THIRD
DIVISION
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HILARIO S. RAMIREZ,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Cebu City, HON.
NLRC, 4th Division, Cebu City and MARIO S. VALCUEBA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 182626 Present: Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: December 4, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the (a) 13 July 2007 Resolution[1] of
the Court of Appeals which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Hilario Ramirez for
failure to properly verify his petition and to state material dates and (b) the
7 March 2008 Resolution[2] of
the same court denying petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration.
The
facts are:
Respondent
Mario Valcueba (Valcueba) filed a Complaint[3] for
illegal dismissal and nonpayment of wage differential, 13th month
pay differential, holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, and
service incentive leaves with claims for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees, against Hilario Ramirez (Ramirez). Valcueba claimed that Ramirez hired him as
mechanic on P140.00,
which was increased to P165.00 a day in 2003 and to P190.00 in
2005. He was not paid for holidays and rest
days. He was not also paid the complete
amount of his 13th month pay.
On
Ramirez, on the other hand, presented
a different version of the antecedents, asserting that Valcueba was first hired
as construction worker, then as helper of the mechanic, and eventually as
mechanic. There were three categories of
mechanics at the workplace. First were
the mechanics assigned to specific stations.
Second were the mechanics paid on pakyaw
basis; and finally, those who were classified as rescue/emergency
mechanics. Valcueba belonged to the last
category. As emergency/rescue mechanic,
he was assigned to various stations to perform emergency/rescue work. On
Further, Ramirez insisted that Valcueba
was never terminated from his employment.
On the contrary, it was the latter who abandoned his job. On
After
hearing, the Labor Arbiter rendered her decision, where she pointed out that:
The allegation of complainant that his refusal to work on pakiao basis prompted respondent Hilario Ramirez to dismiss him from the service is not substantiated by any piece of evidence. Not even a declaration under oath by any affiant attesting to the credibility of complainant’s allegation is presented. No documentary evidence purporting to clearly indicate that complainant was discharged was submitted for Our judicious consideration. A fortiori, there is reason for Us to doubt complainant’s submission that he was dismissed from his employment grounded on disobedience to the lawful order of respondent.
On the side of respondent Ramirez,
he insisted that complainant was never terminated from his employment. On the contrary, he alleged that it was complainant
who abandoned his job. As rescue or
emergency mechanic temporarily assigned at Babag Station, on
Nonetheless, as the records are bereft of any evidence that respondent sent complainant a letter which advised the latter to report for work, We do not rule out a case of abandonment because the overt act of not answering an emergency call is not insufficient to constitute abandonment.
Consequently, there being no dismissal nor abandonment involved in this case, it is best that the parties to this case should be restored to their previous employment relations. Complainant must go back to work within ten (10) days from receipt of this judgment, while respondent must accept complainant back to work, also within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.[6]
In
the end, the Labor Arbiter decreed:
WHEREFORE, VIEWED FROM THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent HILARIO RAMIREZ, OWNER OF H.R. TAXI, NOT GUILTY of illegally dismissing complainant from the service, it appearing that there is no dismissal to speak of in this case. Consequently, complainant is ordered to report back for work within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, and respondent Hilario Ramirez must complainant (sic) back to work as soon as the latter would express his intention to report for work or within the same period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof, whichever comes first. Proof of compliance hereof, must be submitted within the same period (sic), complainant would be guilty of abandonment and respondent of illegal dismissal.
In addition, respondent HILARIO RAMIREZ, owner of H.R. Taxi, is hereby ordered to pay complainant MARIO S. VALCUEBA the following:
a. Wage Differential - P30,538.00
b. 13th Month Pay - 15,287.98
Total Award - P45,825.98
Philippine currency, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, through the Cashier of this Arbitration Branch.
Other claims are DISMISSED for failure to substantiate.[7]
Records
show that Ramirez received the Labor Arbiter’s decision on
Resolving
the motion, the NLRC issued a Resolution[9]
dated
Upon a careful perusal of the motion to reduce bond, however, the Commission found that the same does not comply with Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.
x x x x
Respondent
has not offered a meritorious ground for the reduction of the appeal bond and
the amount of P10,000.00 he posted is not a reasonable amount in
relation to the monetary award of P45,825.98. Consequently, his motion to reduce appeal
bond shall not be entertained and his appeal is dismissed for non-perfection
due to lack of an appeal bond.
