FIRST DIVISION
|
MAYOR HADJI AMER R. SAMPIANO, SOMER ABDULLAH, SALIC TAMPUGAO, ANTHONY ABI, SAGA POLE INOG, TORORAC DOMATO, KING MARONSING, MARGARITA SOLAIMAN, HADJI ACMAD MAMENTING and BILLIE JAI LAINE T. OGKA, Complainants,
- versus – JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Respondent. |
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953
Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN,
and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December
21, 2009 |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This
administrative case against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur stemmed from a complaint[1]
filed by Hadji Amer R. Sampiano (Sampiano), incumbent Mayor, and the members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, charging said judge with gross and wanton ignorance
of the law, grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and serious acts of
impropriety in connection with the issuance of an Order[2]
dated October 11, 2004 in Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 12-173,[3]
entitled Sumulong Sampiano Ogka (Ogka) v.
Philippine National Bank(PNB)-Marawi Branch, represented by its Branch Manager
Sandorie T. Disomangcop (Disomangcop), Atty. Alvin C. Go (Go), Hadji Amer
Sampiano and Mamarinta Macabato (Macabato), for Prohibition and Injunction
with Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction.
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
Prior
to the filing of the present administrative case, complainant Sampiano filed before
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/TRO[4] against
his rival mayoralty candidate, his uncle Ogka, and the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur composed of Vadria Pungginagina and
Zenaida Mante. The case was docketed as
SPC No. 04-285. It appears that the Comelec
issued the following: Order dated August 4, 2004[5]
(authorizing the vice-mayor to temporarily assume the duties and
responsibilities as mayor due to the double proclamation of Sampiano and Ogka
for the position of mayor), Order dated August 12, 2004[6] (recalling
the Order authorizing the assumption of the vice-mayor as the mayor, and instead
maintaining the status quo prevailing
at the time of the issuance of the said Order), and Order dated September 9,
2004[7] (clarifying
the Order of August 12, 2004). Pursuant
to the said Orders, Sampiano was ordered to act, perform and discharge the
duties, functions and responsibilities as mayor “to prevent paralysis to public service” pending determination and
final resolution of the controversy involving the mayorship of the Municipality
of Balabagan.
Aggrieved,
Ogka filed, on September 13, 2004, an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
September 9, 2004 Order.[8] He also informed in writing,[9] the
Chief Legal Counsel of PNB, Atty. Alvin C. Go, and asked him not to release the
IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment which is the share of the local government unit
in national internal revenue taxes) for the
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises
considered, petitioner thru counsel, most respectfully prays this Honorable
Court that:
(1)
Considering the urgency of the subject matter of the petition, a
temporary restraining order (TRO) be immediately issued upon the filing of this
petition ORDERING
(a) respondent Atty. Alvin C. Go to cease and
desist from issuing an order ordering the respondent PNB-Marawi Branch manager
Sandorie T. Disomangcop to release the October 2004 IRA and the months
thereafter to respondents Hadji Amer Sampiano and Mamarinta Macabato or their
agents or persons acting for and in their behalves,
(b) respondent PNB-Marawi thru Sandorie T.
Disomangcop to cease and desist from accepting and honoring any withdrawal
check(s) for the October 2004 IRA of Balabagan signed by respondents Hadji Amer
Sampiano and Mamarinta Macabato and or releasing the October 2004 IRA for
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur to respondents Mamarinta Macabato and Hadji Amer
Sampiano or their agents or persons acting for and in their behalves, and
(c)
respondents
Hadji Amer Sampiano and Mamarinta Macabato including their agents or persons
acting for and in their behalves to cease and desist from withdrawing/releasing
the October 2004 IRA for Balabagan, Lanao del Sur from the respondent
PNB-Marawi; and
(2) After,
notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) be issued against
the respondents including the persons acting for and in their behalves under
the same terms and conditions as the TRO for a period lasting until the
petition in SPC No. 04-285 pending before the Comelec shall have been finally
decided.[11]
On the
same day, respondent Judge issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on
xxx xxx xxx
In the meantime, considering that
the urgency of the Petitioner (sic) and while the petition is pending
resolution of the Court, the Philippine National Bank represented by its Branch
Manager Sandorie T. Disomangcop and Atty. Alvic C. Go, are hereby ordered to
hold or defer the release of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) intended for
the Municipal Government of Balabagan unless ordered otherwise by this Court.
