of sum of money with damages against petitioner which it alleged erred in encashing
the checks and in charging the proceeds thereof to its account, despite the lack
of authority of “Rosauro C. Cayabyab.”
By Decision[1]
of November 13, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Manila found both Citytrust and petitioner
negligent and accordingly held them equally liable for the loss. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals
which, by Decision[2]
dated
In arriving
at its Decision, the appellate court noted that while “Citytrust failed to take
adequate precautionary measures to prevent the fraudulent encashment of its
checks,” petitioner was not entirely blame-free in light of its failure to
verify the signature of Citytrust’s agent authorized to receive payment.
Brushing
aside petitioner’s contention that it cannot be sued, the appellate court held that
petitioner’s Charter specifically clothes it with the power to sue and be sued.
Also
brushing aside petitioner’s assertion that Citytrust’s reservation of the filing
of a separate civil action against Flores precluded Citytrust from filing the
civil action against it, the appellate court held that the “action for the
recovery of sum of money is separate and distinct and is grounded on a separate
cause of action from that of the criminal case for estafa.”
Hence, the
present appeal, petitioner maintaining that Flores having been an authorized
roving teller, Citytrust is bound by his acts.
Also maintaining that it was not negligent in releasing the proceeds of
the checks to Flores, the failure of its teller to properly verify his signature
notwithstanding, petitioner contends that verification could be dispensed with,
Flores having been known to be an authorized roving teller of Citytrust who had
had numerous transactions with it (petitioner) on its (Citytrust’s) behalf for
five years prior to the questioned transaction.
Attributing
negligence solely to Citytrust, petitioner harps on Citytrust’s allowing Flores
to steal the checks and failing to timely cancel them; allowing Flores to wear the issued
identification card issued by it (petitioner); failing to report Flores’ absence from work on
the day of the incident; and failing to explain the circumstances
surrounding the supposed theft and cancellation of the checks.
Drawing attention
to Citytrust’s considerable delay in demanding the restoration of the proceeds
of the checks, petitioners argue that, assuming arguendo that its teller was negligent, Citytrust’s negligence,
which preceded that committed by the teller,
was the proximate cause of the loss or fraud.
The
petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner’s
teller Iluminada did not verify Flores’ signature on the flimsy excuse that Flores
had had previous transactions with it for a number of years. That circumstance did not excuse the teller from
focusing attention to or at least glancing at Flores as he was signing, and to
satisfy herself that the signature he had just affixed matched that of his
specimen signature. Had she done that, she would have readily been
put on notice that Flores was affixing, not his but a fictitious signature.
Given that petitioner
is the government body mandated to supervise and regulate banking and other
financial institutions, this Court’s ruling in Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals[5]
illumines:
The contract between the bank and its
depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan. Article
1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “x x x savings x x x deposits of
money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan.” There is a
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its
depositor. The bank is
the debtor and the depositor is the creditor.
The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the
rights and obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary
nature of banking. Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 8791 (“RA 8791”), which took effect on
This fiduciary
relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe “high standards of
integrity and performance” is deemed written into every deposit agreement
between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks
to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a
family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that
the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or
contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a
family. Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks
– that banks must observe “high standards of integrity and performance” in
servicing their depositors. Although RA 8791 took effect almost nine
years after the unauthorized withdrawal of the P300,000 from L.C. Diaz’s
savings account, jurisprudence at the time of the withdrawal already imposed on
banks the same high standard of diligence required under RA No. 8791. (Emphasis supplied)
Citytrust’s
failure to timely examine its account, cancel the checks
and notify petitioner of their alleged loss/theft should mitigate petitioner’s
liability, in accordance with Article 2179 of the Civil Code which provides
that if the plaintiff’s negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. For had Citytrust timely discovered the
loss/theft and/or subsequent encashment, their proceeds or part thereof could
have been recovered.
In line
with the ruling in Consolidated Bank,
the Court deems it proper to allocate the loss between petitioner and Citytrust
on a 60-40 ratio.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision
of July 16, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION, in that
petitioner and Citytrust should bear the loss on a 60-40 ratio.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who inhibited himself from the case due to close relation to a party, per Raffle dated January 26, 2009.
** Additional member per Raffle dated January 26, 2009.
[1] CA rollo, pp. 160-172. Penned by Assisting Judge Benjamin P. Martinez.
[2] Id. at 287-300. Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and concurred in by Associate Justices Corona Ibay-Somera and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
[3] Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
[4] Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances.
[5] G.R. No. 138569, September 11, 2003, 410 SCRA 562, 574-575.