FIRST
DIVISION
PAT.
EDGARDO HERRERA
y G.R. Nos. 119660-61
BALTORIBIO
and PAT. REDENTOR
MARIANO
y ANTONIO,
Petitioners,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
and PEOPLE OF THE
Respondents. Promulgated:
February 13, 2009
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
Petitioners
Pat. Edgardo Herrera y Baltoribio and Pat. Redentor Mariano y Antonio, together
with the other accused, Pat. Roberto Barrera and Pat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all
members of the Parañaque Police Station, were charged with two (2) counts of
murder, FOR THER KILLING OF Shi Shu Yang and George Go y Tan, before public respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16674 and 16675.
The
original informations, both dated
In Criminal Case No.
16674:
That on or about the 28th day of December, 1989
in the Municipality of [Parañaque], Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused who were then
public officers, being then members of the Parañaque Police Force, and armed
with guns, and conspiring and confederating and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill and with treachery and by taking advantage of
their public positions as members of the Parañaque Police Force, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one SHI SHU YANG on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious and mortal wounds upon said
victim, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said victim, in such amount as may be awarded to
them under the provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
In Criminal Case No.
16675:
That on or about the 28th day of December,
1989 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who were then
public officers, being then members of the Parañaque Police Force, armed with
guns, conspiring and confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent to kill and with treachery and by taking advantage of their public
positions as members of the Parañaque Police Force, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one GEORGE GO Y TAN on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious and mortal wounds upon
said victim, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim, in such amount as may be
awarded to them under the provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On
The
amended informations, both dated
In Criminal Case No.
16674:
That on or about the 28th day of December,
1989 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who were then
public officers being then members of the Parañaque Police Force and armed with
guns, and conspiring and confederating and mutually helping and aiding one
another, committing the offense in relation to their public position or
office, with intent to kill and with treachery and by taking advantage of
their public positions as members of the Parañaque Police Force, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one SHI SHU YANG on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious and mortal wounds upon said
victim, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said victim, in such amount as may be awarded to
them under the provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
In Criminal Case No.
16675:
That on or about the 28th day of December,
1989 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who were then
public officers being then members of the Parañaque Police Force and armed with
guns, and conspiring and confederating and mutually helping and aiding one
another, committing the offense in relation to their public position or
office, with intent to kill and with treachery and by taking advantage of
their public positions as members of the Parañaque Police Force, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one GEORGE GO Y TAN on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious and mortal wounds upon
said victim, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim, in such amount as may be
awarded to them under the provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Arraigned anew on September 18, 1992, petitioners
Herrera and Mariano entered their pleas of not guilty[6] and
withdrew their objections to the issue of lack of jurisdiction of public respondent
Sandiganbayan over the case and moved that the proceedings and evidence
presented during their petition for bail be adopted in toto. The two other accused, Barrera[7]
and Alcalde, remained at large.
During the pre-trial on
The
prosecution’s evidence consisted of the following:
Reynaldo Ong was the manager of Chow
Chow Restaurant which was owned by Spouses George Go, one of the victims, and
Edna Ong Go, located at 5 P20) and two t-shirts). George Go was quiet. Barrera also demanded that George Go present
the license of his firearm which the latter readily showed. Barrera then told George Go that he would
bring the firearm to the police station for verification. He then called the police station informing
them that he had just disarmed George Go.[8]
At about
Edna Go also testified that George Go
was an agent of Stanley Work Sales and operator of Chow Chow Restaurant. She said she had spent for the wake and
funeral of her husband and, estimated the expenses for the wake to be at around
P10,000 as she was not able to keep the receipts. However, she presented the receipt issued by
La Funeraria Paz amounting to P11,500 as expenses for the casket and funeral
services. She stated that she was in a
state of shock and became frightened upon learning of the death of her husband.[10]
Cristina Winterhalter y Siscar, a resident
of nearby Saint Anthony Street, witnessed the killing of the two victims with
the use of a pair of binoculars lent to her by a neighbor, as she viewed it
from a distance of about 80 to 90 meters.
