Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
EN BANC
|
HEIRS
OF SIMEON PIEDAD, namely: ELISEO PIEDAD, JOEL PIEDAD, PUBLIO PIEDAD, JR.,
GLORIA PIEDAD, LOT PIEDAD, ABEL PIEDAD, ALI PIEDAD, and LEE PIEDAD, Complainants, -
versus - EXECUTIVE
JUDGE CESAR O. ESTRERA and JUDGE GAUDIOSO D. VILLARIN, Regional Trial Court,
Branches 29 and 59, respectively, Toledo City, Cebu, Respondents. |
|
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3094-RTJ] Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December
16, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This administrative case stemmed from
the sworn-complaint[1] dated
February 28, 2007 of the heirs of the late Simeon Piedad, namely: Eliseo Piedad, Joel Piedad, Publio Piedad,
Jr., Gloria Piedad, Lot Piedad, Abel Piedad, Ali Piedad, and Lee Piedad filed
with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging respondent Judges
Cesar O. Estrera and Gaudioso D. Villarin with Issuing an Unlawful Order
against a Co-equal Court and Unreasonable Delay in Resolving Motions in
relation to Civil Case No. 435-T, S.P. Proc. No. 463-T, and S.P. Proc. No.
457-T.
The Facts
In 1974,
Simeon Piedad filed with the Cebu City Regional Trial Court (RTC) a case
against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles for the annulment of
an Absolute Deed of Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 435-T entitled Simeon Piedad v. Candelaria Linehan-Bobilles
and Mariano Bobilles. This was raffled
to Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC, presided by the late Judge Benigno Gaviola. Said court ruled in favor of Simeon Piedad in
its Decision dated March 19, 1992,[2]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of
evidence, the Court hereby renders a Decision in favor of herein plaintiff
Simeon Piedad and against defendants Candelaria Linehan-Bobilles and Mariano
Bobilles, by declaring the deed of sale in question (Exhibit “A” or “5”) to be
NULL and VOID for being a mere forgery, and ordering herein defendants, their
heirs and/or assigns to vacate the house and surrender their possession of said
house and all other real properties which are supposed to have been covered by
the voided deed of sale (Exhibit “A” or “5”) to the administrator of the estate
of spouses Nemesio Piedad and Fortunata Nillas. Furthermore, herein defendants
are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff or his heirs the following: (1) P3,000.00
Moral Damages; (2) P2,000.00 Exemplary Damages; and (3) P800.00 attorney’s
fees, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals, through its Decision dated September 15, 1998 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 38652, affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, We hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
Costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The foregoing decision became final
and executory on
WHEREFORE, let a writ of demolition issue against
Candelaria Linehan Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles. The sheriff implementing the
writ is ordered to allow the defendants 10 days to remove their improvements in
the premises and for them to vacate. Should defendant still fail to do so
within the period aforestated, the sheriff may proceed with the demolition of
the improvements without any further order from this Court.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On
November 5, 2001, a motion for reconsideration was then filed by defendant
Candelaria, which was denied in an Order dated November 26, 2001, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED. The Order dated
SO ORDERED.[6]
Thus, on December 4, 2001, a Writ of
Demolition[7]
was issued against the defendants therein and referred for implementation to Sheriff
Antonio A. Bellones. In a seeming attempt to stop the enforcement of the writ,
Candelaria attached to the expediente
of Civil Case No. 435-T, a Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Testament
of Simeon Piedad. This was found to be untenable by the late Judge Gaviola, who
ordered the filing of the said petition in its natural course and its raffling
to other branches of the court in its Order dated April 22, 2002.[8]
Subsequently, Candelaria filed a
Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad with the
Toledo City RTC, docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 457-T and raffled to Branch 59, which
was presided by respondent Judge Villarin.
