EN BANC
|
representative danilo ramon s. fernandez, Petitioner, - versus - house of representatives electoral tribunal and
jesus l. vicente, Respondents. |
G.
R. No. 187478
Present:
PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December
21, 2009 |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court stems from the Decision[1]
in HRET CASE No. 07-034 for quo warranto entitled Jesus
L. Vicente v. Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez promulgated by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on December 16, 2008 as well as Minute Resolution No. 09-080 promulgated
on April 30, 2009, likewise issued by the HRET, denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
The
dispositive portion of the questioned Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the Tribunal DECLARES respondent
Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez ineligible for the Office of Representative of [the]
First District of Laguna for lack of residence in the district and [ORDERS] him to vacate his office.
As soon
as this Resolution becomes final and executory, let notices be sent to the
President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives through the Speaker,
and the Commission on Audit through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 96 of the
2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On December 22, 2008, petitioner
Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez (petitioner) filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the above-quoted Decision. The HRET, in
the questioned Resolution, found petitioner’s Motion to be “bereft of new
issues/ arguments that [had] not been appropriately resolved”[3] in
the Decision.
Petitioner thus applied for relief
to this Court, claiming that the questioned Decision and Resolution should be
declared null and void for having been respectively issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction, and praying for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to
enjoin and prohibit the HRET from implementing the questioned Decision and
Resolution.[4]
The antecedent facts are clear and
undisputed.
Petitioner filed for candidacy as
Representative of the First Legislative District of the
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente
(private respondent) filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification” before the Office
of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046 (PES).
Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC and the
latter’s disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during
past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan
was located in the Fourth Legislative District of the
Petitioner was proclaimed as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Laguna on June 27, 2007,
having garnered a total of 95,927 votes,
winning by a margin of 35,000 votes over the nearest candidate.[8]
On July 5, 2007, private respondent
filed a petition for quo warranto
before the HRET, docketed as HRET CASE
No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as
a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Legislative
District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.[9]
Private respondent’s main ground
for the quo warranto petition was
that petitioner lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided
under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. In support of his petition, private respondent
argued that petitioner falsely declared under oath: (1) his alleged Sta. Rosa
residence; (2) the period of his residence in the legislative district before
May 14, 2007, which he indicated as one year and two months; and (3) his
eligibility for the office where he was seeking to be elected. Private respondent presented the testimony of
a certain Atty. Noel T. Tiampong, who stated that petitioner is not from the
alleged Sta. Rosa residence but a resident of Barangay Pulo, Cabuyao, Laguna; as well as the respective
testimonies of Barangay Balibago
Health Workers who attested that they rarely, if ever, saw respondent in the
leased premises at the alleged Sta. Rosa residence; and other witnesses who
testified that contrary to the misrepresentations of petitioner, he is not a
resident of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence.
A witness testified that petitioner attempted to coerce some of the
other witnesses to recant their declarations and change their affidavits. Finally, private respondent presented as
witness the lawyer who notarized the Contract of Lease dated March 8, 2007
between petitioner as lessee and Bienvenido G. Asuncion as lessor.[10]
Petitioner, as respondent in HRET Case No. 07-034, presented as his
witnesses residents of Villa de Toledo who testified that they had seen
respondent and his family residing in their locality, as well as Bienvenido G.
Asuncion who testified that petitioner is the lessee in Unit No. 13 Block 1 Lot
I, Maharlika St., Villa de Toledo Subdivision, Brgy. Balibago,
Since the HRET ruled in favor of
private respondent, this petition was filed before us.
In petitioner’s assignment of
errors, he alleges that the HRET grievously erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion:
1.
In not placing on the quo warranto petitioner Jesus L. Vicente
the burden of proving that then respondent (now petitioner) Fernandez is not a
qualified candidate for Representative of the First District of the
2.
When it disregarded the ruling of a
co-equal tribunal in SPA No. 07-046;
3.