[12]
Sampiano
also alleged that during the
Sampiano
considered the October 11, 2004 Order as a “SUPER ORDER” because it was not
only issued ex-parte but also it directed
the PNB-Marawi to hold or defer the
release of the IRA “until ordered otherwise by [the] court.” He likened the said Order to a TRO and a writ
of preliminary injunction, and insisted that in both instances, prior notice
and hearing are required. He added that
a TRO has a limited life of twenty (20) days while a writ of preliminary
injunction is effective only during the pendency of the case and only after
posting the required injunction bond. Sampiano
further claimed that the said Order was issued in violation of Section 286 of
the Local Government Code (LGC), which provides for the automatic release of
the share of the local government unit from the national government.[15] Sampiano prayed that respondent Judge be
dismissed from judicial service for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority, manifest partiality and serious acts of impropriety for the
following reasons:
1.
Assumption
of jurisdiction over SCA 12-173 the subject matter of which concerns the
enforcement of election laws by the Comelec; and
2.
Ex-parte
issuance of the
By
1st Indorsement of
In
his Comment[17] dated
xxx He believed that he could not
be administratively sanctioned as he did not commit any administrative
lapses. His court assumed jurisdiction
over [SCA] No. 12-173 as it is a petition for prohibition and injunction and
not an enforcement of election laws.
While he considered the said petition as an improper remedy, hence, the
court should not have taken cognizance of the case, he had nevertheless acted
on it since the petition prays for the issuance of temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction, both an auxiliary remedy which concerns the “enforcement of legal right or a matter that
partakes of a question of law” and not the enforcement of election laws.
Considering the urgency of the petition and before granting the prayer
for the issuance of the TRO, he immediately issued an order on
The main issue in petitioner Ogka’s
petition is the determination of whether petitioner is entitled to the issuance
of TRO and later, a permanent injunction to hold the release of the IRA to
Hadji R. Sampiano or to any person acting in his behalf considering that
petitioner is also a holder of [a] “COMELEC” proclamation.
There is no question that the
COMELEC is vested under the Constitution with the enforcement of election
laws. However, he [respondent] did not
arrogate upon himself such power as he neither contracted nor annulled any
order of the COMELEC. Under Section 21
of B.P. 129, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction in the issuance of
writ of prohibition and injunction.
Hence, he simply applied Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which is the
prevailing rule applicable in determining the merits of the subject
petition. He did not require petitioner
to post a bond because the
Moreover, he was also cautious in
his actions to avert the already growing tension between the warring families
newly aroused by the result of the
Concerning the alleged violation of
the pertinent provision of the Local Government Code, respondent believes that
the provision on the automatic release of IRA is not a shield or immunity to
the authority of the courts to interfere, interrupt or suspend its release when
there is a legal question presented before it in order to determine the rights
of the parties concerned.