She testified that at around
Dr. Roberto Garcia, Medico Legal Officer
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), conducted an autopsy on the body
of George Go at around
At around
Edwin Purificando, Senior Forensic
Chemist of the NBI, examined the blood type of the victims, as follows, blood
type “B” for George Go per Biology Report No. B-89-2490 (Exhibit “M-2”) and
blood type “A” for Shi Shu Yang per Biology Report No. B-89-2491 (Exhibit “M-1”). He also analyzed the specimen of the blood
obtained by the NBI Duty Chemists, Aida Pascual and Bella Arriola, from the
pavement located along
Aida Veloria Magsipoc, Supervising
Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that on December 28, 1989, acting upon
the requests for paraffin test (Exhibit “I” and “I-1”) by P/Cpl. Glen Tiongson
and P/Cpl Jose Suarez, respectively, she conducted the diphenylamine-paraffin
tests on the dorsal of the left and right hands of the victims and per Chemistry
Report No. C-89-1605 for George Go (Exhibit “H”) and Chemistry Report No.
C-89-1606 for Shi Shu Yang (Exhibit “H-1”), they were found negative of
nitrates which proved that the victims never fired a gun.[14]
Teodoro Ubia y Janeo, a Medical
Technologist of the NBI, took pictures of the cadaver of George Go (Exhibits “K
to K-4”) and an unidentified person, later known to be, Shi Shu Yang (Exhibits
“J to J-2”) to show the different locations where the victims were shot.[15]
Atty. Leoncio Evangelista, an agent of
the NBI, conducted investigation on the killing incident.
On the other hand, the evidence for the defense, are as
follows:
Rodolfo Ver y Foronda, Fingerprint
Examiner II of the NBI, presented the following documents relative to the
shooting incident that resulted in the death of the two victims, to wit;
Progress Report dated December 28, 1989 (Exhibits “1” and “1-a”); Initial
Investigation Report signed by Col. Rogelio Pureza (Exhibit “2”); Request for
Paraffin Test dated December 28, 1989 (Exhibit “3”); Sworn Statements of Pat Barrera,
petitioner Mariano, Pat. Alcalde, and petitioner Herrera (Exhibits “4,” “4-a,” “5,”
“5-a,” “6,” “6-a,” “7,” and “7-a”); photocopies of a picture of the Parañaque
Police van No. 102 (Exhibits “8,” “8-a” to “8-g”) and a Certification issued by
Capt. Abraham Gatchillano dated January 5, 1990 (Exhibits “9” and “9-a”).[16]
Col. Rogelio Pureza y Abutan, PNP
District Director of the NPD, CAMANABA testified that he approved the Progress
Report dated December 28, 1989 (Exhibits “1” and “1-a”) of Rodolfo Ver. The report addressed to the Regional
Commander (Exhibit 11) was based on the investigation conducted on petitioners
Herrera and Mariano, Pat. Alcalde, Pat. Barrera, and Edwin Maquinay, and the report
of the investigator on the case. He
narrated that at about noontime of December 28, 1989, Edna Go came to his office
requesting Col. Pureza for assistance with regard to her husband’s case, but he
told her to await for the outcome of the investigation as the cases for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Resisting Arrest were already filed with the
Prosecutor’s Office and it would be inappropriate for him to intercede in the
case. While he was talking with Go, SPO4
Ticzon called to inform him about a shooting incident involving the husband of
Go. Since he was not sure if George Go
was already dead when the call came in, he did not relay the information to Go. Thereafter, he came to know that George Go
was brought to the
SPO4 Glenn Fuentes Ticson testified that on December 28, 1989, he was
assigned as Duty Investigator at the CID, Parañaque Police Station and, as
such, was tasked to investigate criminal cases referred to him by their Desk
Officer or immediate supervisor. On
SPO3 Gil Labay y Cantor declared that
on
Testifying in his defense, petitioner Redentor
Mariano declared that on
On cross-examination, he declared that
the reason why the two Chinese nationals were brought to the hospital in the
morning of
In the morning of December 21, 1181,
they were submitted for paraffin tests at the PNP Crime Laboratory and with
respect to him, the findings was negative but he does not know what was the
result of the findings with respect to accused Barrera and Alcalde. They left the hospital before
Dr. Frederick Singson y Soliven,
Resident Physician of the
SPO2 Armand Octavio, a member of the
Parañaque police Station testified that on December 28, 1181, he was instructed
to take the statement of accused Barrera (Exhibit 21, 21-a and 21-b). He also received an investigation report from
the office of the Investigation Division signed by SPO3 Ticzon and Col.