When it added a property qualification
to a Member of Congress;
4.
When it determined that the petitioner
failed to comply with the one (1) year residency requirement based on the contract
of lease;
5.
When it completely disregarded the
testimonies of material witnesses;
6.
When it failed to consider the intent of
the petitioner to transfer domicile based on the totality of the evidence
adduced; and
7.
When it failed to find the petitioner in
HRET Case No. 07-034 guilty of forum-shopping.[13]
On the first assignment of error,
petitioner questions the following pronouncement of the HRET in its decision:
In the
case before us, petitioner has clearly asserted, and respondent does not deny,
that his domicile of origin is Pagsanjan in the Fourth District of Laguna. Hence, the burden is now on respondent to
prove that he has abandoned his domicile of origin, or since his birth, where
he formerly ran for provincial Board Member of Laguna in 1998, for
Vice-Governor of Laguna in 2001 and for Governor of Laguna in 2004. In all his Certificates of Candidacy when he
ran for these positions, he indicated under oath that his domicile or permanent
residence was in Pagsanjan in the Fourth District of Laguna, not in the First
District where he later ran in the last elections.[14]
Petitioner contends that “it is a
basic evidentiary rule that the burden of proof is on he who alleges, and he
who relies on such an allegation as his cause of action should prove the same.”[15] Since private respondent is the party
alleging that petitioner is not eligible for his position, it is therefore
incumbent on the former, who filed the quo
warranto case before the HRET, to prove such allegation. He cites in support of his contention Sec. 1,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SECTION 1. Burden of proof . — Burden of proof is the duty
of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
Petitioner avers that private
respondent failed to establish his claim and to adduce evidence sufficient to
overcome petitioner’s eligibility to be a candidate for Representative of the
First District of Laguna.
On
the second assignment of error, petitioner submits that the HRET should have
been “guided and/or cautioned” by the COMELEC’s dispositions in SPA No. 07-046, wherein he was adjudged
as qualified to run for the position of Congressman of the First District of
Laguna by an agency tasked by law and the Constitution to ascertain the
qualifications of candidates before election.
Petitioner claims that the HRET should have respected the findings of the COMELEC and should have discreetly
denied the petition.
On
the third assignment of error, petitioner argues that under Article V, Section
1, of the 1987 Constitution, any citizen of the
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Petitioner alleges that in the
questioned Decision, the HRET added a new qualification requirement for
candidates seeking election to the position of Member of the House of
Representatives, and that is, they must be real property owners in the
legislative district where they seek election.
On
the fourth assignment of error, petitioner addresses private respondent’s
arguments against the contract of lease that he presented as part of the proof
of his compliance with the residency requirement. Petitioner asserts that the nomenclature used
by contracting parties to describe a contract does not determine its nature,
but the decisive factor is the intention of the parties to a contract – as
shown by their conduct, words, actions, and deeds – prior to, during and after
executing the agreement.[16] Petitioner claims that he has presented ample
proof of his residency in terms of evidence more numerous and bearing more
weight and credibility than those of private respondent. He proceeds to highlight some of the evidence
he offered in the quo warranto case
that allegedly prove that his transfer of residence and intention to reside in
Sta. Rosa were proven by his stay in Villa de Toledo, to wit: (1) even earlier
than 2006, he had purchased a house and lot in Bel-Air Subdivision in Sta. Rosa
which he rented out because he was not yet staying there at that time; (2) he
sent his children to schools in Sta. Rosa as early as 2002; and (3) he and his
wife established a restaurant business there in 2003. Petitioner contends that when he and his
family moved to Sta. Rosa by initially renting a townhouse in Villa de Toledo,
it cannot be said that he did this only in order to run for election in the
First Legislative District.[17]
As
regards the alleged infirmities characterizing the execution of the contract of
lease and the renewal of said contract of lease, petitioner contends that these
are not material since the lessor, Bienvenido Asuncion, affirmed his stay in
his townhouse; the neighbors and other barangay personalities confirmed his and
his family’s stay in their area; and petitioner has continued actual residence
in Sta. Rosa from early 2006 to the present.
