Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST
DIVISION
|
JUNO BATISTIS, Petitioner, -versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent.
|
G.R. No. 181571 Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO-MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December 16, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O
N
BERSAMIN, J.:
On
On
Batistis now appeals via petition for review on certiorari
to challenge the CA’s affirmance of his conviction for infringement of trademark.
We affirm
the conviction, but we modify the penalty by imposing an indeterminate sentence,
conformably with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and pertinent jurisprudence.
Antecedents
The Fundador trademark characterized the
brandy products manufactured by Pedro Domecq, S.A. of
Allied
Domecq Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation exclusively authorized[6]
to distribute Fundador brandy
products imported from
The Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila formally charged Batistis in the RTC in
That on or about December 20, 2001, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then in possession of two
hundred forty one (241) empty Fundador bottles, one hundred sixty three
Fundador boxes, one half (1/2) sack of Fundador plastic caps, and two (2)
Fundador bottles with intention of deceiving and defrauding the public in
general and Allied Domecq Spirits and Wines and Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc.
represented by Atty. Leonardo P. Salvador, a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and engaged in
manufacturing of Fundador Brandy under license of Pedro Domecq, S.A. Cadiz,
Spain, and/or copyright owner of the said product, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously reproduce, sell and offer for sale, without prior
authority and consent of said manufacturing company, the accused giving their
own low quality product the general appearance and other features of the
original Fundador Brandy of the said manufacturing company which would be
likely induce the public to believe that the said fake Fundador Brandy
reproduced and/or sold are the real Fundador Brandy produced or distributed by
the Allied Domecq Spirits and Wines Limited, U.K. and Allied Domecq
Philippines, Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter and the public.
Contrary to law.[12]
With
Batistis pleading not guilty on
ACCORDINGLY,
this Court finds the accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of
the crime of Violation of Section 155 of the Intellectual Property Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS and
to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS.
This Court
likewise finds accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the
crime of Violation of Section 168 (sic) penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS
and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (Php50,000.00) PESOS.
Accused is
further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the sum of TWENTY-FIVE
(Php25,000.00) PESOS as actual damages.
The
following items recovered from the premises of the accused and subject of the
case are hereby ordered destroyed, pursuant to existing rules and regulations:
Twenty (20)
empty Carlos 1 bottles
Ten (10)
Black Label empty bottles
Two (2)
empty bottles of Jhonny (sic) Walker Swing
One(1)
empty bottle of Remy Martin XO
One (1)
empty bottle of Chabot
Two hundred forty-one (241) empty Fundador
bottles
One hundred
sixty-three (163) Fundador boxes
One half
(1/2 sack of Fundador plastic caps, and
Two (2)
filled Fundador bottles
Eight (8)
boxes of empty Jose Cuervo bottles
WITH COSTS
AGAINST ACCUSED
SO ORDERED.[14]
Batistis
appealed to the CA, which, on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Appeal of Appellant JUNO BATISTIS is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in so far as the charge against
him for Violation of Section 155 of the Intellectual Property Code is
concerned.
However,
for failure of the prosecution to prove to a moral certainty the guilt of the
said Appellant, for violation of Section 168 of the same code a judgment of
ACQUITTAL is hereby rendered in his favor.
SO ORDERED.[16]
After
the CA denied his motion for
reconsideration, Batistis brought this appeal.
Issue
Batistis contends that:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF THE SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVITS AND
TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS WHO CONDUCTED THE RAID ON THE HOUSE OF THE
ACCUSED.
He submits that the only direct proofs of his guilt were the self-serving
testimonies of the NBI raiding team; that he was not present during the search;
that one of the NBI raiding agents failed to immediately identify him in court;
and that aside from the two bottles of Fundador
brandy, the rest of the confiscated items were not found in his house.
Ruling
The petition for review has
no merit.
1.
Appeal confined only to Questions of Law
Pursuant to Section 3,[17] Rule 122, and Section
9,[18] Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the
review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a
penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
is by petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly so provides, viz:
Section
1. Filing of petition with
Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner
may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same
action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Accordingly,
we reject the appeal for the following reasons:
Firstly: The petition for review
replicates Batistis’ appellant's brief filed in the CA,[19] a true indication that the errors
he submits for our review and reversal are those he had attributed to the RTC. He
thereby rests his appeal on his rehashed arguments that the CA already
discarded. His appeal is, therefore, improper, considering that his petition
for review on certiorari should raise
only the errors committed by the CA as the appellate court, not the errors of
the RTC.
Secondly: Batistis’ assigned errors stated in the
petition for review on certiorari
require a re-appreciation and re-examination of the trial evidence. As such, they
raise issues evidentiary and factual in nature. The appeal is dismissible on
that basis, because, one, the
petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal
questions, and, two, the Court, not being
a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were
mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin.[20]
Whether a question of law or a question of fact is involved is explained
in Belgica v. Belgica:[21]
xxx [t]here exists a question of law when
there is doubt on what the law applicable to a certain set of facts is. Questions of fact, on the other hand, arise
when there is an issue regarding the truth or falsity of the statement of
facts. Questions on whether certain pieces of evidence should be accorded
probative value or whether the proofs presented by one party are clear,
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition are issues of fact. Such questions are not subject to review by
this Court. As a general rule, we review
cases decided by the CA only if they involve questions of law raised and
distinctly set forth in the petition.[22]
Thirdly: The
factual findings of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect,
if not conclusive effect, unless cogent facts and circumstances of substance,
which if considered, would alter the outcome of the case, were ignored,
misconstrued or misinterpreted.[23]
To accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of
the trial court’s findings of fact, we do not disturb such findings of fact of
the RTC, particularly after their affirmance by the CA, for Batistis, as
appellant, did not sufficiently prove any extraordinary circumstance justifying
a departure from such doctrine.
2.
Findings of fact were even correct
A review of the decision of the CA, assuming that the appeal is
permissible, even indicates that both the RTC and the CA correctly appreciated
the evidence against the accused, and correctly applied the pertinent law to
their findings of fact.
Article 155 of the Intellectual
Property Code identifies the acts constituting infringement of trademark, viz:
Section 155.
Remedies; Infringement. — Any person
who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered mark:
155.1. Use
in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any
goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the
sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce,
counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature
thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation
to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant
for the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the infringement takes
place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection
are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services
using the infringing material.
Harvey Tan, Operations Manager of Pedro Domecq,
S.A. whose task involved the detection of counterfeit products in the
Philippines, testified that the seized Fundador
brandy, when compared with the genuine product, revealed several
characteristics of counterfeiting, namely: (a) the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
seal label attached to the confiscated products did not reflect the word tunay
when he flashed a black light against the BIR label; (b) the “tamper evident
ring” on the confiscated item did not contain the word Fundador; and (c) the word Fundador
on the label was printed flat with sharper edges, unlike the raised, actually
embossed, and finely printed genuine Fundador
trademark.[24]
There is no question, therefore, that Batistis
exerted the effort to make the counterfeit products look genuine to deceive the unwary public into regarding the
products as genuine. The buying public would be easy to fall for the counterfeit
products due to their having been given the appearance of the genuine products,
particularly with the difficulty of detecting whether the products were fake or
real if the buyers had no experience and the tools for detection, like black
light. He thereby infringed the registered Fundador trademark by the colorable
imitation of it through applying the dominant features of the trademark on the
fake products, particularly the two bottles
filled with Fundador brandy.[25]
His acts constituted infringement
of trademark as set forth in Section 155, supra.
3.
Penalty Imposed should be an
Indeterminate Penalty and Fine
Section
170 of the Intellectual Property Code
provides the penalty for infringement of
trademark, to wit:
Section 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and administrative
sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years
to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two
hundred thousand pesos(P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found
guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and
Subsection 169.1. (Arts. 188 and 189, Revised Penal Code).
The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC imposing the “the penalty of imprisonment of
TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.”
We rule
that the penalty thus fixed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[26] as
amended by Act No. 4225. We modify
the penalty.
Section 1
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended, provides:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other
law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
The straight penalty the CA imposed
was contrary to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be an indeterminate sentence. According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge de Guzman,Jr.,[27] the imposition of an indeterminate
sentence with maximum and minimum periods in criminal cases not excepted from
the coverage of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law pursuant to its Section 2[28] is mandatory, viz:
The
need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence
is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to
enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical,
mental, and moral record. The
requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses
whether punishable by the Revised Penal
Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the
Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law
must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.
Indeed, the imposition of an indeterminate sentence is mandatory. For
instance, in Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals,[29] three persons
were prosecuted for and found guilty of illegal fishing (with the use of
explosives) as defined in Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1058, for which the prescribed penalty was
imprisonment from 20 years to life imprisonment. The trial court imposed on
each of the accused a straight penalty of 20 years imprisonment, and the CA affirmed
the trial court. On appeal, however, this Court declared the straight penalty
to be erroneous, and modified it by imposing imprisonment ranging from 20
years, as minimum, to 25 years, as maximum.
We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay,[30] a prosecution for illegal possession
of firearms punished by a special law (that
is, Section 2692, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act 56 and Republic Act No. 4) with imprisonment of not less than five years
nor more than ten years. There, the Court sustained
the straight penalty of five years and one day imposed by the trial court
(Court of First Instance of Rizal) because the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison sentence. Yet, we
cannot apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a
prosecution under a special law like that in Nang Kay. Firstly, the trial court in Nang Kay
could well and lawfully have given the accused the lowest prison sentence of
five years because of the mitigating circumstance of his voluntary plea of
guilty, but, herein, both the trial court and the CA did not have a similar
circumstance to justify the lenity towards the accused. Secondly, the large number
of Fundador articles confiscated from
his house (namely, 241 empty bottles of Fundador,
163 Fundador boxes, a half sack full of
Fundador plastic caps, and two filled
bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly demonstrated
that Batistis had been committing a grave economic offense over a period of
time, thereby deserving for him the indeterminate, rather than the straight and
lower, penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the decision dated
P50,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 35-44.
[2]
[3] Records, p. 35.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Section 3. How appeal taken. –
x x x.
(e) Except as
provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to
the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. (3a)
[18] Sec. 9. Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases. — The mode of appeal prescribed in this Rule shall be applicable to both civil and criminal cases, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. (n)
[19] CA Rollo, pp. 28-37.
[20] Philip
Morris, Inc. v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. No. 158589, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 333, 345; Sampayan
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220; The Insular
Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.. No. 126850,
[21] G..R.
No. 149738,
[22]
[23] Pelonia v. People, G.R. No. 168997,
[24] TSN,
[25] Exhibits
H-8 and H-9.
[26] Act No. 4103.
[27] A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349,
[28] Section 2.
This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy
or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who
are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum
term of imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor to those already sentenced
by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section
5 hereof. (as amended by Act No. 4225,
[29]
G.R. No. 118806,
[30] 88 Phil. 515, 520 (1951).