Pureza. Aside from these reports, he was
also furnished a certification from the Firearms and Explosive Unit and an
investigation report regarding the charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms
against accused George Go.[23]
Testifying in his defense, petitioner Edgardo
Herrera declared that he had been a member of the Parañaque Police
Station. On
On cross-examination, he declared that
he did not see who placed handcuffs on the hands of George Go but when he saw
the latter seated at the back of the police van, he was not handcuffed. Before they brought George Go to the
hospital, he saw Go’s wife who was insisting to go with them but George Go did
not allow her and, instead, he took along his Taiwanese friend, one Shi Shu
Yang. Apart from George Go and Shi Shu
Yang, there were four (4) of them who boarded the police van and alighted at
the hospital but did not go back with them to the police headquarters. All of them, except Maquinay, were
armed. Being the driver of the police
van for almost a year, he was familiar with the different roads coming from the
police station to the
On
WHEREFORE, after joint trial on the merits in the
above-numbered cases, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:
I. In Crim.
Case No. 16674 — accused Edgardo Herrera y [B]altoribio and Redentor Mariano
y Antonio are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in
the offense of Murder, as defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, qualified by treachery and with the generic aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of their public positions, abuse of superior
strength, in band and use of a motor vehicle, without any mitigating
circumstance in offset, and each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in said case, with the accessory
penalties of imposed by law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
the late George Go in the amounts of P11,500.00 as actual damages, plus
P500,000.00 in the form of unrealized earnings and income.
II. In Crim.
Case No. 16675 — accused Edgardo Herrera y [B]altoribio and Redentor
Mariano y Antonio are herby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
co-principals in the offense of Murder, defined and penalized by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery and with the generic aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of their public positions, abuse of superior
strength, in band and use of a motor vehicle, without any mitigating
circumstance in offset, and each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua in said case, with the
accessory penalties of [i]mposed by law; to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of the late Shi Shu Yang in the amounts of P50,000.00;
III. Both accused
to pay their proportionate share of the costs of these actions. [27]
On
1. THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS FOR MURDER UNDER THE AMENDED INFORMATIONS;
2.
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO CONDUCT FURTHER CROSS EXAMINATION ON
PROSECUTION WITNESS WINTERHALTER;
3.
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT
FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED EYEWITNESS WINTERHALTER
WAS WANTING IN CREDIBILITY;
4.
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT
FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT PROSECUTION WITNESS NBI MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER AND
HIS REAL EVIDENCE SUPPORT THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE;
5.
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT
FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS TOTAL ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
CONSPIRACY;
6.
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT
FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL ACTS; AND
7.
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT
FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONERS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The Court affirms the conviction.
First. Petitioners insist that respondent
Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them for the crime of murder under the
amended informations as they had earlier been arraigned under the original
informations for murder and their rearraignment under the amended informations
placed them in double jeopardy.
The
rule on double jeopardy does not apply.
Public respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the amendment of the
informations and made it of record that the evidence adduced during the
pre-trial of the case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed
automatically reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case on the
merits. Double jeopardy did not attach
by virtue of petitioner’s plea of not guilty under the amended information. For a claim of double jeopardy to prosper,
the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same
is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.[28]
In
the present case, petitioners and the other accused pleaded not guilty to the
original informations. Thereafter, at
the instance of the petitioners, through a joint petition for bail, they raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed to
allege in the informations that the crimes were committed “in relation to their
office.” On the same day, respondent
court ordered the amendment of the informations accordingly. Thus, the first requirement for double
jeopardy to attach, that is, that the informations against the petitioners were
valid, has not been complied with.
Likewise,
the fourth element was lacking.
Petitioners cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the original
information as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the
crimes were committed “in relation to their office.” Petitioners were thus not placed in danger
of being convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the
insufficient information. Moreover,
there was no dismissal or termination of the case against petitioners.
Furthermore,
it was well-within the power of public respondent Sandiganbayan to order the amendment
of the information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
which states that if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order
that an amendment be made. If it is based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the
court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be
granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
Second. Petitioners make much of the fact the public
respondent Sandiganbayan should have allowed their counsel to conduct further
cross-examination on prosecution witness Winterhalter.
Rule
132, Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the
adverse party as to any matter stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit
all important facts bearing upon the issue.
The cross-examination of a witness is a right of a party against whom he
is called. Article III, Section 14(2) of
the Constitution states that the accused shall have the right to meet the
witnesses face to face. Rule 115,
Section 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also states that, in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Indeed, petitioners’ counsel has conducted an extensive
cross-examination of witness Winterhalter on the scheduled dates of
hearing. Petitioners, therefore, cannot
claim there has been any procedural infirmity in the proceedings.