Petitioner claims that all these prove that he had effectively changed
his residence and could therefore likewise transfer his voter’s registration
from Pagsanjan to Sta. Rosa under Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 8189.[18] Petitioner also alleges that he had become
qualified to seek elective office in his new place of residence and
registration as a voter.
To
further prove that he has made Sta. Rosa his domicile of choice from early 2006
to the present, petitioner points out that he and his wife had purchased a lot
in the same area, Villa de Toledo, on April 21, 2007, built a house thereon,
and moved in said house with their family.
Regarding
the non-notarization of the contract of lease raised by private respondent,
petitioner avers that this “does not necessarily nullify nor render the
parties’ transaction void ab initio.”[19]
On
the fifth assignment of error, petitioner alleges that the HRET relied on
private respondent’s witnesses in negating petitioner’s claim that he had
validly resided at the alleged Sta. Rosa residence for more than one year and
two months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, and did not touch on the
testimonies of his witnesses. The
questioned Decision pointed out petitioner’s alleged non-appearance in the
day-to-day activities of the Homeowners’ Association and considered this as
failure to prove that he is a resident of Villa de Toledo, without considering
the fact that private respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof in
support of his indictment against petitioner.
On
the sixth assignment of error, petitioner claims that the questioned Decision
was arrived at based on the perceived weakness of his evidence and arguments as
respondent, instead of the strength of private respondent’s own evidence and
arguments in his quo warranto
petition.
On
the seventh and last assignment of error, petitioner alleges that the matters
raised in HRET Case No. 07-034 were
no different from the ones raised by private respondent before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-046 (PES); thus, private
respondent’s petition should have been dismissed by the HRET for
forum-shopping.
In
his Comment dated June 22, 2009,
private respondent summarized the issues raised in petitioner’s assignment of
errors into two: (1) those that involve the issue of conflict of jurisdiction
between the HRET and the COMELEC respecting the eligibility, qualification/s or
disqualification of elective public officials; and (2) those that involve
factual and evidentiary matters designed as supposed errors.[20]
Regarding
the first issue, private respondent contends that the 1987 Constitution is most
equivocal in declaring that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives, under the following provision:
Art. VI, SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members.
Private respondent alleges that the
above constitutional provision was adopted by the HRET in its Rules, which
read:
THE 1998 RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal hereby adopts and
promulgates the following Rules governing its proceedings as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of
the House of Representatives, pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE
17
Quo
Warranto
A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
The rule on verification provided in Section 16 hereof shall apply
to petitions for quo warranto.
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondent concludes from
the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET, when
reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is
concerned, is “co-equal” to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot disregard
any ruling of COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of
a member of the House of Representatives.
The truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to
the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or
qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as
sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another body may
have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of
the Member’s qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases
involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and
dissimilar in their nature and character.
Anent
the second issue, private respondent contends that petitioner raised errors of
judgment, mistakes in the factual findings, and/or flaws in the evidence
appreciation, which are appropriate on appeal, but not in a petition for certiorari
which is a special civil action, where the only allowable ground in order
to prosper is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.
For
its part, public respondent HRET, through the Solicitor General, filed a
Comment dated July 14, 2009, arguing that it did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that
petitioner failed to comply with the one year residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.[21]
The
HRET avers that the questioned Decision is supported by factual and legal
basis, for it found that the original and extended contracts of lease presented
by petitioner were defective and fabricated, as it contained “several apparent,
if not visible, deficiencies as to form, i.e.[,] it being not notarized; the
absence of witnesses, the intercalations thereat especially on the term/period
of the alleged lease; the absence of respondent’s participation therein and
some others pointed out in the petition.”[22] The Decision states that even if the contract
of lease was valid and legitimate, “a fixed period of one year … negates the
concept of permanency that would suffice to prove abandonment of respondent’s
previous residence or domicile at Pagsanjan.”