Also, a
verified petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction was filed by Candelaria on May 16, 2002 with the Toledo
City RTC, docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 463-T entitled Candelaria Linehan v. Antonio Billones, Sheriff RTC, Branch 9, Cebu
City, against Sheriff Bellones to restrain the latter from enforcing the Writ
of Demolition.[9] On the
day that the said petition was filed, respondent Judge Estrera, the Executive
Judge of the Toledo City RTC and presiding judge of Branch 29, ordered the
raffle of the petition. Four days thereafter, respondent Judge Estrera took it
upon himself to hear the case summarily. Finding that the matter was of extreme
urgency and would cause grave injustice and irreparable injury to the plaintiff,
Candelaria, since it involved the demolition of the properties owned by the
latter, respondent Judge Estrera immediately issued a restraining order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant Court
Sheriff, Antonio Billones of the RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, and all his
servants, attorneys, agent and others acting in his aid are hereby commanded to
cease and desist from enforcing the Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC,
Branch 9, Cebu City, over the properties of plaintiff particularly Lot No.
1157-A located at Barangay Ibo, Toledo City.
Defendant is hereby further directed to appear before
this Court and file his Answer or Opposition why a Preliminary Injunction
should not be granted.
Set the hearing of this case on
SO ORDERED.[10]
On June 11, 2002, Sheriff Bellones filed
his answer, alleging that he was only performing his ministerial duty, and that
there was no cause of action against him.[11] Meanwhile,
upon the instance of Candelaria, respondent Judge Estrera issued an order for
the consolidation of the cases (S.P. Proc. No. 457-T and S.P. Proc. No. 463-T) in
the Toledo City RTC, Branch 59.[12] Immediately thereafter, respondent Judge Villarin
issued the Order dated May 27, 2002,[13]
extending the TRO for 17 days, upon the instance of Candelaria.
Subsequently, the following motions
were filed before Branch 59 of the Toledo City RTC: (1) a motion to dismiss, as
amended;[14] (2) a
motion requesting the issuance of an order lifting the injunction order;[15]
and (3) a joint motion to resolve motions.[16] Significantly, no action was taken on these
motions.
In compliance with the directive of
the OCA, respondent Judge Estrera submitted his comment dated April 24, 2007, in
which he clarified that what he issued was an ex parte TRO, not an “injunction order,” and that the said ex parte TRO was valid only for 72 hours
and would be deemed automatically vacated should the preliminary injunction
remain unresolved within the said period. He also stated that the TRO was never
issued against the heirs of the late Simeon Piedad, the complainants herein, as
they were never made parties to S.P. Proc. No. 463-T. He added that he was not
aware of the circumstances attendant to Civil Case No. 435-T.[17]
On the other hand, respondent Judge
Villarin explained in his comment that he did not act on the motion to dismiss,
as amended, as this would be tantamount to a judicial interference in the order
of Branch 29 of the Toledo City RTC, a court of co-equal jurisdiction. As
regards his inaction on the motion requesting the issuance of an order lifting
the injunction order, he justified such inaction by stating that there was no
need to resolve the motion, considering that before S.P. Proc. No. 463-T was
transferred to Branch 59 of the Toledo City RTC, the 72-hour restraining order
had already lapsed. He then justified that the resolution of the motion
requesting for the issuance of an order lifting the injunction order had already
become moot.[18]
On
The recommendation of the Court
Administrator and the premises holding it together are well taken.
The Acts of Respondent Judges Are Tantamount to Gross
Ignorance
of the Law, which Renders Them Administratively Liable
The acts of
respondent Judge Estrera in issuing a TRO and of respondent Judge Villarin in
extending the TRO disregard the basic precept that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of a co-equal and
coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the
relief sought by injunction. As held in Cojuangco v. Villegas:
The various branches of the court of first instance of a province or
city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do
concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders
or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously
hamper the administration of justice. [20]
In Yau v.
The Manila Banking Corporation, we held that undue interference by one in the proceedings and
processes of another is prohibited by law. Specifically:
Thus, the doctrine of
judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders
or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves
as an insurmountable barrier to the competencia of the RTC Cebu City to
entertain a motion, much less issue an order, relative to the Silverio share
which is under the custodia legis of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, by virtue of a
prior writ of attachment. Indeed, the policy of peaceful co-existence among
courts of the same judicial plane, so to speak, was aptly described in Parco
v. Court of Appeals, thus:
...[J]urisdiction is
vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge, and as a corollary
rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a judicial
district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on the same
level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and processes
of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the various
branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they
have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and
coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere
with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.
