THIRD
DIVISION
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HERMINIO M. GUTIERREZ and ELISA A.
GUTIERREZ-MAYUGA, Petitioners, - versus
- FLORA MENDOZA-PLAZA and PONCIANO
HERNANDEZ, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 185477 Present: Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: December 4, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Amended Decision[2]
dated
As culled
from the records, the antecedents of the case are as follows:
Ignacio
Mendoza is the common ascendant of the parties herein. Ignacio was first married to Juana Jaurigue,[5]
to whom Dominador and Victoria were born.
Petitioner Herminio M. Gutierrez (Herminio)[6]
is the son of
After the
death of Juana in 1913, Ignacio married Ignacia Jaurigue, the younger sister of
Juana. Out of this second marriage, five
children were born, namely: Crisostomo, Flora, Felisa, Mercedes and
Constancia. As aforesaid, respondent Flora Mendoza-Plaza
(Flora) is the daughter of Ignacia, while respondent Ponciano Hernandez (Ponciano)
is the son of Felisa.
The parcel
of land subject of this case (subject property) is an unregistered land located
in Barangay Sta. Clara, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, containing an area of 446 square
meters, more or less.
On P200.00,
which sale was contained in a notarized document entitled Escritura Publica.[8]
Thereafter,
on
Subsequently,
on
Petitioners
accordingly denied the above material averments in their Answer,[10]
asserting that Ignacio and his first wife, Juana, had been in possession of the
subject property as early as 1900. After
the death of Juana,
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the [respondents]
and against [petitioners]:
1. Pronouncing and confirming that the [respondents] are
the lawful, true and rightful owners of the land described in paragraph 4 of
the complaint [subject property], and hereby remove the cloud and quiet their
title thereto:
2. Ordering the [petitioners] to refrain from disturbing
in whatever manner the ownership and possession of the [respondents] over the
land subject matter of this litigation;
3. Pronouncing [petitioners] to have lost the house of
strong and concrete materials which they built in bad faith on the land of the
[respondents] without right to indemnity, and ordering the [petitioners] to
demolish and remove the said house from the [respondents’] land within thirty
(30) days from the date this judgment becomes final at their own expense and
thereafter vacate and restore to the [respondents] possession of the portion of
the land which the [petitioners] have occupied.
4. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay [respondent]
Ponciano Hernandez the sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages, and another
sum of P20,000.00 to both [respondents] for attorney’s fees.
5. Plus the costs assessed against the [petitioners].[11]
Principally,
the RTC relied on the deed of donation inter
vivos in awarding the subject property to respondents. The same was properly identified and
described in the testimony of Mercedes Mendoza, one of the daughters of Ignacio
by his second marriage. The deed was
also a notarized document, which was executed with all the formal requirements
of the law. Thus, the recitals contained
therein were presumed to be true and authentic, which presumption the
petitioners failed to overcome with clear, convincing, overwhelming and more
than merely preponderant evidence. The
RTC also ruled that the deed of donation inter
vivos was an ancient document,[12]
having been executed on
Moreover, the
RTC declared petitioners to be in bad faith in building a house of strong
materials on a portion of the subject property.
The respondents strongly opposed the construction from the start, given
that the occupation and possession by the petitioners were merely tolerated.
Petitioners
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
89555.
On
It is
undisputed that the subject property is an unregistered land over which both
parties, who are descendants of Ignacio Mendoza, claim ownership. [Respondents] claim ownership by virtue of a
donation inter vivos, allegedly
executed in 1940 by Ignacio in favor of Ignacia, and possession thereof. On the other hand, [petitioners] claim that
they are owners of a portion of the property by acquisitive possession. Both parties presented receipts proving that
they have been paying realty taxes on the property. Thus, the controversy boils down to the
examination of the evidence presented.