Moreover,
the trial court has the power to direct the course of the trial either to
shorten or to extend the direct or cross examination of a counsel. Under Rule 133, Section 6 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the court may stop the introduction of further testimony
upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that
more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be
additionally persuasive. But this power
should be exercised with caution. Thus, it
is within the prerogative of the trial court to determine when to terminate the
presentation of the evidence of the prosecution or the defense.
Third. Petitioners’ attempt to destroy the
credibility of prosecution witness Winterhalter fails. The trial court had the opportunity to
observe first-hand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses, and,
therefore, its findings that the witnesses for the prosecution are to be
believed over those of the defense are entitled to great weight. Winterhalter recognized the petitioners as
the ones who cooperated with Pat. Barrera in killing the victims. She saw the events unfolding with the use of
her binoculars 80-90 meters away. She
established the identity of the petitioners as the companions of Pat. Barrera
when he effected the killing. It has
been ruled that findings of fact of the trial court on credibility of witnesses
should be accorded the highest respect.
The Court has refrained from interfering with the judgment of the trial
court in passing on the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or
the significance of which as been misapprehended or misinterpreted. None exists in this case.
After
the incident, Winterhalter’s neighbor, who was also a foreigner, has been
receiving death threats. She herself has
been getting death threats too, yet she voluntarily testified in order to shed
light on the commission of the crime. In
fact, she did not even know the two victims.
Indeed, where there is nothing to indicate that a witness was moved by
improper motives, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness
stand, made under solemn oath, should be given full faith and credence. It has not been shown that Winterhalter has
any reason to falsely implicate petitioners.
Winterhalter
narrated that Pat. Barrera and Pat. Alcalde, together with petitioners, were
responsible for the death of the victims.
This was confirmed by the post mortem report prepared by Dr. Roberto
Garcia, medico legal officer of the NBI, showing the gunshot wounds on the
different parts of the victims’ body.
Fourth. Petitioners would persuade the Court that the
testimony of the NBI-Medico Legal Officer, a prosecution witness, supports the
theory of the defense that they acted in self-defense.
This
argument cannot stand. By invoking the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, petitioners assume the onus of
proving: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Petitioners failed to discharge this burden.
To
proceed with the argument that there was unlawful aggression by the two deceased
who tried to get the pistol tucked in the waist of one of the police officers,
petitioners should prove that they used reasonable means in repelling the
aggression. Considering that both
deceased where handcuffed and unarmed and had restricted movements, it could
only mean that the perceived threat to petitioners’ lives were not sufficiently
serious, in which case they were not justified in shooting the hapless victims
who were unarmed. Petitioners could have
simply subdued the two victims in a manner as to engage them in a fight without
necessarily killing them. Moreover, the
autopsy reports showing the extent of the wounds sustained by George Go and Shi
Shu Yang tend to discredit the version of the defense.
Fifth.
Petitioners assert that there was total
absence of evidence to support the theory that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime.
Conspiracy
can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a
concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. The familiar rule in conspiracy is that when
two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible,
when the conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the conspiracy.[29] In this case, petitioner Herrera drove the
vehicle along
Sixth. Intertwined with their argument that they
were acting in self-defense, petitioners want this Court to appreciate the presumption
of regularity in the performance of their official acts.
This contention has no merit. In order to consider the defense of
fulfillment of a duty, it must be shown that:
(1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed
is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of a right or office.[30] There was no showing that petitioners should
resort to inflicting injuries and even to the extent of killing the victims as
there was no resistance at all from them when they were apprehended. The two victims were handcuffed and unarmed
while the petitioners and the other police officers were armed with pistols and
a rifle. Aida Veloria Magsipoc,
Supervising Forensic Chemist of the NBI, per Chemistry Report No. C-89-1606,
conducted the paraffin test on George Go and Shi Shu Yang which yielded
negative results, thus showing that the victims never fired a gun and were
totally defenseless in the face of the fully armed police officers.
Petitioners
anchor their argument that they merely acted in self-defense. This contention has no merit. The accused who invokes self-defense thereby
admits having killed the victim, and the burden of evidence is shifted on him
to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the following
essential elements: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[31]
Moreover,
the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and
unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove a plea of
self-defense or defense of stranger because they demonstrate a determined
effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself.[32] The victims were repeatedly shot at close
range and on vital parts of their bodies, thus indicia that the police officers
really intended to kill them. Clearly,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on the part
of the petitioners and the other police officers does not apply.