Lastly, respondent was not able to
continue handling the subject case, particularly the complainant’s motion to
dismiss save the issuance of an order requiring petitioner Ogka to file his
comment to the said motion considering that he was already relieved of his
duties and responsibilities as presiding judge of RTC, Branch 12, Malabang
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 154-2004 designating and assigning him on
permanent detail in all the branches of the RTC, Cotabato City. Hence, it was already the new acting judge in
the person of Hon. Rasad G. Balindong who proceeded with the hearing of the
subject petition. Upon verification, he
learned that Judge Balindong had already issued an order dated
Considering all of the foregoing,
respondent prays for the immediate dismissal of the instant complaint for being
preposterous so that he can concentrate on his judicial tasks more important
than the instant harassment suit.[18]
The OCA filed
with the Court an Administrative Matter for Agenda with the following
recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully
submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court our recommendation that
respondent judge be found guilty of ignorance of the law for violating Section
5 of Rule 58, Revised Rules on Civil Procedure and that he be imposed a penalty
of FINE in the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos.[19]
In
a Resolution dated September 7, 2005, the Court resolved to re-docket the case
as a regular administrative matter and on December 11, 2006, we required the
parties to manifest, within ten (10) days from notice, whether they were submitting
this case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Both parties failed to comply; hence, we
considered the case submitted for resolution.
We
agree with the findings of the OCA that the October 11, 2004 Order is
essentially a preliminary injunction order, and that the respondent Judge
failed to comply with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court.
We
shall first tackle the question of whether the RTC had acquired jurisdiction
over the petition. It is settled that
jurisdiction over the subject matter on the existence of the action is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some
of the claims or relief sought therein. Such
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or
upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is
retained up to the end of the litigation.[20] In this case, the petition
prayed, among others, that Go should cease and desist from ordering PNB-Marawi
through its branch manager to release the IRA for the month of October 2004 and
the succeeding months to Sampiano and Macabato or their agents. The issue here involves the determination of whether
Ogka is entitled to the issuance of a TRO or an injunction and not the application
or enforcement of election law. Undeniably, the RTC has jurisdiction over such
action pursuant to Section 21 of BP 129, which provides:
SEC
21. Original
jurisdiction in other cases. -
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1)
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions; xxx (italics ours)
Sampiano’s claim
that the October 11, 2004 Order was in contravention of Section 286 of the LGC on
the automatic release of the share of the local government unit is untenable. We agree with respondent Judge that the
automatic release of the IRA under Section 286 is a mandate to the national
government through the Department of Budget and Management to effect automatic
release of the said funds from the treasury directly to the local government
unit, free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government. However, this automatic release of the IRA
from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or
suspending the release thereof to particular local officials when there is a
legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights of the parties
to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary
injunction while such rights are still being determined.
A cursory
reading of the said Order reveals that it was in effect a TRO or preliminary
injunction order. The Order directed PNB’s
Go and Disomangcop to hold or defer the release of the IRA to Sampiano and
Macabato while the petition is pending resolution of the trial court and unless
ordered otherwise by the court. This
Order was merely consistent with the relief prayed for in respondent’s petition
for prohibition and injunction.
Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC.
5. Preliminary injunction not granted without
notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it
shall appear from the facts shown by the affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application
for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said
twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at
a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine
within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order (as amended by En Banc
Resolution of the Supreme Court, Bar Matter No. 803, dated February 17, 1998).
However, and subject to the
provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and
the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but
he shall immediately comply with provisions of the next preceding section as to
service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within
the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining
order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
heard. In no case shall the total period of the effectivity of the temporary
restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two
(72) hours provided therein.
The above-quoted
provisions expressly prohibit the grant of preliminary injunction without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. However, courts are authorized to issue ex parte a TRO effective only for
seventy-two (72) hours if it should appear from the facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter could be heard on notice. Within the aforesaid period of time, the
Court should conduct a summary hearing to determine if a TRO shall be
issued. The TRO, however, shall be
effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. During the
20-day period, the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of
issuing a preliminary injunction. At the
end of such period, the TRO automatically terminates without need of any
judicial declaration to that effect, leaving the court no discretion to extend the
same.[21]
Here, respondent
Judge issued the October 11, 2004 Order on the very same day it was filed, and
without any hearing and prior notice to herein complainants. As discussed above, respondent was allowed by
the Rules to issue ex parte a TRO of
limited effectivity and, in that time, conduct a hearing to determine the
propriety of extending the TRO or issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent conducted
the hearing of the petition on October 14, 2004 or on the third day of the
issuance of a TRO ex parte. Atty.