The
RTC herein relied heavily on the donation inter
vivos, Exh. “B” dated
“Sec. 194. Recording of instruments
or deeds relating to real estate not registered under Act Numbered Four Hundred
and Ninety-Six or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. – No instrument or deed
establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing rights
with respect to real estate not registered under the provisions of Act Numbered
Four Hundred and Ninety-Six entitled “The Land Registration Act,” and its
amendments, or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, shall be valid, except as
between the parties thereto, until such instrument or deed has been registered
x x x in the office of the register of deeds for the province or city where the
real estate lies.
x x x
x
The
above provision of the law has been reiterated in Section 113 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, as amended, which states:
“Sec. 113. Recording of instruments
relating to unregistered lands. – No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease or other
voluntary instrument affecting land not registered under the
x x x
x
A careful review of the records shows that
Exh. “B”, purporting to be a deed of donation, was not registered at all. Apropos, the [petitioners], being third parties
thereto, are not bound by the transmittal of rights from Ignacio Mendoza to the
[respondents] x x x.
Setting aside Exh. “B”, the pieces of evidence left
are the tax declarations presented during the trial. However, it is an established jurisprudence that
tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership x x
x. “In the absence of actual public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership” x x x. Further examination of
the tax declarations x x x show that both parties have been paying realty taxes
thereon in the name of Ignacio Mendoza.
Likewise, while the parties rely on the tax receipts and tax
declarations coupled with the assertions of adverse possession, these do not
indicate that they own the same because the property was not declared in their
names. x x x.[13]
(Emphases ours.)
The Court
of Appeals, thus, decreed:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) dated June 15, 2007, promulgated by Branch 83, City of Tanuan, Batangas,
in Civil Case No. 06-04-2929, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered DISMISSING
the complaint in Civil Case No. 06-04-2929.
No cost.[14]
Respondents
forthwith filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15]
on the above Decision, contending, inter
alia, that where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which
was unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his
knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as
to him. The knowledge of Victoria, an instrumental
witness to the deed of donation inter
vivos, of the existing prior interest of the heirs of Ignacio by his second
marriage is deemed in law to be knowledge of the petitioners.
On
After a careful analysis of the circumstances of this
case, We find merit in the arguments of the plaintiff-appellees.
x x x x
To clarify, as a general rule, “no deed, conveyance,
mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument affecting land not registered
under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto,
unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed
in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land
lies” (Section 113, Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended). This means that any instrument dealing with
unregistered land shall not bind third persons, unless the instrument is
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds albeit valid as between the
parties therein.
As correctly pointed out by the [respondents], the law
has exceptions. “The conveyance shall
not be valid against any person unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2)
his heirs and devisees, and (3) third persons having actual notice of knowledge
thereof” (Heirs of Eduardo Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 426, citing
Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1994 ed. p. 28.)
x x x x
Appropriately, the proper exception applicable in this
case to bind the [petitioners] to the donation inter vivos should be under the second exception, that is, being
heirs of Ignacio Mendoza. It should be stressed that the owner of the
unregistered property is Ignacio Mendoza and that both parties are his
successors. [Respondents] are his
successors by his second marriage, while [petitioners] are his successors by
his first marriage. Thus, being his
heirs and successors, the [petitioners] must be bound for they are considered
mere extension of the grantor (Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds,
p. 28).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant motion for
reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. This Court’s Decision promulgated on
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17]
and a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration,[18]
but the Court of Appeals was not persuaded.
On
A careful review of the motion for reconsideration
shows that the issues raised therein have been already been (sic) clarified in
and by Our Amended Decision. As to the
arguments raised in the Supplement, i.e.,
that the [petitioners’] legitimes are prejudiced, the same must likewise be
denied for having been raised for the first time at this stage of the appeal in
a motion for reconsideration. In any
case, the [petitioners] are not without recourse regarding their alleged
prejudiced right to their legitimes.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant motion for
reconsideration and Supplement are DENIED.
Petitioners
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari,
imploring the Court to take another judicious look at their case, in their hope
of securing a more favorable judgment.
Petitioners
insist on disputing the authenticity of the deed of donation inter vivos in favor of the children of
Ignacio and his second wife, Ignacia.
Not only was the deed belatedly introduced by Ponciano; the same is also
fatally invalid in view of its non-registration as prescribed by law. Supposedly, the said deed is likewise inherently
flawed substantively, because its provisions totally exclude petitioners from
participating in the sharing of the property subject of the case, thereby
impairing their legitimes. Furthermore,
petitioners claim that they have occupied and possessed a portion of the subject property in
their own right and in the concept of owners, thus acquiring the same by
prescription, if not laches.