The
NLRC then held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of respondent is hereby DISMISSED for non-perfection due to want of an appeal bond.[10]
Ramirez
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the NLRC resolved in a Resolution
dated
The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the requisites of meritorious grounds and posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award does not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. Thus, respondent’s failure to abide with the requisites so mentioned has not perfected his appeal. Verily, since the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter contains a monetary award in favor of complainant, it behooves upon respondent to post the required bond.
While the filing of a motion to reduce bond can be considered as a motion of preference in case of an appeal, the same holds true only when such motion complies with the requirements stated above. Consequently, respondent’s motion to reduce bond which missed to comply with such requisites does not deserve to be entertained nor to be given a preferred resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration of respondent is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.[11]
The
decision of the Labor Arbiter became final and executory on
Ramirez
went up to the Court of Appeals. The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 02614.
In a resolution dated
Ramirez’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution
dated 7 March 2008;[14]
hence, this petition where Ramirez prays that the “dismissal resolution issued
by the Court of Appeals be set aside and in its stead to give due course to
this petition by dismissing the unwarranted claims imposed by the NLRC for
being highly speculative, with no evidence to support of (sic).”[15]
The
issues are:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE OF THE FILED PETITION.
II
THE DISMISSAL RESOLUTION (ANNEX “A”) HAS NOT RESOLVED THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 02614.[16]
The
case presents no novel issue.
We
first resolve the propriety of dismissal by the NLRC.
At
the outset, it should be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with the
provisions of law. The party who seeks
to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, he loses the right to
appeal.[17]
Article
223 of the Labor Code provides for the procedure in case of appeal to the NLRC:
Art. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
a. If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
b. If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;
c. If made purely on questions of law; and
d. If serious errors in the finding of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sections
4(a) and 6 of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended,
reaffirms the explicit jurisdictional principle in Article 223 even as it
allows in justifiable cases the reduction of the appeal bond. The relevant provision states:
SECTION 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. - (a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; for in three (3) legibly type written or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties.
x x x x
SECTION 6. Bond. — In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
x x x x
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds, and only upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the requisites in the preceding paragraphs shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
Under
the Rules, appeals involving monetary awards are perfected only upon compliance
with the following mandatory requisites, namely: (1) payment of the appeal
fees; (2) filing of the memorandum of appeal; and (3) payment of the required
cash or surety bond.[18]
The
posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases
involving monetary awards from the decision of the labor arbiter. The intention
of the lawmakers to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of
an appeal by the employer is clearly expressed in the provision that an appeal
by the employer may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond.” The word “only” in Articles 223
of the Labor Code makes it unmistakably plain that the lawmakers intended the
posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the essential and
exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected. The word “may” refers to the perfection of an
appeal as optional on the part of the defeated party, but not to the compulsory
posting of an appeal bond, if he desires to appeal. The meaning and the intention of the
legislature in enacting a statute must be determined from the language
employed; and where there is no ambiguity in the words used, then there is no
room for construction.[19]
Clearly,
the filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional
requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the
NLRC. Non-compliance with the requirement
renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the
workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment
in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal.
It
is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade
their obligation to satisfy their employees’ just and lawful claims.[20]
In
this case, although Ramirez posted an appeal bond, the same was insufficient,
as it was not equivalent to the monetary award of the Labor Arbiter. Moreover, when Ramirez sought a reduction of
the bond, he merely said that the bond was excessive and baseless without
amplifying why he considered it as such.[21]
Colby Construction and Management
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission[22]
succinctly elucidates that an employer who files a motion to reduce the appeal
bond is still required to post the full amount of cash or surety bond within
the ten-day reglementary period, even pending resolution of his motion.