The Decision further reads as follows:
Respondent’s
connection to the First District of Laguna is an alleged lease agreement of a
townhouse unit in the area. The intention not to establish a
permanent home in the First District of Laguna is evident in his leasing a townhouse unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of the First District of Laguna
(and the fact that his domicile of origin is Pagsanjan, Laguna is not within
the First District of Laguna) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new residence or
domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the First
District of Laguna.[23]
xxx xxx xxx
Exhibit
–“3” is the very document that was produced and presented by respondent to attest
that while the original contract, replete with infirmities, as only for one
year expiring even before the May 14, 2007 elections, here now comes the
renewed Contract of Lease, signed by respondent himself, no longer his wife,
immaculately perfect on its face, now notarized and properly witnessed, and
even the terms and conditions thereof undeniably clear and explicit, with the
added feature of a prolonged 2-year period of lease that will go well beyond
the May 14, 2007 elections.
We
cannot however, simply accept the renewed Contract of Lease (Exhibit –“3”) on
its face. In fact, as succinctly pointed
out by petitioner, the renewed Contract of Lease suffers from a more grievous
infirmity.
x
x x As respondent’s brother-in-law, Atty. Macalalag is prohibited from
notarizing a document that involves the respondent.[24]
xxx xxx xxx
But
the lack of notarial authentication does not even constitute the main defect of
[Exhibit “3”]. The surfacing of Exhibit
“3” very late in the day cannot but lead to the conclusion that the same was a
mere afterthought. x x x[25]
xxx xxx
xxx
We
have to emphasize that the initial one-year lease contract expired on February
27, 2007, and as such, standing alone, the same cannot prove and will not
establish the declared one-year and two months prior residence eligibility
requirement of respondent, unless it is shown that the expired lease agreement
was extended or renewed beyond the May 14, 2007 elections, and, more
importantly, accompanied by a copy of the claimed existing renewed lease
agreement. x x x[26]
xxx xxx
xxx
By
the unexplained delay in the production and presentation of Exhibit “3”,
respondent’s residence qualifications suffered a fatal blow. For it can no longer be denied that
respondent’s claimed residence at the alleged townhouse unit in Sta. Rosa for
one year and two months prior to the May 14, 2007 election is not only most
doubtful, but also negates the concept of permanency that would suffice to
prove abandonment of respondent’s previous residence or domicile at Pagsanjan.[27]
Furthermore, the HRET alleges that,
as it found in the questioned Decision, the witnesses presented who were
residents of Sta. Rosa, Laguna were consistent and credible in disputing
petitioner’s alleged physical presence at any given time in said place. Among these witnesses were three Barangay Health
Workers, one of whom, Rowena Dineros, submitted an affidavit that her job
required her to frequently go around Villa de Toledo, knocking on every
household door to inquire about its occupants, and not once did she see
petitioner at the alleged Sta. Rosa residence.
The HRET claims that this testimony was corroborated by another Barangay
Health Worker (BHW), Jeanet Cabingas, who stated in her affidavit that every
time she accompanied her niece, who was petitioner’s goddaughter, to request a
favor from petitioner, the latter would ask them to return to his house in
Cabuyao, Laguna, even if she was a resident of Sta. Rosa.[28] The Solicitor General quotes the following
portion from the questioned Decision:
What
appears very evident from this is that respondent has absolutely not the slightest
intention to reside in Sta. Rosa permanently.