Seventh.
Petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
On the contrary, the killing of the
two victims was proved to have been committed with the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. The essence of treachery is a deliberate
and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or to escape. Frontal
attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is
unarmed. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself/herself
or to retaliate.[33]
The
records are extant on the findings of respondent Sandiganbayan that when
petitioner Herrera drove the patrol car along
Clearly,
the elements of murder have been proven: 1). that the two victims were
killed; 2). that petitioners and the two
other accused killed the victims; 3). that the killing was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery committed by the petitioners and the two
other accused who conspired together in killing the victims; and 4). that the
killing was not parricide or infanticide.
Eighth. Public respondent
Sandiganbayan did not grant any award of damages in favor of the heirs of Shi
Shu Yang and George Go y Tan. When death
occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.[34]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. Under
prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 to the heirs of the
victims as civil indemnity is in order.[35] In cases of murder and homicide, moral
damages may be awarded without need of allegation and proof of the emotional
suffering of the heirs, other than the death of the victim, since the emotional
wounds from the vicious killing of the victims cannot be denied. Thus, the award of P50,000 is proper.[36]
As
to the award of actual damages, Edna Go testified that she incurred funeral
expenses of P11,500. Moreover,
the award of exemplary damages of P25,000 is proper since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the killing of the victims. Article 2230 of the Civil Code allows the
award of exemplary damages as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating circumstance as used
therein should be construed in its generic sense since it did not specify
otherwise.[37]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of showing that public respondent
Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error.
The Decision of public respondent Sandiganbayan, dated P50,000
as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, P11,500 for actual
damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, Vol. 2, p. 6.
[2]
[3] G.R.
No. L-64548,
[4] Records,
Vol. 2, p. 1.
[5] Records,
Vol. 2, p. 4.
[6] Records,
Vol. I, pp. 105-106.
[7] Pat.
Roberto Barrera was later apprehended and trial of the case against him
proceeded. In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following:
(1) In Crim.
Case No. 16674, the Court finds the accused Pat. Roberto Barrera guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined in and penalized by Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the time of his sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification for public office.
(2) In Crim.
Case No. 16675, the Court finds the accused Pat. Roberto Barrera guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined in and penalized by Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the time of his sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification for public office.
Accused Barrera is further ordered to pay the legal
heirs of George Go and Shi Shu Yang the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) each for moral damages and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each
as indemnity for death; and, to pay eleven thousand five hundred pesos
(P11,500.00) as actual damages and one million four hundred thirty three
thousand four hundred eighteen pesos (P1,433,418.00) for loss of earnings to
the heirs of George Go.
The period within which the accused Roberto Barrera
was detained at the City Jail shall be credited to him in full as long as he
agrees in writing to abide by and follow strictly the rules and regulations of
the said institution.
Costs against the accused.
SO
ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 273-274).
Per
records of the case, while accused Barrera filed a notice of appeal, no further
pleading was thereafter filed.
[8] TSN (Reynaldo Ong),
[9] TSN (Edna Go),
[10] TSN
(Edna Go),
[11] TSN (Cristina Winterhalter),
[12] TSN (Dr. Roberto Garcia),
[13] TSN ,
[14] TSN,
[15] TSN,
[16] TSN
(Rodolfo Ver),
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN,
[19] TSN,
[20] TSN,
[21] TSN,
[22] TSN,
[23] TSN,
[24] TSN,
[25] TSN,
[26] Per
Justice Romeo M. Escareal (Chairman, Second Division) and concurred in by
Justice Augusto M. Amores and Justice Minita Chico-Nazario, now an Associate
Justice of this Court.
[27] Rollo,
pp. 92-93.
[28] Amadore
v. Romulo, 466 SCRA 397 (2005); Lasoy
v. Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360 (2005).
[29] People
v. Masagnay, 431 SCRA 572 (2004).
[30] Angcaco
v. People, G.R. No. 146664,
[31] People
v. De los Reyes, 430 SCRA 166.
[32] Cabanlig
v. Sandiganbayan, 464 SCRA 324.
[33] People
v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 176385,
[34]
People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051,
[35]
[36]
People v. Villa, G.R. No. 179278,
[37]
People v. Eling, G.R. No. 178546,