Romaraban Macabantog (Macabantog) and Atty. Tingcap Mortaba (Mortaba) — counsels for Ogka and Sampiano, respectively –
argued in their clients’ behalf.
Sampiano and Macabato were also present.
During the said hearing, Atty. Mortaba manifested that his clients would
either file an answer or a motion to dismiss the petition (in SCA No. 12-173),
while Atty. Macabantog opted to file a rejoinder after the latter has submitted
their answer or motion to dismiss.[22] On
It is worthy to
note that the said October 11, 2004 Order was subsequently lifted by the
succeeding judge on the ground that the requisites for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction were not present.
However, Sampiano
adduced no evidence to prove that the issuance of the October 11, 2004 Order was
motivated by bad faith. Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn
duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or
ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident
bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to
do wrong or cause damage.[26] In issuing the assailed Order, respondent
Judge was not at all motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred and some other
motive; rather, he took into account the circumstances obtaining between the parties
as can be gleaned from his Comment, and we quote:
This
should be considered an exercise of judicial functions and judicial
prerogatives in the most cautious manner taking into account the factual and
serious circumstances obtaining between petitioner Ogka and his Uncle Mayor Sampiano
whose family were already at war with each other.
Further,
respondent judge was cautious in his court actions in this petition in order to
avert the already growing tension between the warring families aroused anew by
the result of the
Since there is no showing that
respondent Judge was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the
assailed Order, and this is his first offense, we sustain the penalty
recommended by the OCA to be imposed on respondent Judge for violating Section
5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE,
the penalty of a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is hereby
imposed on respondent Judge for the above-mentioned violation of the Rules of
Court.
SO
ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-10.
[2] Annex “B” of the Complaint; id. at 48.
[3] Annex “A” of the Complaint; id. at 11-19.
[4] Annex “C-32” of the Complaint; id. at 81-94.
[5] Annex “A-14” of the Complaint; id. at 24-25.
ORDER
xxx xxx xxx
In the meantime, considering that this is a case of double proclamation, petitioner [Sampiano] having been issued a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation dated May 24, 2004 and respondent’s [Ogka’s] claim being based on the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation dated June 6, 2004, both parties are ordered to cease and desist from performing the function of Mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. While the case is pending, the duly elected vice-mayor is directed to temporarily assume the post of Mayor of said municipality pursuant to the rule on succession as provided for under the Local Government Code to avoid a vacuum of leadership in the municipality.
[6] Annex “A-16” of the Complaint; id. at 26-29.
ORDER
xxx xxx xxx
hereby orders as follows:
1)
to set aside
the second paragraph of its Order dated
“In the meantime, considering that this is a case . . . .
2) to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the issuance of the foregoing Order.
[7] Annex “A-20” of the Complaint; id. at 30-32
ORDER
xxx xxx xxx
the Commission (First Division) CLARIFIES that:
1. The
“Status Quo” to be maintained and referred to in the
and hereby ORDERS that:
1.
Petitioner Hadji
Amer R. Sampiano shall PERFORM
the functions, duties and responsibilities of MUNICIPAL MAYOR of the
2. The foregoing Order shall TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY to prevent paralysis to public service in the aforementioned municipality.
[8] Annex “A-23” of the Complaint; id. at 33-46.
[9] Annex “A-37” of the Complaint; id. at 47.
[10] Supra note 3.
[11]
[12] Supra note 2.
[13] Rollo, pp. 4 and 8.
[14] Annex “C” of the Complaint; id. at 49-64.
[15]
Sec. 286. Automatic
Release of Shares. – (a) The share of each local government unit shall be
released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis
within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the National Government
for whatever purpose.
[16] Rollo, p. 99.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Dandoy
v. Maglangit, G.R. No. 144652,
[21] Columbres
v. Madronio, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1461,
[22] Rollo, p. 123.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Planas v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 146,160.
[27] Rollo, p. 107.