It cannot be gainsaid
that adherence to a different rule would sow confusion and wreak havoc on the
orderly administration of justice, and in the ensuing melee, hapless litigants
will be at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause.[21]
In his
comment, respondent Judge Estrera categorically admitted that he issued a TRO
directing Sheriff Bellones to cease and desist from enforcing the Writ of Demolition
issued by Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC over the property of Candelaria.
Attached to the said comment was a copy of respondent Judge Villarin’s Order
dated May 27, 2002, extending the TRO for 17 days.
Clearly, when
the respondents-judges acted on the application for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that
they were acting on matters pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC, which was already
exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case No. 435-T.
Nonetheless, respondents-judges still opted to interfere with the order of a
co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard
of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom
in adjective law.
As
members of the judiciary, respondents-judges ought to know the fundamental legal
principles; otherwise, they are susceptible to administrative sanction for
gross ignorance of the law, as in the instant case. As held in Mactan Cebu
International Airport v. Hontanosa, Jr.:
As a judge, the respondent must have the basic rules
at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional competence
at all times. Judges should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in
law and jurisprudence, and regard the study of law as a never-ending and
ceaseless process. Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it
is incumbent upon the respondent to apply them regardless of personal belief
and predilections. To put it differently, when the law is unambiguous and
unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is imperative. Indeed, a
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules. He must be conversant with basic legal principles
and well-settled doctrines. He should strive for excellence and seek the truth
with passion. The failure to observe the basic laws and rules is not only
inexcusable, but renders him susceptible to administrative sanction for gross
ignorance of the law from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge.[22]
Respondent Judge Villarin Is Additionally Liable for
Undue Delay in Rendering an Order
In his
comment, respondent Judge Villarin admitted that he did not act on the Motion
to Dismiss, as amended, and the Motion Requesting the Issuance of an Order
Lifting the Injunction Order dated
We do not
agree. If respondent Judge Villarin indeed believed that the motions pending
before him were defective, he could have simply acted on the said motions and
indicated the supposed defects in his resolutions instead of just leaving them
unresolved. The importance of judicious and prompt disposition of cases and
other matters pending before the courts was aptly explained in Biggel v. Pamintuan:[23]
Undue delay in the disposition of cases and motions
erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary and
unnecessarily blemishes its stature. No less than the Constitution mandates
that lower courts must dispose of their cases promptly and decide them within
three months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required
by the Rules of Court or by the Court concerned. In addition, a judge's delay
in resolving, within the prescribed period, pending motions and incidents
constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requiring
judges to dispose of court business promptly.
There should be no more doubt that undue inaction on
judicial concerns is not just undesirable but more so detestable especially now
when our all-out effort is directed towards minimizing, if not totally
eradicating the perennial problem of congestion and delay long plaguing our
courts. The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is
designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice, for obviously,
justice delayed is justice denied. An unwarranted slow down in the disposition
of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers
its standards and brings it into disrepute.
Considering
the above ruling, respondent Judge Villarin is liable for Undue Delay in
Rendering an Order, a less serious charge under Section 9, Rule 140, as
amended, of the Revised Rules of Court. In accordance with Sec. 11(b) of Rule
140, such offense is punishable by suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) or more than three (3) months or a
fine of more than ten thousand pesos (PhP 10,000) but not exceeding twenty thousand
pesos (PhP 20,000).
WHEREFORE, the
Court finds Judge Cesar O. Estrera and Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin of the RTC in
Toledo City, Cebu, Branches 29 and 59, respectively, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF
THE LAW and imposes upon them a FINE
in the amount of twenty one thousand
pesos (PhP 21,000) each, with the stern warning that a repetition of
similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. Also, the Court finds Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin GUILTY of UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING AN ORDER and imposes upon him a FINE in the additional amount of eleven thousand pesos (PhP 11,000).
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
(On
official leave)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN MARIANO
C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice