FIRST DIVISION
|
IN RE:
PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND
LOAN BANK, INC. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK,
INC., Respondents. |
G.R. No. 181556 Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December
14, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Central Bank of the Philippines,
now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
filed on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition
for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.
(Intercity Bank) alleging that, inter
alia, said bank was already
insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to
depositors, creditors and the general public.[1]
Finding the
petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due course.[2] Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner,
liquidator of Intercity Bank.[3]
In the
meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302)[4]
was enacted, Section 12 of which provides:
SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance with the preferences established by law, the Corporation shall periodically charge against said assets reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the proper court, reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of receivership/liquidation proceedings and collect payment therefor from available assets.
After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank. (emphasis supplied)
Relying
thereon, PDIC filed on
1. The reimbursement of the liquidation
fees and expenses incurred and/or advanced by herein petitioner, PDIC, in the
amount of P3,795,096.05;
2. The provision of P700,000.00 for
future expenses in the implementation of this distribution and the winding-up
of the liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.;
3. The write-off of assets in the total
amount of P8,270,789.99, as set forth in par. 2.1 hereof;
4. The write-off of liabilities in the
total amount of P1,562,185.35, as set forth in par. 8 hereof;
5. The Final Project of Distribution of
Intercity Savings and Loan Bank as set forth in Annex “Q” hereof;
6. Authorizing petitioner to hold as
trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated in the project of
distribution for creditors who shall have a period of three (3) years from date
of last notice within which to claim payment therefor. After the lapse of said period, unclaimed
payments shall be escheated to the Republic of the
7. Authorizing the disposal of all the
pertinent bank records in accordance with applicable laws, rules and regulations
after the lapse of one (1) year from the approval of the instant Motion.
By Order of July 5, 2006,[6]
Branch 134 of the Makati RTC granted the motion except the above-quoted paragraphs
5 and 6 of its prayer, respectively praying for the approval of the Final
Project of Distribution and for authority for PDIC “to hold as trustee the
liquidating and surplus dividends allocated . . . for creditors” of Intercity
Bank.
In granting the motion, the trial court resolved in
the negative the sole issue of whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle
Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends, it otherwise holding that to so resolve
would run counter to prevailing jurisprudence and unduly prejudice Intercity
Bank shareholders, the creditors having been paid their principal claim in 2002
or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004.
PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals[7]
before which respondent Stockholders of Intercity Bank (the Stockholders) moved
to dismiss the appeal, arguing principally that the proper recourse should be
to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari since the question
involved was purely one of law.[8]
By Resolution of
PDIC contends that the appellate court
disregarded the issue of the trial court’s disapproval of the payment of
additional liquidating dividends to Intercity Bank creditors, which involved a
question of fact that entailed a review of the evidence; that the prayer for
surplus dividends involved another question of fact as there must first be a
factual finding that all claims against Intercity Bank have been paid; and that
there having been previously approved but unclaimed liquidating dividends, the
denial of its prayer for appointment as trustee therefor resulted in an
anomalous situation where no one has the authority to handle them until they
are claimed.[11]
The Stockholders, for their part,
maintain that only a question of law was brought to the appellate court, the
parties having stipulated in the trial court that the sole issue for
determination was whether RA 9302 may be applied retroactively; that the
payment of additional liquidating dividends should be deemed approved since
they never opposed it and the trial court specifically disapproved only the payment
of surplus dividends; and that in any event, RA 9302 cannot be given
retroactive effect absent a provision therein providing for it.[12]
The petition lacks merit.
Indeed, PDIC’s appeal to the
appellate court raised the lone issue of whether Section 12 of RA 9302 may be
applied retroactively in order to award surplus dividends to Intercity Bank
creditors, which was, as stated above, what the parties had stipulated upon as
the sole legal issue in PDIC’s Motion
for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the
Liquidation Proceedings.
Whether a
statute has retroactive effect is undeniably a pure question of law. PDIC should thus have directly appealed to this Court by
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not an ordinary
appeal with the appellate court under Rule 41.
The appellate court did not err, thus, in holding that PDIC availed of
the wrong mode of appeal.[13]
In the
interest of justice, however, and in order to write finis to this controversy, the Court relaxes the rules and decides the
petition on the merits.[14]
A
perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive
application. In fact, its effectivity
clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary:
Section 28. Effectivity Clause.
- This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days following the completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. (emphasis supplied)
Statutes are prospective and not
retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the
future, not the past. Hence, the legal
maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law
provides for the future,
the judge for the past, which is articulated in
Article 4 of the Civil Code: “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.” The reason for
the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive
on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal
effect of prior transactions.[15]
En passant, PDIC’s
citation of foreign jurisprudence that supports the award of surplus dividends
is unavailing. Resort to foreign
jurisprudence is proper only if no local law or jurisprudence exists to settle
the controversy. And even then, it is
only persuasive.[16]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 1-7.
[2]
[3]
[4]
An
Act Amending Republic Act No. 3591, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the “Charter
of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation” and for Other Purposes;
Approved on
[5] Records, pp. 304-314.
[6]
[7]
[8] CA rollo, pp. 12-17.
[9] Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia Salvador and Magdangal M. De Leon; id. at 86-96.
[10]
[11] Vide Petition, rollo, pp. 3-36.
[12] Vide Comment, id. at 241-256.
[13] Quezon City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 496, 507.
[14] Vide
[15] Curata
v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. Nos. 154211-12,
[16] Vide
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54470,