This
ineluctably confirms that respondent has not developed animus manendi over the latter place, Sta. Rosa[,] and that he has
not actually abandoned his old domicile of origin in Pagsanjan.[29]
As for the third BHW witness,
Flocerfina Torres, the HRET gives credence to her testimony that she conducted
a household census in Villa de Toledo every three months, but not once had she
seen petitioner in the alleged Sta. Rosa residence, and that she was advised by
petitioner to proceed to his house in Cabuyao, Laguna when she had attempted to
solicit from petitioner at his “Rafter’s establishment because it was near her
residence in Sta. Rosa.” From the
foregoing testimonies, the HRET found in the questioned Decision that:
The
uniform testimony of our 3 BHW witnesses disputing the physical presence of the
respondent at his claimed
The
HRET likewise contends that the fact that petitioner registered as a voter in
Sta. Rosa does not prove that he is a resident thereat, given that a voter is
required to reside in the place wherein he proposes to vote only for six months preceding the election.
The
HRET avers that this Court had explained the importance of property ownership
in Aquino v. COMELEC, et al.[31]
and finds no merit in petitioner’s insistence that the will of the electorate
attests to his residence in Sta. Rosa because, the HRET further avers, “[a]
disqualified candidate cannot assume office.”[32]
The HRET likewise contends that the
purpose of the residency requirement is to ensure that the person elected is
familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency.
The
issues for determination are: (1) whether the HRET had jurisdiction over the
case; and (2) whether petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency
requirement to be a Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the
1987 Constitution.
The
first issue is procedural and involves the jurisdiction of the HRET vis-à-vis
that of the COMELEC in cases involving the qualification of Members of the
House of Representatives. Petitioner
suggests that the matters raised in HRET
Case No. 07-034 were already passed upon by the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-046 (PES), thus the HRET
should have dismissed the case for forum-shopping.
We
do not agree. The
1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that
the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members. The authority
conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of
the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals,[33]
which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the
proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed
and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the
House of Representatives. [34]
Thus,
private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as
in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or
quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the
House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
Anent
the second issue pertaining to petitioner’s compliance with the residency
requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, after studying the
evidence submitted by the parties, we find for petitioner, taking into account
our ruling in Frivaldo v. COMELEC,[35]
which reads in part:
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed
the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will
of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to
give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot. Otherwise stated, legal
niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
For
the foregoing reason, the Court must exercise utmost caution before
disqualifying a winning candidate, shown to be the clear choice of the
constituents that he wishes to represent in Congress.
The
qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives are found in Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution,
which provides:
Section 6. No person shall be a
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years
of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Emphasis
supplied)
We
find the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the
Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual
circumstances of this case.
The
evidence presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly suffices to
prove that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement
under the Constitution. Private respondent’s documentary evidence to disqualify petitioner mainly
consisted of (a) petitioner’s certificates of candidacy (COCs) for various
positions in 1998, 2001 and 2004, which all indicated his residence as
Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth District of said province; (b) his
application for a driver’s license in August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan,
Laguna as his residence; and (c) the statement in his COCs including his 2007
COC for Congressman for the First District of Laguna that his place of birth
was Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The
only thing these pieces of documentary evidence prove is that petitioner’s
domicile of origin was Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained his domicile up to
2005, at the latest. On the other hand, what petitioner asserted in his 2007
COC is that he had been a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna in the First District
of Laguna as of February 2006 and respondent’s evidence failed contradict that
claim.
If it
is true that petitioner and his family had been living in Sta. Rosa, Laguna as
of February 2006 with the intent to reside therein permanently, that would more
than fulfill the requirement that petitioner be a resident of the district
where he was a candidate for at least one year before election day, which in
this case was May 14, 2007.
In
order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna beginning at least in February 2006, petitioner’s evidence
included, among others: (a) original and extended lease contracts for a
townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b)
certification issued by the President of the Villa de Toledo Homeowners
Association, Inc, that petitioner has been a resident of said Subdivision since
February 2006; (c) affidavits of petitioner’s neighbors in Villa de Toledo
attesting that petitioner has been a resident of said subdivision since
February 2006; (d) certification of the barangay chairman of Barangay Balibago,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna that petitioner is a resident of Villa de Toledo within the
said barangay; (e) certificates of attendance of petitioner’s children in
schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2005; and (f) DTI certificates of
business issued in the name of petitioner and his wife to show that they own
and operate businesses in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2003.