We deny the
petition.
Petitioners seem to have
overlooked the fact that the deed of donation inter vivos is a notarized document. According to Section 30, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, “every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved.” A notarial document is evidence of the facts
expressed therein.[20] A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity
and due execution. Clear and convincing
evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption.[21]
In the instant case,
petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to overcome the above
presumption. The only evidence offered
by petitioners to impugn the deed of donation inter vivos was the testimony[22] of
petitioner Elisa, wherein she stated that the contents of the deed could not
have been true, given that petitioners inherited the subject property from
Victoria Mendoza, the daughter of Ignacio with his first wife Juana. Such testimony was utterly lacking. Furthermore, the Court finds nothing wrong
and/or unusual in the fact that the deed of donation inter vivos was produced and made known to petitioners only in the
early part of the year 2006 or more than sixty (60) years after its execution. Understandably, it was only when petitioners
claimed ownership of a portion of the subject property that respondents were
compelled to assert their own title to the property, which they traced to the
deed of donation inter vivos.
The
non-registration of the aforesaid deed does not also affect the validity
thereof. Registration is not a requirement for validity of the
contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly
to bind third persons. The principal
purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a
contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into.[23] The conveyance of unregistered land shall not
be valid against any person unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2) his
heirs and devisees, and (3) third persons having actual notice or knowledge
thereof. As held by the Court of
Appeals, petitioners are the heirs of Ignacio, the grantor of the subject
property. Thus, they are bound by the
provisions of the deed of donation inter
vivos.
Anent the argument that the donation inter vivos impaired the legitimes of petitioners, the Court deems
it unnecessary to discuss the same. Said
argument was indeed only raised for the first time on appeal to the Court of
Appeals and in the Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration of the
appellate court’s Amended Decision at that.
Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments
not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily
will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the
first time at such late stage. Basic
considerations of due process underlie this rule.[24]
Petitioners’ claim of
prescription in their favor likewise deserves scant consideration. Unlike respondents who can trace their title
to the subject property by virtue of the deed of donation inter vivos, petitioners cannot adequately explain how they entered
and possessed the subject property to become owners thereof. More importantly, petitioners cannot even
rebut the testimony[25]
of Mercedes Mendoza that she was present when
Prescription
as a mode of acquisition requires the existence of the following: (1) capacity
to acquire by prescription; (2) a thing capable of acquisition by prescription;
(3) possession of the thing under certain conditions; and (4) lapse of time
provided by law. Acquisitive
prescription may either be ordinary, in which case the possession must be in
good faith and with just title; or extraordinary, in which case there is
neither good faith nor just title. In
either case, there has to be possession, which must be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.[26]
As a corollary, Article 1119 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art.
1119. Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere
tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession.
Acts of possessory character
performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en
concepto de dueño, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so
continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
In light of the foregoing,
petitioners cannot claim any better right to the subject property as against
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is DENIED. The Amended Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-36.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) and Pampio A. Abarintos, concurring; rollo, pp. 106-110.
[3] Rollo, pp. 78-85.
[4] Penned by Presiding Judge Hermenegildo M. Lacap; rollo, pp. 38-46.
[5] The exact date of the marriage of Ignacio and Juana is not clearly established in the records.
[6] Sometimes referred to as “Armenio” in other parts of the records.
[7] Sometimes referred to as “Eliza” in other parts of the records.
[8] The original instrument was written in the Spanish language; records, pp. 7-9.
[9] Records, p. 10.
[10]
[11] Rollo, p. 46.
[12] The rule on ancient documents is found in Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 21. When evidence by authenticity of private document not necessary. — Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given.
[13] Rollo, pp. 82-84.
[14]
[15] CA rollo, pp. 111-119.
[16] Rollo, pp. 106-110.
[17] CA rollo, pp. 137-147.
[18]
[19] Rollo, pp. 161-162.
[20] Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, 193 Phil. 326, 335 (1981).
[21] Domingo v. Robles, 493 Phil. 916, 921 (2005).
[22] TSN,
[23] Heirs of Eduardo Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125585, 8 June 2005, 459 SCRA 412, 426.
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26] National
Power Corporation v.