Very
recently, in Mcburnie v. Guanzon, the
respondents therein filed their memorandum of appeal and motion to reduce bond
on the 10th or last day of the reglementary period. Although they posted an initial appeal bond,
the same was inadequate compared to the monetary award. The Court found no basis for therein
respondent’s contention that the awards of the Labor Arbiter were null and
excessive. We emphasized in that case
that it behooves the Court to give utmost regard to the legislative and
administrative intent to strictly require the employer to post a cash or surety
bond securing the full amount of the
monetary award within the 10-day reglementary period. Nothing
in the Labor Code or the NLRC Rules of Procedure authorizes the posting of a
bond that is less than the monetary award in the judgment, or deems such
insufficient posting as sufficient to perfect the appeal.[23]
By stating that the bond is excessive
and baseless without more, and without proof that he is incapable of raising
the amount of the bond, Ramirez did not even come near to substantially
complying with the requirements of Art. 223 of the Labor Code and NLRC Rule of
Procedure. Given that Ramirez is
involved in taxi business, he has not shown that he had difficulty raising the
amount of the bond or was unable to raise the amount specified in the award of
the Labor Arbiter.
All given, the NLRC justifiably
denied the motion to reduce bond, as it had no basis upon which it could
actually and completely determine Ramirez’s motion to reduce bond. We have consistently enucleated that a mere
claim of excessive bond without more does not suffice. Thus, in Ong
v. Court of Appeals,[24] this
Court held that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioner’s motion, for the same failed to elucidate why the amount of
the bond was either unjustified or prohibitive.
In
Calabash Garments, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[25]
it was held that “a substantial monetary award, even if it runs into millions,
does not necessarily give the employer-appellant a `meritorious case’ and does
not automatically warrant a reduction of the appeal bond.”
It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard to this intention. There is a concession to the employer, in excluding damages and attorney's fees from the computation of the appeal bond. Not even the filing of a motion to reduce bond is deemed to stay the period for requiring an appeal. Nothing in the Labor Code or the NLRC Rules of Procedure authorizes the posting of a bond that is less than the monetary award in the judgment, or would deem such insufficient postage as sufficient to perfect the appeal.
On the other hand, Article 223 indubitably requires that the appeal be perfected only upon the posting of the cash or surety bond which is equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. The clear intent of both statutory and procedural law is to require the employer to post a cash or surety bond securing the full amount of the monetary award within the ten (10)-day reglementary period. While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, there is that proviso in Rule VI, Section [6] that the filing of such motion does not stay the reglementary period. The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the ten (10)-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said ten (10)-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the ten (10)-day period.[26] (Emphases supplied.)
While
in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules to
set right an arrant injustice, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only to proper
cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances, but
none obtains in this case. The NLRC had,
therefore, the full discretion to grant or deny Ramirez’s motion to reduce the
amount of the appeal bond. The finding
of the labor tribunal that Ramirez did not present sufficient justification for
the reduction thereof cannot be said to have been done with grave abuse of
discretion.[27]
While
Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure allows the Commission
to reduce the amount of the bond, the exercise of the authority is not a matter
of right on the part of the movant, but lies within the sound discretion of the
NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds.[28]
It
is daylight-clear from the foregoing that while the bond may be reduced upon
motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion
to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious
grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount
in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant; otherwise,
the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the
period to perfect an appeal. The
qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of
the cash bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond securing
the full amount within the said 10-day period.
We
have always stressed that Article
223, which prescribes the appeal bond requirement, is a rule of jurisdiction
and not of procedure. There is little leeway for condoning a liberal
interpretation thereof, and certainly none premised on the ground that its
requirements are mere technicalities. It must be emphasized that there is no
inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from grant of
statute, namely, the Labor Code.
For
the same reason, we have repeatedly emphasized that the requirement for posting
the surety bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional and cannot be
trifled with. Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.[29]
That
settled, we next resolve the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the petition of Ramirez.
The Court of Appeals found that he committed the following fatal defects
in his petition:
1. Failure of petitioner to properly verify the petition in accordance with A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC amending Section 4, Rule 7 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which now requires that a pleading must be verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records, as a consequence of which the petition is treated as an unsigned pleading, which under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, produces no legal effect.
2. Petitioner failed to indicate in the petition the material dates showing when notice of the resolution subject hereof was received and when the motion for reconsideration was filed in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.[30]
On
Ramirez’s failure to verify his petition, it is true that verification is
merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters that are
alleged are true and correct. Thus, the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them
and waive strict compliance with the rules.[31] However, this Court invariably sustains the
Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition on technical grounds under this
provision, unless considerations of equity and substantial justice present
cogent reasons to hold otherwise. In Moncielcoji Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[32] the
Court states the rationale –
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. The application of the Rules may be relaxed only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice. But, petitioner has not presented any persuasive reason for this Court to be liberal, even pro hac vice. Thus, we sustain the dismissal of its petition by the Court of Appeals on technical grounds.