The
fact that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see
petitioner whenever they allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no
moment, especially considering that there were witnesses (including
petitioner’s neighbors in Villa de Toledo) that were in turn presented by
petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of Villa de Toledo, in the
address he stated in his COC. The law
does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven
days a week, in order to fulfill the residency requirement. It may be that whenever these health workers
do their rounds petitioner was out of the house to attend to his own employment
or business. It is not amiss to note
that even these barangay health workers, with the exception of one, confirm
seeing petitioner’s wife at the address stated in petitioner’s 2007 COC. Indeed, these health workers’ testimonies do
not conclusively prove that petitioner did not in fact reside in Villa de
Toledo for at least the year before election day.
Neither
do we find anything wrong if petitioner sometimes transacted business or
received visitors in his Cabuyao house, instead of the alleged Sta. Rosa
residence, as there is nothing in the residency requirement for candidates that
prohibits them from owning property and exercising their rights of ownership thereto
in other places aside from the address they had indicated as their place of
residence in their COC.
As
regards the weight to be given the contract of lease vis-à-vis petitioner’s previous COCs, we find Perez v. COMELEC[36]
to be instructive in this case, and quote the pertinent portions of the
decision below:
In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed
his residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990
on the basis of the following: (1) the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza,
the owner of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, where private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the contract of lease
between private respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a
residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period
July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996; (3) the marriage certificate, dated January 18,
1998, between private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the certificate of
live birth of private respondent's second daughter; and (5) various letters
addressed to private respondent and his family, which all show that private
respondent was a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.
There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private
respondent had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is
nothing in the record to detract from the merit of this factual finding.
Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was a
resident of Gattaran, at least until June 22, 1997, is shown by the following
documentary evidence in the record, to wit: (1) his certificates of candidacy
for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections; (2) his voter's
registration records, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997; and (3)
the fact that private respondent voted in Gattaran, Cagayan, in the elections
of 1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995.
The contention is without merit. The fact that a person is registered
as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another
district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino, this Court held that the
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not
sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
Nor is it of much importance that in his
certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988,
1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran.
Under the law, what is required for the election of governor is residency in
the province, not in any district or municipality, one year before the
election.
Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos
v. COMELEC:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears
to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates
of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of
Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third
District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for
more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His
claim that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible
considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be
convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the
capital of the province of Cagayan.
As always, the polestar of adjudication in cases of this nature is Gallego v. Vera, in which this Court held: "[W]hen the evidence on the alleged lack of residence
qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant
case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right
to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected." In
this case, considering the purpose of the residency requirement, i.e.,
to ensure that the person elected is familiar with the needs and problems of
his constituency, there can be no doubt that private respondent is qualified,
having been governor of the entire province of Cagayan for ten years
immediately before his election as Representative of that province's Third
District.[37]
Thus, in the case above, the Court
found that the affidavit of the lessor and the contract of lease were
sufficient proof that private respondent therein had changed his
residence. In the case now before us,
although private respondent raised alleged formal defects in the contract of
lease, the lessor himself testified that as far as he was concerned, he and
petitioner had a valid contract and he confirmed that petitioner and his family
are the occupants of the leased premises.
Petitioner correctly pointed out
that the lack of proper notarization does not necessarily nullify nor render
the parties’ transaction void ab initio. In Mallari
v. Alsol, we found a contract of lease to be valid despite the
non-appearance of one of the parties before a notary public, and ruled in this
wise:
Notarization converts a private document into a
public document. However, the non-appearance of the parties before the notary
public who notarized the document does not necessarily nullify nor render the
parties' transaction void ab initio. Thus:
. . . Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the
necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. Failure to follow the proper form does not invalidate a
contract. Where a contract is not in the form prescribed by law, the parties
can merely compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been
perfected. This is consistent with the basic principle that contracts are
obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all
essential requisites are present.
Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor
Perez's failure to appear before the notary public. [38]
The
HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a
townhouse in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places
has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his
permanent residence or that he had not abandoned his domicile of origin.
Although
it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile of
choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election
laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home
in one district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order
to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. Neither do we see the fact that petitioner
was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a
barrier for him to run in that district.
Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate
to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides
in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property in the district
as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies
that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in
effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office,
which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
This
case must be distinguished from Aquino v.
COMELEC[39] and Domino v. COMELEC,[40]
where the disqualified candidate was shown to be merely leasing a residence in
the place where he sought to run for office.
In Aquino and Domino, there appeared to be no other
material reason for the candidate to lease residential property in the place
where he filed his COC, except to fulfill the residency requirement under
election laws.
In
the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to
establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of
origin and/or any other previous domicile.
To begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and operated
businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003.
Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. Although ownership of property should never be
considered a requirement for any candidacy, petitioner had sufficiently confirmed
his intention to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential
properties in that city even prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced by
certificates of title issued in the name of petitioner and his wife. One of these properties is a residence in
Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa which petitioner acquired even before 2006 but which petitioner
had been leasing out. He claims that he
rented out this property because prior to 2006 he had not decided to
permanently reside in Sta. Rosa. This
could explain why in early 2006 petitioner had to rent a townhouse in Villa de
Toledo— his Bel-Air residence was occupied by a tenant. The relatively short period of the lease was
also adequately explained by petitioner – they rented a townhouse while they
were in the process of building their own house in Sta. Rosa. True enough, petitioner and his spouse
subsequently purchased a lot also in Villa de Toledo in April 2007, about a
month before election day, where they have constructed a home for their
family’s use as a residence. In all, petitioner had adequately shown that his
transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona
fide and was not merely for complying with the residency requirement under
election laws.
It
was incumbent upon private respondent to prove his assertion that petitioner is
indeed disqualified from holding his congressional seat. Private respondent’s burden of proof was not
only to establish that petitioner’s domicile of origin is different from Sta.
Rosa but also that petitioner’s domicile for the one year prior to election day
continued to be Pagsanjan, Laguna which was petitioner’s domicile of origin or
that petitioner had chosen a domicile other than Sta. Rosa, Laguna for that
same period. In other words, to prove
petitioner’s disqualification, the relevant period is the one year period prior
to election day. It would be absurd to
rule that the petitioner in a quo
warranto suit only needs to prove that the candidate had some other
previous domicile, regardless of how remote in time from election day that
previous domicile was established, and then the candidate would already have the
burden to prove abandonment of that previous domicile. It is the burden of the petitioner in a quo warranto case to first prove the
very fact of disqualification before the candidate should even be called upon
to defend himself with countervailing evidence.
In
our considered view, private respondent failed to discharge his burden of
proof. Petitioner’s COCs for previous elections and his 2005 application for a
driver’s license only proved that his domicile of origin was Pagsanjan, Laguna
and it remained to be so up to 2005.
Affidavits/testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, at most, tended to
prove that petitioner was on several instances found in his house in Cabuyao,
Laguna, which was not even his domicile of origin. Cabuyao, Laguna is in the Second District of Laguna while petitioner’s domicile of origin,
Pagsanjan, is in the Fourth District
of Laguna. Based on private respondent’s
own documentary submissions, Cabuyao was never even stated as a domicile or
residence in any of the petitioner’s COCs. Moreover, owning an abode in Cabuyao where
petitioner is occasionally found did not prove that Cabuyao is petitioner’s
real domicile. Indeed, disregarding
Cabuyao as petitioner’s domicile would be consistent with the established
principle that physical presence in a place sans
the intent to permanently reside therein is insufficient to establish
domicile. Neither did private respondent’s
submissions refute petitioner’s evidence that since February 2006 petitioner
has chosen Sta. Rosa as his domicile.