Again
as in the NLRC, Ramirez has not shown any justifiable ground to set aside
technical rules for his failure to comply with the requirement regarding the verification
of his petition.
For
the same reasons above, we also find no reversible error in the assailed
resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing Ramirez’s petition on the ground
of failure to state material dates, because in filing a special civil action
for certiorari without indicating the
requisite material date therein, Ramirez violated basic tenets of remedial law,
particularly Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which states:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – x x x.
x x x x
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
On
the other hand, the pertinent provision under Rule 46 is explicit:
Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. – x x x .
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
x x x x
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
There
are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari
brought under Rule 65. First, the date
when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second,
the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and
third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. In the case before us, the petition filed
with the Court of Appeals failed to indicate when the notice of the NLRC
Resolution was received and when the Motion for Reconsideration was filed, in
violation of Rule 65, Section 1 (2nd par.) and Rule 46, Section 3 (2nd
par.).
As
explicitly stated in the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any of the
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The
rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to
appreciate. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[33]
the court explains that the requirement is for purpose of determining the
timeliness of the petition, thus:
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. x x x.
In
the instant case, the petition was bereft of any persuasive explanation as to
why Ramirez failed to observe procedural rules properly. [34]
Quite
apparent from the foregoing is that the Court of Appeals did not err, much less
commit grave abuse of discretion, in denying due course to and dismissing the
petition for certiorari for its
procedural defects. Ramirez’s failure to verify and state material dates as
required under the rules warranted the outright dismissal of his petition.
We
are not unmindful of exceptional cases where this Court has set aside
procedural defects to correct a patent injustice. However, concomitant to a
liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part
of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with
the rules.
In
sum, we find no sufficient justification to set aside the NLRC and Court of
Appeals resolutions. Thus, the decision
of the Labor Arbiter is already final and executory and binding upon this
Court.[35]
The
relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid reasons
proffered for or underpinning it. To
merit liberality, Ramirez must show reasonable cause justifying his
non-compliance with the rules and must convince the court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantive
justice. The desired leniency cannot be
accorded, absent valid and compelling reasons for such procedural lapse. The appellate court saw no compelling need
meriting the relaxation of the rules; neither do we see any.[36]
Wherefore, premises considered, the petition
is Denied
for lack of merit. The Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
|
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Francisco P. Acosta, concurring. Rollo, p. 23.
[2] Rollo, pp. 25-27.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] Or on task basis, paid on the
basis of output. (Cebu Metal Corporation v. Saliling, G.R.
No. 154463,
[5] Records, p. 13.
[6] Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[7]
[8] Ramirez submitted Postal Money
Order in the amount of P10,000.00 for the appeal bond (Rollo,
p. 57).
[9] Rollo, p. 58.
[10]
[11]
[12] Records, p. 297.
[13] Rollo, p. 23.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Colby
Construction and Management Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 170099,
[18] Ciudad Fernandina Food Corporation Employees Union-Associate Labor Unions v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166594, 20 July 2006, 495 SCRA 807, 817.
[19] Mcburnie
v. Ganzon, G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117 and G.R. Nos. 186984-85,
[20] Accessories
Specialist, Inc. v. Alabanza, G.R. No. 168985,
[21] Records, p. 49.
[22] Supra note 17.
[23] Mcburnie v. Ganzon, supra note 19.
[24] 482 Phil. 170 (2004).
[25] 329 Phil. 226 (1996).
[26] Colby Construction and Management Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 17.
[27] Mcburnie v. Ganzon, supra note 19.
[28] Ong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24 at 675.
[29] Computer Innovations Center v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 152410, 29 June 2005, 462 SCRA 183,
190-193.
[30] Rollo,
pp. 23-24.
[31] Traveno
v. Bobongon Banana Growers, G.R. No. 164205,
[32] 409 Phil. 486, 491-492 (2001).
[33] 413 Phil. 41, 53-54 (2001).
[34] Lapid v. Judge Laurea, 439 Phil. 887, 897 (2002).
[35] Heritage
Hotel Manila v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 180478-79,
[36] Daikoku
Electronics, Phils. v. Raza, G.R. No. 181688,