To
summarize, private respondent’s own evidence did not categorically establish
where petitioner’s domicile is nor did said evidence conclusively prove that
for the year prior to the May 14, 2007 petitioner had a domicile other than
where he actually resided, i.e. Sta.
Rosa, Laguna. To be sure, Gallego v. Vera[41]
decreed that:
We
might add that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community; and when the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is
weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the
purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office,
the will of the electorate should be respected. xxx xxx
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Frivaldo[42]
likewise prescribed that:
xxx xxx xxx To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately
create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. xxx
xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
In Torayno,[43]
the Court had the occasion to say that:
The
Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and
holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to
be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth
and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and
fitness for the job they aspire for. xxx
xxx xxx
Recently,
in Japzon v. COMELEC,[44]
the Court, citing Papandayan, Jr. v.
COMELEC,[45] said:
In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections, the Court provided a summation of the different principles
and concepts in jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for
elective local officials. Pertinent portions of the ratio in Papandayan are
reproduced below:
Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the
issue of whether or not a candidate has complied with the residency requirement
for elective positions. The principle of animus
revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an
"intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be elected.
Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an
"abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to
depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of
Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the
Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the
duly elected representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims
that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
In Abella v. Commission on
Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections, it was explained that
the determination of a person's legal residence or domicile largely depends
upon the intention that may be inferred from his acts, activities, and
utterances. In that case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the
highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and who had
thus been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was disqualified by the
COMELEC for lack of residence and registration qualifications, not being a
resident nor a registered voter of
In Romualdez v. RTC,
Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of
residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.
We do not doubt that the residency
requirement is a means to prevent a stranger or newcomer from holding office on
the assumption that such stranger or newcomer would be insufficiently
acquainted with the needs of his prospective constituents. However, it is appropriate to point out at
this juncture that aside from petitioner’s actual, physical presence in Sta.
Rosa for more than a year prior to election day, he has demonstrated that he
has substantial ties to Sta. Rosa and the First District of Laguna for an even
longer period than that. Petitioner has business interests in Sta. Rosa
comprised of restaurants and a residential property for lease. Petitioner has two children studying in Sta.
Rosa schools even before 2006. These
circumstances provided petitioner with material reasons to frequently visit the
area and eventually take up residence in the said district. Significantly, petitioner previously served
as Board Member and Vice-Governor for the
Simply
put, petitioner could not be considered a “stranger” to the community which he
sought to represent and that evil that the residency requirement was designed
to prevent is not present in this case.
We take this occasion to reiterate
our ruling in Sinaca v. Mula,[46] to wit:
[When] a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly
and clearly expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the
candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the
people. Above and beyond all, the
determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else,
that must prevail. This, in essence, is
the democracy we continue to hold sacred.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the HRET in HRET CASE No. 07-034 promulgated on
December 16, 2008, and its Minute
Resolution No. 09-080 promulgated on April 30, 2009 in the same case, are
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
|
MARIANO C. Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate
Justice |
MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 64-111.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Alvaro v. Ternida, G.R. No. 166183, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 288.
[17] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[18] Otherwise known as "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996." SECTION 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. — Any registered voter who has transferred residence to another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of his registration records.
[19] Mallari v. Alsol, G.R. No. 150866, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 148.
[20] Rollo, p. 212.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 400.
[32] Rollo, p. 287.
[33] Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House Of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30,
1991, 199 SCRA 692, 699.
[34] Supra note 31 at 417-418.
[35] G.R. Nos. 120295 & 123755, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727, 770-771.
[36] G.R. No. 133944, October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 641.
[37]
[38] Supra note 19 at 158-159.
[39] Supra note 31.
[40] G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546.
[41] G.R. No. L-48641, November 24, 1941, 73 Phil. 453,459.
[42] Supra note 1 at 771-772.
[43] G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 574, 577.
[44] G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009.
[45]
G.R. No. 147909, April 16, 2002, 430
Phil. 754, 768-770.
[46] G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266, 282.